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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine intellectual property (IP) protection for 
nanotechnology, comparing the laws of Malaysia with those of the United Kingdom (as a 
member of the European Union and European Patent Convention). As well as analysing 
current primary and secondary legal sources, a small number of discrete interviews were 
conducted with key nanotechnology scientists in Malaysia and the United Kingdom to 
ascertain the nature and development of nanotechnology in the jurisdictions under study and 
to explore the experts’ perceptions of IP laws, including the pattern of protection that might 
be expected as the technology matures. 
 
This study argues that current intellectual property rights are appropriate to govern 
nanotechnology creations, so that there is no need to devise a new form of IP right for 
nanotechnology.  
 
The emphasis in the IP literature to date has been on patent law, but this study argues that the 
law of breach of confidence is also very significant, despite difficulties presented by the 
technology. Furthermore, from qualitative empirical and doctrinal evidence, other forms of 
IP protection may be applicable to some extent. 
 
This study also investigates the current term protection of different forms of IP which may be 
relevant to nanotechnology, including the possible application of Supplementary Protection 
Certificates to allow for the time taken by nanotechnology products to enter the market.  
 
Finally, some recommendations are made for both Malaysia and the United Kingdom to 
protect nanotechnology appropriately. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In 1959, Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman predicted the ability to write the entire 24 
volumes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica on the head of a pin in his famous talk entitled 
“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom” in which he also posed a question: 
“I don’t know how to do this on a small scale in a practical way, but I do know 
that computing machines are very large; they fill rooms. Why can’t we make them 
very small, make them of little wires, little elements – and by little, I mean little. 
... I am not afraid to consider the final question as to whether, ultimately – in the 
great future – we can arrange the atoms the way we want; the very atoms, all the 
way down! ... When we get to the very small, the small world – say circuits of 
seven atoms – we have a lot of new things that would happen that represent 
completely new opportunities for design. Atoms on a small scale behave like 
nothing on a large scale, for they satisfy the laws of quantum mechanics. So as we 
go down and fiddle around with the atoms down there, we are working with 
different laws, and we can expect to do different things. We can manufacture in 
different ways. We can use, not just circuit, but some system involving the 
quantised energy levels, or the interactions of quantised spins, etc”.1 
 
The answer to Feynman’s question lies in nanotechnology. Nanotechnology involves 
characterisation and manipulation of structures at the atomic and molecular level from range 
of 1nm to 100nm.2 To put this in context, the width of human hair is 80,000nm.3 
Nanotechnology is not only concerned with small scale per se. It is also concerned with the 
properties of materials that are developed at the nanoscale and exhibit unique behaviours that 
are dramatically different from macro-scale, for example strength, chemical reactivity, 
colours, melting point etc. Nanotechnology also signifies unique characteristics that cut 
across different disciplines of sciences and technologies including physics, biology, 
chemistry, engineering etc. For this reason, nanotechnology is different from most other 
technologies.  
                                                          
1 Talk given by Richard Feynman at the annual meeting of the American Physical Society at Caltech, transcript 
was published in Engineering and Science (Feb 1960) Vol XXIII, No.5, at pp.22-36. Available also at Feynman 
R ‘There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom (transcript) in Goddard W A (ed) Handbook of Nanoscience, 
Nanoengineering and Technology (London: CRC Press, 2003) at p.1-8; also available at 
http://nanoparticles.org/pdf/Feynman.pdf  
2 Nm or nanometre is one-billionth of a meter, 10-9m. 
3 See 2.2.1. 
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Nanotechnology is relatively new and has become an increasingly important aspect of 
technological development around the world. Nanotechnology is growing significantly and 
has the potential to create a revolution in life through the products and technologies we use. 
It is not surprising that countries nowadays have incorporated nanotechnology into products 
such as consumer products, medical applications, energy and power etc – to name just a few 
of them such as tennis racquets, golf sticks, tennis ball’s4 stain-resistant clothes, sunscreen 
and suntan lotion. 
 
Due to its importance, countries worldwide have recognised and invested huge amounts of 
resources5 to develop nanotechnological related matters. Thus, it is not surprising that 
nanotechnology has been identified as priority area for future investment. For example, the 
United States (US) has become one of the leading nations in nanotechnology research and 
development (R&D). The same trend focusing on the substantive R&D development for 
nanotechnology has also arisen in Europe and Japan. In Malaysia as well, nanotechnology is 
considered as a priority area to foster the research culture among researchers for innovative 
and competitive development of nanotechnology. As far as Malaysia is concerned, 
nanotechnology is relatively very new and the questions related to intellectual property (IP) 
are significant. Although the development of nanotechnology has received much attention 
within countries to foster its development, one aspect of nanotechnology, its associated 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been less developed. 
 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
 
The arrangement of structures at nanoscale creates a difficulty in defining nanotechnology. 
Generally, although there have been a number of attempts to define nanotechnology, the term 
has never been given a single definition and to date there is no universally accepted 
terminology for nanotechnology.6 Whilst this is less likely to pose a difficulty for the science 
community, it can be problematic from a legal perspective, particularly in the context of IP. 
                                                          
4 The Wilson Double Core™ which has been used in the Davis Cup in 2002; to make the ball bounce longer 
than usual, it has been incorporated with clay nanoparticles in the polymer lining in the inner wall, Kulinowski 
K Nanotechnology: From ‘Wow’ to ‘Yuck’? in Hunt G and Mehta M (eds) Nanotechnology: Risk, Ethics and 
Law (London: Earthscan, 2006), at p.17; see also Ratner M and Ratner D Nanotechnology (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall PTR, 2003), at p.3; see 2.4 example of application of nanotechnology. 
5 See 2.5, nanotechnology development. 
6 Defining nanotechnology, see 2.2. 
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Furthermore, rather than dealing with one discipline, there are many players involved in 
nanotechnology, which to some extent causes the problem of identification of the player, 
their role and their rights, including IPRs. The change of size from nanoscale to macro-scale 
produces different and new properties,7 which is also significant to determine the appropriate 
IPRs regime.  
 
Nanotechnology is new, complex and interdisciplinary. Although the development of IPRs 
and the legal regime surrounding nanotechnology has begun to be established elsewhere 
drawing upon the existing IPRs regime, particularly in countries like the United States (US) 
and the United Kingdom (UK), this is not the case in Malaysia. The technology is important 
for Malaysia in keeping with the pace of technological development, and therefore the legal 
development should be kept in parallel. Thus far, in Malaysia the law of IP governing 
nanotechnology is still to be developed and it is crucial to determine what types of IPRs are 
appropriate for nanotechnology. This study acknowledges that the problem of cross-
disciplines, difficulty of defining and a complex technology of nanotechnology could 
potentially cause difficulties to the current IPRs system.  
 
Given the potential issues that need to be taken into consideration, this study queries whether 
it would be adequate to define nanotechnology to form a sui generis right, and whether 
boundaries for new forms of IP can be set? This study also questions whether it would be 
appropriate to devise a new regime for nanotechnology and or whether the existing forms of 
IPRS are sufficient to protect nanotechnology.   
 
In testing these questions, comparison between scientific and legal landscape of Malaysia 
and the UK/ Europe is employed, to answer the following questions: 
(1) What is nanotechnology and how is it likely to develop? 
(2) What are difficulties and challenges that nanotechnology could pose to the current 
form of IP law? 
(3) What are the most appropriate forms of IP protection for nanotechnology? Can 
nanotechnology best be protected under the existing law? Can nanotechnology be 
protected under possible sui generis right? 
                                                          
7 See 2.2.2. 
4 
 
(4) Does this new technology demand new or specific defences? 
(5) Does this new technology pose special difficulties for ownership rights? 
(6) Does this new technology require special form of duration for its protection?   
 
As a result of examining these questions, this study argues that even with all the 
opportunities and challenges that nanotechnology could give, the current IPRs are the most 
appropriate to govern nanotechnology related creations and that to devise a new form of IPRs 
for nanotechnology is undesirable. This study also examines that nanotechnology cannot be 
usefully and precisely defined, which militates against sui generis right. This study also 
argues that the most appropriate forms of IPRs are not only patents which are generally 
assumed to be relevant IPRs, but the law of confidence is also an important method of 
protection. Furthermore, from the qualitative and doctrinal evidence set out in this study, 
other forms of IPRs protection may be applicable to some extent to nanotechnology. This 
study will make a number of critical observations which are necessary to evaluate and clarify 
some aspects of IP and nanotechnology, and aims to make important suggestions and 
recommendations on how nanotechnology should be regulated for Malaysia. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
 
The objectives of this study are: 
(1) to explore the scope and development of nanotechnology related-creations in the 
selected legal jurisdictions and how if at all this determines the IPRs regime for 
nanotechnology; 
(2) to examine what are the most appropriate forms of IPRs protection for 
nanotechnology; 
(3) to investigate the extent to which the current IPRs are challenged by 
nanotechnology; 
(4) to propose any necessary changes to the existing legal framework on IPRs for 
nanotechnology related-creations for Malaysia.  
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1.4 Research methodology 
 
In addition to doctrinal and comparative legal analysis, in this study four interviews were 
undertaken during the period from June 2008 until April 2009. Appendix 1 of this thesis 
provides full discussion of the methodology employed along with the justification for the 
approach taken. However, it is worth noting at the outset the purpose of the interviews and 
the role they place in this thesis.   
 
As regards the purpose of the interviews, the objectives were; (a) to assess the trend and 
development of nanotechnology both in Malaysia and UK; (b) to examine interviewees’ 
attitudes to possible IP protection for the nanotechnology; (c) to explore the potential benefit 
and possible problems which nanotechnology might pose to the health, safety and 
environment (HSE) and how they could relate into the IPRs; (d) to investigate 
commercialisation aspects which nanotechnology could enjoy. The purpose of the interviews 
was also to check researcher understanding of the technology. Although the materials from 
the interviews were intended to be largely illustrative or anecdotal rather than substantive, 
they offer a comparative analysis and provide some insights for the current study, both under 
Malaysian and UK scientific and legal conditions.  
 
The interviews were conducted among experts from the University of Newcastle - Institute of 
Nanoscale and Technology (INSAT) and Institute of Innovation in Nanotech Exploitation 
(INEX); National University of Malaysia - Institute of Microengineering and 
Nanoelectronics (IMEN) and Technology University of Malaysia – Department of 
Chemistry, Faculty of Science. From the initial study of the science and technology 
involved8, it was evident that nanotechnology is well represented at Newcastle University 
and at Universities in Malaysia. In maintaining confidentiality of all interviewees’ identities, 
their names will be kept anonymous and all the interviewees will be referred to in the male 
gender.  
 
                                                          
8 Based on a survey of the legal literature in international journals and key English-language periodicals in 
significant jurisdictions and standard scientific texts. 
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Normally, the potential interviewee in scientific and legal subject fields is identified on the 
basis of subject area.9 The interviewees should possess the relevant experience and 
knowledge which require skill and time in finding appropriate interviewees.10 In this 
research, the interviewees were identified based on their field of expertise, scientific and 
technology training in the subject areas relevant to nanotechnology. Potential interviewees 
were identified from biographical information of University web sites to represent various 
interdisciplinary scientific discipline in a hope to assist the researcher to familiarise herself 
with scientific understanding across the technology as well as focusing on her legal analysis. 
They were the persons who had expertise in the relevant fields and were able to explain 
scientific and legal regime in nanotechnology.  
 
It is recognised that the interview sample for this research is small and for that reason these 
interviews will only provide anecdotal background and offer illustration rather than serve a 
substantive role in providing primary qualitative data.11 Accordingly, the research method 
employed semi-structured interviews, which generally covered different sections; (a) the 
interviewee’s background and qualifications; (b) the basic understanding of the technology; 
(c) the potential benefits and problems on HSE; (d) the knowledge and perception of IP 
regime for nanotechnology; and (e) the commercialisation aspects of nanotechnology.12  
 
For further discussion of the methodology employed in undertaking the interviews see 
Appendix 1. 
 
1.5 Limitation of study 
 
Given that nanotechnology is new and emerging, the scarcity of materials in terms of 
academic discussion and case laws are expected. This was the main difficulty encountered by 
                                                          
9 See Stedward G On the Record in Burnham P (ed) Surviving the Research Process in Politics (London: 
Printer, 1997), at pp.152-153. 
10 Rubin H J and Rubin I S Qualitative Interviewing 2nd edn (London: Sage Publications, 2005), at pp.64-65. 
11 Kvale S and Brinkmann S Interviews 2nd edn (London: SAGE, 2009) explain that there are two metaphors of 
interviewer - as a miner or as a traveler. A miner approach regards interview as a site of data collection – that 
the knowledge is buried metal and interviewer digs out the valuable metal. Whereas, a traveler metaphor 
regards interview concept leads to data analysis as intertwined phases of knowledge construction – that he or 
she travels on a journey to a distant country, engaging in conversation with people that he or she met, at pp.48-
49. 
12 See Appendix 6. 
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the researcher in finding the relevant materials especially in the Malaysian context. To date, 
to the knowledge of the researcher, there are no reflections which have taken place on the 
issue of nanotechnology and IPRs in Malaysia. One article13 has discussed the overview of 
nanotechnology and legal analysis, but unfortunately it does not discuss anything about IPRs 
and nanotechnology. It was this lack of discussion which motivated the researcher to 
undertake the topic under study, and considering that IP and nanotechnology is undeveloped 
and non-existent, this study is timely. The scarcity of legal materials was not only evident in 
the Malaysian context, even in other countries materials specific to nanotechnology and IPRs 
are limited. For this reason, approaches from countries which have developed their own IPRs 
related to nanotechnology had to be examined.  
 
Being new and emerging, it is inevitable for nanotechnology to learn from previous 
technologies. There are rich literatures on other technologies which may provide useful 
analogies to ascertain legal protection for nanotechnology. The precedents in the previous 
technologies draw a framework to exert their suitability and relevancy to the current stage of 
new technology. But as far as literatures are concerned, the researcher needed to be selective 
in the use of those materials to contemplate the parallel issues in which these technologies 
share.  
 
1.6 Thesis structure 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the scope and development of legal jurisdiction in relation 
to IPRs over nanotechnology related-creations and to propose a legal framework for 
Malaysia. Thus, in reaching the aim, this study is comprised of seven chapters.  
 
Chapter Two focuses on the scientific development of nanotechnology in Malaysia, UK and 
other selected jurisdictions such as the US and Australia. This chapter examines the defining 
terminology for nanotechnology and examines the particular patterns of IP protection for 
nanotechnology. The major comparisons between the two countries include the technological 
development and historical background and how this can provide some guidelines for IP 
                                                          
13 Munir A B and Mohd Yassin S H ‘News and Views Nanotechnology in Healthcare’ (2007) Eur. J. Health 
Law, 14, 261 
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aspects for nanotechnology. However, in certain parts of the discussion, special reference has 
been made to the US and Australia in order to support the argument that the nature and 
development of nanotechnology are worldwide. Chapter Three and Chapter Four examine 
which IPRs are the most appropriate protection for nanotechnology. Both chapters argue that 
the appropriate forms of IP protection are not only patents that are already assumed to be 
important form of protection, but also include the law of confidence. This conclusion was 
informed by the doctrinal evidence and qualitative interviews conducted in this study. 
Chapter Three examines and analyses types of information relevant to nanotechnology, 
what obligations arise in nanotechnology, how is the “right owner” of information 
determined in nanotechnology and the extent to which the public interest defence applicable 
to nanotechnology. Chapter Four examines the creations of nanotechnology and whether 
they can be characterised as “invention”, why difficulty in defining nanotechnology pose 
problems to the current patent law, whether nanoscale creations challenge the patentability 
requirements, how ownership is determined in complex technology like nanotechnology, 
whether nanotechnology could potentially have damage or risks to the environment and 
whether patent defences are problematic for nanotechnology. Chapter Five analyses the 
other forms of IPRs, including copyright, trademarks and design law and to what extent they 
are applicable to nanotechnology. Chapter Six examines whether term of existing forms of 
IP protection are appropriate for nanotechnology or a more suitable term be identified. Lastly 
Chapter Seven draws the study to close by proving concluding remarks on the research 
findings concerning the issue of nanotechnology and IP. Proposals are also made for the legal 
framework for IP protection of nanotechnology in Malaysia.  
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CHAPTER 2  
INTRODUCTION TO NANOTECHNOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Nanotechnology involves the characterisation, control and manipulation of structures (either 
products or processes) at the atomic and molecular scale. Nanotechnology has been loosely 
used as an umbrella term14 and is believed to be the next technological revolution in the 21st 
century.15 The term used to define the meeting of the nanoscale and micro-scale from various 
fields such as physical, chemical, engineering, information technology and other important 
fields (Figure 2.1 below). Accordingly, all of these scientific disciplines converge to the same 
basic principles and potentially will have very far-reaching impact.16 In the future, 
nanotechnology should be able to change every aspect of human life by offering solutions to 
variety of health and environmental problems,17 to provide better opportunities in areas such 
as medicine, biotechnology, manufacturing, material sciences, space exploration, information 
technology, and telecommunications.18  
 
                                                          
14 Interviewee A stated that there is difficult to find any faculty programs in the university specifically refers to 
nanotechnology; see also Mehta M D ‘Nanoscience and Nanotechnology’ (2002) B. Sci. Tech. Soc. 22, 269, at 
p.269. 
15 Interviewee D; Mehta, n.14, states that this technology will soon revolutionize science and industry in the 
next future, at p.269; This advancement is likely to be as great as that of Industrial Revolution, Fiedler F A and 
Reynolds G H ‘Legal Problems of Nanotechnology’ (1993-1994) 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 593, at p.595; The 
technological revolution of nanotechnology will be considered as a key technology in the twenty-first century 
for the economic advancement, Bowman D M ‘Patently Obvious: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Nanotechnology’ (2007) Technology in Society, 29, 302-315, at p.310; Nanotechnology is the largest 
government investment since the Space Race (larger than Human genome Project), the Nanotech Report: (2003) 
Vol. II, Lux Capital Group LLC, at p.11 at http://www.altassets.com/pdfs/nanotechreportluxcapital.pdf accessed 
29 October 2009. 
16 Roco M C and Bainbridge W S Societal Implications of Nanosciences and Nanotechnology (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001) at p.1; Mehta, n.14, at p.269; Silva G A ‘Introduction to Nanotechnology 
and Its Applications to Medicine’ (2004) 61 Surg Neurol, 216-220, at p.269. There is advancement of science 
through convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science, 
acronym as NBIC by the National Science Foundation and Department of Commerce, ‘Converging 
Technologies for Improving Human Performance’ (2002) at 
http://www.tec.org/Converging_Technologies/1/NBIC_report.pdf. See an interesting discussion of the 
convergence in Bainbridge W S Nanoconvergence (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2007). For 
a different responses of the EU and the US approaches of “converging technologies” see Cameron N M S 
Ethics, Policy, and the Nanotechnology Initiative in Cameron N M S and Mitchell M E Nanoscale (eds) (New 
Jersey: JWS, 2007), at Chapter 3. 
17 Hullmann A ‘Who is Winning the Global Nanorace?’ (2006) Nature Nanotechnology, Vol. 1, 81, at p.81. 
18 Drexler K E Engines of Creation (New York: Anchor, 1986), at pp.14-20. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature of nanotechnology from selected 
jurisdictions. This chapter argues that unique and multidisciplinary technology like 
nanotechnology is difficult to define and argues that this would make the devising of new 
forms of IP difficult. This chapter demonstrates that nanotechnology has the potential as 
subject matter for different forms of existing IPRs as discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
To do this, this chapter identifies research priorities of the chosen legal jurisdictions and 
determines the subject matter that relates to the different forms of IPRs. This chapter argues 
that the development of nanotechnology within different jurisdictions is important to 
determine the significant IPRs applicable to nanotechnology generally. It also argues that as 
the technology matures, a pattern and enforcement of IP protection for nanotechnology can 
be expected in the future. The two main selected legal jurisdictions under study are surveyed, 
i.e. Malaysia and the UK.19 Along the line, since the UK is the member of EU and the 
contracting states for the European Patent Convention (EPC), the survey also discusses the 
European position. Other important jurisdictions include the US, because it is at the forefront 
in the nanotechnology research development and because of the United States of Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO)’s international influence.20 Similarly, because of the same 
Commonwealth legal family, Australia is also considered. Further, Australia is regionally 
linked with Malaysia under the same membership of the Asia Pacific Nanotechnology Forum 
(APNF).21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 See Appendix 1. 
20 The USPTO is a member of the Trilateral Offices that includes also the European Patent Office (EPO) and the 
Japanese Patent Office (JPO). This was set up in 1983, see http://www.trilateral.net/index.html; there is ongoing 
collaboration process of Trilateral Office and proposed collaboration project in nanotechnology, see Grubb P W 
‘The Trilateral Cooperation’ (2007) J.I.P.L.P. Vol. 2, No. 6, 397, at p.399; they have strong collaboration in the 
technical field and continuing strengthening cooperation arrangements, see Smith P Harmonisation, Regional 
Collaboration and Small Patent Offices in Antons C et al., (eds) Intellectual Property Harmonisation Within 
ASEAN and APEC (The Netherlands: KLI, 2004), at p.230. 
21 It is non-profit organization which facilitates the coordination of nanotechnology development and program 
and cross regional collaboration among government, policy makers, industry, R&D institutions and researchers. 
Japanese is also members of this APNF, see generally at http://www.asia-anf.org/index.php , and this is justified 
for the Trilateral Offices referred above; informed also from interviewee C.  
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Figure 2.1: Multidisciplinary fields of nanotechnologies 
 
 
Source: The Malaysian National Nanotechnology Initiative (MNNI)22  
 
Figure 2.1 above shows nanotechnology is not concerned with one particular field, but rather 
the interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary combination of different fields. In particular, the 
technologies have the potential to affect of many different fields and this multidisciplinary 
aspect provides unique opportunities for the legal development. Thus, nanotechnology 
requires, not only people from scientific and technological backgrounds, but it also attracts 
other different fields including policy makers, legal, sociology, religious people etc23 which 
is arguably significant when it comes to confidentiality.24 Furthermore, new and complex 
interdisciplinary fields like nanotechnology, arguably spans different forms of IPRs subject 
matter.  However, it is important to admit that there is dearth of penetrating legal literature.25 
                                                          
22At http://www.nano.gov.my/?National_Nanotechnology_Initiative:Overview. 
23 Interviewee D. 
24 Large numbers of people in the same and different teams are likely to be involved in the project, see 3.3.1.2 
and 3.3.3.1. 
25 In the context of IP and nanotechnology, only few discussions have been made, see for example Fiedler and 
Reynolds, n.15; Newberger B ‘Intellectual Property and Nanotechnology’ (2003) 11 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. J. 593; 
Troilo L M ‘Patentability and Enforcement Issues Related to Nanotechnology Inventions’ (2005) 2 Nanotech L 
& Bus. 36; Lemley M A ‘Patenting Nanotechnology’ (2005) 58 Stan. L. Rev. 601; Serrato R et al. ‘The 
Nanotech Intellectual Property Landscape’ (2005) 2 Nanotech Law & Bus. 150; Tullis T K ‘Current Intellectual 
Property Issues in Nanotechnology’ (2004) U.C.L.A.J.L. Tech and Notes 12; Schellekens M ‘Patenting 
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Therefore, this chapter is significant to identify the scope and development of 
nanotechnology – where the technology comes from, and the direction that it might be going 
in the future to inform the discussion of IPRs in subsequent chapters. The discussion is drawn 
from the scientific literature as well as from the insight from the interviews undertaken by the 
researcher as part of the thesis research.  
 
2.2 Defining Nanotechnology 
 
The defining terminology of nanotechnology is very important for identifying appropriate IP 
protection. Currently, the development of this technology is still at the age of infancy. In 
order to appreciate the value of nanotechnology in the future, there is greatest need to 
understand the current technology as well as its scientific principles. There are numerous 
available examples of definition of nanotechnology in the literature. Though as we shall see 
in this section, some definitions of nanotechnology are broad, while others take a narrow 
construction, and it can also exist in subsets. Thus, not all definitions are consistent or in 
agreement. Nanotechnology is an emerging technology which has sometimes been referred to 
as an enabling26 or disruptive27 technology which needs to be further developed in the future. 
Disruptive technology refers to the technology that manages to produce new products in new 
ways which may result to the better opportunities to the society or it may also create new 
problems.28 Nanotechnology is a kind of disruptive technology because of its different 
applications (nanoparticles alone can have the impact into a wide array of products and 
services); it manages to transform into radically new generations of existing products and 
processes (for example optical data storage for computing system, digital cameras based 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Nanotechnology in Europe’ (2010) J.W.I.P Vol 13, 47; To the knowledge of the researcher, none of the 
discussion has been made from Malaysian’s perspectives on the IPRs and nanotechnology. 
26 For example, Lemley, n.25 refers enabling as“not merely to important new ideas or even ideas that create a 
new market, but only to technological breakthroughs that facilitate a wide range of different exploitations. 
Obviously, the term is not capable of precise definition”, at n.24. 
27 This term was coined by Clayton M Christensen in his famous book Christensen C M The Innovator’s 
Dilemma (Harvard: Harvard Business School Press, 1997); however, see great view of creative destruction by 
Schumpeter which states that the opening up a new market and the creation of new technology although they 
revolutionise the economic structure, nevertheless, they also destroying the old technology, Schumpeter J A 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Introduction by Richard Swedberg (London: Routledge, 2003) 
published before in Taylor and Francis e-Library, and first published in the UK 1943, Chapter VII, at p.83.  
28 Roco and Bainbridge, n. 16, at p.53. 
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solid-state memory) and enables whole new classes of products and markets which are not 
previously feasible (for example portable computer, mobile phones and digital imaging).29  
 
Generally, nanotechnology involves the arrangement and manipulation of a matter or 
structure at molecular and atomic scale. Molecules and atoms are the smallest component to 
form a basic material. Interestingly, this technology is defined by its scale; that is one 
nanometre (nm) is one billionth of a meter, used in the metric measurement to mean 10-9. The 
visualisation, characterisation and manipulation of the structures or matters at the basic form 
of atomic and molecular level have attracted attention and discussions from different legal 
and academic perspectives. Nanotechnology has become a popular description and it can be 
very tricky to have an exact sense of the definition, because nanotechnology is not only that 
concerned with the size scale but it is a new way of making technology.30 One view put 
forward is that the defining terminology of nanotechnology may not be a problem among the 
scientists31 but it may pose difficulties for lawyers. However, one may argue that to provide a 
precise definition of nanotechnology is an impossible task.32 This is because so far, there is 
no single, or universally accepted, definition of nanotechnology which could either refer to 
the fields itself and its scale, products, materials, or applications.33 The various definitions of 
nanotechnology are discussed below. 
 
2.2.1 Defining by size dimension 
 
It would seem difficult to predict and understand how small nanotechnology is. This is 
because nanotechnology is not just small from the bulk materials, but it is a very special kind 
                                                          
29 The New Dimensions of Manufacturing: A UK Strategy for Nanotechnology, Report of the UK Advisory 
Group on Nanotechnology Applications, submitted to Lord Sainsbury, Minister for Science and Innovation, 
(June 2002), at http://www.innovateuk.org/_assets/pdf/taylor%20report.pdf accessed 25 October 2009, at p.17 
(Advisory Group). 
30 Bawa R et al. ‘Protecting New Ideas and Inventions in Nanomedicine with Patents’ (2005) Nanomedicine: 
Nanotechnology, Biology and Medicine 1, 150-158 (2005) at p.151. 
31 Interviewee A; See also “there is no disagreement about oversimplifying and misleading character of that 
term’, Wei V Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology in Roco M C and Bainbridge W S (eds) n.16, at p.245. 
32 This is because some may define as it refers to less than a micron (1000nm) and some may refers as between 
1 to 100nm, Miller J C et al. The Handbook of Nanotechnology (New Jersey: JWS, 2005) at p.13. 
33Burger J A et al. Nanotechnology and the Intellectual Property Landscape in Cameron and Mitchell n.16, at 
p.248. 
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of small, but nevertheless it is possible to make.34 Therefore, to put the scale in a context at 
least provides assistance to understand nanotechnology more clearly. This is important to 
note that fragmented definition of nanotechnology may cause problem not only for the 
application of IPRs but also for all other legal regulations. 
 
As a comparison, the world is one hundred million times larger than a soccer ball 
(approximately 22cm), and a soccer ball is one hundred million times larger than a size of 
Carbon 60 (C60) or Buckyballs;
35 the width of human hair is 80 000nm; red blood cell is 
about 7000nm, water molecule is 0.3nm across;36 and a sheet of paper is approximately 100 
000nm thick.37 Hunt and Mehta list a good example of nanotechnology objects including, the 
diameter of a hydrogen atom is 0.1nm; ten hydrogen atoms in a row is 1nm; amino acid is 
0.8nm; diameter of DNA alpha helix is 2nm; globular protein is 4nm; microfilaments is 6nm; 
thickness of cell membranes is 10nm; ribosome is 11nm; microtubule is 25nm; nuclear pore 
is 50nm; large virus is 100nm; ebola virus is 200nm; small bacterium is 500nm; wavelength 
of visible light is approximately between 400-900nm.38 
 
There are examples of well-known biological objects which are bigger than nanoscale such 
as the sizes for prokaryotes39 is about 1-10micro-meter (μm); diameter of human nerve cells 
is 1μm; a large bacterium like Escherichia coli is 2μm; mitochondrion is 3μm; length of 
chloroplast is 5μm; cell nucleus is 6μm; red blood cell is 9μm; eukaryotic animal cells is 10 -
30μm; ragweed pollen is 20μm; amoeba is 90μm; human egg is 100μm; dust-mite is 200μm 
                                                          
34 Ratner and Ratner, n.4, at p.7; this is because nanotechnology is not only involved miniaturisation but it is 
qualitatively new scale, Roco and Bainbridge, n.16, at p.1. 
35 It is carbon atoms assembled in a soccer ball-shaped structured, and applied to everyday products such 
windshields and health care for example medicine, in energy and fuel cell component, see Miller et al., n.32, at 
p. 17. 
36 The Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, ‘Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: July 2004 
available at http://www.nanotech.org.uk/FinalReport.htm accessed on 10 October 2009 (RAE) at p.vi; the 
smallest things that are etched on a microchip are about 130nm and the smallest things seeable with unaided 
human eye are approximately 10 000nm across; white blood cell is about 10μ or 10 000nm, Ratner and Ratner, 
n.4, at p.6.  
37 The National Nanotechnology, (2009) available at http://www.nano.gov/NNI_2010_budget_supplement.pdf  
accessed 30 Oct 2009. 
38 Hunt and Mehta, n.4 Appendix at p.282-283; while blood cell is approximately 10μ or 10 000nm, capillary is 
8000nm in diameter, mitochondria is about 500-1000nm, semiconductor chip features is from 90nm and above, 
ribosome is 25nm, carbon nanotubes can have about 2nm, quantum dot can be manufactured about 2nm,  
Buckminsterfullerene is 0.7nm, Edwards S A The Nanotech Pioneers (Weinheim: Wiley-VCH, 2006), at pp.2-
3; a DNA molecule is approximately 2.5nm long and sodium atom is about 0.2nm, Silva, n.16, at p.216. 
39 Molecules that encircled by a membrane and cell wall. 
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and ant is 2000μm or equivalent to 2mm.40 Another example is the wavelength of visible 
light ranges from about 400nm at the violet end of spectrum to approximately 700 nm at the 
red.41 
 
The examples for objects smaller than nanometre are atoms and water molecules.42 Although 
size spectrum description may prove that certain things are nanotechnology, however, it is 
not always true. Many experts do not consider mature technology to be called 
nanotechnology although it may perfectly fall under the nanotechnology characterisation. 
This is because the technology has popularly been used. For example, zeolite although its 
diameter between 0.3nm to 0.9 nm range, probably because it is synthesised and widely used 
in industrial since 1950s generally was not labelled as nanotechnology although the position 
would be different if it were developed today.43  
 
The examples above demonstrate the small size of nanotechnology and there are attempts to 
define nanotechnology by size dimension. For example the EPO define nanotechnology to 
cover equipments, methods and processes at the length below the 100 nm scale which states:  
“the term nanotechnology covers entities with a controlled geometrical size of at least 
functional component below 100 nanometres in one or more dimensions susceptible of 
making physical, chemical or biological effects available which are intrinsic to that size. It 
covers equipment and methods for controlled analysis, manipulation, processing, fabrication 
and measurement with a precision below 100 nanometres”.
44 
 
Whilst Masciangioli and Zhang, and Ratner and Ratner demonstrate a specified range of 
nanoscale when they state that nanotechnology refers to the use of material and structure at 
the dimension that is usually ranging from 1 to 100nm.45 In emphasising size dimension, 
similarly, Borisenko and Ossicini observe that nanotechnology is applied to physical, 
                                                          
40 Hunt and Mehta, n.4, at p.283. 
41 Bainbridge, n.16, at p.2. 
42 Ibid, at p.2. 
43 Scheu M et al. ‘Mapping Nanotechnology Patents’ (2006) 28 World Patent Information 204 -211, at p.205. 
44 See generally at http://www.epo.org/focus/issues/nanotechnology.html. 
45 Masciangioli T and Zhang W X ‘Environmental Technologies at the Nanoscale’ (2003) Envl. Sci. & Tech. 1 
at p. 103A; Ratner and Ratner, n.4, at p.7.  
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chemical and biological systems to explore the novel properties arising from the scale under 
100nm.46 
 
In defining nanotechnology at molecular level, Peterson refers to “the projected ability to use 
positional control of chemical reactions to build complex materials and devices (including 
molecular machinery) resulting in precise control of the structure of matter at the molecular 
level.”47 Wolsfon states nanotechnology involves the manipulation of the structures at the 
molecular level to create molecular size machines and other devices.48  
  
From the size dimension definition, it shows defining nanotechnology is fragmented because 
some of the definitions refer to the size range and some of the others refer to the controlling 
of structure at molecular level. This significantly shows that defining nanotechnology is 
difficult and non-satisfactory, and it strongly supports the contention made earlier in this 
study that it would be impossible to devise new forms of IPRs for nanotechnology.  
 
2.2.2 Defining by dimensional change of properties 
 
Nanotechnology represents a bridge between the classical world of physics and the world of 
quantum mechanics.49 The classical law of science to which traditional rules of Newtonian 
physics and chemistry apply is essentially modified according to the rules of quantum 
mechanics at the nanometre scale, normally at the range of 100nm. Nanoparticles, 
nanostructures or nanomaterials that are developed at nanoscale possess special properties as 
well as exhibit unique behaviour that impacts on the physical, chemical, electrical, biological, 
mechanical and functional qualities of the substances.50 There are two factors why the 
properties behave differently at nanoscale; firstly, when compared to the same mass of 
                                                          
46 Borisenko V E and Ossicini S What is What in the Nanoworld (Weinhim: Wiley-Vch Verlag GmbH & Co. 
KGaA,) at p.197. 
47 Peterson C L Nanotechnology in Krummenacker M and Lewis J (eds) Prospects in Nanotechnology (eds) 
(New York: Wiley, 1995), at p.173. This chapter appeared originally in the Journal of the British Interplanetary 
Society (1992), 395-400. 
48 Wolfson J R ‘Social and Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology’ (2003) 22 Biotechnology L. Rep. 376, at p.376. 
49 Casey P Nanoparticle Technologies and Applications in Hannink R H J and Hill A J (eds) Nanostructure 
Control of Materials (England: Woodhead Publishing, 2006) at p.2. 
50 Theodore L and Kunz R G Nanotechnology (New Jersey: JWS, 2005) at pp.1-2; Casey, n.49, at p.3; and also 
gives effect to the optical, magnetic properties, RAE, n.36, at p.5. 
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material products at a larger scale, nanomaterials exhibit a relatively larger surface area.51 
The smaller the properties, its surface areas become larger, and that is why a small ant 
manages to carry things similar to its weight which may not always be possible for human 
beings to do so.52 Secondly, quantum effects start to dominate the behaviour of materials at 
the nanoscale.53 Interestingly, in this nanoworld the interaction between individual atoms 
dramatically gives new attributes to the properties such as, but not limited to, change in its 
sizes, colours, strength, shapes and surface. For example, the gold only shows a smaller size 
if it is cutting down the size into a micron scale, nevertheless not until the size is reduced at 
nanolevel where its colour, melting point and chemical properties will change dramatically; 54 
carbon in the form of graphite is soft but changes to become stronger than steel and six times 
lighter; and zinc oxide with white colour and opaque, turns transparent at nanoscale.55 The 
changes of behaviour are important for instance in making nanomaterials useful as catalysts 
to improve the efficiency of fuel cells and batteries.56 
 
The size range may prove not to be effective definition for nanotechnology because the 
unique effect exhibits by structures are different at nano-range. This unique effect by the 
change of nanostructure properties may have the most significant impact to the legal aspects 
in term of creation and innovation, instead of, by the use of the size dimensional definition.  
 
2.2.3 Defining by functions or effects 
 
The definition has been referred to cover a controlled geometrical size of functional 
component below 100nm57 or the ability to manufacture and control structure at the 
molecular level.58 A more general meaning has been adopted by Newberger where he states 
that “in particular, it is the application of science at the nanoscale that exploits the 
                                                          
51 For example, a particle of size 30nm is having 5% of atoms on its surface area, of 10nm is 20% and 3nm is 
increasing to 50% of its atom on the surface, RAE, n.36, at p.7. 
52 Interviewee D. 
53 RAE, n.36, at p.vi. 
54 Ratner and Ratner , n.4, at p.12; when the gold at the nanoscale level measuring 1nm across the particles 
appear to be red in color and this redness can be measured only with the help spectrophotometer, Kulinowski, n. 
4, at, p.17 and n.2. 
55 The ETC Group, ‘A Tiny Primer on Nanoscale Technologies and “Little Bang Theory” (June 2005) Otawa 
available at http://etcgroup.org/upload/publication/55/01/tinyprimer_english.pdf accessed 3 Nov 2009. 
56 RAE, n.36, at p.5. 
57 EPO, n. 44.  
58 Miller et al., n.32, at. p.14. 
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characteristics of materials that only just manifest themselves or become apparent at the 
nanoscale.”59 In approaching the meaning on the basis of discipline breakthrough and a 
broad view, Hunt and Mehta define nanotechnology as “the contemporary result of a natural 
‘downsizing’ progression in nearly all the sciences and their techniques, whether chemistry, 
materials science, physics, biology, industrial processes, pharmacology, genetic engineering, 
electronic engineering, neuropsychology and so on.”60 
 
This definition discusses the different functions and effects of things at nanoscale. This 
definition also places the emphasis on the “downsizing” of scientific and technological 
breakthrough. Although this definition may seem a better one it is still considered as non-
satisfactory for legal definition, for example it may cause a problem to the patent office to 
make such categorisation. Furthermore, as discussed above, the structures behave differently 
at nanoscale which could give different effect of their function.  
 
2.2.4 Other kinds of definition 
 
The fragmented definition of nanotechnology above lies in the unique characteristics and 
illustrates that the defining nanotechnology is not very successful. There are other attempts to 
define nanotechnology by combinations of the above definitions. The definition covers tools, 
techniques, processes and the application of nanotechnology at the nanoscale size. This is 
adopted by the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAE) which defines 
both nanoscience61 and nanotechnology as: 
“nanoscience is the study of phenomena and manipulation of materials at atomic, and molecular 
and macro-molecular scale, where properties differ significantly from those at a larger scale; 
whereas nanotechnology is the design, characterisation, production and application of structures, 
devices, and systems by controlling shape and size at nanometre scale”.
62 
 
A similar definition also has been adopted by the Report of the UK Advisory Group on 
Nanotechnology Applications (Advisory Group) which defines nanotechnology as a 
                                                          
59 Newberger, n.25, at p.650 
60 Hunt and Mehta, n.4, at p.2. 
61 Ratner and Ratner, n.4, refer nanoscience as “the study of fundamental principles of molecules and structures 
between 1 to 100 nanometre. This structures which form a basis in nanotechnology at nanoscale level”, at p.7. 
62RAE, n.36, at p.5, nanoscale level is defined between 0.2nm to 100nm, at p.vii. 
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collective set of technology and application of science in developing new materials and 
processes by manipulating molecules and atoms.63 The EPO refers to the size dimensional, 
functional and application of structures at nanoscale.64 The US National Nanotechnology 
Initiative refers nanotechnology to the scale dimension between 1nm to 100nm and the 
manipulating matter at this scale.65 The USPTO definition is mirrored to the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) definition of nanotechnology in classifying a cross-
reference digest, Class 977 for the purpose of determining prior art. In relation to 
nanotechnology, this Class 977 provides for disclosure for nanotechnology related patents 
that: 
“relates to the research and technology development at the atomic, molecular or macromolecular 
levels, in the length of scale of approximately 1-100 nanometre range in at least one dimension, 
and that provide a fundamental understanding of phenomena and materials at the nanoscale and to 
create and use structures, devices and systems that have novel properties and functions because of 
their size”.
66 
This definition indicates the size dimensional range, unique phenomena and application of 
nano-structures. Commenting on this, Bawa states the size range between 1nm to 100nm 
potentially excludes various devices and materials of micro size, a scale that is included 
within the realm of nanotechnology by many scientists; and recommends that the phrase 
‘small technology’ should be replaced for the term ‘nanotechnology’ and further suggests 
that this should include devices and materials at the nanoscale as well as micro scale.67 
However, following this view will enable to include anything as nanotechnology, even for 
mere devices and materials at the micro scale which is unlikely to be considered as 
nanotechnology. Based on this definition, it is clear that there is still no proper definition for 
nanotechnology. 
 
For the purpose of standardisation and measurement, the International Patent Classification 
Subclass B82B of the WIPO refers to nanostructures thus: 
                                                          
63 The lower limit is referred to 0.1nm, Advisory group, n.29, at p.16. 
64 EPO, n.44. 
65 National Nanotechnology Initiative, ‘What is Nanotechnology’ available at 
http://www.nano.gov/html/facts/whatIsNano.html accessed 10 Oct 2009. 
66 USPTO ‘Class 977, Nanotechnology Cross-Reference Art Collection’ available 
www.uspto.gov/web/patents/biochempharm/crossref.htm accessed 10 October 2009. 
67 Bawa R ‘Nanotechnology Patenting in the US’ (2004) Nanotech. Law & Bus, Vol. 1, at p.31. 
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“(1) consists solely of an atom, a molecule, or an atomically precise limited collection of either 
atoms or molecules (i.e., the collection in its entirety would be undetectable by any optical 
microscope) and 
(2) is formed by having its atoms, molecules, or limited collections individually manipulated as 
discrete units during the manufacture of its arrangement.”.
68  
This definition seems closer to what has been referred by Bawa69 above because there is no 
size range referred only refers to the limited collection of atoms or molecules that cannot be 
detected by the microscope and the manipulation of its discrete units. The International 
Organisation for Standardization (ISO) has illustrated that: 
“standardisation in the field of nanotechnologies that includes either or both of the following: (1) 
understanding and control of matter and processes at the nanoscale, typically, but not exclusively, 
below 100 nanometres in one or more dimensions where the onset of size-dependent phenomena 
usually enables novel applications; (2) utilising the properties of nanoscale materials that differ 
from the properties of individual atoms, molecules, and bulk matter, to create improved materials, 
devices, and systems that exploit these new properties.”.
70 
 
This definition although refers to the size dimensional range under 100nm, but it does not 
make as exclusivity since it also taking into account on the size depended phenomena. This 
definition also includes the utilising of nanoscale materials to create an improved material. 
This definition may give significant impact to the legal effect because the standardisation is 
not only useful for the characterisation of the technology, but could also be useful for safety 
purposes. Furthermore, it is argued that the terminology and standards definition of 
nanotechnology is important to scientific and public debate, but also to avoid the ill-treatment 
of the word “nano”.71  
 
                                                          
68 The International Patent Classification IPC/008, Annex 13, Subclass B82B available at 
http://www.wipo.int/ief-projects/d008-a13_usrp.pdf accessed on 10 Oct 2009. 
69 See n.67. 
70 Hatto P ISO/TC 229 – Nanotechnologies, ISO Committee Chairs Conference, Geneva, 5 June 2008, available 
at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/search.htm?qt=ISO%2FTC+229&searchSubmit=Search&sort=rele&type=simple&publi
shed=on accessed 10 October 2009. 
71 For example, nanosized particles which are mixed together with products, whether these mixed products are 
still considered nano-products; or whether they should be declared as such; or whether they are just ordinary 
mixed chemicals remains uncertain, Meili C Report on Nano-Regulation’ The Innovation Society, March 2006, 
available at http://www.innovationsgesellschaft.ch/images/publikationen/Nano_Regulation_final3.pdf accessed 
3 Nov 2009 at p.6 and p.25. Although the word “nano” has become popular used for the marketing purposes, it 
widespread use does not help to define a technology that already embedded in wide range of scientific and 
technological fields, Cameron in Cameron and  Mitchell n.16, at p.249; also similar view from interviewees C 
and D that nowadays people tend to misuse the word ‘nano’.  
21 
 
In order to meet the ISO international standards, the British Standard Institute (BSI) has been 
working on the common language for nanoparticles of nanotechnologies where it has 
established a Publicly Available Specification (PAS 71:2005).72 In 2006, the European 
Committee for Standardization also established a new technical committee for 
nanotechnology CEN/TC 352. This working group is responsible for developing a standard 
for classification, terminology and nomenclature; metrology and instrumentation; science-
based health; safety and environmental practices; and nanotechnology products and 
processes.73 CENT/TC 352 will work closely with the ISO/TC 229 on nanotechnologies, 
which will be implemented in Vienna Agreement for the mutual interest between ISO and 
CEN.74 The standards for nanotechnology are important because of its multidisciplinarity of 
fields and could be practicable for risk assessment, as a foundation for research and 
commercial applications and for securing the public confidence.75 Furthermore, standards 
and measurement are potentially important in labelling and marking purposes under 
trademarks law.76  
 
The MNNI has adopted the size dependent meaning of nanotechnology, that is “the science 
of materials and systems with structures and components which display improved novel 
physical, chemical and biological properties; phenomena that exist in the nano size scale (1-
100 nm)”.77 The linguistic definition above could be suitable basis to confer legal 
                                                          
72 The British Standard Institute, Publicly Available Specification PAS 71:2005, ‘Vocabulary – Nanoparticles’ 
available at http://www.bsigroup.com/upload/Standards%20%20Publications/Nanotechnologies/PAS71.pdf 
accessed 25 October 2009. PAS is a consultative process across many fields of industries, rather than a full 
consensus of technical committee; once full documents of ISO TC/229 is completed, then PAS will be 
withdrawn. 
73 The European Committee for Standardization, CEN/TC 352 available at 
http://www.cen.eu/CENORM/Sectors/TechnicalCommitteesWorkshops/CENTechnicalCommittees/CENTechni
calCommittees.as?param-508478&title=CEN%FTC+352. Interviewee C suspected that in the future, the 
Information Services and Centres Patent Information-Standard Information (formerly known as the Standards 
and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia) (SIRIM) will likely to adopt the international standards for 
nanotechnology in Malaysia. 
74 For an executive summary about this see Business Plan, CEN/TC 352 Nanotechnologies, 2006 available at 
http://www.cen.eu/cen/Sectors/TechnicalCommitteesWorkshops/CENTechnicalCommittee, accessed 22 
September 2010. 
75 Phelps T A The European Approach to Nanoregulation in Cameron and Mitchell, n.16 at p.195. 
76 For example the letters IBM were formed by 35 xenom atoms, Browne M W ‘2 Researchers Spell ‘I.B.M.’ 
Atom by Atom, New York Times, 1990 accessible via http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/05us/2-researchers-
spell-ibm-atom-by-atom.html accessed 21 February 2010. Another example is that the scientists from Monash 
University, Australia is developing high capacity Electron Beam Lithography (EBL) tools to write or mark or 
etch data on particles less than 10 nm, Press Release ‘A Giant Step for Nanotechnology’, 15 Sept 2009 available 
at http://www.monash.edu.au/news/newsline/story/1504, accessed 30 Sept 2009. For this, new standards are 
desirable because nanotechnology combine several technologies in new forms, Phelps, n.75, at p.195. 
77 N.22 above. 
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distinctiveness. To some extent, this is a better definition, but it is still not unique because of 
the inclusion of the nanoscale range from 1 to 100nm, as different areas of nanotechnology 
takes effect differently as discussed above. 
 
From the selected literature given above, the general tendency of definitions of 
nanotechnology can be summarised as follows: (1) they define nanotechnology in general 
terms on developing and manipulating materials at nanoscale; (2) they define 
nanotechnology based on the application across different  technologies at nanoscale; (3) they 
define nanotechnology based on the size defining criteria either from lower 1nm to the upper 
limit 100nm, or anything less than 100 nanometre and (4) they define nanotechnology based 
upon size dependent property that behave differently at nanoscale. Although one may find 
that size defining features could be regarded as the best working definition of 
nanotechnology, nevertheless, it has been argued that the size range for nanotechnology 
should not be specified because nanomaterials or enhanced properties are determined by 
more than just of their size, while structure, surface and shape are of particularly important 
too.78 In arguing for the size dimensional alone, different properties at nanoscale take effect 
differently. For example, in electronics the nanoscale takes effect at less than 30nm, whilst in 
material sciences, the effect of nanoscale starts at length approximately 300nm.79 Other than 
the size itself, the definitions of nanotechnology are also unusual compared to the other types 
of technology because the latter tend to be defined based on a key technology or 
breakthrough.80  
 
2.2.5 Types of definition and discussion 
 
Nanotechnology is effectively a new way of making things; rather than specific areas of 
technology, it refers to set of technologies, devices, techniques and processes. Some scholars 
                                                          
78 The UK Defra Consultation on a Voluntary Reporting Scheme for Engineered Nanoscale Materials, Summary 
of Findings and Government’s Response, August 2006, at http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult/nanotech-
vrs/index.htm, at pp.5-6. It has been argued that there was no need to adopt common unique definition for 
nanotechnology, sufficient if the technology is breaking down into sub-disciplines, Hullman A and Frycek (eds) 
IPR in Nanotechnology, Lessons from Experiences Worldwide, available at 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/ipworkshop_proceedings_02052007en.pdf at p.2. 
79 Meyer M Socio-Economic Research on Nanoscale Science and Technology in Roco and Bainbridge, n.16 at 
p.279. 
80 Zhou W ‘Ethics of Nanobiotechnology at the Frontline’ (2002-2003) 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. 
L. J. 481, at p.482. 
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have opted for a very wide and some of them have adopted a narrow view of the meaning. In 
fact, there arises confusion and disagreements among the experts of what might be 
considered as nanotechnology.81 Almeling, for instance views that any technology at the 
nanometre scale would be treated as nanotechnology, even if the technology is larger than 
100 nm.82 Since nanotechnology represents a variety collection of technologies which have 
different characteristics and applications, this broadness in scope may represent difficulty in 
understanding technical, legal83 and ethical implications.84 Nevertheless, there is opinion that 
how nanotechnology is intellectually constructed and defined is heavily based on the 
scientific disciplinary background and the working environment of the technology itself.85  
 
Thus, the definition above demonstrates that attempts have been made to define 
nanotechnology based on size dimensional, the size dependent property, the functional and 
effect and the combination of all these definition, nonetheless none of them provide the 
satisfactory or sufficiently promise definition for nanotechnology. Thus, the precise and 
useful definition cannot be reached because its effect and the scope are uncertain, which 
therefore suggest that sui generis right is impossible to be introduced for nanotechnology. 
Hence, how the existing forms of IP in principle could be applied and the details of this will 
be discussed in subsequent chapters of this research.    
 
2.3 Historical background and trajectory of nanotechnology 
 
Historically, the word nanotechnology is originated from Greek word “nano” which means 
“dwarf” or small. The arrangement of materials at the nanoscale has been with us for many 
centuries ago, nonetheless only recently has been debated and appreciated. To this effect, 
                                                          
81 Bawa, n.30, at p.150. This is because no common understanding of what might nanotechnology comprises, 
and scientist and technologists have a common basis on the meaning of “nano” in their own particular area, 
Meyer, n.79, at p.279. 
82 Adds that the size defining feature could be regarded as the best definition, Almeling D S ‘Patenting 
Nanotechnology (2004) Stan. Tech. L. Rev. N1, at N.1. However, scale above 100nm of magnitude would be 
micro-scale rather than nanoscale. 
83 Troilo, n.25, at p.36. 
84 Zhou, n.80, at p.482. Due to rapid development and interdisciplinary nature of nanotechnology, a truly 
comprehensive coverage does not seem feasible, Poole Jr. C P and Owens F J Introduction to Nanotechnology 
(New Jersey: JWS, 2003) at p. xii. 
85 Nicolau D ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Nanotechnology Policies’ (2004) 1 Nanotech L. & Bus. 446, at 
p.447. This definition also reinforces by the nanotechnologists’ interviews conducted in this study. 
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“nanotechnology is not new, only new in the sense that the way we understand it”.86 To 
illustrate that this technology has been with us for many years, for example the using of 
carbon as nanoscale particles especially as reinforcing additives in tires, protein vaccines, 
peptides which are similar to quantum dots size (less than 10nm), and some viruses are the 
same as drug delivery nanoparticle (less than 100nm).87 Appreciation of history is relevant to 
any attempt to project into future for nanotechnology. Furthermore, it shows that 
nanotechnology has developed without a special IP regime. This reinforces the conclusion 
that a sui generis system of protection for nanotechnology is undesirable.  
 
During the middle ages, one of the earliest applications of nanotechnology was in stained 
glass windows made of small gold nanoparticles in order to create red pigments;88 which has 
been useful for ink, paints and finishes products.89 Chemists have been working with 
polymers for many decades and scientists used the tiny features in computer chips for over 
20 years.90  However, not until 1959, when the Nobel Prize winner Richard Feynman 
predicted the control of individual atom with great complexity to form a product in his 
famous talk entitled “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”.91 His speech alerted chemists 
and physicists to decrease the size of the objects at the nanoscale precision. Undoubtedly, his 
vision, futuristic in 1959, has the enormous advantages for a variety scope of application and 
has been applied in today’s technology.92 For example he pointed out how to make the power 
of electron microscope 100 times better, and in fact this prediction led to the existence of 
Electron Beam Lithography (EBL) which is used today to make silicon chips.93 The 
speculation of manipulating individual atoms to decrease the size of the objects has now been 
accomplished using a sophisticated microscope called a Scanning Tunnelling Microscope 
(STM) and Atomic Force Microscope (AFM).94 The key milestones of historical background 
and trajectory of nanotechnology is shown in the Table 2.1 below. The table shows the 
                                                          
86 Interviewee D; “in some senses, nanoscience and nanotechnologies are not new”, RAE, n.36, at p.vi; 
“nanotechnology is a collective term for a set of technologies, techniques and processes – effectively a new way 
of thinking – rather than a specific area of science and engineering”, Advisory Group, n.29, at p.6. 
87 Bawa et al. n.30, at p.151. 
88 Ratner and Ratner, n.4, p.13. 
89 Edwards, n.38, at p.5. 
90 RAE, n.36, at p.vi. 
91 Feynman, quoted above at n.1. 
92 For an interesting note how influential and inspirational of Feynman’s futuristic view for the research today, 
see Ball P ‘Feynman’s Fancy’ (Jan 2009) Chemistry Today, 58. 
93 Poole and Owens, n.84, at p.2. 
94 Ibid, at p.2. 
25 
 
nanotechnology development pre-1974 and post 1974 and demonstrates its significance to 
the IP regime. 
  
Table 2.1: The key milestones for nanotechnology development 
Year Development Significant to IP 
Pre-1974 
 
1959 
 
 
Nobel Prize winning physicist Richard Feynman 
gives his famous talk entitled “There’s Plenty of 
Room at the Bottom” describing the possibility of 
manufacturing of atomic engineering. 
 
 
Nobel Prize and possibility of 
manufacturing atom significant to the 
public awareness and spark its 
importance. 
1974 Norio Taniguchi of Tokyo Science University first 
coined the word ‘nanotechnology’.95 
Popular used of the word “nano” relevant 
to trade mark. 
Post-1974 
 
1981 
 
 
1. Gerd K Binnig and Heinrich Rohrer from the 
IBM’s Zurich Research Laboratory create a STM in 
order to make researchers to see and manipulate 
atoms for the first time. This invention led them to 
receive Nobel Prize in Physics in 1986.96 
2. Eric Drexler publishes a first technical paper on 
molecular nanotechnology and appeared in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.97  
 
 
See and manipulate atoms relevant to 
trade mark. 
 
 
 
 
1985 Robert F Curl Jr., Harold W Kroto and Richard E 
Smalley discover the soccer ball shaped of carbon 
atoms, as known as Buckminsterfullerenes 
(Buckyballs) approximately of 1nm in diameter. 
They were granted Nobel Prize for this discovery in 
1996.98 
Product and design entity. 
                                                          
95 Taniguchi N ‘On the Basic Concept of ‘Nanotechnology’ (1974) Proceedings of the International Conference 
Production Engineering’ Tokyo, Part 11, Japan Society of Precision Engineering. 
96 Binnig G and Rohrer H Scanning Tunneling Microscopy in Tore Frängsmyr and Gösta Ekspång (eds) Nobel 
Lectures, Physics 1981-1990 (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 1993), at p.392. 
97 See also his famous book Drexler K E Engines of Creation (New York: Anchor Press, 1986), at pp.4-5. 
98 Smalley R and Curl Jr. R F ‘Fullerenes’ (1991) 265 Sci. Am 54; Curl Jr. R F Dawn of the Fullerenes in 
Grenthe I (ed.) Nobel Lectures, Chemistry 1996-2000 (Singapore: WSP, 2003) at pp.11-32; Kroto H Symmetry, 
Space, Stars and C60  in Grenthe I (ed.) Nobel Lectures, Chemistry 1996-2000 (Singapore: WSP, 2003) at 
pp.44-79; Smalley R E Discovering the Fullerenes in Grenthe I (ed.) Nobel Lectures, Chemistry 1996-2000 
(Singapore: WSP, 2003) at pp.89-103. 
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1986 AFM was invented offering similar resolution of 
STM.99 
Research tools of visualisation. 
1988 William degrade of Dupont create a new protein 
from scratch. 
Biotechnology analogous. 
1989 Physicists at IBM research centre manage to 
manipulate 35 xenom atoms and form a letter of 
IBM.100 
Marking and labelling for trade mark. 
1991 Somio Iijima from NEC Research Labs in Japan 
discovers multi-wall carbon nanotubes.101 
Nanotubes available commercially and 
widely used relevant to patent. 
1993 1. Warren Robinett from the University of North 
Carolina and R Stanley Williams from the 
University of California invent a virtual reality 
system connected to a STM to equip researchers to 
see and manipulate the atoms. 
2. The first nanotechnology laboratory was 
established at Rice University. 
Virtual reality system for information and 
communication technology (ICT) and 
computing technology. 
 
 
 
Coming together with discipline in one 
lab. 
1996 Robert Curl, Harold Kroto and Richard Smalley 
discover buckyballs and win the Nobel Prize in 
chemistry for their discovery of Buckyballs in 
1985.102  
Public awareness. 
1997 Nandrian C Seeman of the New York University 
demonstrates how to use DNA as a building block 
for nanoscale mechanical devices. 
The DNA as a building block refers to 
research manufacturing and constructing 
tools. 
1998 Researchers of Delft University of Technology, 
Netherlands create a transistor from carbon 
nanotubes. 
The transistor relates to semiconductor 
chips. 
1999 Mark Reed and James M Tour from Yale University 
create an organic switch in a single molecule. 
Organic with single molecule relates to 
ICT. 
2000 Lucent and Bell Labs together with Oxford 
University create the first DNA motors of the 
convergence biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
The DNA motors for research tools and 
convergence relates to biotechnology 
analogous. 
2001 1. Researchers from IBM working with Delft 
University develop nanometre sized logic circuit 
Nanometre sized logic circuit for 
semiconductor nanoscale. 
                                                          
99 See for example Thompson V ‘Veeco Came, Saw, Acquired of AFM Market’ Small Times, 8 Oct 2002 
available at http://www.smalltimes.com/document_display.cfm?document_id=4759 accessed 4 Nov 2009. 
100 See n.76 above. 
101 Iijima S ‘Helical Microtubules of Graphitic Carbon’ (Nov 1991) 354 Nature, 56, at pp.56-57. 
102 Smalley and Curl Jr. n.98, at pp.11-32; Kroto H Symmetry, Space, Stars and C60 in Grenthe I (ed.) Nobel 
Lectures, Chemistry 1996-2000 (Singapore: WSP, 2003) at pp.44-79; Smalley, n.98, at pp.89-103. 
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using carbon nanotubes. 
2. Mitsui & Co of Japan announces the mass 
manufacture of carbon nanotubes. 
 
From 1991 to 2001, it took ten years to 
manufacture nanotubes, and this 
demonstrates the delay to market the 
product which relates to Supplementary 
Protection Certificates.103  
2002 Researchers at IBM illustrate data-storage density of 
1 trillion bits per square inch, equal to a 100 
gigabyte hard drive, which is sufficient to store 25 
million printed textbook pages on a surface of a 
postage stamp 
IBM announces the development of a new electron 
microscope enhanced resolving power less than the 
radius of a single hydrogen atom. 
Data storage density relates to copying. 
The new electron microscope relates to 
the visualising tools.  
2003 The use of fluorescent semiconductor nanoparticles 
or quantum dots for imaging and as markers for 
biological processes.104 
Semiconductor nanoparticles relates to 
the protection of nano-layers under 
Semiconductor Chip design right.  
2004 A team of scientists from the Newcastle University 
and Liverpool University use nano-porous material 
to trap and store hydrogen gas that can be used in 
fuel cell car engine.105 
 Nano-porous material relate to product 
under patent. 
2005 Quantum dots for imaging, labelling and sensing 
purposes.106 
For labelling and marking purposes under 
trade mark. 
2006  The use of nanoparticles containing zero-valent iron 
for remediation of contaminated groundwater.107  
Nanoparticles product for patent. 
2007 The Envirox™ Fuel Borne Catalyst produced by 
Oxonica Ltd to improve fuel combustion and reduce 
fuel consumption using additive 10nm particles of 
cerium oxide.108 
Nanoparticles product for patent. 
                                                          
103 See 6.3.1.  
104 Roco M C ‘Nanotechnology’ (2003) Current Opinion in Biotechnology, 14, 337, at p.338. 
105 At http://www.ncl.ac.uk/press.office/newslink/item/1097846725, 15 Oct 2004, accessed 20 April 2011. 
106 See for example Medintz I L et al. ‘Quantum Dot Bioconjugates for Imaging, Labelling and Sensing’ (2005) 
Nature Materials Vol. 4, 435, at p.442. 
107 Tratnyek P G and Johnson R L ‘Nanotechnologies for Environmental Cleanup’ (2006) Nanotoday, Vol. 1, 
44, at p.44. 
108 See for example at Elcock D Potential Impacts of Nanotechnology on Energy Transmission Applications and 
Needs, Nov 2007, accessed on 20 May 2012, available at 
http://corridoreis.anl.gov/documents/docs/technical/APT_60861_EVS_TM_08_3.pdf , at p.6. 
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2008 Food packaging enhanced with nanoparticles with 
stronger mechanical and thermal performance to 
prevent invasion by micro-organisms.109 
Enhanced nano-particle of food 
packaging relates to trade mark. 
2009 1. Researchers at the Universiti Sains Malaysia have 
invented High Performance Varistors which can be 
produced at the nanoscale.110 
2. The use of label-free nano-sensors technique to 
enable biomarkers detection from whole blood for 
certain disease such as cancer.111 
Product relates to patent. 
 
 
 
Process relates to patent. 
2010 The application of nanotechnology in cancer therapy 
to achieve the desired concentration of therapeutic 
agent in tumour sites and minimizing damage to 
normal cells.112 
Process relates to patent. 
2011 Designing and engineering of a plethora of 
nanoparticulate entities with high specificity for 
Alzheimer’s disease diagnosis and treatment.
113 
Product design entity. 
2012 A silicon based single atom transistor has been made 
by positioning a phosphorus atom between metallic 
electrodes.114 
Single atom transistor relates to 
semiconductor chip. 
Source: Adapted from Nanotech: The Tiny Revolution115 and The Big Down – From 
Genomes to Atoms116 
 
Table 2.1 above shows key milestones representing the time frame of nanotechnology.117 For 
example, in 1991 nanotube was discovered, and in 2001 ten years duration for manufacture 
                                                          
109 Siegrist M et al., ‘Perceived Risks and Perceived Benefits of Different Nanotechnology Foods and 
Nanotechnology Food Packaging’ (2008) Appetite Vol. 51, 283, at 283. 
110 Sue-Chern L, ‘ Lecturer’s Lightning Breakthrough,’ The News Straits Times, 13 Nov 2009, available at  
http://www.nst.com.my/Current_News/NST/articles/20xhi/Article/index_html; also USM Researcher Uses 
Nanotechnology to Invent High Quality Varistor, available at http://www.innovations-
report.com/html/reports/physics_astronomy/usm_researcher_nanotechnology_invent_high_quality_143408.htm
l accessed 27 Dec 2009. 
111 Stern E et al. ‘Label-free Biomarkers Detection from Whole Blood’ (2009) Nature Nanotechnology, 1 at p.4. 
112 Misra R et al., ‘Cancer Nanotechnology’ (2010) Drug Discovery Today, Vol 15, 842, at p.842. 
113 Brambilla D et al., ‘Nanotechnologies for Alzheimer’s Disease’ (2011) Nanomedicine: Nanotechnology, 
Biology and Medicine, Vol 7, 521, at p.521. 
114 Lansbergen G P ‘Nanoelectronics’ (2012) Nature Nanotechnology 7, 209, at p.209. 
115 The Cientifica, ‘Nanotech: The Tiny Revolution, CMP, (July 2002) at 
http://www.cientifica.eu/attachments/061_nanotech_WP.pdf accessed on 27 Oct 2009 
116 The ETC Group, The Big Down – From Genomes to Atoms Ottawa (2003) at 
http://etcgroup.org/upload/publication/171/01/thebigdown.pdf accessed on 27 Oct 2009. 
117 See Chapter 6. 
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and product entering the market. The delay of ten years provides a good argument for 
adopting Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs, Chapter 6).  
 
2.4 Application of nanotechnology 
 
Nanotechnology holds many possibilities to affect every aspect of human life which have 
resulted in development and expansion in the research, commercialisation at national and 
international level.118 The development however, is still at the speculative stage and so far 
only a few inventions have been commercialised.119 This situation has been described as 
“bulk nanotechnology” for example the production of ultra-thin films and nano-sized 
particles such as metal oxides and clay.120 It has been argued that the development of 
nanotechnology now mirrors the stage of development in information technology in the early 
1960s and biotechnology at the beginning of the 1980s; and now the emphasis of 
nanotechnology is shifting towards the development of the underlying technologies as well as 
their development.121 In cases where certain technology has reached the optimal of its 
development, another new technology will take place;122 and now it is likely that every 
technology is moving towards nanotechnology.123 IP law coped with the introduction of new 
technologies like information technology and biotechnology, and the technologies are 
developed without a special IP regime. The same statement could be made that the existing 
forms of IP law are flexible enough to cope with any difficulties that new technology could 
bring, particularly nanotechnology.124  
 
                                                          
118 Seear K et al. ‘The Social and Economic Impacts of Nanotechnologies’ Final Report (Feb 2009), prepared 
for the Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, at 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/Section/Innovatio/Documents/Literature_Review.pdf accessed 14 October 2009, 
at 9. 
119 Lemley, n.25, at p.602; because of the young field, nanotechnology focuses on two categories i.e. basic 
research and material science products, Tullis, n.25, at 2; interviewee C confirmed that this technology is still 
young in Malaysia.  
120 The European Commission, ‘Setting the Nanotechnology Research Agenda – Nanotechnologies’  European 
Industrial Research, Dec 2003, at p.8, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/industrial_technologies/pdf/eir_magazine_3.pdf accessed 30 Oct 2009. 
121 Advisory Group, n.29, at p.23. 
122 Interviewee D. 
123 Interviewee C. 
124 interviewee C and D also mentioned that existing forms of IP are sufficient to cater a new technology like 
nanotechnology. 
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The huge potential of nanotechnology has given opportunities for all countries to enhance 
further their research and development. Lux Research has reported that the worldwide 
funding for nanotechnology research and development increased 13 per cent from 2005 to 
reach $11.8 billion in 2006. 125 In terms of basic and applied research, Japan and the US are 
the most innovative and the biggest producers of products related IP, and in certain key areas 
such as materials, Japan leads the US.126 Japan now is second to the US in terms of 
government investment for global player of nanotechnology development. For instance, in 
the year 2003, Japan invested nearly $900 million a figure believed to have increased by 20% 
in 2004.127 Recently, the amount of USD 1.66 billion has been invested for the US NNI in the 
2010 budget.128 Other countries have been supported financially for their nanotechnology 
initiatives such as Singapore, Taiwan, China, India and Korea.  
 
There are considerable examples of products which are already available in the market, for 
example at August 21, 2008, the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars released 
figures that there were 1015 nanotechnology consumer products on the market.129 It has been 
estimated that by the year 2015, the worldwide market products enhanced with 
nanotechnology will be worth US$1 trillion.130 The categorisation of nanotechnology 
application is shown in the Table 2.2 below. 
  
Table 2.2: Nanotechnology applications  
No Stages Types of product 
1. Available in the market Hard disks; magnetoresistance in nanostructures 
magnetic multilayers; sun-block cream incorporated 
with nanoparticles for UV light absorption; lasers, 
                                                          
125 Lux Research, The Nanotechnology Report (5th ed) 2007, at p.iii. 
126 Ross L ‘A Cursory Look at Commercializing Nanotechnology in Japan’ (2004) 1 Nanotech. L. & Bus. 213, 
at p.213. 
127 Liu L ‘Asia Pacific Nanotechnology R&D and Commercialisation Efforts’ (2004) 1 Nanotech L. & Bus. 
104, at 106. 
128 The National Nanotechnology Initiative (2009) at http://www.nano.gov/NNI_2010_budget_supplement.pdf 
accessed 30 Oct 2009. 
129 The Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, 
available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/analysis_draft, accessed 20 Feb 2009. This 
Centre has developed online inventory of nanotechnology-based consumer products. 
130 The National Science Foundation, available at http://www.nsf.giv/crssprgm/reports/nni031210ro@euro-
nanforum.pdf, accessed 30 Oct 2009; see also Lux Research ‘Sizing Nanotechnology’s Value Chain’ (2004), 
New York. 
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modulators and amplifiers for telecommunications; 
computer peripherals for example Vertical Cavity 
Surface Emitting Lasers 
2. Nearly close to the market Photovoltaic techniques for energy sources; electronic 
display technologies; scratch resistance coating 
glasses; harder, lighter and stronger material, lab-on-
chip diagnostic devices; quantum structure electronic 
devices; self-cleaning surfaces; advanced photonics 
devices in telecommunications 
3. Expected in the future Drug delivery systems with lower dosage and reduced 
side effects; anti-corrosion coatings; tougher and 
harder cutting tools; longer lasting medical implants; 
artificially created organs; retina implants; medical 
sensors to monitor patients  
 Source: Advisory Group131 
 
From numbers 1 until 3 above, the types of nanotechnology products which have been 
widely applied in areas of electronics, medical, information communication and technology 
(ICT) and biotechnology. The most applied area is the medical one, a point made in the 
thesis’s qualitative interviews. The types of products also show some analogy with previous 
technology such as ICT and biotechnology which strongly suggest that the existing forms of 
IPRs are sufficient for nanotechnology.  
 
Table 2.3: The phases of nanotechnology development 
Timeline Products 
First Generation – passive nanostructures 
̴ 2001 onwards 
in coatings, nanoparticles, bulk materials 
(nanostructured metals, polymers, ceramics) 
Second Generation – active nanostructures 
̴ 2005 onwards 
As transistors, amplifiers, actuators, adaptive 
structures 
Third Generation – 3D nanosystems 
̴ 2010 onwards 
With heterogeneous nanocomponents and 
various assembling techniques 
Fourth Generation – molecular nanosystems 
̴ 2020 onwards 
With heterogeneous molecules, based on 
biomimetics and new design 
Source: Roco M C ‘The Future of National Nanotechnology Initiative’132 
                                                          
131 N. 29, at pp.23-24. 
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The timeline for nanotechnology development is important to determine the IPRs and the 
pattern for IP duration can be expected. As informed from the interviews conducted, 
technology needs certain duration of development before companies exercising their IPRs.133 
The first generation of the passive nanostructures would be a process that may be suitable for 
confidentiality and patent. The active nanostructures under the second generation 
demonstrate applicability in electronics products, and it can be expected that this requires 
from ten to fifteen years to develop which strongly favours unregistered design by 
semiconductor chip model. For third generation, it shows methods or techniques which are 
suitable for patent protection for 20 years of protection and confidentiality. Patent is also 
important to protect inventions that can be easily configured by reverse engineering. 
Bowman and Hodge list second and third generations of nanotechnology application as 
follows; (1) scientific tools: AFM and STM; (2) electronics: Semiconductor Chip, memory 
storage, photonics and optoelectronics; (3) military and security: bio-sensors weapons, 
sensory enhancement; (4) environment and energy: water, and air purification filters134, fuel 
cells,135 photovoltaics; (5) food science: processing, ‘nutraceutical’ foods, nanocapsules 
foods; (6) materials: nanoparticles carbon nanotubes, biopolymers, paints and coatings; (7) 
chemicals and cosmetics: nanoscale chemicals and compounds, paints, coatings; (8) nano-
medicines: nano-drugs, medical devices, tissue engineering; (9) agriculture: pesticides, food 
production.136 The fourth generation shows some of the products strength that requires for 
patent protection. For the third and fourth generation phases, the pattern of IP enforcement 
such as the protection for methods or processes with licensing opportunities for people to 
fabricate the methods or process or the possibility of applying research exemption would be 
typically expected.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
132 Roco M C ‘The Future of National Nanotechnology Initiative’ (Nov 5, 2002) presented at the Annual 
meeting of AIChE, Indianapolis, available at http://www.nano.gov/html/res/roco_aiche_48slides.pdf accessed 5 
Oct 2009. 
133 Interviewee A. 
134 This is very important for developing countries, interviewee C.  
135 The Oxonica company produces Envirox™ fuel combustion catalysts used as a diesel fuel additive to reduce 
fuel consumption and costs, and emission of greenhouse gases, and currently been used by Stagecoach; see n. 
108 above. 
136 Bowman D and Hodge G ‘Nanotechnology’ (2006) Future, 1060-1073, at p.1062. 
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2.5 Nanotechnology development 
 
This next part of this chapter discusses research, development and strategic planning of 
nanotechnology from different selected jurisdictions including Malaysia, UK, Europe, 
Australia and US. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, UK is chosen as a comparative study 
employed in this research. Moreover, the prioritised areas of nanotechnology development in 
the UK are slightly different from Malaysia. Furthermore, as part of the comparative 
analysis, this would directly relate to the European level. Australian jurisdiction is also 
important because as one of the chosen examples from the Commonwealth countries. In the 
context of other chapters in this research, the selections have been made to discuss Australian 
IPRs whenever it is appropriate. This research does not make any comparative legal analysis 
with the US, however, to date the US has already advanced with the nanotechnology 
investment, therefore the scientific discussion has also provided rich literatures for this 
research. The nanotechnology development in different selected jurisdictions is vital to see if 
there are any distinctions or commonalities that can be identified for IPRs and 
nanotechnology.  
 
2.5.1 Nanotechnology development in Malaysia 
 
The Malaysian government takes the strategic initiatives in promoting nanotechnology 
development by strengthening the roles of the policy makers and by formulating policy 
guidelines, strategies for human resources development, facilitating the establishment of 
infrastructure and allocating funding scheme in nanotechnology research fields.137  
 
The areas of potential impact of nanotechnology have been identified under the Ninth 
Malaysian Plan (2006-2010) and are related to research and development on nanoparticles, 
micro-machining and fabrication, sensors in electronics, communications, automotive and 
                                                          
137 The Final Report, Research Survey for Implementing Nedo’s International Cooperative Research Project for 
Development Support Projects in Asian Countries (Malaysia) Environmental and Bioprocess Technology 
Centre, (2006) ETC237/16/586 (R045/06) SIRIM Berhad available 
http://www.tech.nedo.go.jp/PDF/100008942.pdf, accessed 20 Oct 2009, at Chapter 8.1 (SIRIM Report). 
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chemicals industries.138 The research and development have also identified the focused areas 
with high potential on the local industries such as nanostructured catalysts for environmental-
friendly hydrocarbon fuels, nanostructured membranes for waste water treatment and MEMS 
for medical diagnostic devices.139  
 
The official programmes of nanotechnology started when the Minister of Defence140 
launched the APNF, on 4th July 2005. From this forum, the Minister emphasised that 
Malaysia should have more effective control over the nanotechnology development and the 
government was committed to support the establishment of the MNNI. In terms of 
coordinating research and development, investment, commercialisation aspects, industrial 
collaboration, the establishment of a Malaysian Nanotechnology Centre should be proposed. 
The government gave full support for promoting nanotechnology as one of the top priority 
areas in science and technology.141   
It was recommended to establish the Malaysian National Nanotechnology Centre (MNNC) 
with the aim to administer and plan the National Nanotechnology Initiative. The proposed 
functions of the MNNC are to:142 to (1) form the structure of MNNC; (2) draft a National 
Nanotechnology Policy; (3) to formulate the financial strategies for R&D, education and 
national nanotechnology management; (4) establish the national nanotechnology niche areas; 
(5) to manage the activities of nanotechnology R&D; (5) provide and facilitate the national 
nanotechnology infrastructure and research facilities; (6) train people for the human resource 
development;143 (7) update the national nanotechnology databases; (8) create and organise 
the nanotechnology educational programme; (9) provide assistance for the commercialisation 
activities; (10) enhance national and international collaboration; (11) supervise the potential 
impact health, environmental and societal impacts of nanotechnology; (12) formulate the 
standards and specifications for nanotechnology; (13) manage intellectual property rights and 
                                                          
138 The Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2007, The Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, Putrajaya, 
(2006) (9MP), Thrust 2, Chapter 12.18 of the 9MP; The total amount which has been allocated under this Ninth 
Plan is RM2.5 billion.  
139 Thrust 2, Chapter 12.58 of the 9MP. 
140 Now the Prime Minister, Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak. 
141 At http://web.utm.my/today/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=198&Itemid=2. This is because 
Malaysia should identify areas which others countries are still under development too, interviewee C. 
142 See n. 22.  
143 They could involve scientists or technologists with Ph.D holder that can assist the patent office, see 4.3.3.1.  
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other legal matters;144 (14) engage with commercialisation and collaboration activities. Under 
the MNNC, the centres of excellence for nanotechnology have been identified as shown in 
Appendix 2.  
In 2007, there was a study conducted by MiGHT145 for the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of 
the Prime Minister’s Department entitled “Identification of Business and R&D Opportunities 
in the Application of Nanotechnology in Malaysia” which identified the roadmap for 
Malaysian nanotechnology development. The study has shown that there were six major 
target products that could bring the most potential impact to the industries. The target 
products and applications are shown in the table below.  
 
Table 2.4: Areas of application of nanotechnology in Malaysia 
Target Products Identified Applications IP Significant 
Biosensors 
· Clinical diagnostic 
· Home diagnostic  
· Real-time alert sensor and 
detection for pathogen infection 
caused by bacteria, fungi and 
viruses 
· Real-time detection of 
contamination 
· Food production and agricultural 
diagnostic kit 
· Process and product 
patent. 
Biochips 
· Whole genome arrays 
· Pathogen (HIV, bacteria, fungus) 
detection chips 
· Real-time monitoring 
· Portable lab-on-chip devices 
· Product and process 
patent. 
Molecular Farming 
· Mass producible therapeutic 
medical proteins 
· Low cost enzymes for industrial 
use 
· Mass producible vaccines 
· Plant/animal vaccines for 
agriculture/livestock 
· Biosensor/biochip for agricultural 
diagnostics 
· Process patent. 
· Plant variety rights. 
Drug Delivery System 
· Clinical treatment 
· Topical and cosmetics 
· Nutritional applications 
· Veterinary and agricultural 
application 
· Process patent. 
                                                          
144 This is also emphasized under the National Nanotechnology Statement that embark on the initiative to 
protect IPR on effective and efficient policy, National Nanotechnology Statement, Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation Malaysia, July 2010, at http://www.nano.gov.my/?Home accessed 20 Oct 2011. 
145 The Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology. 
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Solar 
· Higher efficiency and lower cost 
solar panels 
· Flexible/robust solar panels for 
outdoor applications 
· Dye-sensitised solar panels 
· Product patent. 
Lithium-ion 
· Li-ion batteries for hybrid electric 
vehicle (HEV) 
· Li-polymer batteries 
· Industrial application (i.e. robotic 
system) 
· Product and process 
patent. 
Source: adapted from the MiGHT Report146 
 
Subsequent to this study, the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronic Systems (MIMOS) has 
undertaken a study on the “Nanoelectronics Technology Roadmap for Malaysia”147 which is 
a complement to the earlier study by MiGHT. This study provides the directions and 
frameworks for nanoelectronics in the areas identified in Table 2.4. This study also highlights 
to develop fundamental and applied technologies in various nanotechnology application as 
well those areas that have been identified by the MNNI. 
 
2.5.2 UK nanotechnology development 
 
In Europe, UK is among the earliest countries which developed its nanoscience and 
nanotechnology. However, obstacles existed to slow the nanotechnological industrial 
developments such as the fragmented nature of the UK’s effort, the multidisciplinary nature 
of the technology, the variability of mechanisms which were unable to facilitate the 
commercialisation in order to transfer the science from the academia spectrum into the 
industrial world.148 The National Initiative on Nanotechnology (NION) was launched in 1986 
and UK was the earliest country which had a national initiative for nanotechnology. The 
initiative was announced by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),149 and was 
subsequently followed by the nanotechnology programs under the four-year LINK 
nanotechnology programme in 1988. However, the programme has not been continued 
                                                          
146 The Nanoelectronics Technology Roadmap for Malaysia – R&D Opportunities, MIMOS Berhad, (2008) at 
http://www.mosti.gov.my/mosti/images/stories/DICT/policy/NanoRoadmap-MIMOS-2008-publicversion.pdf 
accessed 15 Oct 2009 (Nanoelectronics Roadmap). 
147 Ibid.  
148 Advisory Group, n.29, at p.7. 
149 Now the Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS). 
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because of fragmented support for nanotechnology.150 The research and development 
strategy is now being coordinated together with the Nanotechnology Knowledge Transfer 
Network (NanoKTN)151 for one of the primary knowledge based networks for micro and 
nanotechnologies. 
 
In 2002, the Advisory Group identified six main specific applications for nanotechnology 
which have strength in the UK152 in the Table 2.5 below.  
 
Table 2.5: Areas of application of nanotechnology in UK 
Target Product Identified Application IP Significant 
Electronics and communications quantum structure electronic 
devices for memory and data 
storage, displays, optoelectronics, 
photonic crystal structures, 
quantum information technology 
Semiconductor chip. 
Process patent. 
Drug delivery systems polymer-drug conjugates, 
nanoparticles, liposome and 
polymer micelles and dendrimers 
Process patent. 
Tissue engineering, medical 
implants and devices 
external tissue implants, in-vivo 
testing devices, medical devices 
 
Product patent. 
Nanomaterial particularly at the 
bio/medical/functional interface: 
nanostructured materials, smart 
composites, catalysis, biosensors 
Process and product patent. 
Instrumentation, tooling and 
metrology 
tools for top down manufacture for 
example high resolution and soft 
lithography, nanometrology 
Product patent. 
Sensors and actuators medical diagnostics and implants; 
systems integration 
Product patent. 
Source: adapted from the Advisory Group 
                                                          
150 Advisory Group, n.29, at p.4. 
151 NanoKTN was established by the Technology Strategy Board and managed by the Centre of Process 
Innovation Limited.  Four main areas of focus are: (1) promoting and facilitating knowledge; (2) support the 
growth of the UK capabilities; (3) encourage awareness of nanotechnology; (4) provide leadership and input for 
policy and strategy consideration. 
152 This report identified specific application of the technology rather than specific subdivision of the 
technology, Advisory Group, n.29, at p.13. This group has provided assistance in terms of advice for the 
improvement of UK’s capabilities in nanotechnology and related technology. 
38 
 
The Advisory Group also analysed that the UK had strength in nanoelectronics, 
nanophotonics and molecular nanotechnology which were mainly related to develop research 
in semiconductor physics, photonics, molecular biology and pharmacy.153 This Advisory 
Group recommended the establishment of the National Nanotechnology Fabrication Centres 
(NNFCs) with the aim of developing and operating world class facilities for nanotechnology 
research activities. 
 
The RAE report in 2004 identified areas of application such as (1) nanomaterials; (2) 
metrology; (3) electronics, optoelectronics and ICT; (4) bionanotechnology and 
nanomedicine; and (5) industrial applications.154  
 
In analysing patent data of UK innovation in the fields of nanotechnology, the UKIPO155 has 
observed that in all of the areas of the technology such as nanomaterials/nanostructure, 
nanometrology, electronic applications, nanofiltration/nanoseparation, applications of 
nanotechnology and nanotoxicity, the UK has overall strong capabilities in 
bionanotechnology. In a specific technology breakdown, medical preparations such as 
targeted drug delivery and antibody directed enzyme therapy is seen to fall since its prolific 
activity in 1990s, whereas cyclodextrins and medicinal preparations involving nanoparticles 
and/or nanocapsules is seen to have  increased recently. Recent university research activities 
have contributed to the activity in nanostructures and physics/electrical field. Among the 
universities listed, University of Cambridge has the most prolific activity for its strength in 
chemical and physical fields including applications and medical nanotechnology, followed 
by University of Oxford in medical and cosmetic application of nanotechnology. Other 
university specialism includes the University of Glasgow in semiconductors, lasers and light 
guides; the University of Bristol in nanometrology and the University of Liverpool in 
nanofiltration and separation. Commercial organisations are more productive in medical and 
cosmetic applications whereas the universities are strong on fundamental science base 
research related to nanostructures, physics and electrical including scanning probes, light 
guides, semiconductors and magnets. The UKIPO report also indentified key patents on the 
                                                          
153 Advisory Group, n.29, at p.26. 
154 RAE, n.36, at p.viii. 
155 UKIPO, ‘IPO Patent Informatics Project Report’ (April 2009) available at  
http://webdb4.patent.gov.uk/informatic-nanotech.pdf , accessed 24 Feb 2010. 
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basis of citation and evidence where it was found that UK had strengths in nanowires,156 
nanotubes, nanoparticle composition and nanoprobes. 
 
2.5.3 EU nanotechnology development 
 
In the development of nanosciences and nanotechnologies at the EU level, the Commission 
of the European Communities plays two important roles as policy maker and as a funding 
body for research and innovation. In the EU, nanoscience and nanotechnology had been 
given priority on the research activities. The European Commission has been committed to 
strong research activities of nanotechnology.  
 
At EU level the nanotechnology programmes have been funded under the Fourth Framework 
Programmes (FP4) and the Fifth Programmes (FP5). However it was not until the Sixth 
Framework Programmes (FP6) from 2002-2006, that the EU provided strong funding and 
promotion of research on nanotechnologies with nearly €1.3million and classified 
nanotechnology as one of the thematic priority areas.157 The thematic priority includes 
nanotechnologies and nanosciences, knowledge-based multifunctional materials and new 
production processes and devices with almost 550 projects of nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies research activities. This was subsequently continued to receive an increase 
investment under the Seventh Framework Programmes (FP7) from 2007-2013. For the years 
to come, nanotechnology has been seen as leading-edge technologies for knowledge based 
products, services and manufacturing processes. The budget has been increased in the FP7 to 
approximately €3.5 billion over the FP7 duration for nanosciences, nanotechnologies, 
materials and New Production Technologies (NMP). Under FP7 nanotechnology has 
continued as a priority area identified under NMP theme with additional cross cutting 
activities shared with other themes and programmes such as health, food, information 
technologies and societal aspects and infrastructures.158 
 
                                                          
156 Also known as nanorods or nanowhiskers, which are solid wires made from silicon, zinc oxide, and various 
metals, having a diameter range with a lengths in the tens of micrometers with optical, electrical characteristics, 
Miller et al, n.32, at p.18. 
157 For more information see http://fp6.cordis.lu/fp6/home.cfm. 
158 For more information see http://cordie.europa.eu/fp7. 
40 
 
The Commission has also adopted a Strategy159 for nanoscience and nanotechnology in 
which is proposed a safe, integrated and responsible strategy for nanotechnology. Subsequent 
to this Strategy the Commission published another Action Plan160 in which it set out and 
emphasised a priority for safe, integrated, responsible of nanoscience and nanotechnology 
that directly adding to the existing communication. The Commission proposes to reinforce 
nanoscience and nanotechnology research activities161 and to double the funding under the 
European Union’s seventh framework programme. The Commission proposes to support for 
the strength areas of nanoelectronics which has been identified under the ICT priority areas 
of the FP7 and the research strategy under the European Technology Platform on 
Nanoelectronics.162 
 
Both Malaysian and the UK (and EU) demonstrate overlapping areas, particularly on the 
medical or health and nanoelectronics products and application. The medical or health 
indicates especially suitable for patent protection. The areas also suggest the pattern of 
duration that could be identified under SPCs for nanotechnology. Nanoelectronics have been 
identified areas under Malaysia, UK and EU that demonstrate significant protection under 
unregistered design for semiconductor chip model, which could be adopted by Malaysia.163 
One of the identified areas particularly different from Malaysia and the UK is molecular 
farming which may be suitable to be protected under plant variety rights.164 The variety areas 
for nanotechnology under both Malaysian and the UK jurisdictions may indicate that 
                                                          
159 The European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Towards A European Strategy for 
Nanotechnology COM (May 12 2004) 338 Final at 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/nano_com_en_new.pdf, accessed 20 Oct 2009. 
160 The European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee, ‘Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: An Action Plan for Europe 
2005-2009’ COM (June 7 2005) 243 Final, at 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/nano_action_plan2005_en.pdf, accessed on 25 Oct 2009. 
For a summary of progression of activities within 2005-2007 in relation to the key areas of nanotechnology 
Action Plan of 2005-2009, see the European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Nanosciences and 
Nanotechnology: An Action Plan for Europe 2005-2009, First Implementation Report 2005-2007, Commission 
of the European Communities, Brussels COM (2007) 505 Final, at 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/com_2007_0505_f_en.pdf, accessed 30 Oct 2009. 
161 For example by (a) increasing the investment and coordination of R&D in collaborative, interdisciplinary 
and competitive in nanoscience and nanotechnology with industries; (b) developing world-class competitive 
R&D for industry and R&D organizations; (c) promoting the ethical principle and integrating societal 
considerations into the R&D process to encourage a dialogue with citizens. 
162 The Vision 2020: Nanoelectronics at the Centre of Change, Report of the High-Level Group EUR 21149 
(June 2004) at http://www.cordis.lu/ist/eniac, accessed 25 Oct 2009.  
163 See 5.4.5.3. 
164 However, plant variety rights are not within the discussion under this study because the main purpose of this 
study is to examine the overlap products and application between the two jurisdictions. 
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nanotechnology cannot be a discrete area and it is unwise for both countries to adopt for a 
new IP system for nanotechnology protection. Furthermore, none of these two jurisdictions 
has adopted a different IP system for nanotechnology. Thus, it is a common conclusion that 
sui generis system is out for both jurisdictions. Furthermore, a broadly similar conclusion 
could also be made, that all IP forms are meant to be surveyed for all areas of 
nanotechnology. The different focused areas adopted in both jurisdictions however, do not 
mean that different system of IP forms will be introduced, and this contention of the legal 
analysis for nanotechnology is predicted to continue to be valid in the future.  
 
2.5.4 Nanotechnology development in Australia 
 
In Australia, nanotechnology has been identified as a key technology under its National 
Research Priority goals. In 2007, the Australia National Nanotechnology Strategy (NNS) 
launched approximately AUS$21 million for a four year programmes with the objectives to 
help Australia to harness the potential of nanotechnology and at the same time to address the 
social, ethical and safety issues; as well as to overcome any impediments of nanotechnology 
through regulatory frameworks, public confidence and metrology.165 The aim of NNS is to 
establish the environment for Australia to benefit from nanotechnology and address the 
issues of nanotechnology development. The initiatives taken by NNS are; (1) to address the 
regulation and standards issues concerning health, safety and environment impacts of 
nanotechnology; (2) to promote the public awareness and engagement programs on 
nanotechnology; (3) to establish nano-particle metrology at the National Measurement 
Institute (NMI) and (4) to assist the approach of nanotechnology development through the 
establishment of the Australian Office of Nanotechnology.166 The main agency which 
coordinates the NNS is the Australian Office of Nanotechnology (AON) based on the 
Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research.167 The AON is acting on advice 
                                                          
165 The National Nanotechnology Strategy Annual Report 2007-2008, Australian Office of Nanotechnology, at 
p. 19 available at http://www.innovation.gov.au/Section/Innovation/Documents/NNS%20Annual%20report.pdf 
(NNS Report).  
166 Ibid, at p.1. 
167 National Nanotechnology Strategy, Jan 2008 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/Industry/Nanotechnology/Documents/NNSFeb08.pdf, accessed 26 Oct 2009 
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on the implementation of the NNS and nanotechnology development to the Australian 
Government.168  
 
The working group for the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council 
(PMSEIC)169 has identified specific consolidation and clustering needs for the Australian 
nanotechnology initiatives. This group has also recognised that although there is a difference 
between nanotechnology and biotechnology (such as the breadth of technologies and product 
applications), the process adopted for the formulation and implementation of biotechnology 
strategy (Australian National Biotechnology Strategy) may be useful as a lesson on the 
experience, strategic planning and business systems in the context of formulating and 
implementing the national nanotechnology strategy.170 This group has also recognised that 
Australia’s nanotechnology research base is strong and globally competitive but 
comparatively small, and focused upon particular areas such as diagnostic devices, 
nanomaterials, quantum computing and energy storage.  
 
In response to the PMSEIC report, the Nanotechnology Strategy Taskforce was formed. This 
group agreed that there was correlation between ICT and nanotechnology because (1) these 
two are overlapping in many disciplines such as nano-ICT for instance in photonics, micro-
electronics, quantum computing; (2) nanotechnology is being enhanced in the ICT products 
and services; (3) many applications incorporate both nanotechnology and ICT such as nano-
biotechnology, monitoring system and sensory systems for clean environment; (4) that ICT is 
a tool to develop and manipulate nanotechnology materials.171 This Taskforce promotes 
research strength in the Australian industry and it should be made more apparently at the 
                                                          
168 For a review in considering whether NNS was still considered the best responsible for nanotechnology 
management see Cutler T, Venturous Australia – Building Strength in Innovation, Report of the Review of the 
National Innovation System, Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Canberra, (2008) 
available at http://www.innovation.gov.au/innovationreview/Pages/home.aspx.  
169 The Independent Working Group for the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council 
(PMSEIC) ‘Enabling Technologies for Australian Innovative Industries’ (11 March 2005) available at 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/Industry/Nanotechnology/Documents/nanotechnology-pmseic110305.pdf 
accessed 26 October 2009. 
170 Recommended the same view that the model of Biotechnology Australia should be adopted taking into 
consideration of the unique characteristics and broader applications of nanotechnology, The Options for a 
National Nanotechnology Strategy’ Report to Minister Industry, Tourism and Resources, the National 
Nanotechnology Strategy Taskforce, at p.10 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/Industry/Nanotechnology/Documents/taskforcereport20070215100254.pdf 
accessed 26 Oct 2009 (Nanotechnology Taskforce). 
171 Ibid, at p.19. 
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international level especially in areas of Australian’s scientific strength in photonics, opto-
electronics, biomedical, quantum-based technologies and materials.172 
 
2.5.5 US nanotechnology development 
 
Since the space race, nanotechnology has become the largest US government science 
initiative.173 The US NNI was established in 2000 to build, characterise and understand 
devices at nanoscale. The potential areas of applications have been identified including 
medicine, manufacturing, material sciences, information technology, energy and 
environmental sciences. The NNI has allocated funding in different agencies to continue 
research activities for nanotechnology programmes, where $464 million has been spent in 
2001 and has increased to approximately $1 billion in fiscal year 2005.174  
 
The implementation plan of NNI includes the long term goal of fundamental research of 
nanoscience and engineering specifically focusing upon understanding and synthesis of 
nanometre size building blocks in potential areas of materials and manufacturing, 
nanoelectronics, medicine and health care, environment and energy, the chemical and 
pharmaceuticals industries, biotechnology and agriculture, computation and information 
technology, and national security.175 For future investments in nanotechnology, importance 
areas have been identified to include (1) nanomaterials; (2) interface of nanoscale technology 
with biology; (3) integration of nanosystems; (4) infrastructure and instrumentation.  
 
The introduction of the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (also 
known as Nanotechnology Act) has authorised the nanotechnology research and development 
programmes in different agencies. By passing of the Nanotechnology Act, the legislation has 
unauthorised USD 3.7 billion in nanoscience and nanotechnology between fiscal year 2005 
to 2008.176 This Act has authorised the formation of the National Nanotechnology Program 
                                                          
172 Nanotechnology Taskforce, n.170, at p.20. 
173 Bawa et al., n.30, at p.151. 
174 Roco M C and Bainbridge W ‘Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance’ National 
Science Foundation and Department of Commerce Report, 2002.  
175 The Committee for the Review of the National Nanotechnology Initiative “Small Wonders, Endless Frontiers 
Nanotechnology Academy Press, Washington (2002) at 
http://www.nano.gov/html/res/small_wonder_pdf/smallwonder.pdf accessed 20 October 2009, at p.23. 
176 Miller et al., n.32, at p.116. 
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with the aim to establish research centres and advanced technology user facilities, encourage 
coordination between agencies; support the research on ethical, legal, education  implications 
of nanotechnology.177  
 
There are similar areas of interest of nanotechnology between Australia and Malaysia and 
UK, particularly the emphasised on the medical and health areas as well as electronics. The 
different area show different is mining and agri-business. This may also provide similar 
argument to Australia that different areas of nanotechnology requires different subject matter 
of IPRs such as patents, design and plant variety rights. The existing forms are sufficient to 
protect the areas and they are meant to be examined in this thesis, except as in plant variety 
rights. In the US, it demonstrates active funding activities from different organisations for the 
development of nanotechnology. The introduction of the Nanotechnology Act marked the 
importance and how serious nanotechnology in the US, however none of new IPRs are 
mentioned under this Act. This strongly supports the argument that new forms of IPRs are 
insufficient.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the technical and scientific principle underpinning nanotechnology 
which relevant to the legal analysis in the selected jurisdiction. This chapter argues that being 
new, emerging, complex and multidisciplinary like nanotechnology, it is difficult to define 
precisely and usefully. To date, there is no single or universally accepted definition for 
nanotechnology. Furthermore, as revealed in the interviews conducted under this study, it is a 
common understanding that nanotechnology cannot be a discrete area. The difficulty in 
defining nanotechnology therefore militates against sui generis protection. Thus, this thesis 
strongly argues that the current IPRs are sufficient to govern the issues related to 
nanotechnology and all forms of IP are meant to be surveyed in this thesis. From the 
literature and informed by the interviews conducted in this study, nanotechnology shows 
some characteristics with previous technologies such as Semiconductor Chip, biotechnology 
and ICT. These previous technologies have been sufficiently protected under the existing 
                                                          
177 More discussion see Honda M ‘Nanotechnology Legislation in the 108th Congress’ (2004) 1 Nanotech Law 
& Bus. 63. 
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forms of IP. Thus, the same contention may be made to nanotechnology without the need to 
have separate forms of IP. Appreciation of historical background and trajectory of 
nanotechnology also provide some significant illustration to the legal analysis in determining 
the different IP subject matter as well as the magnitude of duration for IP enforcement. The 
development suggests that nanotechnology has developed without a separate IP regime. The 
focused areas of interest for nanotechnology in Malaysia, UK, and EU demonstrate that there 
are some overlapping areas such as health and medical and electronics. All of these areas are 
potentially applicable to the existing forms of IP, and these forms of IP will be examined in 
this study. Furthermore, it reveals that none of these jurisdictions have protected 
nanotechnology through sui generis rights. Similar legal analysis can also be made to the 
Australian which has overlapping areas with Malaysia and UK, particularly in health and 
medical, except on mining and agriculture. This indicates that various IP subject matters are 
applicable for nanotechnology without the need to introduce a new form of IP. Furthermore, 
the US Nanotechnology Act is silent on the new form of IP, which reinforces that sui generis 
right for nanotechnology is impossible.  
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CHAPTER 3  
BREACH OF CONFIDENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The small scale and multidisciplinary nature of nanotechnology information would be 
relevant to be protected under the law of confidence. The point became evident in the 
interviews conducted in this study, where it was emphasised that the law of confidence is 
important for nanotechnology.178 Examples provided in the interviews were manufacturing 
processes at nanoscale and customer lists. Beyond the company level, it was also emphasised 
the importance of having a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) between a university and a 
graduate student who is conducting research on nanotechnology in order to expressly prohibit 
such disclosure of the information. Furthermore, as compared to other IPRs, law of 
confidence does not differentiate between products, processes, goods or services because it 
protects the information as such, as long as all the requirements for confidentiality are 
fulfilled. It is to be emphasised too that due to complexity and multidisciplinary nature of 
nanotechnology where the research is still at the basic stage and lots of technological 
investment has to be made, the confidentiality agreement would be very significant to protect 
valuable information. As currently drawn, the law of confidence is neither complicated nor 
controversial, save on the issue of proprietary interest in the information. 
 
Similar to the approach taken in the UK, Malaysia has also adopted the common law and 
rules of equity protecting confidential information.179 The action for breach of confidence 
protects information in various forms ranging from personal information, government secrets 
to information of a highly technical and commercial significance.180  
                                                          
178 Interviewees B, D and A. A survey of economics literatures illustrates firms using secrecy as the most 
effective mechanism rather than other IP, Lopez A with comments by Dominique Foray and Kevin Urama 
‘Innovation and Appropriability chapter 1, at pp.9-10 available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/economics accessed 25 May 2012. 
179 Reception of common law rules and equity to Malaysia has been made through section 3 and 5 of the Civil 
Law Act 1956; see a copy of this in n.77, Appendix 1.  
180 Gurry has categorised the information into trade secrets, personal confidences, government information and 
artistic and literary confidences, Gurry F Breach of Confidence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) at pp.7-21. 
Gurry’s first text of breach of confidence is still very useful and highly relevant to the current study because it 
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John Hull181 discusses a number of the policy concerns which underlie the protection of 
technical, commercial and other confidential information. He first considers a property rights 
approach, including the notion of personal autonomy put forward by Sisella Bok.182 Hull 
opines that Bok’s arguments are more compelling in the field of personal secrets than of 
commercial secrets. However, they arguably apply with some force to scientists working at 
the forefront of nanosciences; for these individuals and teams of individuals who wish to 
publish their research results183 or move from one organisation to another.184  
 
Another problem with a property right approach is that the courts of Malaysia and the UK 
have rejected a proprietary analysis. The idea of treating information as having proprietary 
rights has attracted consideration185 and has been a long standing debate.186 There have been 
fairly voluminous judicial decisions which have rejected the notion of proprietary rights of 
the information, for example secret processes of mechanical conception187 or information in 
wedding photographs188 or in examination papers.189 The court held that contract or equity 
would play their role for the action of breach of confidence, for example in Boardman v 
Phipps,190 Seager v Copydex Ltd,191 and in AG v Guardian Newspaper;192 and also similar 
stance in Malaysia in Schmidt Scientific Sdn Bhd v Ong Han Suan & Ors,193 Yeohata 
Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors194 and Electrocad Australia Pte Ltd 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provides groundwork study of the law of confidence. Although new edition has now been prepared, Gurry’s 
extensive discussion provides useful source for the nanotechnological context. On account of Gurry’s original 
work, Aplin T et al., Gurry on Breach of Confidence 2nd ed (Oxford: OUP, 2011) produce an updated 
development of the law of confidence. 
181 Hull J Commercial Secrecy: Law and Practice (London: S&M, 1998), at pp.1-2 (‘Hull, 1998’). 
182 According to Bok “Someone who cherishes a secret recipe or who is working in secret on a scientific 
formula or a new design for a machine may see its secrecy of the highest personal importance.” Bok S Secrets 
(Oxford: OUP, 1984), at p.141. 
183 For concerns whether their research result might be against public interest, see 3.4. 
184 Interviewee D. 
185 Barrett M ‘The “Law of Ideas” Reconsidered’ (1989) J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 691, at p.695.  
186 See for example, Toulson R G and Phipps C M Confidentiality (2nd edn) (London: S&M, 2006), at p.29. See 
also Ricketson S ‘Confidential Information – A New Proprietary Interest? Part I and Part II (1977-1978) 11 
Melb. U. L. Rev. 223; Stuckey J E ‘The Liability of Innocent Third Parties Implicated in Another’s Breach of 
Confidence’ (1981) 4 U.N.S.W.L.J. 73; Weinrib A S ‘Information and Property’ (1988) 38 U. Toronto L. J. 
117; Wei G ‘Surreptitious Takings of Confidential Information’ (1992) 12 Legal Stu. 302. 
187 Nichrotherm Electric Co. Ltd v Percy [1957] R.P.C. 207, at 209. 
188 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No.3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] Q.B 125, at 119 and 127. 
189 Oxford v Moss (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 183. 
190 [1967] 2 A.C 46 (HL) 127. 
191 [1967] 1 W.L.R 923, at 931. 
192 [1990] A.C 109, at 281. 
193 [1998] 1 C.L.J 685. 
194 [2001] 6 C.L.J 418. 
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v Mejati RCS Sdn Bhd.195 Against this background, many of Honore’s incidents of 
ownership may be identified in relation to nanotechnology information and that an approach 
based on property may have a sound theoretical basis. Although this researcher has 
considered it,196 nevertheless in view of strong judicial statements against property 
characterisation in Malaysia and UK, the approach is unlikely to be accepted in the near 
future. 
 
Next, Hull discusses the economic considerations that are used to justify IP.197 He notes that 
breach of confidence lies behind and complements rights such as patents, designs and 
copyright. Many of these justifications for IP apply with equal force to confidential 
information, even regarding patents as an incentive to disclose novel inventions – there 
would be no incentive to disclose if inventions could not otherwise be kept secret, nor would 
novelty be possible to preserve.198  
 
Especially significant for nanotechnology is Hull’s next point – that protection of secrecy is 
essential to encourage and protect exchanges of ideas and information, citing the US case of 
Kewanee Oil v Bicron.199 In this case, the US Supreme Court recognised trade secrets law as 
alternative protection to patents. The court emphasised that the patent policy of encouraging 
invention was not disturbed by the existence of another form of incentive to invent, i.e. trade 
secret. In fact, both systems co-exist and each has its own role. The court concluded that the 
extension of trade secret protection to patentable inventions does not conflict with the patent 
policy of disclosure. For a multi-disciplinary topic like nanotechnology, the ability to 
exchange ideas and information in confidence is especially important. 
 
As a tool in the armoury of commercial ethics, breach of confidence can be useful to 
discourage industrial espionage and cyber-appropriation of information,200 alongside specific 
                                                          
195 [1998] 3 M.L.J 422. 
196 See Appendix 3. 
197 Hull 1998, n.181, at pp.3-4. 
198 See 3.3.1.2. 
199 416 US 470 (1974). 
200 For example, Torremans P Holyoak & Torremans Intellectual Property Law 5th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 
states that use of the internet has increased the cross-border flow of confidential information, at p.525; Sir 
Nicholas-Browne Wilkinson V.-C in AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Two Others [1989] 2 F.S.R. 81, 
stated that “the truth of the matter is that in the contemporary world of electronics and jumbo jets news 
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legislative measures. Enactment of measures such as the US Federal Economic Espionage 
Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839) and the UK’s Computer Misuse Act 1990201 suggest 
that these are perceived to be problem areas. 
 
The need for protection of trade secrets has developed alongside other aspects such as 
personal privacy202 official secrecy and its counterpart, freedom of information. The 
exceptions to the UK’s Freedom of Information Act203 suggest that its potential to undermine 
confidentiality in nano research is limited, even where carried out in public universities or 
government laboratories. However, the question arises whether or not the changes to UK 
breach of confidence in personal information caused by the introduction of the Article 10 of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) affects trade secrets? It is said that the passage of 
HRA 1998 is less likely to affect commercial confidences.204 Aplin explains that although “it 
no longer makes sense to speak of a defence of public interest” post-HRA 1998 and that 
injunctive relief may be governed by the decision in Cream Holdings v Banerjee,205 
nonetheless she is clear that other ingredients should remain relatively unchanged for 
commercial confidences.206 In a recent decision, Slade J in WXY v Gewanter207 has adopted 
the traditional approach to private information and she even has a heading ‘public interest 
defence’ where she refers to this as a part of proportionality under European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). As well, she uses the cause of action under Coco v AN Clark 
(Engineering) Ltd.208 Likewise, the same approach of applying Coco v Clark has been made 
by Arnold J in Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd209 for 
technical information. This shows that the law relating to commercial confidences has not 
changed significantly and therefore remains in line with Malaysia and other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions where ECHR does not apply.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
anywhere is news everywhere”, at 105; see also the international and European protection of the cross border 
flow of information in 3.2. 
201 Malaysia’s Computer Misuse Act 1997 was modeled on the UK law. 
202 Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457, is arguably less relevant for nanotechnology. 
203 http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/environmental_information/information_request/exceptions.aspx 
204 Aplin T ‘Commercial Confidences After the Human Rights Act’ (2007) E.I.P.R 411, at p.419. 
205 [2004] UKHL 44. 
206 Aplin, n.204, at p.419; in “a commercial context it continues unscathed”, Moosavian R ‘Charting the 
Journey from Confidence to the New Methodology’ (2012) E.I.P.R. 324, at pp.334-335. 
207 [2012] EWHC 496 (QB). 
208 [1968] F.S.R. 415 at 419. 
209 [2012] EWHC 616 (Ch). 
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Furthermore, the court’s approach for breach of confidence has been tailored by flexibility 
and pragmatism approach.210 This flexibility approach was emphasised by Bently and 
Sherman “that the courts would not be hidebound by particular conventions or models. As 
such, they could tailor rules to the circumstances as and when they present themselves.” 211 
This suggests that this cause of action may be well suited to new fields such as 
nanotechnology. As noted by Keene LJ in Douglas v Hello!212 “breach of confidence is a 
developing area of the law, the boundaries of which are not immutable but may change to 
reflect changes in society, technology and business practice.”213 Similarly, Burger CJ stated 
that trade secrets “still have an important part to play in the technological and scientific 
advancement of the Nation”.214 The dynamic nature of breach of confidence is especially 
suitable for nanotechnology because the technology moves rapidly. The policy 
considerations discussed above justify as appropriate the protection under the law of 
confidence for nanotechnology.   
 
The information is to be secret or confidential and it can be in any form, either oral, written 
or any other tangible forms. The obligation of confidential information is based on 
contractual agreement, equitable principle and possibly proprietary rights in the information. 
The requirement for an action for breach of confidence was set out in Coco v Clark where 
Megarry J held that:215  
“In my judgment, three elements are normally required if, apart from contract, a case of breach of 
confidence is to succeed. First, the information itself … must ‘have the necessary quality of 
confidence about it.’216 Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances 
importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that 
information to the detriment of the party communicating it”. 
 
                                                          
210 Gurry, n.180, at p.58. 
211 Bently L and Sherman B Intellectual Property Law 3rd ed (Oxford: OUP, 2009), at p.1005.  
212 [2001] Q.B 967 CA); [2001] E.M.L.R 199. 
213 Ibid, at 1011 and at 251. 
214 Kewanee Oil Co Bicron Corp (1974) 416 US 470. 
215 [1968] F.S.R. 415 at 419. 
216 This is the word of Lord Greene MR in Saltman (Engineering) Co. Ltd v Campbell (Engineering) Co. Ltd 
(1948) 65 R.P.C. 203. But the court has held that to establish the action for breach of confidence, the 
information needs to be identified; see John Zink Co. Ltd v Wilkinson [1973] RPC 717; see also Ocular 
Sciences Ltd. & Anor v Aspect Vision Care Ltd & Ors, Geoffrey Harrison Galley v Ocular Sciences Ltd [1997] 
RPC 289 at 360; and CMI – Centers for Medical Innovation GmbH and Another v Phytopharm Plc [1999] FSR 
235, at 252. 
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As an equitable creature of case law in UK, Malaysia and other commonwealth countries, 
law on breach of confidence is well established and executed in judicial decision.217 The 
protection under the law of confidence has the potential to be valuable right because it does 
not need to resort to expensive applications to register, nor is term of protection limited by 
statute as in patent and trade mark protection.218 The following discussion uses Megarry’s 
characteristics of the cause of action to explore its application to nanotechnology. Next, 
however, is to discuss the international protection of undisclosed information under the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement, the treatment of secret information under the WIPO Model Law 
Provisions on Protection Against Unfair Competition219 (WIPO Model Law) and the 
European recognition of ‘know-how’. 
 
3.2 International and European attitudes to protection of undisclosed information  
 
TRIPS recognises a requirement for the Member States to protect undisclosed information. 
Article 39 states that in order to ensure effective protection against unfair competition as 
provided under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention 1967 (Paris), a natural or legal persons 
shall have a right to control information from being disclosed, acquired or used without their 
consent in a manner contrary to the honest commercial practices, provided the information is 
secret, having commercial value and a reasonable steps have been taken to keep the 
information secret.  
 
This provision provides a flexible framework to Member States to protect confidential 
information and enjoy certain freedom to implement it.220 The protection of “undisclosed 
                                                          
217 The approach has given the courts more flexibility, although the flexibility would allow the court to 
judicially accommodate to a new situation, however, legal uncertainty until the courts give a legal decision 
could be a problem, see also in Colston C and Galloway J Modern Intellectual Property Law 3rd edn (London: 
Routledge, 2010), at p.234. 
218 Torremans, n.200, at p.526. 
219 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair 
Competition, Geneva, 1996, WIPO Publication No. 832(E), ISBN 92-805-0642-0, (‘WIPO Model Law’); The 
earliest Model Law was in 1967, Model Law for Developing Countries on Marks, Trade Names and Acts of 
Unfair Competition, United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), Geneva, 
1967. 
220 De Werra J ‘What Legal Framework for Promoting the Cross-Border Flow of Intellectual Assets (Trade 
Secrets and Music)? A View from Europe Towards Asia (China and Japan) (2009) I.P.Q. 27, at pp.32-33. 
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information” includes know-how and trade secrets which have commercial value.221  The 
rationale for TRIPS to choose the words “undisclosed information” is to avoid being 
connected to any given legal system and the information mentioned under TRIPS should be 
given a wide meaning to include all types of data such as formulas and test data, subject to 
that the information is identifiable.222 “Contrary to honest commercial practices” includes 
breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and acquisition of 
undisclosed information by the third party.223 The words “lawfully within the control” is to 
be associated with reasonable steps taken by the right holder to keep the information secret in 
the sense that he has the possession of the information, he has knowledge of the information 
and that the information must be under his physical control either in documents form or other 
materials form which embody the secret information.224 
 
The concept of “commercial value” under TRIPS requires that a trade secret will have to do 
within the business sphere225, is not easily accessible226, must confer competitive 
advantage227 and involve a difficulty in obtaining the techniques and the information in 
question.228 Thus, commercial value is set as a threshold for the protection of trade secrets 
i.e. below the threshold, no protection will be granted.229 The secrecy of the information is all 
dependant on the extent to which the information is generally known as well as the owner’s 
                                                          
221 The line to draw on ‘confidential information’, ‘trade secret’ and ‘know-how’ can be traced in many cases 
involving employer and ex-employee; albeit likely to be confusing, Hull J ‘Trade Secret Licensing’ (2009) 
J.I.P.L.P. Vol. 4, No.3, 203, at pp.205-206. Information having technical and commercial value is protected 
under TRIPS, Dessemontet F Protection of Trade Secrets and Confidential Information in Correa C M and 
Yusuf A A (ed) Intellectual Property and International Trade: TRIPS Agreement (The Netherlands: KLI, 
2008), at p.281. 
222 Gervais D The TRIPS Agreement (London: S&M, 2008) at p.424. 
223 Footnote Article 39(2) TRIPS. 
224 De Carvalho N P The TRIPS Regime of Antitrust and Undisclosed Information (The Netherlands: KLI, 
2008), at p.226. For example as mentioned in the interview a reasonable step taken to keep the information 
through the NDA. 
225 The enforcement of rights of trade secret does not necessarily means that it should occurs in a trade-related 
environment only, but what is important is economic competition of any relevant sort, Ibid, at pp.225-226. 
226 Accessible refers only to the information, not to the physical support embodying the secret information, Ibid, 
at p.231. 
227 It is sufficient to confer competitive advantage if competitors or consumers perceive information to have 
value, Gervais, n.222, at p.425. 
228 Dessemontet, n.221, at p.280. 
229 Ibid, at p.280 who stresses that rather than to define precisely what ‘commercial value’ is, it is more 
convenient to relate to the usefulness of the information; De Carvalho, n.224 states that “commercial value 
means competitive value”, and the information is having commercial value because it is secret must be 
ascertained in terms of objective test, at pp.235-236; commercial value may include technical information and 
business information, Correa C M Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 
at p.373; that the information should give some competitive advantage, where it is sufficient for the information 
to be seen as having some value, does not need to be put in practical valuable way, Gervais, n. 222, at p.425.  
53 
 
effort to keep the information secret.230 Relative secrecy is sufficient for protection and if it 
involves a complex body of information; what matters is it lies in the body of information 
and not in the individual elements of the information.231  
 
The WIPO Model law has shown a similar approach to unfair competition in respect of secret 
information. Article 6(3) 1996 WIPO Model law defines “secret information” as not 
generally known or readily accessible to the persons within the circles that normally deal 
with the kinds of information; having commercial values for its secrecy and where the 
rightful holder has taken reasonable steps to keep the information secret. The consideration to 
determine the reasonable steps taken by the rightful owner includes the effort and money 
spent in developing the secrecy of the information; how valuable the information is to 
himself and his competitors; the extent of the measures taken and the ease or difficulty of 
acquisition of the information by others; that the information has to be identified and the 
intention on the part of rightful holder to treat the information as secret.232 
 
Article 6(1) WIPO Model law provides: 
“Any act or practice, in the course of industrial or commercial activities, that results in the 
disclosure, acquisition or use by others of secret information without the consent of the person 
lawfully in control of that information and in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices 
shall constitute an act of unfair competition”. 
 
When information becomes public, it loses its economic value, both its licensing value and 
competitive values.233 Competitive value depends on innovative techniques and know-how in 
the industrial and commercial fields, therefore unauthorised acquisition of the secret 
information by others although the rightful owner has taken reasonable steps to keep 
information secret will be considered as an act of unfair competition.234 It is a matter of 
                                                          
230 Nimmer R T and Krauthaus P A ‘Information as Property’ (1993) I.J.L.&T Vol. 1, No. 1, 3 at p.27. The 
person who has lawful control must take reasonable steps to ensure that the information in question is 
confidential in nature, reasonably proportionate to the means available and the value of the information, De 
Carvalho, n.224 at pp.236-237; the reasonable steps depend on the types of information and conditions of its 
used, for example keys to get access the computerized information or encryption, Correa, n.229, at p.373; this 
may also include a cost or benefit analysis, Gervais, n.222 at p.425. 
231 De Carvalho, n.224, at pp.231-232. 
232 WIPO Model Law 6.20. 
233 Ibid, 6.04. 
234 Ibid, 6.05 states an exception that employee’s acquisition of confidential information of their employer’s 
commercial and industrial activities will not be caught under this paragraph. 
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concern of the rightful “owner” to maintain the secrecy of the information, for example 
through express contractual agreement or indirect circumstances that reasonable measures are 
taken to keep the information secret so that others may be aware of the confidential nature of 
the information.235  
 
Article 6(2) of the WIPO Model Law lists non-exhaustive acts of unfair competition which 
are similar to the examples provides under TRIPS, and reads as follow:  
Disclosure, acquisition or use of secret information by others without the consent of the rightful 
holder may, in particular, result from;  
(i) industrial or commercial espionage; 
(ii) breach of contract; 
(iii) breach of confidence; 
(iv) inducement to commit any of the acts referred to in items (i) to (iii); 
(v) acquisition of secret information by a third party who knew, or grossly negligent in failing to 
know, that an act referred to in items (i) to (iv) was involved in acquisition. 
 
In the EU, there is no harmonised law of unfair competition but competition law is adapted to 
deal with confidential information. Technology transfer agreements refers to patent licensing 
agreements, know-how licensing agreement, a software copyright licensing agreement or a 
mixed patent, know-how or software licensing agreement.236 Article 1 (i) of the Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulation defines ‘know-how’ as: 
a package of non-patented practical information, resulting from experience and testing, which is: 
(i) secret, that is to say, not generally known or easily accessible, 
(ii) substantial, that is to say, significant and useful for the production of the contract products, and 
(iii) identified, that is to say, described in a sufficiently comprehensive manner so as to make it 
possible to verify that it fulfils the criteria of secrecy and substantiality.237 
                                                          
235 WIPO Model Law 6.07. 
236 Article 1 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 772/2004 of April 2004 on the Application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty of Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements. 
237 The Block Exemption on Technology Transfer Agreements Regulation 772/2004 OJ [2004] 123/11. For a 
working definition of “know-how” in different jurisdiction from Japanese law and Australia law with a 
comparative analyses of other common law countries see Tarr J ‘A Comparative Overview of “Know-How” 
Protection in Japan and Australia’ (1993) J. B. L. 596.  See also discussion on the protection of undisclosed 
information from Indian perspective in Pandey S ‘Legal Regime of Undisclosed Information’ paper 
downloadable link at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965049  visited on 22 July 2009. 
‘Know-how’ is clearly not regarded as having proprietary interest in EEC, Corones S G ‘The European 
Commission’s Approach to Know-How Licensing’ (1984) I. C. L. Q. 181, at p.189. More frequently ‘know-
how’ is considered as “Cinderella’s right” added to the patent licence, or mixed patent and know-how licence, 
and also becomes part of the learning curve of the licensee, without having determine whether it has any 
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Know-how licensing is as important as patent licensing and the protection will be very 
important for industrial development.238 In ‘know-how’ licensing the licensee has to be 
shown how to make an effective use of the information by proper practicality as well as its 
operation rather than simply disclosing the information only.239 The requirement of “secret, 
substantial and identifiable” are likely similar to the requirements for establishing breach of 
confidence. However, the requirement for establishing know-how is rather more stringent 
than the requirement for breach of confidence; in that “experiencing and testing” seem rather 
problematic in application because it needs to show some practicality before establishing 
know-how, and is more relevant to the manufacturing of products – the sphere of Reg 
772/2004. Furthermore, the information resulting from “experiencing and testing” may not 
always be considered as confidential because it is likely difficult to maintain its secrecy.  
 
Based on the provisions discussed above, there seems to be a common understanding of the 
law of confidence although TRIPS is the only instrument obliging protection at the 
international level. The international and European attitudes are important towards the 
protection of cross-border flow of information as mentioned by Hull. It is also evident from 
the Commonwealth jurisdictions that the protection for breach of confidence has been 
developed successfully, for example Australia and Malaysia; Scotland has no rules of equity, 
but it recognises breach of confidence.240 The position under EU competition law reflects a 
common understanding of valuable know-how, albeit rather strictly defined.   
 
3.3 Requirements for protecting confidential information   
 
Using Megarry J’s cause of action241 to provide a structure for nanotechnology confidential 
information, this section examines what is considered as necessary quality of confidence; 
including what types of nanotechnology information might be protected by breach of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
substantial value, see further discussion in Castro-Edwards K ‘Know Your Know-How’ (2009) J.I.P.L.P, Vol 4.  
81. 
238 Whish R Competition Law 6th edn (Oxford, OUP, 2008) at p.766. Corones, argues that licensing agreement 
in ‘know-how’ should be given considerably a greater detail from the economic perspective rather than purely 
legalistic analysis, n. 237, at p.189. 
239 Hull 2009, n, 221, at p.206. 
240 See for example Colston and Galloway, n.217, at p.233. 
241 Extensively cited by Lord Griffiths in Spycatcher [1990] 1 A.C. 109, at 268; Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] A.C. 457, at 13; Lord Hoffmann in Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
(No.3) [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 A.C.1, at 14. 
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confidence; what is considered an obligation of confidence for nanotechnology information; 
how might unauthorised use be considered in the context of nanotechnology information 
especially since it involves collaborative research. 
 
3.3.1 Necessary quality of confidence 
 
The information “must have the necessary quality of confidence”.242 In other words, the 
information “must not be something which is public property and public knowledge.”243 
Thus, types of confidential information, the confidentiality level and when the confidentiality 
is lost are important in determining the necessary quality of confidence.  
 
3.3.1.1 Types of confidential information 
 
There are varying types of information which are protected under the law for breach of 
confidence. Trade secret protection is normally given to the information which has industrial 
and commercial value244 such as chemical formulae;245 technical formulae;246 manufacturing 
processes;247 encrypted programmes;248 price lists;249 customer lists,250 customers’ identities 
                                                          
242 Lord Greene MR in Saltman Engineering (1948) 65 RPC 203, at 215. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Notes from the WIPO Model Law secret information includes manufacturing and commercial secrets 
information such as production methods, chemical formulae, drawings, prototypes, sales methods, distribution 
methods, contract forms, business schedules, details of price agreements, consumer profiles, advertising 
strategies, lists of suppliers or clients, computer software and databases, at 6.16. 
245 For example medicinal formulae in Morison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 241, 68 ER 492; Schering Chemicals Ltd 
v Falkman [1981] 2 All ER 320. In nanotechnology, an example is a chemical formulae of fuel-borne catalyst 
based on cerium oxide which able to save fuel and to reduce the emission of the gas. This example has been 
developed by Oxonica Company; a nanotechnology company spins out from the University of Oxford, see 
n.108. Another example is where a team of scientists from the Newcastle University and Liverpool University 
use nanoporous material to trap and store hydrogen gas that can be used in fuel cell car engine, see 
http://www.ncl.ac.uk/press.office/newslink/item/1097846725, 15 Oct 2004, accessed 20 April 2011. 
246 For example technical formulae relating to heating machinery in Industrial Furnaces Ltd v Reaves [1970] 
R.P.C. 605; technical formulae for anti-theft car device in Electro Cad Australia Pty Ltd & 2 Ors v Mejati RCS 
Sdn Bhd & Ors [1998] 3 A.M.R. 2555; [1998] 3 C.L.J. Supp 196 (HC). The example of nanostructure 
manufacturing process of metal alloy, interviewee A; and using small devices like dendrites in the drug delivery 
system in human body, interviewee C. 
247 For example manufacturing process of copper foil for printed circuits in Yates Circuit Foil Company and 
Another v Electro foils Ltd and Another [1976] F.S.R 345; manufacturing process for making plastic coated 
metal pipes in InTechnology B.V and Others v Unicorn GmbH Plastmaschinen and Others [1995] F.S.R. 765; 
manufacturing process for mosquito coil machine in Yeohata Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn 
Bhd & Ors [2001] 6 C.L.J. 418 see also Australian case for example Mense and Ampere Manufacturing Co Pty 
Ltd v Milenkovic [1973] V. R. 784 concerning the process of making a die for wall plugs. Nanotechnology 
example is the new technique of developing microchips using diamond, interviewee B. 
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and preference, traders’ identities and business consultancy techniques,251 and other 
information of a technical character such as the design of moped engine.252 Equally the court 
does not treat less significantly other information, for example government secrecy253 or 
personal information.254 The varying nature of “confidential information” according to Howe 
et al. “embraces a wide spectrum of types of valuable information, whose relative value, 
duration of value or shelf-life, character and importance vary enormously.”255  
 
The wide spectrum of information protected suggests that there is no strict rule for the 
information to be treated as confidential as long as it is not “trivial tittle-tattle”256 or immoral 
information.257 Therefore, the law of confidence can easily fit in to protect nanotechnology. 
There are different types of nanotechnology information which might be protected under the 
law of confidence including devices or the design, manufacturing processes, methods of 
application of the materials as indicated above. Other examples include using quantum dots 
as markers for labelling purposes.258 Further examples of nanotechnology information can be 
traced from the interviews conducted in this research such as the manufacturing process of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
248 Mars UK Limited v Teknowledge Limited [2000] FSR 138. Under the Seventh Framework Programme 
(FP7) for example the Alternative Routes Towards Information Storage and Transport at the Atomic and 
Molecular Scale (ARTIST) is a completely new nanoscale technology project for information processing and 
storage for efficient inter-molecular communication and compatible data storage, available at 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=FP7_PROJ_EN&ACTION=D&DOC=2&CAT=PROJ&QUERY=0126
f694df5a:1dbd:32ca2052&RCN=93599, accessed 20 April 2011. 
249 For example Certact Pte Ltd v Tang Siew Choy & Ors [1991] 3 C.L.J. 2269 (HC). 
250 For example Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315; Schmidt Scientific Sdn Bhd v Ong Han Suan & Ors [1998] 1 
C.L.J. 685. Nanotechnology example given by interviewee B. 
251 Stephenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd v MacDonald & Evans (1951) 68 R.P.C. 190. Nanotechnology example 
is the information about manufacturing contract in microsystem and electronic devices, interviewee B. 
252 Coco v Clark [1969] RPC 41. Nanotechnology example is the technical character on the design of 
biocompatible dendrimers for cancer diagnosis and therapy, see for example Cheng Y et al. ‘Design of 
Biocompatible Dendrimers for Cancer Diagnosis and Therapy’ (2011) 40 Chem. Soc. Rev. 2673 at p.2676. 
253 For example concerning state secrecy in AG v The Observer Ltd [1989] A.C. 109. 
254 Prince Albert v Strange [1849) EWHC Ch J20; (1849) 2 De Gex & Sim 652; Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 
A.C. 457; [2003] QB 633; Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA 446; WXY v Gewanter [2012] 
EWHC 496 (QB).  
255Howe R et al. Confidential Information and the Database Right in Goulding P (ed) Employee Competition 
(Oxford: OUP, 2007), at p.93. 
256 Coco v Clark [1969] R.P.C. 41 at 48, Per Megarry J “equity ought not to be invoked merely to protect tittle-
tattle, however confidential”; Spycatcher [1990] 1 A.C. 109 (HL) at 282 Per Lord Goff “the duty of confidence 
applies neither to useless information, nor to trivia”; Douglas v Hello [2007] UKHL 21 Per Lord Walker “the 
law of confidence does not protect trivia”, at 83. 
257 Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch. 449, at 453. 
258 Quantum dots or semiconductor nano-crystals have been introduced for bio-labelling purposes, see for 
example Parak W J ‘Labelling of Cells with Quantum Dots’ (2005) Nanotechnology R9 – R25, at p.R.10; see 
also the use of quantum dots for imaging, labelling and sensing, Medintz et al., n.106, at p.442. 
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making aerogels from rice husk, the methods of application of zeolite materials259 new 
techniques of developing microchips using diamonds,260 identification of research 
information related to Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMs) on nano-wires, making 
devices mimicking the nature known as “bio-mimetic”, NDA for students doing research in 
the university concerning nanotechnology;261 and nano-structure techniques for making 
orthopaedic devices for arms and joint replacement.262  
 
Case law on breach of confidence suggests that the cause of action will protect similar range 
of secrets as in macro-world and the dynamic nature of breach of confidence is flexible 
enough to serve nanotechnology and is especially suitable for nanotechnology because it 
moves fast. In particular and unlike patents or (until recently) trademarks, the law of 
confidence does not distinguish between products, goods, materials, processes and services.  
 
3.3.1.2  Confidentiality or secrecy 
 
To establish the action for breach of confidence, the party has to prove that the information 
must have a “confidential” or “secret” quality (or “private” in the case of personal 
information in the UK). The determination of this is decided on a case by case basis. The 
courts are not willing to rely on any accepted general meaning of the terms, because 
confidential or secrecy are chameleonic.263 The interpretation may cover any information 
which has been transmitted in confidence and, not necessarily absolute confidence, it is 
sufficient to treat for relative secrecy.264  
 
                                                          
259 Interviewee C. 
260 Interviewee B. 
261 Interviewee D. 
262 Interviewee A. 
263 Finn P D Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1977), at p.148; “the courts have not 
fleshed-out the meaning of “confidential”, Aplin T ‘The Development of the Action for Breach of Confidence 
in a Post-HRA Era’ (2007) I.P.Q. 19, at p.21, “the source of definition is difficult to find”, Hull, 2009, n. 221, at 
p.205. 
264 For relative confidentiality see Franchi v Franchi [1967] R.P.C. 149, at 153; Schering Chemicals Ltd v 
Falkman [1982] Q.B. 1 at 28 and 37; Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449, at 454, Spycather [1990] 1 A.C. 109 
(HL) at 282. 
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The court has established that the quality of confidence should involve “some product of the 
human brain which suffices to confer a confidential nature upon the information”.265 In 
nanotechnology, it may be potentially easy to establish the quality of confidence and secrecy 
of the information. This is because the scientists and engineers are engaging towards a new 
creation of research as well as building on existing research and looking for improvement. 
Undoubtedly, this involves considerable product of human brain as well as money and their 
laborious effort in reaching for the research’s result. This type of nanotechnology 
information has the quality of confidentiality or secrecy. Therefore, while engaging with all 
of the research a lot of confidential and secret information may have been identified.  
 
Furthermore, nano-material acts differently from material at macro-scale, and the properties 
change dramatically.266 So long as information of this scientific discovery is being kept 
secret, nanoscale information will be treated confidential. In nanotechnology, because of the 
significant amount of money that has been invested, it is especially important to keep the 
scientific discovery confidential prior to scientific publication or patent application.  
 
The test for confidentiality is that the information is not public property and public 
knowledge.267 The effect of the information being imparted to the public domain and being a 
common knowledge of the public was confirmed in Spycatcher.268 In this case, the 
confidential character was lost when the information was disclosed to the public, but 
essentially the court opined that the information will not be considered to have entered the 
public domain if accessible only by some members of the public. Lord Keith noted that:  
“all possible damage to the interest of the Crown has already been done by the publication of 
Spycatcher abroad and the ready availability of copies in this country”.269  
                                                          
265 Per Megarry J in Coco v Clark [1969] R.P.C. 41. 
266 See 2.2.2. 
267 Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd, Lord Green MR (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203, at 
215; Woodward v Hutchin [1977] 2 All E.R. 751; Seager v Copydex [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923, at 932. 
268 [1990] 1 A.C. 109; see also in Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v Central News Ltd (1897) 2 Ch. 48, Stirling J 
stated that “but the information was not made known to the whole world; it was no doubt known to a large 
number of persons, but a greater many more were ignorant of it”, at 53. 
269 [1990] 1 A.C. 109 per Lord Keith at 260; the information is confidential if it is available to one person or 
group of people, and not generally available to others, provided that the information should not be available to 
others, Douglas v Hello (No.3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] Q.B. 125, at 151; this point was not affected by 
appeal to the HL in OBG v Allan [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 A.C. 1. 
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Lord Brightman refused to grant injunctions to the plaintiff on the basis that wide 
dissemination of the information had definitely caused it to enter into public domain and 
stated: 
“that as a result of that publication and the ensuing worldwide dissemination of the facts and 
surmises therein contained, the initial confidential quality of the contents of the book has been 
totally destroyed”.270  
Lord Goff added that: 
“in particular, once it has entered what is usually called the public domain ... the principle of 
confidentiality can have no application to it”.271  
In this regard, Lindsay J in Douglas v Hello (No.5) stated what is important is whether the 
information has the “basis of attributes of inaccessibility”.272  
 
The confidentiality remains as the section of the public have difficulty in obtaining the 
information, except under improper means.273 Thus, in Coco v Clark 274, the court stated that 
“there can be no breach of confidence in revealing to others something which is already 
common knowledge.”275  
 
In O Mustad & Son v Dosen and Another,276 the court refused to grant a permanent 
injunction to protect information, which had been confidential, after the purchaser of the 
originating company’s assets had filed a patent which had been published. No evidence was 
adduced as to any other information which might have remained confidential.277 Lord 
Buckmaster stated: 
“after the disclosure had been made by the appellants to the world, it was impossible for them to get 
an injunction restraining the respondents from disclosing what was common knowledge. The secret, 
as a secret, had ceased to exist”.278 
Similarly in Franchi v Franchi279 once the information had been published in the foreign 
patent specification in Belgium, the confidentiality of information was lost.  
                                                          
270 [1990] 1 A.C. 109 per Lord Brightman at 265. 
271 Ibid, per Lord Goff, at 282. 
272 [2003] E.M.L.R. 31, at 701-702. 
273 Hull 1998, n.181, at p.50. 
274 [1968] F.S.R. 415. 
275 Ibid, per Megarry J at 419-420. 
276 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 109 but decided in 1928. 
277 Ibid; see also Stanelco Fibre Optics Ltd's Applications [2004] EWHC 2263; [2005] RPC 15. 
278 [1964] 1 W.L.R. 109. 
279 (1967) R.P.C. 149. 
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On the other hand secret information which is not in the public domain, but intended to be 
published in the near future may not have the necessary quality of confidence to be protected 
by an interlocutory injunction. In Times Newspaper plc v MGN Ltd280 the second plaintiff 
was the publisher of Lady Thatcher’s memoirs which was expected to be published on 10 
October. The first plaintiff had been licensed to publish extracts of the book in the Sunday 
Times on the 10 October. However, on 5 and 6 October substantial extracts from the books 
appeared in the Daily Mirror. The plaintiffs claimed for copyright infringement, breach of 
confidence and an interlocutory injunction restraining further publication of the contents of 
the book. The court held that: 
“It is certainly not information which is confidential in the sense that the public is not intended to 
learn of it, because this is material which is intended to be published eventually, no doubt, as widely 
as an efficient publisher can procure.... whether that commercial interest in the exclusive right to 
publish this material is such as to confer on the material what has in law been described as the 
quality of confidentiality, seems to me doubtful”.281 
 
If the decision in Times v MGN is correct (which Hull doubts282) it could be problematic for 
research information which is intended for publication in scientific journals. However, it has 
probably been overtaken by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Douglas v Hello283 where the 
details of the wedding photos were intended to be published commercially have been 
recognised to have a quality of confidence.  
 
However, access by others does not always mean that confidentiality is lost. Arguably, the 
proposition on the basis that once the information has been disclosed it loses its confidential 
character may not always be true because this is a question of degree.284 There are factors 
which determine whether publication of the information destroys confidentiality such as facts 
of the case, the types of publication made and the nature of industry in which publication is 
made.285 The court emphasised the question of degree in Franchi v Franchi,286 where Cross J 
stated that: 
                                                          
280 [1993] E.M.L.R. 443. 
281 Ibid, at 446-447, per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 
282 Hull 1998, n.181, at p.52 
283 N.272 above. 
284 Spycatcher [1990] 1 A.C. 109 at 177; Douglas v Hello! (No.6) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, at 105. 
285 Lavery P ‘Secrecy, Springboards and the Public Domain’ (1998) E.I.P.R. 93, at p.95. 
286 [1967] R.P.C.149. 
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“It must be a question of degree depending on the particular case, but if relative secrecy remains, 
the plaintiff can still succeed”.287  
 
Thus, widely known information does not necessarily means that it is in the public domain as 
Shaw LJ observed in Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd288 that: 
“though facts maybe widely known, they are not ever-present in the minds of the public. To 
extend the knowledge or to revive the recollection of matters which may be detrimental or 
prejudicial to the interests of some person or organisation is not to be condoned because the facts 
are already known to some and linger in the memories of others”.289 
 
The possibility that information may be known by a considerable number of people but still 
be protected by confidentiality is helpful in nanotechnology, because it is often devised by 
teams of researchers. Therefore as Hull has argued, the accessibility and availability of the 
information to the public does not simply mean the information has lost its confidentiality.290 
Although the information is accessible if it may be ascertained by reverse engineering,291 or 
through product analysis,292 it does not simply mean by purchasing the brochure of portable 
building enable them to build a building without constructing a prototype and relevant test on 
it.293 Therefore, this is important in nanotechnology because it is not simply that the scientist 
would be able to reverse engineer (it is not easy to reverse engineer in nanotechnology) of the 
nanoscale product, or obtain information of certain nanoscale process, but he has to undergo 
a very complicated experiment over the process.294 Therefore, the mere availability of 
nanotechnology information, to some extent will not make it lose its confidentiality, 
especially where important nanotechnology exhibits different properties from its macro-scale 
counterparts.  
                                                          
287 [1967] R.P.C. 149, at 152-153; see also Lord Keith in Spycatcher [1990] 1 A.C. 109, at 260; see also Hull 
1998, n.181, at p.53. 
288 [1982] Q.B. 1. 
289 Ibid, at 28 
290 Information is still confidential if it could only be obtained by expenditure of times and effort to discover, 
Hull 1998, n.181, at p.53. 
291 Yates Circuits Foil Co. Ltd v Electrofoils Ltd [1976] F.S.R. 345; Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd [1999] 
EWHC 226 (Pt) at 29-37. 
292 Ackroyds (London) Ltd v Islington Plastics [1962] .R.P.C 97. 
293 Terrapin v Builders Supply (Hayes) Limited [1967] R.P.C. 375; see discussion in Hull 1998, n.181, at p.53. 
294 As compared to other technology, it was viewed that to reverse engineer in nanotechnology is radically more 
difficult, Zekos ‘Patenting Abstract Ideas in Nanotechnology’ (2006) the J.W.I.P. Vol 9, No.1 113, at p.115. 
Even it can be obtained by reverse engineering as in Franchi v Franchi [1967] RPC 149 it does not necessarily 
means that the information is accessible to the public. But the court stated that the information of coin-receiving 
machine was not confidential since anyone could buy the machine and re-calibrate the machine to see how it 
worked in Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd 1999] EWHC 226 (Pat) at 29-37. 
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However, if the information is disclosed to a large group so that too many people know about 
the information, it is very unlikely to maintain its quality of confidence.295 This view was 
emphasised by Lord Denning in Dunford and Elliott Ltd v Johnson and Firth Brown Ltd296 
where he stated that: 
“this widespread use of the information drives a hole into the blanket of confidence: especially 
when the information is being used  - or, shall I say misused – for the benefit of some potential 
shareholders, and not for the benefit of the others. So much so that it would not be reasonable that 
the stipulation for confidences should be enforced”.297  
 
The confidence is only lost after it has been transmitted into a relevant group of people who 
have some interest in knowing the information.298 This situation, according to Lavery does 
not include “men on the street” because they do not have interest in knowing the 
information.299 In that case, less extensive publication of the information is sufficient to 
destroy confidentiality if the information is having some interest to the group of specialised 
people such as foreign intelligence agencies or trade competitors who by all means can be 
expected to obtain the information even the information has been placed in an obscure 
place.300  
 
In nanotechnology, there are analogies with the submission of scientific papers to a journal. 
The important question here is when the information loses its confidence; either when the 
article has been published in the scientific journal or when the article is sent to the editor? 
Applying Douglas v Hello!, albeit a case on personal confidence, the information is 
confidential if it is only available to one person or group, so long that this person or group 301 
does not intend to disclose it to others. Similarly, applying the rules in Spycatcher the 
confidentiality is not lost when only a section of the public has access to the information. 
Thus, if for example the paper is merely sent to the editorial board, it does not necessarily 
mean that the confidential is lost. However, applying Dunford v Johnson, it is very difficult 
                                                          
295  Especially relevant in the internet age, see n.200 above.  
296 [1978] F.S.R 143. 
297 Ibid, at 148-149; see also from Lord Goff in Spycatcher [1990] 1 A.C. 109 which argued that when too many 
people know, it is impossible to maintain its confidentiality “means no more than that the information in 
question is so generally accessible that in all the circumstances, it cannot be regarded as confidential”, at 282. 
298 Lavery, n.285, at p.93. 
299 Ibid, at p.93. 
300 Stanley P The Law of Confidentiality: A Restatement (Oxford: HP, 2008) at p.39. 
301 The readership of the journal sometimes may comprise a group of people, for example editor-in-chief, 
managing editors, editorial boards. 
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to maintain the confidentiality when too many people know about the information, which 
may be relevant to nanotechnology when several teams of individuals are involved. 
Nevertheless, as pointed in Franchi v Franchi, what is important is the question of degree, 
depending on the particular case. Based on these, it is clear that confidentiality is lost when 
the article has been published in the scientific journal, and not when it was sent to the editor, 
so long as the editor does not intend to disclose to the other person, for example if not 
accepted for publication. However, it is difficult to maintain the confidentiality if there are 
too many editors or scientists which have a particular interest in the information. But if the 
decision in Times v MGN is correct it could be problematic for research information which is 
intended for publication in scientific journals. 
 
The ‘quality of confidence’ requirement need not be the same as in proving novelty for 
patentability. In Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd,302 the court 
stated that novelty is not a requirement for breach of confidence. In Coco v Clark,303 Megarry 
J observed that “novelty depends on the thing itself, and not upon the quality of its 
constituent parts. Indeed, often the more striking the novelty, the more commonplace its 
components”.304 However, in different situation the court requires that the information 
should have qualities of novelty and originality.305 In De Maudsley v Palumbo and Others,306 
the plaintiff communicated his idea to the defendant of the features of a night club which 
were; (a) it would be legally open all night long; (b) large size of a “high tech industrial” 
warehouse style; (c) it would have separate areas for dancing, resting, socialising and VIP 
lounge; (4) enclosed dance area to ensure a good sound quality, light and excellent 
atmosphere; (5) it would employ top disc jockey from the UK and around the world. Knox J 
stated that all the features, except the first for it to be legally open all night long, lacked 
novelty and or were too vague for the information to constitute it being confidential.  
 
                                                          
302 (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203; see also Under Water Welders v Street & Longthorns [1968] R.P.C. 498. 
303 [1969] R.P.C. 41. 
304 Ibid, at 47. 
305 See, for example in Maudsley v Palumbo [1996] F.S.R. 447; Gupta v Dasgupta [2003] F.S.R. 18 Vijeder Jain 
J observed that “the very concept of matchmaking by the plaintiff’s concept of giving the choice to the bride was 
novel and original in thought and capable of being protected.”, at 352; see also in Coulthard v Disco Mix 
[1999] 2 All E.R. 457. 
306 [1996] F.S.R. 447. 
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In relation to the patent protection, the law of confidence is very significant because the 
obligation that arises in confidence will secure against disclosure of the invention, without 
which it can be novelty destroying.307 Thus, the action for breach of confidence is able to 
secure “novelty” for the new product, process and plays a pre-requisite part for patent 
protection.308 Sir John Donaldson has considered breach of confidence as an “ice-cube” 
where he stated that: 
“confidential information is like an ice-cube: unless the other party agrees to keep it in his 
refrigerator by the time of trial it will be just a pool of water which neither party wants. It is the 
inherently perishable mature of confidential information which gives rise to its unique 
problems”.309  
 
There should be provided certain limit to the access of confidential information before the 
application for patents. This can be done in the form of express covenant, NDA which 
prevented the disclosure of confidential information before applying patents. The relation of 
confidentiality and patent law in the context of novelty of an invention has been considered 
by the court in Lux Traffic Controls Limited v Pike Signals Ltd,310 on the issue whether prior 
disclosure had made the invention available to the public. In this case Aldous LJ examined 
that the minutes of a meeting did not clearly describe a system of the patent and did not make 
the invention known to the public. Furthermore, there was an obligation of confidence in a 
letter to the Department of Transport and the defendant had not established that the 
information in the letter was made available to the public. In Miliken Denmark As v Walk 
Off Mats Ltd311 the Patent Court considered whether prior use would invalidate the patent, 
and held that a prior use does not invalidate the patent if it is merely a use which is “secret 
and uninformative”. But it is not uninformative use if the use which enabled the invention to 
be performed.  
 
Breach of confidence is thus useful on its own right, for example as mentioned above for 
secret manufacturing process like nanotechnology, and as “provisional protection” for 
                                                          
307 Cornish W and Llewelyn D Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights 
(London: S&M, 2007), at p.308, n.19; see Sampson T ‘Strategy Legal Thinking for IPR Dependent Enterprise – 
the “Five Rings” Method’ (2009) E.I.P.R. 411, at p.415. 
308 Carty H ‘An Analysis of the Modern Action for Breach of Commercial Confidence: When is Protection 
Merited?’ (2008) I.P.Q. 416, at p.434. 
309 In Spycather [1988] Ch. 333, at 358. 
310 [1993] R.P.C. 107. 
311 [1996] F.S.R. 292. 
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patentable nanotechnology invention.312 This is very important for the nature of new 
technology like nanotechnology, secrecy is the best protection before disclose of their new 
invention in patent.313 Furthermore, breach of confidence can act as supplement to patent 
protection in terms of developing the ideas and protecting know-how surrounding the 
patent.314 At early stages of the formulation of the project, as pointed out by Torremans that 
“when a formal intellectual property right is a target, but one that has yet to achieved – that 
rights in confidential information may have their most valuable role to play”.315 This is 
extremely important for nanotechnology context in particular where the information involves 
processes.316 
3.3.1.3 Protection of ideas or concept 
 
The law of confidence protects ideas or concepts.317 The question here is, does simplicity of 
an idea mean that it is not protected under the law of confidence? The court held that the 
simplicity of the idea does not mean that it is not protected.318 In nanotechnology simple or 
extra piece of information can be protected, for example the information related to the 
development of building up multi-walled nanotubes; nanotechnology applications for food 
                                                          
312 Breach of confidence is alternative protection to patent protection particularly when secrecy is maintainable 
and short term protection is critical, Carty H ‘The Common Law and the Quest for the IP Effect’ (2007) I.P.Q. 
237, at p.265; Binnie J noted that in the food industry recipe secrets were an area where trade secrets law rather 
than patent protection may be sought, such secrets potentially surviving longer than patent protection with its 
disclosure requirement in Cadbury Schweppes Inc v FBI Foods Ltd [2000] F.S.R. 491; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report (2005) Transnational Corporations and the 
Internationalization of R&D, United Nations, New York and Geneva (2005) has also emphasised the 
importance of trade secret by stating that “For R&D – and innovation in general – the most relevant types are 
patents and trade secrets. Trade secrets may in fact be even more important than patents for a country to be 
able to attract FDI in R&D. To the extent that R&D involves sensitive information, TNSc [transnational 
corporations] will always seek to protect trade secrets against disclosure” at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/dosc/wir2005_en.pdf accessed on 7 January 2011, at p.209. Selection has to be made 
for new innovation either to be protected under breach of confidence or patent law, but not under both, 
Beckerman-Rodau A ‘The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and 
Business Decision’ (2002) 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 371, at p.376. Trade secret will be opted over 
patent protected for small companies and start-up firms, Grusd J E ‘Internet Business Methods: What Role Does 
and Should Patent Law Play? (1999) 4 VA. J. L. & Tech. 9, at p.49. 
313 This is because the function of patent as incentives to induce inventors to disclose their new invention rather 
than keeping them secret, Machlup F and Penrose E ‘The Patent Controversy’ (1950) 10 Journal of Economic 
History 1, at p.25. 
314 Carty, n.312, at p.246. 
315 Torremans, n.200, at p.256. 
316 Traditionally, the law of confidence has been used to protect secret processes used to manufacture products, 
Whaley S S ‘The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure’ (1999) 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 809, at p.838; also 
pointed out in the interviews conducted in this study. 
317 But the court held that there is significant difference between concept and aspiration, Knox J in De Maudsley 
v Palumbo [1996] F.S.R. 447, at 456. 
318 Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant and Another [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1293, Roskill J at 1309. 
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packaging;319 or nanotechnology process in cosmetics for examples anti-ageing creams, 
make-up and moisturisers.320 The simplicity or not of the idea is totally dependent on the case 
and the circumstances in which the claimant wishes to protect the idea. Megarry J in Coco v 
Clark321 noted that “the simpler an idea the more likely to be protected”.322 Helsham CJ 
stated that “the more simple an idea, and more novel, given a high potential for profit, then 
the greater the risk, unless there is confidentiality when attempts are being made to find 
purchaser of the system”.323 
 
The ideas should not be vague324 because “vagueness and simplicity are not the same”.325 
Therefore, to be capable of protection the idea must be sufficiently well developed to put into 
practice, therefore the general idea of a triple spiral device is not protected under the law, 
whereas the idea of the actual design is protected.326  
 
The claimant needs to show that the idea is not common knowledge, and the idea needs to be 
realised because if the law is to protect in very general ideas, this would rather impose 
unjustifiable obligations onto those who receive the information.327 In Fraser v Thames 
Television Ltd,328 Hirst J said that “to be capable of protection the idea must be sufficiently 
developed, so that it would be seen to be a concept that has at least some attractiveness for a 
television programme and which is capable of being realised to actuality”.329 Similarly, the 
court granted the action for breach of confidence for an idea of a new concept for a TV series 
in Talbot v General TV Corp Pty Ltd330 because it was capable of being realised in actuality. 
                                                          
319 Chaudry Q ‘Safety and Regulatory Implications of Nano (Health) Foods’ presented at Nanotechnology and 
the Law: The Legal Nitty-Gritty for Nano Foods, Nanocosmetics and Nanomedicines, Leuven 8-9 Dec 2008, 
available at http://www.law.kuleuven.be/imer/IX%20Cahudry.PDF accessed on 5 January 2009. 
320 Bowman D and Van Calster G V ‘Flawless or Fallible? A Review of the Applicability of the EU’s Cosmetics 
Directive in Relation to Nano-Cosmetics’ presented at Nanotechnology and the Law: The Legal Nitty-Gritty for 
Nano Foods, Nanocosmetics and Nanomedicines, Leuven 8-9 Dec 2008, available at 
http://www.law.kuleuven.be/imer/V%20Bowman%20&%20van%20Calster.PDF accessed on 5 January 2009. 
321 [1968] F.S.R. 415. 
322 Ibid, at 420 
323 Wheatley v Bell [1984] F.S.R. 16, at 18. 
324 De Maudsley v Palumbo [1996] F.S.R. 447, at 456 (except that the club would be legally open all night, all 
the ideas were vague and not original); Intelsec Systems v Grenchi-Cini [1999] 4 All E.R. 11, at 31 (the ideas 
for the flame detection and smoke detection were too vague). 
325 Knox J in De Maudsley v Palumbo [1996] F.S.R. 447, at 456. 
326 Sales v Stromberg [2005] EWHC 1624 (Ch); [2006] F.S.R. 7. 
327 Bently and Sherman, n.211, at p.1012. 
328 [1984] 1 Q.B. 44. 
329 [1983] 2 All E.R. 101, at 121.  
330 [1981] R.P.C. 1, at 9. 
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Capable of being realised in actuality means that the idea must be capable to be put into “a 
finished product in the relevant medium”.331 
 
Apart from that, the court will also consider the usage or practices of particular trade or 
industry concerned, to determine whether the information is confidential or not.332 In Fraser v 
Thames TV333 Hirst J considered that trade usage “is the factor of considerable force in 
deciding whether a legal obligation exists”.334 
 
The cases above highlighted that the idea should not be vague, but does not mean that it 
should not be simple. Therefore, in nanoscale example of idea the simple idea of 
transforming the tweezers in medical application at nanoscale may be protected335 or the idea 
of the light detection at nanoscale336 potentially attracts confidentiality. These ideas of 
nanoscale would be sufficiently developed, and capable to realise in actuality, and at least 
have some attractiveness. The trade usage or practices of nanotechnology will also be 
considered in determining whether the information is confidential or not. 
 
3.3.1.4 Springboard doctrine 
 
The disclosure of information to the public will not make the other party liable for breach of 
confidence to use it. However, there is an exception to this rule called the “springboard 
doctrine.” This springboard doctrine imposes an obligation on the person to maintain 
confidentiality for a certain period of time even after transmission of the information to the 
public by the wrongdoer. The rule was derived from Terrapin Ltd v Builders Supply,337 
which concerned a new type of portable building of manufacture developed by plaintiffs and 
defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had breached confidence by using the 
information to develop new products and therefore sought to claim for an interlocutory 
                                                          
331 De Maudsley v Palumbo [1996] F.S.R. 447, at 456. 
332 Per Sir Robert Megarry V.-C in Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch. 227 stated that “the 
information must be judged in the light of the usage and practices of the particular industry or trade 
concerned”, at 428. 
333 [1984] Q.B. 44. 
334 Ibid, at 65. 
335 Interviewee A. 
336 Interviewee D. 
337 [1967] R.P.C. 375. 
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injunction to restrain the defendants from selling the product. In this case Roxburgh J said 
that: 
“that a person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use it as a springboard 
for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential information, and a springboard it 
remains even when all features have been published or can be ascertained by actual inspection by 
any member of the public”.338  
In Seager v Copydex Ltd,339 Lord Denning MR in determining either public or private 
information observed that: 
“when the information is mixed, being partly public and partly private, then the recipient must 
take special care to use only the material which is in the public domain.  ... He should not get a 
start over others by using the information which he received in confidence”.340  
Salmon LJ clearly adopted the principle in Terrapin and held that “the law does not allow the 
use of such information even as a spring-board for activities detrimental to the plaintiff”.341 
 
The law prevents the confidant from using the confidential information as a springboard 
without paying for the laborious effort, time and skills in devising the information. 
Commenting on this judgement, Gurry however opines that this doctrine is uncertain on the 
ground that it prohibits confidant from ever using the confidential information even after it 
ceased to have effect of its confidentiality character.342 In this respect, although the person 
might not realise that the information is confidential, the court insisted that once he is aware, 
he must stop using the information.343 In different instances, if the plaintiff himself has 
disclosed the information to the public, he cannot claim that the springboard doctrine 
operates.344 In order to balance the interest of the defendant this doctrine is only applicable 
for a limited period of time as Lord Denning M.R stated in Potters-Ballotini Ltd v Weston-
Baker345 that: 
                                                          
338 Ibid, at 391 which was adopted by Roskill J in Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant [1965] 1 
W.L.R. 1293, 1317-1319. 
339 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923. 
340 Ibid, at 931-932. 
341 Ibid, at 933. 
342 Gurry, n.180, at pp.245-246. He adds the prohibition on the confidant was only for specific context and does 
not continue when the information has lost its confidentiality character, at, p.248. 
343 Lord Denning M.R. in Fraser v Fraser [1969] 1 All E.R. 8, at 11. 
344 See for example Mustad v Dosen [1963] R.P.C. 41; Franchi v Franchi [1963] R.P.C. 41. 
345 [1977] R.P.C. 202.  
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“although a man must not use such information as a springboard to get a start over others, 
nevertheless that springboard does not last forever. If he does use it, a time may come when so 
much has happened that he can no longer be restrained. That is another point of difficulty.”346 
 
May J in American Cyanamid’s347 considered that interim injunctions can be granted to 
prevent defendants from obtaining information as a headstart or springboard to the detriment 
of the person who provided the information. However, the “springboard” interim injunction 
should not provide the injured party with more protection than necessary, with a view to 
discourage or prohibit legitimate competition of the business. This is because the purpose of 
the injunction was to protect the plaintiffs, and not to punish the defendants.348 The court also 
put a question that in granting the injunction, the court should ask that whether any injunction 
should be subject to a time limit other than the usual “until trial or further order” and for what 
period such injunction should be so limited.349  
 
The speed of nanotechnology development emerges dramatically. The springboard doctrine 
is important because it preserves the interest of the plaintiff and at the same time encourages 
competition. When the speed of development is so rapid, this situation tends to encourage 
one party to use nanotechnology information as a headstart for other information without 
using his laborious effort. Therefore, the injunction can be applied to prevent the other party 
from taking information to the detriment of the ‘owner’ of the confidential information. It 
should be limited in time, by not allowing it to continue in its effect.  
 
3.3.1.5 Objective and subjective test  
 
Objective and subjective tests have been adopted by the courts to assess the quality of 
confidence. The objective test concerns what a reasonable person would consider to be 
confidential and for subjective test, what the owner himself believes to be confidential. In De 
                                                          
346 [1977] R.P.C. 202, at 206-207; see also Harrison v Project & Design [1978] F.S.R 81, at 87, Graham J 
agreed that springboard doctrine must be regarded as one of limited duration; also Fisher-Karpark Industries 
Limited v Nichols  [1982] F.S.R. 351, followed in Roger Bullivant Ltd and Ors v Ellis and Ors [1987] F.S.R 
172, at 184. 
347 American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] A.C. 396. 
348
 Nourse L J in Roger Bullivant Ltd and Ors v Ellis and Ors [1987] F.S.R 172, at 182.  
349 Roger Bullivant Ltd. And Others v Ellis and Ors [1987] F.S.R. 172, at 188. 
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Maudsley v Palumbo350 Knox J held that the test that imposes a duty of confidence is an 
objective test. The person must have taken steps to make that his information secret, or he 
has “secured” the information within a confidential relationship or he has taken steps to limit 
the access to the confidential information.351 In Cray Valley Ltd v Deltech Europe Ltd352 the 
party did not mark the information as confidential, and no attempt had been made to limit 
access to the confidential information or to control its use. The court held that the 
information was not capable of attracting the protection under the law of confidence – 
because the “desultory efforts” made to prevent the information from entering the public 
domain were not sufficient.353   
 
In certain situations, the court has adopted both the objective and subjective tests in 
determining the confidentiality of a company’s secret information. For example in Thomas 
Marshal Exports Ltd v Guinle354 Megarry V.-C laid down four elements in the context of 
industrial or trade setting in identifying confidential which were:355  
(a) the owner believes that the release of the information would  be injurious to him or 
advantage to his rival; 
(b) the owner believes that the information is confidential;  
(c) the belief must be reasonable; 
(d) the information must be judged in light of the usage or practices of the industry or 
trade concerned. 
 
In observing this case, Hull comments that the subjective test must be treated with caution 
because the courts still emphasise the objective test.356 Hull cites Ansell Rubber Co. Pty Ltd 
v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd357 and states that all considerations must be taken into 
                                                          
350 [1996] F.S.R. 447. 
351 Carty, 2008, n.308, at p.429. 
352 [2003] EWHC 728 (Ch). 
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354 [1979] 1 Ch. 227.  
355 [1979] 1 Ch. 227; [1978] 3 All E.R. 193, at 209-210. 
356 Hull 1998, n.181, at p.49. 
357 [1972] R.P.C. 811, at 825, Gowan J suggested the following guidelines “There is little in these English cases 
enable one to identify a “trade secret”. But some collation of the characteristics may be attempted, without 
trying to make it an exhaustive statement. Its subject matter may not be a process in common use or something 
which is public property and public knowledge, but if it is the result of work done by the maker upon materials 
which may be available for the use of anybody, so as to achieve a result which can only be produced by 
somebody who goes through the same process, it will be sufficient. All of its separate features may have been 
published, or capable of being ascertained by actual inspection by any member of the public, but if the whole 
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account for example how the parties wish to treat the information, the practices and usages of 
the trade will also be a guideline.358 This is because simply labelling non-confidential 
information as “secret” is not accepted because it does not mean that the information is 
secret.359  
 
In Lancashire Fires Ltd v S.A. Lyons Ltd360 Carnwath J refused to adopt a subjective test and 
stated: 
“The subjective view of the owner cannot be decisive. There must be something which is not only 
objectively a trade secret, but which was known, or ought to have been known, to both parties to 
be so. The normal presumption is that information which the employee has obtained in the 
ordinary course of his employment, without specific steps such as memorising particular 
documents, is information which he is free to take away and use in alternative employment”.361 
 
In nanotechnology, scientists and technologists must have taken steps to secure their 
confidential information, for example by applying secret encrypted code to access the data, 
or locked the information with special and limited accessible code, or by having limited 
access to their experimental laboratories or experimental processes.362 They can also mark 
the information in their research or in the lab as confidential with limited access, or they can 
limit the control and use of the confidential information. They should also believe themselves 
that the information is confidential and disclosure of such information would be injurious to 
them. They should also believe that the public does not have accessed to the information. 
They have reasonably believed to secure and protect the information from being disclosed.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
result has not been achieved, and could not be achieved, except by someone going through the same kind of 
process as the owner, it will not fail to qualify by reason of the publication… There is no suggestion of the need 
for invention. Little can be gathered of the degree of secrecy required beyond what is implied in what is said. 
But it is a fair inference from what is said that the [plaintiff] must have kept the matter to himself and from his 
competitors”. In the context of nanotechnology, the subject matter involves at nanoscale seems unlikely in a 
common use, and public property or public knowledge because only the scientists and technologists who works 
with the subject matter. In order to achieve the result, the scientists and technologists have to go through the 
experiment and laboratory works. Although subject matter at nanoscale may be published or inspected later, but 
the whole results have not been achieved or could not been achieved yet, except with the same process of 
determining subject matter at the nanoscale, it does not fail to qualify confidentiality.  
358 Hull 1998, n. 181, at p.47, cites Drake Personnel v Beddison [1978] V.R 13 per Anderson J at 20. 
359 Hull, 1998, n.181, at p.49, cites Wright v Gasweld Pty Ltd [1991] 20 I.P.R. 481 at 490-491. 
360 [1996] F.S.R. 629; see also Carflow Products (UK) Limited v Linwood Securities (Birmingham) Limited 
[1996] F.S.R. 424, Jacob J recognized two approaches of objective and subjective test. He identified the 
objective test as relating to the action in contract; on the basis that the obligation of confidence is equitable, he 
emphasized the subjective view was that “equity looks to the conscience of the individual”, at 428. See Clark S 
‘Circumstances Importing an Obligation of Confidence: A Subjective or Objective Test? (1996) E.I.P.R. 632. 
361 [1996] F.S.R. 629, at 656. 
362 See also Stokes S ‘Intellectual Property and Technology Issues’ (2010) C.O.B.1, at p.18. 
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3.3.2 The obligation of confidence 
 
The information must be imparted under circumstances of an obligation of confidence. The 
obligation of confidence may arise in different situations such as contractual obligation 
(either express or implied), equitable principle and to some courts are willing to deal with 
proprietary rights in the information.363 In the early cases, judges confusedly treated contract, 
trust, equity, property as the basis of the decision.364 As discussed above, the flexibility and 
dynamic nature of breach of confidence suggests that it well suited to such new fields like 
nanotechnology.365 Furthermore, flexibility and pragmatism may be essential in a field 
characterised by collaboration between researchers from different science disciplines and 
working for different types of organisation for example universities, industrial companies, 
government research centres etc. It was stressed too in this study by the interviews that there 
are differing approaches of confidentiality, for example government employees may have 
official secrets obligation in addition to contractual and equitable ones. Although this section 
mainly considers obligation of confidence in relation to trade secret, it also spans the 
government information and personal confidences.  
 
3.3.2.1 Contractual obligation – express and implied terms 
 
In many instances, parties may use an express terms to define clearly a contractual 
obligation. The obligation of confidence is imposed on parties either by means of express 
contractual obligation such as confidentiality terms in the contract, NDA, technology transfer 
agreements or know-how agreement. In nanotechnology, because of the research is still 
emerging, there are lots of collaborative research involved in nanotechnology using 
university facilities or collaboration between different institutions such as universities, 
industry and government. The contractual obligation arises in term of NDA between 
employer and employee, or other contractual agreement which stipulates the terms of 
confidentiality in the contract. The use of these and their terms may vary across the 
university-government-industry relationships. The express terms sometimes provides that the 
information will not be transmitted except for the purpose stipulated only. This means that 
                                                          
363 Gurry, n.180, at pp.25-57. 
364 For example Prince Albert v Strange (1894) 41 All E.R. 1171. 
365 See 3.1.  
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the information will only be disclosed according to the terms prescribed in the contract. 366 
The confidence is breached when the party has imparted the information beyond the terms in 
the contract and has disclosed the information to the unauthorised party.367 Thus, it may be 
important to try to stipulate this in advance when the research ethics of a collaborative 
project are being worked out. 
 
However, in the absence of any expressed terms either in written, oral or any other forms 
which could denote clearly the confidentiality duties of the parties, the court is willing to 
interpret an implied duty of disclosure to prevent unauthorised use and disclosure. The effect 
was emphasised by Lord Green Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co. 
Ltd,368 that “the law will imply an obligation to treat that confidential matter in a 
confidential way as one of the implied terms of the contract”369 and not to use the 
information other than for the purpose for which it was imparted, nor make unauthorised 
disclosure to third parties. The courts infer the effect of the obligation as Lord Bowen LJ 
observed in Lamb v Evans.370  
 
As to the test whether or not the information is bound by a duty of confidence, in Coco v 
Clark371 Megarry V.-C stated that:  
“It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of 
the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information 
was being given to him in confidence...”.372   
 
This reasonable person test possibly works well with the objective approach that the recipient 
ought to have known that the information was disclosed to him in confidence.373 This is a 
good basis for scientists or technologists they ought to have realised that upon reasonable 
ground that the information was imparted to them in confidence. For example, if a NDA 
                                                          
366 See Cornish and Llewelyn, n.307, at pp.321-323. 
367 See for example Exchange Telegraph Co. v Gregory & Co [1896] 1 Q.B. 147. 
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369 Ibid, at 211.  
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371 [1969] R.P.C. 41. 
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373 Hull 1998, n.181, at p.109. 
75 
 
stipulates clearly that information related to nanotechnology should not be imparted without 
authorisation.  
 
In absence of express agreement, the court would rely on the circumstances of a contract to 
imply the obligation of confidence. The implication of terms in contract has been considered 
by the House of Lords (HL) in Liverpool City Council v Irwin.374 The county court held that 
the landlord council were under an implied duty to keep the structure of the residential block 
in repair as well as common parts, and the council were in breach of that duty. In the HL, 
Lord Wilberforce stated that for the existence of an obligation between landlord and tenants 
in relation to the stairs, lifts and chutes, the test was one of necessity, and no more. The 
implied obligation on the council in relation to the common parts was to take reasonable 
repair to ensure usability with the conditions that the tenants themselves had their 
responsibilities according to what a reasonable set of tenants would and could do for 
themselves.375   
 
However, the court may be trying to adopt a new approach to the objective meaning of an 
implied term; departing from the normal test of “necessary to give business efficacy”. In AG 
of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd376 the question arise as to an implied term in a company’s 
articles of association allowing for the removal of officers. In the Privy Council, Lord 
Hoffmann observed that in determining the implied term in the contract, the question was 
“whether such provision would spell out in express words what the instrument, read against 
the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean?”377 Lord Hoffmann 
stated that: 
 “the instrument may not have expressly said so, but this is what it must mean. In such a case, it is 
said that the court implies a term as to what will happen if the event in question occurs. But the 
implication of the term is not an addition to the instrument. It only spells out what the instrument 
means”.378  
In considering what the instrument meant Lord Hoffmann added that the:  
                                                          
374 [1976] 2 W.L.R. 562; [1977] A.C. 239 
375 The court considered business efficacy as per Lord Cross, at 258; see also Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. 
Appellant v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. [1985] 3 W.L.R. 317; [1986] A.C. 80  at 91. 
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“meaning is not necessarily or always what the authors or parties to the document would have 
intended. It is the meaning which the instrument would convey to a reasonable person having all 
the background knowledge which would reasonably be available to the audience to whom the 
instrument is addressed”.379  
Lord Hoffmann referred to other relevant test for the implications of terms such as that 
implied term must “go without saying” or that it must be “necessary to give business efficacy 
to the contract” or that it must be capable of clear expression and it must not contradict to any 
express term of the contract. However, he added that these tests laid down before were not to 
be treated as different or additional test to the question that he asked above. Thus, in this 
case: 
“the implication is required to avoid defeating what appears to have been the overriding purpose 
of the machinery of appointment and removal of directors, namely to ensure that the board reflects 
the appropriate shareholders interests in accordance with the scheme laid out in the articles”.380  
 
The court should find the meaning of any documents or any background facts and consider 
whether the meaning would convey to a reasonable man. In this case, Lord Hoffmann seems 
to be extending the “purposive approach” from interpretation of express terms381 to 
identification of implied terms. The cases provide helpful consideration for nanotechnology 
because, as in Liverpool, it was stated that the test is necessity, that the obligation arises 
should not exceed of what is necessity. Similarly, Belize seems to combine both business 
efficacy and purposive test that could generally be applied to nanotechnology. This 
integrative approach is very useful for nanotechnology for its multiple especially in terms of 
available material for enquiry purposes. For nanotechnology, a possible approach for the 
court to consider for the purpose of the contract is to maintain the interests of the different 
parties involved, for example those scientists or engineers from different backgrounds – 
chemistry, electronics, mechanical, manufacturing and medical. It may be necessary to 
balance university researchers’ need to publish against industry’s preference for patenting 
rather than secrecy, or a government’s wish to publicise breakthrough widely with 
researchers’ interest in using specialist journals to disseminate their work.  
                                                          
379 [2009] UKPC 10; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988, at 1994 
380 Ibid. The principle in this case was applied in Mediterranean Salvage and Towage Ltd v Seamar Trading and 
Commerce Inc: The Reborn [2009] E.W.C.A. Civ 531. 
381 Deutsche Bank [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 113, Lord Steyn held that “it is true that the objective of the 
construction of contract is to give effect to the intention of the parties. But our law of construction is based on 
an objective theory. The methodology is not to probe the real intentions of the parties but to ascertain the 
contextual meaning of the relevant contractual language. Intention is determined by reference to expressed 
rather than actual intention”, at 122. 
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The same principle also applies in the employment contract where an employee is under 
obligation to maintain confidentiality either based on express or implied terms during the 
subsistence of the employment contract. The obligation between employer and employee 
may be transformed into express employment contract, for example restraint of trade 
covenant or NDA. In nanotechnology, the employment contract may arise between 
university, industry and government collaboration. This collaboration in nanotechnology 
potentially poses problems in assessing the obligation of confidence; it could be either a 
direct or an indirect obligation of confidence.  
 
There are two situations that involve the contract of employment, the obligation during the 
subsistence of the contract of employment, and the obligation when the contract of 
employment has ended.  There is very clear principle that during the subsistence of the 
contract, the employee is under obligation to keep the information in secret and a under duty 
not to disclose or use the information received to the disadvantage of his employer, he is not 
allowed to compete with his own employer during the employment period382 and he is bound 
to disclose information which he receives qua employee from outside sources to his 
employer.383  
 
The obligation of confidence from an implied term of the employee not to disclose the 
information to the unauthorised user was considered by Lynskey J in Bents Brewery Ltd v 
Hogan.384  The employee also should reasonably expect that the information was disclosed to 
him in confidence. In Yates Circuit Foil Co. and Another v Electrofoils Ltd and Another385, 
the court found no circumstances indicating that the operation of the plant design, plant 
construction or methods of running or maintenance were supposedly secret, and the 
employees were not told anything when they joined the plaintiffs’ company that the plant 
were secret. This could be averted in nanotechnology case by expressly advising participants 
of confidentiality as mentioned by interviewee386 in context of student NDA.  
 
                                                          
382 For example in Thomas Marshall Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All E.R. 193, the managing director has set up his 
own company in competing with employer’s business and he was found in breach of his good faith and fidelity. 
383 Gurry, n.180, at p.179. 
384[1945] 2 K.B. 570; [1945] 2 All E.R. 570, at 576. 
385 [1976] F.S.R. 345. 
386 Interviewee D. 
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The employee is under a duty of good faith and fidelity not to disclose confidential 
information to an unauthorised party.387 In Lamb v Evans388 the employees collected 
materials during their employment to be used in their new company. The court granted an 
injunction to restrain the defendants from using the materials.389 Another employer was 
entitled to claim for injunction and damages from the manager of the company who had 
secretly made a copy of the customer list purposely to be used in his own company.390  
 
As above discussed, in the university researcher relationship for example, the researcher is 
restrained from using any materials which have been obtained to be used in new 
company/institution. The university should specify the confidential character of those 
materials that have been used for research purposes. However, if the researcher has secretly 
made a copy or obtained the materials that can later be used in other company/institution, the 
university will have right to claim for injunction or damages caused. This is because at the 
time of the agreement of NDA both parties are aware of the confidential character of those 
materials.  
 
In the course of employment, the employee may be released from the obligation of 
confidence. In United Indigo Chemical Co. Ltd v Robinson391 the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim for an injunction restraining the defendant from using the information which 
he had obtained during employment because the plaintiff had failed to warn the defendant 
that the information of the manufacturing process was to be regarded as confidential, the 
information was freely available to other employees without any limited access imposed by 
the management and the defendant had obtained the information honestly.392 In relation to 
university-industry-government projects, the employed researchers owe a duty of good faith 
to their own employers as well as to all collaborative parties. However, when it involves 
other participants, probably they owe a lesser duty of good faith as with ex-employees.  
 
                                                          
387 See for example Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] F.S.R. 172; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1986] 1 All 
E.R. 617. 
388 [1893] 1 Ch. 218. 
389 Ibid, per Lindley L.J at 226. 
390 Robb v Green [1895] 2 Q.B. 315. 
391 (1932) 49 R.P.C. 178; see also for example Worsley & Co Ltd v Robinson (1932) 1 All E.R. 290; Yates 
Circuit Foil Co v Electrofoils Ltd [1976] F.S.R. 345; see also discussion in Gurry, n.180, at pp.181-183 
392 (1932) 49 R.P.C. 178, at 186-187. 
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The obligation of confidence is also important when the contract of employment ends. The 
ex-employee is also under obligation to maintain the confidentiality, with certain limitation 
not to misuse confidential information or disclose it to an unauthorised party of his ex-
employer after the termination of the contract of employment as for example in Robb v 
Green.393  
 
In all cases the dividing line is difficult to draw between the knowledge of a former employer 
and the knowledge that belongs to ex-employee. The Court in Herbert Morris Ltd v 
Saxelby394 noted that:  
“trade secrets, the names of customers, all such things which in sound philosophical language are 
denominated objective knowledge – these may not be given away by a servant; they are his 
master’s property, and there is no rule of public interest which prevents a transfer of them against 
his master’s will being restrained. On the other hand, a man’s aptitudes, his skill, his dexterity, his 
manual or mental ability – all those things which is sound philosophical languages are not 
objective, but subjective – they may and they ought not to be relinquished by a servant; they are 
not his master’s property; they are his own property; they are himself”.395 
 
As relates to nanotechnology, the most difficult the example is the university’s employees. 
The academician may choose to move from one university to another university, and may 
carry with him not only the skill, or the knowledge that he had gained in the previous 
university but sometimes a project funding as well.  He should be free to make use of his 
own personal skill, knowledge and experiences. This free use of his skill, information and 
knowledge is usually subject to the requirement of ex-employee that did not made any 
deliberate action such by memorising it or by writing down of the information. But balance 
may be different for academics than for industry or government employees, because 
normally university academic is public university. What approach for the court to take or 
whether to diverge from it? Can this difficulty be overcome by express contractual 
agreements? It is suggested perhaps by developing proposal or NDA.  
 
                                                          
393 [1895] 2 Q.B. 315, Lord Esher M.R at 316-318; see also Lamb v Evans [1893] 1 Ch. 218, at 229. 
394 [1916] A.C. 688. 
395 Ibid, per Lord Shaw at 714. 
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In Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler396 at trial the court held that in the absence of any express 
stipulation, the employee could use sales, price and route information which was part of his 
own skill and knowledge either for his own benefit or benefit of a new employer. Neill LJ 
outlined the principles397 and stated the circumstances to be considered when deciding 
whether the information falls within the implied terms of the contract to prevent the 
employee from its use and disclosure after the contract of employment has ended.398 The 
court held that the information as a whole did not have the degree of confidentiality to be 
protected after the contract of employment had ended. There was no evidence of an express 
instruction that the sales or the prices information to be treated confidential. The sales and the 
price information were necessarily acquired by the defendants in order for them to do their 
work and the salesman could quickly commit the information to his own memory. The 
information was also generally known among employees. The COA however, doubted 
Goulding J’s view that an intermediate class of information could be protected by a 
restrictive covenant.399 The appeal from Faccenda’s decision was considered in Lancashire 
Fires Ltd v S. A. Lyons & Comp. Ltd400 where Carnwath J determined that the plaintiff failed 
to establish the case for breach of confidence against the defendant. The court held that the 
normal presumption can be made that the information obtained in the ordinary course of his 
employment, without specific steps taken such as memorising particular documents, he was 
free to take away and use of the information. In this case, there was nothing in the laboratory 
books or in other documents to suggest that the defendant was put in position of confidence, 
either expressly or impliedly. There was nothing have been said to suggest that the defendant 
has limit to use of any particular information. The information therefore was not regarded as 
protectable information to be protected under the law of confidence. The court has 
distinguished this from the information which was protected in the course of employment 
contract, and continues to remain secret after the contract of employment has ceased, even in 
the absence of any covenant to suggest for its secrecy. On Appeal, Lord Bingham M.R stated 
that employer wishing to protect less confidential information than trade secret after the 
contract of employment has ceased would have to do so by way of express covenant. 
                                                          
396 [1986] 3 W.L.R. 288; [1987] Ch. 117 at 135-6 and 137-8. 
397 [1987] Ch 117 at 135-136. 
398 Ibid, at 137-138. 
399 Ibid, at 137 
400 [1996] F.S.R. 629. 
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However, for the covenant to be valid ex-employer must have legitimate interest in 
maintaining its confidentiality.401  
 
In a more recent case, Arnold J in Vestergaard Frandsen S/A (MVF3 AFS) v Bestnet Europe 
Ltd402 stated that the scope of obligation whether express, implied or equitable once the 
employment ceased, did not extend beyond the information of trade secret. The ex-employee 
is free to use for his own benefit of his own skill, knowledge or experience but not to use 
trade secret information. In this case, Arnold J provided a checklist as follows403: 
(a) the nature of the work 
(b) the nature of the information 
(c) the attitude of the employer 
(d) steps taken to protect the information 
(e) the separability of the information 
(f) the commercial value of the information 
(g) the usage and practice of the trade 
 
It was discussed earlier in the cases above that the ex-employee is able to carry with him the 
skill, knowledge or experiences, except trade secret information, when he moves to another 
company, provided that during his course of employment in the previous employment, he has 
not deliberately memorised, or written or removed any information. However, the question 
may arise to determine the implied term in the contract after the contract of employment 
ends, especially when it was devised by individuals or team of individuals like 
nanotechnology. How would the court determine what information that ex-employee will be 
able to bring to another company or transmit to the other person? This is because as was 
observed that “too stringent protection may hamper and harm the free movement of the 
employees to change job and may be detrimental to their professional development and 
career”.404 This potential problem of determining implied term that may be preventing 
                                                          
401 Lancashire Fires Ltd v S. A. Lyons & Comp. Ltd [1996] F.S.R. 629 at 667. 
402 [2011] EWCA Civ 424. 
403 Ibid, at 652. 
404 De Werra, n.220, at p.35; The law is recognised to balance the interest of the parties in G. D. Searle & Co. 
Ltd. v Celltech Ltd. and Others [1982] F.S.R. 92, Cumming-Bruce LJ observed, at 99. 
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exchanging of ideas or free movement of the employee to another company may suggest that 
a proprietary analysis as made by Honore’ could be helpful.405  
 
If the employer made an express term stated that the ex-employee is prevented from 
exercising his skill and knowledge, the ex-employee may use the defence under restraint of 
trade. The restraint of trade to be valid must have a reasonable basis for the interest of 
contracting parties and for the interest of the public. In Herbert Morris Limited v Saxelby406 a 
covenant that the defendant would not during a period of seven years work for another 
company similar to his former employer (appellant) from the date of his ceasing to be 
employed was held unreasonable for the interest of contracting parties and for the interest of 
the public. In Malaysia the principle of restraint of trade has been adopted in Stamford 
College Group Sdn Bhd v Raja Abdullah Raja Othman.407 In this case, the defendant argued 
that the contract of employment was void and unlawful because the contract prohibited him 
from working as lecturer or teacher within two years with another employer after his service 
has ended without the permission from the plaintiff.  The defendant applied to be discharged 
from interim injunction restraining him working at another company. In this case, the court 
contended that the restriction was unreasonable and discharged the injunction on the ground 
that the restriction was unreasonable because it affected the livelihood of the defendant.  
 
In nanotechnology, the example is still revolving around the discussion in the employee of 
the university context. According to Monotti and Ricketson , in the absence of express terms 
of confidentiality, it is rather difficult to bring an action for breach of confidence. 408 They 
provide two situations; one is that, in the absence of an express term of confidentiality, if the 
result from the research done is conducted outside the scope of his employment, the 
employee owed no obligation of confidence towards the employer. Secondly, in the absence 
of express terms of confidence, if the research results are done during the course of 
                                                          
405 However, see 3.1. 
406 [1916] A.C. 688. The earlier example of restraints of trade can be seen in the HL decision in Nordenfelt v 
Maxim Nodenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co [1894] A.C. 535, per Lord Macnaghton, at 565. 
407 [1991] 2 C.L.J. 1135. The court did not grant the defence of restraint of trade to the defendant because the 
restriction made was not attempt to work at another company, but restraint from using or disclosing confidential 
information to the detriment of the plaintiff, see for example Schmidt Scientific Sdn Bhd v Ong Han Suan & 
Ors [1998] 1 C.L.J. 685; Yeohata Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 6 C.L.J. 
418. This suggests that how covenant recommended by Lord Bingham MR should be drafted or constructed.  
408 Monotti A L and Ricketson S Universities and Intellectual Property: Ownership and Exploitation (Oxford: 
OUP, 2003), at p.93. 
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employment, the freedom to publish the result from the research is very important in the 
academic world and that will probably overrides any imposition of obligation in the normal 
contract of employment.409 The view can be adopted in a nanotechnology context. It is true 
that the results from research conducted outside the scope of the university’s employment 
would not make the obligation of confidence towards the university. However, this principle 
may not always be easy to determine in the absence of the express term, for example the 
scope, or the duration. For the second situation, this would seem problematic where in the 
academic world the publication is given a greater consideration, for example, in terms of job 
promotion and knowledge sharing in the academic circles. Thus it is important for the 
university to set a balance between maintaining confidentiality and at the same time provide 
the interest to the academic or researcher to publish their research result or finding. 
Nevertheless, these two situations may become even more problematic in the complex 
multidiscipline like nanotechnology. Thus, to safeguard the situation, the important task is by 
putting express term of the obligation of confidence.     
 
3.3.2.2 Equitable obligation 
 
Equity imposes an obligation on the parties in the absence of express and implied terms in 
the contract. Equitable principle also imposes an obligation where the parties are not 
contractually linked. The equitable principle provides that the party has a duty to maintain 
confidentiality and not to take unfair advantage by imparting the information to other 
persons.  The equitable principle will be relevant when there is no answer in the contract 
either because parties are not in a contractual relationship or the claim is against the third 
party who is not privy to the contract.410 The equitable obligation will only arise if the 
recipient knows or has notice that the information is confidential by objectively assessed 
upon reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient.411  
 
                                                          
409 Ibid, at p.93. This is important because according to Deazley, there are different reasons why academician 
writes research articles – for example financial gain, disseminate and sharing intellectual, reputation and 
develop the thinking, Deazley R ‘Publishers be Damned! (As Well As HEFCE, Government and Apathetic 
Academics): Some Thought on the Science and Technology Committee’s Report on Scientific Publications’ 
(2005) E.I.P.R. 97, at p.100. 
410 Gurry, n.180, at pp.36-46. 
411 Megarry J in Coco v Clarks [1968] F.S.R. 415, at 421; Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 A.C. 
457; Lord Nicholls, at para 14; Lord Hope of Craighead, at para 85. 
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The test for equitable principle in breach of confidential information has been confirmed in 
Saltman (Engineering) Co. Ltd v Campbell (Engineering) Co. Ltd412, Lord Green held that 
“If a defendant is proved to have used confidential information, directly or indirectly 
obtained from a plaintiff, without the consent, express or implied, of the plaintiff, he will be 
guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights”.413 This equitable principle was upheld in 
Seager v Copydex.414 It was emphasised further in Coco v Clark415 by Lord Greene that: 
“I think that the Court, despite the caution which must be exercised before implying any 
obligation, must be ready to make those implications upon which the same and fair conduct of 
business is likely to depend. ...In the case before me I would imply a term if there was a contract 
and, so, a fortiori, I imply the equitable obligation”.416  
 
The court in Kitechnology BV v Unicor GmbH Plastmaschinen417 clearly awarded damages 
for a breach of confidence prohibited by equity. The court also stated that the claim for 
breach of confidence did not arise in tort, but was part of equitable jurisdiction.418 This case 
was decided before the introduction of the EU Regulation 864/2007 of the European 
Parliament and the Council of July 11, 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (Rome II) which came into effect on January 11, 2007. Under Rome II 
Regulation, the parties for non-contractual obligation are free to make their own choice of 
applicable law under the Rome Regulation II.419 Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation 
provides as a basic rule that: 
“unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to non-contractual obligation 
arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective 
of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the 
country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”. 
                                                          
412 (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203. 
413 Ibid, at 213. 
414 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923, per Lord Denning M.R, at 931 
415 [1969] R.P.C. 41. 
416 Ibid, at 50; the principle of equitable principle was considered also by the HL in Spycatcher [1990] 1 AC 
109, at 255, 267 and 281. 
417 [1995] F.S.R. 765. 
418 Ibid, Evans LJ stated that as to whether the defendants’ alternative submission is correct, namely, even if the 
non-contractual claims are properly categorized as tort, nevertheless the present case is not within Article 5(3) 
of Brussels Convention 1968, given statutory force in England by the Civil Jurisdictions and Judgments Act 
1982 because the plaintiffs cannot show that the harmful event has occurred in England, at 778-779. 
419 See for example discussion on this by Wadlow C ‘Trade Secrets and the Rome II Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations’ (2008) E.I.P.R. 309, and argues that in light of this Regulation, 
trade secrets are governed by tort; For a more extended analysis of the broader implications of the Rome II 
Regulations, see Carruthers J M and Crawford E B ‘Variations on a Theme of Rome II. Reflections on Proposed 
Choice of Law Rules for Non-Contractual Obligations: Part 1’ (2005) Edin. L. R. 65 Part 1 and (2005) Edin. L. 
R. 238 Part 2. 
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Article 6(2) of the Rome II Regulation deals with unfair competition and trade secret i.e. 
where trade secret is treated as an aspect of unfair competition law.  
 
Although Kitechnology does not recognise breach of confidence as a tort, however it is 
submitted that tort principles as Wadlow contends should be applied to breach of confidence 
claims involving conflicts of laws.420 This is particularly significant in the context of 
nanotechnology information because frequently, nanotechnology disputes will have a cross-
border element generally and this is important for nanotechnology to have such treaty.  
 
3.3.3 Unauthorised use of the information 
 
The third requirement provided under the test in Coco v Clark421 that the confidential 
information is breached when the person who is not authorised used the information to the 
detriment of the confider or the party communicating it. According to Hull, the inclusion of 
detrimental effect in Coco v Clark is an additional to the test for unauthorised used and 
disclosure, although the court was doubt whether that it was necessary element for an action 
for breach of confidence.422 The situation was confirmed later in A.G v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No.2)423 where Lord Goff referred to Coco v Clark and stated: “... whether 
detriment to the plaintiff is an essential ingredient of an action for breach of confidence. 
Obviously, detriment or potential detriment to the plaintiff will nearly always from part of his 
case; but this may not always be necessary.”424 
 
Based on this judgment, the confider does not necessarily have to show that he himself has 
suffered detrimental effect from the disclosure of the information. Sufficient only to prove 
that the confidant has used the information beyond what it was intended, or misused the 
information of the confidential information.  
 
                                                          
420 Wadlow, n, 419, at pp.316-317. 
421 [1969] R.P.C. 41, “…an unauthorised use of the information to the detriment of the part communicating it”, 
per Megarry J at 47. 
422 Hull 1998, n.181, at pp.170-171. 
423 [1988] 3 All E.R 545. 
424 Ibid, at 659. 
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In nanotechnology, the example can be referred to the contract of manufacturing process 
developed by a company for a client.425 The question here is whether the company will be 
able to give it to another client? The clear proposition is that the company may not use 
beyond what is intended and may not misuse by disclose to another client. The confidant 
must also not take unfair advantage as pointed out by Lord Denning M.R in Seager v 
Copydex426 that “... the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in 
confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it. He must not make use of it to the prejudice 
of him who gave it without obtaining his consent”.427 
 
In Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd428 Lord Green M.R held 
that “If a defendant is proved to have used confidential information directly or indirectly 
obtained from a plaintiff without the consent, express or implied, of the plaintiff, he will be 
guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights”.429 
 
It is a question of fact whether confidential information has been used beyond the purpose for 
which it was disclosed.430 In nanotechnology, an example may be when the confidant has 
disclosed it to a person other than the team member of nanotechnology research 
collaborations. The purpose of nanotechnology information for example is limited to be used 
in the confidential process, but the confidant had misused or disclosed it for another person. 
In this regards, the confidant will be liable for the breach of confidence because the confidant 
has taken an unfair advantage by the used and disclosed of the information without the 
consent from the team member.  
 
3.3.3.1 Recipient of the confidential information  
 
The confidant or the recipient of confidential information may be bound by express or 
implied contractual obligation not to misuse or disclose the information without authorisation 
of the confider. Undoubtedly, a problem of uncertainty occurs in the case of third party 
                                                          
425 Interviewee B. 
426 [1967] 2 All E.R. 415. 
427 Ibid, at 417. 
428 [1948] 65 R.P.C. 203. 
429 Ibid, at 213. 
430 Gurry, n.180, at p.256; Hull 1998, n.181 at p.175. 
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recipients who are not privy to a contractual link between the parties. It has been argued that 
the origins and juridical nature of the obligation of third party recipients of confidential 
information is uncertain and confusing.431 It is particularly important for the courts to 
determine whether at the time he receives the information he has knowledge432 or was 
innocent, until further notice was given to remind him that the information was 
confidential.433 In Prince Albert v Strange434 the plaintiff was granted an injunction 
restraining the defendant from publication of a catalogue containing private etchings related 
to Prince Albert and Queen Victoria. The decision was upheld by Lord Cottenham V.C that a 
third party Judge was also restrained from exhibiting the catalogue of the etchings although 
he was not contractually linked with the plaintiff, and that “the possession of the etchings or 
engravings, on the part of the defendant or Judge, has its foundation in a breach of trust, 
confidence, or contract”.435  
  
It was settled law that the obligations of confidence not only bind the original recipient but 
extend also to the other person who has knowledge  at the time he receives the information 
that it was originally given in confidence.436 The person is prima facie bound under 
obligations of secrecy or confidential not to improperly further disclose or use the 
confidential information without the consent of the confider.437 In order to establish the 
liability of the party, Hull views that the actual, constructive or implied knowledge acquired 
should be applicable for the third party.438  
 
For the innocent third party who has receives information as referring to the defence of bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice is still doubtful.439 There are two reasons why the 
courts may intervene and make the innocent third party liable for breach of confidence; (a) to 
prevent further abuse of confidence and (b) discretionary power under the equitable 
                                                          
431 Colston and Galloway, n.217, at pp.232-234. 
432 This knowledge according to Gurry may be actual, imputed or by constructive notice, n.180, at p.270. 
433 Ibid, at pp.269-289. 
434 (1894) 41 All ER 1171; see Phillips J ‘Prince Albert and the Etchings’ (1984) 12 E.I.P.R. 344. 
435 (1848) 1 Mac. & G. 25 at 44. 
436 Fraser v Thames TV Ltd [1983] 2 All E.R. 101, at 116, Per Hirst J; Talbot v GTV [1981] R.P.C. 1, at 18, per 
Harris J; Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] R.P.C. 239, at 253 and 257, per Cross J. 
437 Dillon L.J. in AG v Newspapers Ltd (No.2) [1988] 3 All E.R. 545, at 614. 
438 Hull 1998, n.181, at p.165.  
439 Gurry, n.180, at p.277. 
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principle.440 Stuckey views that the defence of bona fide purchaser in an action for breach of 
confidence is not appropriate because (a) its theoretical availability is based on the inaccurate 
analysis of action on the property rights in information and (b) likelihood of inequitable 
consequences for its utilisation.441 
 
Arnold (now Arnold J) suggests for an objective assessment for the reasonable man, where 
he contends that: 
“a correct statement of the law is that an obligation of confidence arises whenever confidential 
information is received or acquired by a person with notice that the information is confidential, 
and whether a person has notice is to be objectively assessed by reference to the reasonable person 
standing in the position of the recipient”.442  
 
Wei agrees that that it is necessary to establish that the innocent recipient have the 
knowledge of the unauthorised use of the information by the confidant/direct acquirer, but 
the question has arisen on the degree of knowledge required and remains uncertain; as to 
whether carelessness to the knowledge is sufficient or any other element of recklessness or 
dishonesty before the action is established.443 In this sense, in applying reasonable man test, 
he must at least possess reasonable thinking that there is a serious assertion of the 
confidential information by the confidant.444  
 
As far as team approach of nanotechnology is concerned, the third party recipient of the 
information is relevant. In the research collaborative projects, the person within a team is not 
allowed to disclose or use of the information without the consent of other member in the 
same team. This is well applied to between different team that involve, i.e one team will not 
disclose of use of the information without the consent of another team in the collaborative 
projects. Although, in certain situation they may claim that they are innocent third party, 
nevertheless they may still be liable for breach of confidence. As Arnold pointed out, for the 
                                                          
440 Gurry, n.180, at p.280. 
441 Stuckey, n.186, at p.77. 
442 Arnold R ‘Circumstances Importing an Obligation of Confidence’, (2003) 119 Law Q. Rev. 193, at p.198 
443 Wei, n.186, at pp.29-30 and he refers this as downstream users of the confidential information. Inevitably he 
suggests that the law must seek to balance the interests of the plaintiff and the downstream users who are not 
directly responsible for the original breach of the confidential information and development of the infringing 
product arising from the confidential information, at p. 37; See also in Wei G ‘Surreptitious Takings of 
Confidential Information’ (1991) 12 Legal Stud.302. 
444 Wei, n.186, at p. 30. 
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innocent third party recipient of the information this should be assessed objectively from the 
perspective of reasonable man test standing in the shoes of recipient that the information 
received is confidential.  
 
3.4 Public interest defence 
 
Despite Article 10 of ECHR, the public interest defence is still alive and well as a defence 
within UK breach of confidence.445In applying the defence of public interest, the question is 
what aspects of nanotechnology might require disclosure?  
 
Being new there are concerns about the risk that nanotechnology could pose for health, 
environment and safety of the public. The exposure of the body to the nano-particle is likely 
to cause the safety issue, for example the use of aerogel that made from rice husk, if it is 
misused, it can cause the danger to the safety and health.446 Some may think that this 
technology could potentially provide risks as well as benefits to the society.447 It has been 
recognised that a lot of research needs to be conducted in order to determine the harmful 
effect of nanoparticles to the health and environment.448 It is important to note that the 
procedure for assessing the risks of nano-materials is still under development.449 
Nanotechnology’s potential risk or harmful effects cannot be presumed or predicted of 
having same risk as the material at the macro-scale because the property at nano-level 
behaved differently from the macro-scale counterparts. Although it is unclear to what extent 
the properties at nanoscale have toxicity, evidence shows that some materials are proven 
more toxic at the nanoscale due to effect of surface area.450 For instance, some speculate that 
                                                          
445 See 3.1 above. 
446 Interviewee C. 
447 Interviewee C whom stated that whether good or bad of certain technology, it all depends on how we 
manage the technology; interviewee D admitted that nanotechnology could potentially provide a risk to the 
health and safety for example by inhalation. 
448 See for example Rushton T ‘Very Small and Very Special’ (2010) Construction Research and Innovation, 
Vol. 1, Issue 3, 24, at p.27; also stating that there is need to develop the measure to verify the safety of nano-
medical products, Munir and Mohd Yasin, n.13, at p.261. 
449 See for example European Commission, Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health 
Risks (SCENIHR) Opinion on the Appropriateness of Existing Methodologies to Assess the Potential Risks 
http://files.nanobio-raise.org/Downloads/scenihr.pdf accessed on 9 Nov 2010. 
450 RAE, n.36, at p.71; the current risk assessment methodologies for nanoparticles may be inadequate because 
of reliance on mass metrics, therefore some cosmetic products containing nanoparticles may not be effectively 
regulated under the current regulatory framework, see Bowman D M and Van Calster G ‘Flawless or Fallible? 
A Review of the Applicability of the European Union’s Cosmetics Directive in Relation to Nano-Cosmetics’ 
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carbon nanotubes are the new asbestos due to their smaller size, stronger and highly 
biopersistant, but their harmful effects are still unclear.451 It may be argued that small 
technologies like nanotechnology have the tendency to be dangerous, for example in relation 
to cosmetics products enhanced with nano-particle, for example nano-silver; and the used of 
titanium dioxide at nano-range could also bring the safety issue.452 The potential risk also 
might occur in the inhalation of nano-particle or the penetration of nano-cream into the 
skin.453 It may be uncertain whether nanotechnology could be toxic, for example the use of 
nano-particle in sunscreen and whether it could have the same effect as in asbestos. 454 
Nevertheless, as compared to nanoelectronics, nano-chemistry is more likely to bring 
environmental issues and toxicological effect.455 Another example that nanotechnology could 
pose issue to the health is that the interaction between nanoparticles and the human biological 
system, and this free nano-particle enters into the organisms will remain in organs and tissues 
for undetermined of time.456 The mobility of nanoparticles and the free movement of 
nanoparticles are prone to health and environmental side effects, for example dust and 
powder formulated nanoparticles could get into the body by inhalation.457  
 
3.4.1 The principle of public interest defence 
 
The information transmitted in confidence to the recipient must be kept in confidence or used 
according to the purpose which has been disclosed to him. However, the recipient may 
disclose the information in considering the interest of the public, and he will not be 
considered as breaching confidence. As Lord Goff of Chieveley stated in AG v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No.2)458  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2008) Studies in Ethic, Law, and Technology, Vol 2, 6, at p.29; see also Mandel G N ‘Nanotechnology 
Governance’ (2007-2008) 59 Ala. L. Rev. 1323, at pp.1340-1344. 
451 Rushton, n.448, at p.27. 
452Interviewee C; the same argued by interviewee A that nano-particle in cosmetics and beauty treatment may 
have toxicological effect.  
453 Interviewee D. 
454 Interviewee A. 
455 Interviewee A. 
456 Spanolo A G and Daloiso V ‘Outlining Ethical Issues in Nanotechnologies’ (2008) Bioethics 1, at p.4 
457 Meili, n.7, at, p.12  
458 [1990] 1 A.C. 109; and in Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 Q.B. 396, at 405 “the disclosure is justified 
in the public interest”. 
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“although the basis of the law’s protection of confidence is that there is a public interest that 
confidences should be preserved and protected by the law, nevertheless that public interest may be 
outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure”.459  
 
The property at nanoscale behaves differently from the macro-scale – it becomes stronger 
than the steel, or it can develop small machine, for example like nano-robots than bacterium 
and capable of making a complex products. As mentioned above, nanotechnology provides 
many promises and potential risks, and the more promising the technology seems to be, the 
more concern is raised about it detrimental effects.460  
 
The important principle of public interest defence has been established by the court in 
Gartside v Outram.461 In this case the court considered the public interest defence includes an 
iniquitous act. Wood V-C observed that:  
“there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity. You cannot make me the confidant of a 
crime or a fraud, and be entitled to close up my lips on any secret which you have the audacity to 
disclose to me relating to any fraudulent intention on your part; such a confidence cannot exist”.462  
 
According to this case, iniquitous act includes crime and other serious misconducts.463 The 
defence extended to the appropriate disclosure of the crime such as in Malone v Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner.464 In nanotechnology, the suppression of information about dangerous 
properties may be considered as iniquitous act. For example, the dangerous properties of 
nanotubes which have been considered as the next “asbestos” may be considered as the 
iniquitous act. The self-replication device i.e. nano-machines that could reproduce 
                                                          
459 [1990] 1 AC 109, at 282. See also the justification of the public interest defence; for example Pizer J ‘The 
Public Interest Exception to the Breach of Confidence Action: Are the Lights About to Change?’ (1994) 20 
Monash U. L. Rev. 67 states that the public interest defence is important in order to prevent the controller of the 
information from exercising his power over the information in a harmful manner, at p.98; see also Gurry, states 
that “the public interest require confidences, like contract to be held sacrosanct. In this role, the public interest 
operates not only in the private sector, to enforce a confider’s right to preserve confidentiality of information 
which he entrusts to another, but also in the public sphere”, n.208, at p.324. 
460 Heselhaus S ‘Risk Management of Nanomaterials: Environmental and Consumer Protection under Existing 
EC Legislation on Chemicals, Pesticides and Biocides’ (2010) Env. L. Rev. 115, at pp.115-116. However, 
whether nanotechnology have the hazardous effect for example to the environment is all depended on its 
management properly, interviewee C.  
461 (1856) 26 L.J Ch. 113. 
462 Ibid, at 114. 
463 See also Jones who states that iniquitous act to include criminal act, Jones G ‘Traditional” Legal 
Scholarship: A Personal View in Birks P B H (ed) (Oxford: CP, 1994) at p.448. 
464 [1979] Ch 344. 
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themselves which might act in uncontrollable manner in the human body465 or the 
suppression of the information about the danger of the nano-robot that can penetrate into the 
body466 may be considered as iniquitous act.   
 
The principle has been adopted by the court of appeal in Tournier v National Provincial and 
Union Bank of England467 that it is the right of the bank to disclose their customers’ 
information “to the extent to which it is reasonably necessary ... for protecting the bank, or 
persons interested, or the public, against fraud or crime”.468 
 
The principle of iniquity has been developed further to include less serious misconduct. In 
Initial Services Ltd v Putterill,469 the court of appeal recognised that under the contract of 
employment, an employee is under an implied obligation not to disclose any information or 
documents which he received in confidence. The Court has also stated that this obligation is 
subject to exception. Lord Denning MR stated that this exception is not limited but “it 
extends to any misconduct of such a nature that it ought in the public interest to be disclosed 
to others”.470  Similarly, Salmon LJ applied the principle in Gartside v Outram471 and 
broadened the concept of iniquity by stating that “but what is the sort of iniquity that comes 
within that doctrine is certainly not easy to define. What was iniquity in 1856 may be too 
narrow or perhaps too wide for 1967”.472 
 
The example of misconduct in nanotechnology may be the claimed of certain product to have 
nano-particle enhancement, but in fact it does not have it. Or the product contains certain 
percentage of nano-particle, but it has never been disclosed of the percentage.  
 
                                                          
465 Lin A C ‘Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology’ (2007) Vol 13, Harv. Env. L. Rev. 349, at p.355. 
466 Interviewee C. 
467 [1924] 1 K.B. 461. 
468 Ibid, per Atkin LJ at 486. See however, comment made by Sir John Donaldson MR in Francome v Mirror 
Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 W.L.R. 892 that the word “iniquity” is classic but has been ill-defined, at 895. 
469 [1968] 1 Q.B. 396. 
470 Ibid, at 405. 
471 (1857) 26 LJ Ch 113. 
472 [1968] 1 QB 396, at 410. Commenting on this case, Ricketson S ‘Public Interest and Breach of Confidence’ 
(1979-1980) 12 Melb. U. L. Rev. 176 states that the court has taken wider approach for the disclosure of 
information for public interest, where the judges have extended the defence to the relationship between master 
and servant (contract of employment), at p.187. 
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In Fraser v Evans473 the court developed further the principle of public interest to include 
“just cause or excuse”.474 In this case, Lord Denning MR noted that “no person is permitted 
to divulge to the world information which he has received in confidence, unless he has just 
cause or excuse for doing so”.475 In this case Lord Denning MR observed that iniquity “is 
merely an instance of just cause or excuse for breaking confidence. There are some things 
which may be required to be disclosed in the public interest, in which event no confidence 
can be prayed in aid to keep them secret”.476 In the instance, even though there is no 
misconduct or misdeeds, the court applied the principle of “just cause or excuse” for the 
interest of the public. The examples of “just cause or excuse” can be seen in the exposing of 
the unreliability breathalysers by the police,477 ensuring the safety of the public from 
medically dangerous practices,478 discharging a patient from mental hospital to the 
community479 and preventing the public from being misled of the image of certain pop 
stars.480 Based on these cases, the principle of “just cause or excuse” is wider than the 
principle of iniquity. In other words, whether the disclosure of information can be regarded in 
the public interest does not necessarily means that the action was misconduct. In 
nanotechnology for example, that use of nanoparticles by inhalation or absorbed to the body 
or exposure to the environment does not necessarily means that it is an act of misconduct, but 
the disclosure is justified for public interest because that nano-particle may have the potential 
risk, harm and danger to the human health and environment.  
 
In agreeing with the principle developed in Fraser v Evans, Sir Robert Megarry V.-C said in 
Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner481 that the principle of public interest should 
not be limited to the act of misconduct or misdeed only. But in fact, the act “may relate to 
some apprehension of an impending chemical or other disaster, arising without misconduct, 
of which the authorities are not aware, but which ought in the public interest to be disclosed 
                                                          
473 [1969] 1 Q.B. 349. 
474 The principles of “just cause or excuse” is wide for the court to act upon it on speculative and subjective area 
of inquiry, and the phrase should be applied objectively and should not be left open, Ricketson, n.472, at p.191. 
475 [1969] 1 Q.B 349, at 361. 
476 Ibid, at 362. 
477 Lion Laboratories [1985] 1 Q.B. 526 where the disclosure of accuracy of the functioning of the instrument 
for measuring intoxication levels of alcohol was justified publication in the Sunday newspaper, but not in 
Francome v Mirror Group Newspaper Ltd [1984] 2 All E.R. 408. 
478 Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 W.L.R. 389; Church of Scientology v Kaufman [1973] R.P.C. 635. 
479 W v Edgell [1990] Ch 359. 
480 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 W.L.R. 760. 
481 [1979] Ch 344, at 377. 
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to them”.482 In nanotechnology, the effect is still unknown whether it could bring the 
dangerous or harmful effect,483 but it may concern the issue of public interest of the 
disclosure of nanotechnology related information. 
 
The court in Malaysia has adopted the principle of “just cause or excuse” in relation to 
presenting relevant evidence to the court. In Attorney General of Hong Kong v Zauyah Wan 
Chik & Ors484 the Malaysian witnesses were called to give evidence in Hong Kong in 
relation to criminal proceedings against appellants. The witnesses feared that the disclosure 
of the information might expose them to the criminal liability and would be breaching the 
law of confidentiality and application to court for declaration. The court ruled that the 
witnesses could rely on the defence of just cause or excuse. The Court of Appeal (COA) held 
that the witnesses have legitimate excuse or reason for breaking confidence because they 
were bound by section 132(1) of the Evidence Act 1950 to make such disclosure. NH Chan 
JCA also emphasised that: 
“there is no duty of confidence where the disclosure is made in obedience to the law which 
required it to be made. In the present case, the duty of confidence is outweighed by the 
requirements of section 132(1) of the Evidence Act 1950”.485 
 
As compared to the UK approach, the defence of public interest in Australia has been 
considered as uncertain486 and subject to a narrower approach.487 Rath J in Castrol Australia 
Pty v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd488 has approved the principle as in Beloff v Pressdram 
Ltd489 and stated that in the information being disclosed, the principle of just cause for breach 
of confidence must be assessed as more weighty and precise than a public interest. Therefore, 
the public interest is established as was developed in Gartside v Outram on the principle of 
                                                          
482 Ibid, at 362. 
483 Interviewee A stated further that nanotechnology unknown effect must be carefully developed; interviewee 
C stated that all technology would have good or bad effect but it all depended on how human manage the 
technology, and examined further that small particle at nanoscale will have the tendency to be dangerous.  
484 [1995] 2 A.M.R. 1955. 
485 Ibid, at 1986. 
486 Ricketson, n.472, at p.177; see also Pizer which states that the scope and the effect of the public defence is 
still uncertain, n.459, at p.90; see also Davison M J et al. Australian Intellectual Property Law (Melbourne: 
CUP, 2008), at p.368 and cited AG Holdings v Burton (2002) 58 N.S.W.L.R. 464, 513. 
487 See for example Davison M J et al., n.486, at pp.369-370; see also Wheat K ‘Lawyers, Confidentiality and 
Public and Private Interests’ (1998) 1 Legal Ethics, No.2, 18, at p.30; see also interesting discussion of different 
view of the interpretation of public interest under Australian jurisprudence, Glover T ‘The Scope of the Public 
Interest Defence in Action for Breach of Confidence’ (1999) 6 James Cook U. L. Rev. 109, at p.135. 
488 (1980) 33 A.L.R. 31. 
489 [1973] 1 All E.R. 241, at 260. 
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iniquitous act. This is the most “favoured sense” in which the public interest defence has 
been used is narrower and limited to iniquitous act. Thus, it is not surprising that in different 
decision, Gummow J has criticised the law of public interest in England as “picturesque but 
somewhat imprecise”.490 In Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v 
Department of Community Services and Health491 Gummow J continued to criticise English 
public interest defence on the basis of that it is involved unfounded doctrinal and historical 
analysis. He further added that it was "not so much a rule of law as an invitation to judicial 
idiosyncrasy by deciding each case on an ad hoc basis as to whether, on the facts overall, it 
is better to respect or to override the obligation of confidence".492 Gummow J’s criticism of 
public interest as being “judicial idiosyncrasy” has been considered in Regina v Department 
of Health493 where the COA determined the importance of confining the public interest 
defence within strict limits.494 Therefore, as we can see, the courts have limited the scope of 
public defence concerning privacy or personal information. In Hyde Park Residence Ltd v 
Yelland495 concerned the photographs of a visit by the late Princess of Wales, Diana and 
Dodi Fayed to a villa in France. The publication of the photographs in the newspaper could 
not be justified by means of public interest defence, but only the facts. Similarly, the limit is 
that of privacy in Campbell v MGN Ltd496 the Mirror newspaper published two articles of 
Naomi Campbell concerning that she was a drug addict and that she was attending meetings 
of Narcotics Anonymous (NA) for her rehabilitation, contrary to her false statements. The 
articles were accompanied by photographs of Naomi Campbell leaving a meeting of NA. In 
the exercise of the freedom of expression, the Mirror contended that it was entitled to publish 
the articles and photographs. The HL examined that the publication of the fact that Naomi 
Campbell was receiving treatment at NA, the details of the treatment was an infringement of 
her right to privacy that could not be justified for the interest of the public. The photos 
leaving of NA enabled people to link to the articles, which were also considered intrusion to 
her private life. In relation to personal confidence, it has been made through the introduction 
                                                          
490 Corrs Pavey Whitting & Bryne v Collector of Customs for the State of Victoria (1987) 10 I.P.R. 53, at 71. 
491 [1990] F.S.R. 617.  
492 Ibid, 617, at 663. 
493 [2001] Q.B 424. 
494 Ibid, at 444. 
495 [2000] 3 W.L.R. 215. 
496 [2004] 2 All E.R. 995. 
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of the HRA 1998.497 However, the same principle applies even to commercial confidences, 
that the extent of publication must be appropriate. 
 
3.4.2 The scope and limits of public interest defence  
 
It is a matter of the discretionary power of the court whether to invoke the public interest 
defence or not for confidential information.498 The cases discussed above laid down the 
principle for the court to interpret what constitutes public interest defence. It is significant to 
discuss of what to disclose, to whom does the disclosure should be made and when of 
disclosure to justify for the public interest defence. There may be also limits as to how much 
information should be disclosed as in Campbell v MGN499 (not to disclose her photograph). 
The gravity of reason for/effect of the disclosure should also be taken into consideration for 
the defence to be applicable.500 Particularly important is looking at the likelihood and 
severity of the danger involved by such disclosure in order to prevent harm of the health and 
welfare of the public.501 The gravity assessment can be seen also in London Regional 
Transport v Mayor of London502 where Robert Walker LJ noted that “the court will also 
consider how much disclosure the public interest requires; the fact that some disclosure may 
be required does not mean that disclosure to the whole world should be permitted”.503 
 
3.4.2.1 To whom the disclosure should be made? 
 
For the question to whom should the information be disclosed was decided in Francome v 
Mirror Group Newspaper Ltd504 Sir Donaldson MR accepted that the media is an essential 
foundation of democracy, but the media should not confused their interest with the public 
interest. In this case, the public interest was served by informing to the relevant authorities 
                                                          
497 Article 10(3) arguably applies equally to commercial confidence, see Aplin (2007), n.204, at p.412. 
498 See per Lord Griffiths in AG v Guardian Newspapers (No.2) [1990] 1 A.C 109 at 268-269; per Lord Fraser 
in British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] A.C. 1096, at 1202. 
499 [2004] 2 All E.R. 995. 
500 See for example Stephenson LJ in Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans and Others [1985] Q.B. 526, at 537. 
501 Simes C ‘The Development of the Public Interest Defence to Breach of Confidence’ (1999) 7 Waikato L. 
Rev. 165, at p.183. 
502 [2001] EWCA Civ 1491; [2003] E.M.L.R. 4. 
503 Per Robert Walker LJ in London Regional Transport v Mayor of London [2001] EWCA Civ 1491; [2003] 
E.M.L.R. 4, at 100. 
504 [1984] 2 All E.R. 408. 
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rather than to the national newspaper. The court emphasised that the disclosure would not 
serve the public interest but instead it served the interest of the newspaper (Daily Mirror). 505 
The consideration of what might be considered as the proper authority will depend on the 
nature of the information.506 In Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd507 a company 
manufactured a drug called Primodos which was used as a pregnancy test. However, it was 
found that the drug had caused abnormalities in new born baby and was subject much of 
publicity in newspapers and on television. Thereafter, the drug was withdrawn from the 
market. The defendant, an ex-employee of a drug manufacturing company sought to make 
the information available to a television company for a documentary and alleged that the 
documentary was justified for public interest. Furthermore, the defendant also claimed that 
the information about the drug was already available in the public. The COA held that the act 
amounted to a breach of confidence and granted an injunction restraining the broadcast of the 
documentary. The documentary shown in the television is not the right person whom to 
disclose the information although the information was already available in the public domain. 
The documentary shown in a television would give harmful effect to a company, thus the 
disclosure was not to the right authority i.e. the television show, rather than to the appropriate 
authority that control the effect of the drug.   
 
The principle in Schering may be equally applicable to nanotechnology, that the disclosure 
must be made to the responsible authority to justify the defence of public interest. Similarly, 
in Lion Laboratories the COA stated that the press was an appropriate recipient of 
information relating to defective breathalysers for the level of intoxication. In 
nanotechnology, the disclosure must be made to the relevant authority for example those who 
involved in the environmental issues, or the scientists or technologists in securing the safety 
of nanotechnology to the human health, and environment. To some extent, the relevant 
authority may be the newspaper if the information relates to the danger or risk of 
nanotechnology to the society.  
 
                                                          
505 Ibid, at 413; For disclosure to the relevant authorities see also AG v Guardian Newspapers [1990] 1 A.C. 
109, per Lord Griffiths, at 213; Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 Q.B. 396 at 405-406; W v Edgell [1990] 
1 All E.R. 835 at 852-853; but in Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] Q.B. 526 the information was disclosed 
to the national newspaper was justified of the accuracy of the functioning of intoxication meter. 
506 Pizer, n.459, at p.80. 
507 [1981] 2 All E.R. 321. 
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3.4.2.2 What to disclose? 
 
There are limits for the defence to be applied. The limit of the scope of operation of the 
defence is based on the individual cases, and it is said that the limits of the defence are still 
unclear.508 According to Ricketson, the word “misdeeds” and “iniquities” clearly exclude 
acts of “trivial, sensational or purely salacious nature”.509 In Beloff v Pressdram Ltd510  
Ungoed-Thomas J listed the limits of the public interest defence and further added that the 
public interest defence also “does not extend beyond misdeeds of a serious nature and 
importance to the country”.511  
 
3.4.2.3 When of disclosure in the public interest?  
 
In Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd512 the court held that the 
defendants failed to establish that the use of the documents related to the effect of 
thalidomide was still apparent to the interest of the public. The court ruled that the 
justification to invoke the public interest defence will not be successful if the suspected 
danger to arise in the future.  In Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman513 the court held that the 
fear of the harm in the future does not justify disclosure for the public interest. As Shaw LJ 
pointed out that “there is no occasion to beat the drum again”.514  
 
This note is very significant to nanotechnology, as the effects for example toxicological or 
environmental are still unclear or unknown;515 much more on the speculative effect in the 
future as nanotechnology would bring a dramatic effect as compared to the particle at larger 
scale. The question of precautionary principle would be important here when the technology 
                                                          
508 Gurry, n.180, at 326. 
509 Ricketson, n.472, at p.189. 
510 [1973] F.S.R. 33. 
511 Ibid, at 57. 
512 [1975] Q.B. 613 
513 [1982] Q.B. 1 
514 Ibid, at 27. 
515 Interviewee A queried whether or not to adopt precautionary principle for nanotechnology. This is because 
the environmental and toxicological effect relates to nanotechnology must be developed carefully which 
requires for the test to come out first, before use of nanotechnology, interviewee A; see also Lin, n.465, at 
p.356. 
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is still uncertain as to the effects. The European Union’s Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle 2000 states that:  
“the Communication underlines that the precautionary principle forms part of a structured 
approach to the analysis of risk, as well as being relevant to risk management. It covers cases 
where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific 
evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous 
effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the high level 
of protection chosen by the EU”.516  
 
The principle of precautionary principle is only applied if the damages are serious or 
irreversible and there are still lacking in scientific certainty of the damages.517 The risk 
threshold required to prove for the application of precautionary principle is lower than 
scientific certainty518 and the risk should be addressed even there is no suspected link 
between the cause and the environmental harm.519 In Pfizer Animal Health SA/NV v EU 
Council520 the Court of First Instance (CFI) stated that in the event of scientific uncertainty, 
the precautionary principle could be applied without having to wait for the scientific outcome 
if there was a need to prompt an action to avoid unacceptable risk to the health.  In 
nanotechnology, for example there is the possibility that nanoparticles could destroy the 
biodiversity in the river. This is serious and irreversible therefore there should be some 
measure to prevent the harms, for example, by preventing the use of nanoparticles at all.521 
For example, the use of nanoparticles to purify the fish in the river, and these nanoparticles 
are toxic to the fish population and some of the fish die through the purification.522 The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the first step for the application of the 
precautionary is the identification on the potential negative consequences for health, and 
secondly a comprehensive assessment of the risk to health based on the most reliable 
                                                          
516 http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/precaution-4.html (accessed June 25, 2009). 
517 Allhoff F ‘Risk, Precaution, and Emerging Technologies’ (2009) Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology, 
Vol 3, Issue 2, Article 2, 1, at p.17; These existence of a threat or the serious or irreversible nature of possible 
risk or damage are interacting each other, Cheyne I ‘The Precautionary Principle in EC and WTO Law: 
Searching for a Common Understanding’ (2006) Env. L. Rev. 257, at p .263. 
518 Cheyne, n.517, at pp.262-263; provides an interesting discussion of the law and practice of the EC and WTO 
of the real implications and meaning of the precautionary principle. 
519 McEldowney J and McEldowney S ‘Science and Environmental Law: Collaboration Across the Double 
Helix’ (2011) Env. Law Rev. 169, at p.185. 
520 Case T-13/99 [2002] ECR II-03305. 
521 Allhoff, n. 517, at p.17. 
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scientific data available and the most recent results of international research.523 Then this is 
followed by a risk management, where the appropriate measures must be identified.524  
 
In other words, the precautionary principle would be useful when the human activities lead to 
morally unacceptable harm which is scientifically plausible but uncertain.525 Therefore, 
action should be taken in order to diminish the harm. Thus, the precautionary principle is 
significant to consider uncertain risks that certain technology could provide.526 It is said that 
precautionary principle would be appropriate for nanotechnology because there exist 
scientifically tenable grounds that the release for example nano-materials into the 
environment would give serious harm to the human health and environment.527 Another 
reason precautionary principles are necessary in the case of nanotechnology is the ability of 
this technology to penetrate into the body, the toxicity effect and nanoparticles which are 
unlikely to be easy to be removed from the environment giving an indication of the negative 
consequence of being irreversible.528  
 
3.4.3 Balancing the rights within breach of confidence 
 
The court has to balance the interest of public interest by such disclosure and the public 
interest is served by such refusal to disclose such information. Lord Denning stated in 
Woodward v Hutchins529 that “it is a question of balancing the public interest in maintaining 
the confidence against the public interest”.530 Lord Widgery CJ in Attorney-General v 
Jonathan Cape Ltd531 also stated that “the public interest in non-disclosure must be weighed 
against disclosure in the interests of justice ... The courts should recognise that even if 
injustice to an individual results there is a higher public interest in relation to the protection 
                                                          
523 Commission of the European Communities v Denmark [2003] 3 C.M.L.R. 29, at para 51; However, this is 
not apply when the uncertainty is so severe, potentially applicable to harms of nanomaterials, Hesselhaus, n. 
460, at pp.130-131. 
524 Heselhaus, n.460, at p.130. 
525 World Communication on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology, UN Education, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, the Precautionary Principle 13 (2005) at 
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527 Ibid, at p.384. 
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529 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 760. 
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531 [1976] Q.B. 752. 
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of a certain class of material”.532 The HL in Attorney-General v Observer533 held that the 
matters relied by the courts to balance the interest will be based on the moral principles of 
loyalty and fair dealing as against other matters that will be served by the publication of the 
confidential information.534 However, it is not an easy task to balance the interest of the 
parties, as Sir John Donaldson MR pointed out in Francome and Another v Mirror Group 
Newspapers Ltd535 that “they are peculiarly vulnerable to the error of confusing the public 
interest with their own interest. Usually these interests march hand in hand, but not 
always”.536 
 
The cases above showed that that the disclosure must be made to the appropriate person, so 
in nanotechnology the appropriate authority can be predicted to include for example those in 
charge from the department of environment, the police or the authority from the medical line, 
or those who have a real interest in addressing the harm or risk. On matters of what to 
disclose, related to nanotechnology it may involve matters concerning the issue of health, 
safety and environment as mentioned above. The disclosure of the information must be based 
also in balancing the rights, which can be presumed to include those who are developing the 
technology and the public. However, this is a bit tough to balance the interest since 
nanotechnology is still new and emerging, whereas at the same time to preserve the interest 
of the public of not to expose to the risk or danger from the technology. Thus, looking at 
other statutory parallel of right to access the information with other rights might be 
appropriate for nanotechnology as discussed below. 
 
3.4.4 Statutory parallels and external balances 
 
This study does not consider data protection as primary directed towards personal data. 
However, other statutes require an access to information somewhat parallel public interest 
defence. In this regards, it is significant the balancing act between the public interest in 
maintenance of confidentiality and the public interest that may be served by such disclosure. 
                                                          
532 [1976] Q.B. 752, at 755. See also per Lord Denning MR in Woodward and Others v Hutchins and Others 
[1977] 1 W.L.R. 760, at 764. 
533 [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776; [1990] 1 A.C. 109. 
534 Ibid, Per Lord Griffiths, at 268-269. 
535 [1984] 1 W.L.R. 892. 
536 Ibid, at 898. 
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In the UK, the balancing of the rights is made by the ECHR and now is made through the 
effect of the HRA 1998. Article 10 of the ECHR guarantees the freedom of expression. The 
balancing interest of the media freedom of speech and privacy interest was highlighted by the 
HL in Campbell v MGN537 that the treatment of the known model at the NA and her 
photographs of leaving a place was not amounted to breach of confidence and was not 
justified for public interest under Article 10 of the ECHR.538 Cream Holdings v Banerjee539 
concerned freedom of expression under section 12 of the HRA 1998 and whether to grant 
relief or not in the exercise of the freedom of expression under the ECHR, the court must 
regard to the significant of this right. In this case Lord Nicholls observed that the information 
disclosed was justified for serious public interest, and further noted that “the whistleblower 
provisions were intended to give additional protection to employees, not to cut down the 
circumstances where the public interest may justify private information being published at 
large”.540 
 
Another interesting piece of legislation that may be of relevance to nanotechnology is the UK 
Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR).541 The EIR provides the public access of 
the environmental information upon the request by the relevant authority.542 The Regulation 
5(1) provides that subject to exceptions, the public authority must make available of any 
environmental information upon request. Regulation 6(1) provides the request of the 
information be made available in the relevant form or format, the public authority must make 
it so available in a particular form or format unless, it is reasonable to make it available in 
another form or format or the information is already available or accessible to the public in 
another form or format. Regulation 12 provides for the exception to the rule by stating that 
the public authority may refuse to disclose the environmental information upon request by 
the public if the public interest in maintaining the right is outweighs the public interest in 
disclosing the information. Regulation 12 also provides the exception that the public 
authority may refuse such disclosure of the information if the disclosure would affect 
international relations, defence, national security or public safety and intellectual property 
                                                          
537 [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 A.C. 457. 
538 Ibid, Per Lord Hoffmann at 473-474; Lord Hale at 489. 
539 [2004] UKHL 44. 
540 Ibid, at 262. 
541 SI 2004 3391.  
542 For example the information request regarding the location of an endangered and rare species, Altaras D, 
The Environmental Information Regulations 2004 – An Update’ (2010) J.P.L. 310, at p.319. 
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rights. The ground for refusal to supply information should be interpreted in a restrictive way 
that the public interest is served by such disclosure should be weighed against the public 
interest is served by such disclosure.543 
 
Office of Communications v Information Commissioner544 concerned the Stewart Report of 
the risk health posed by electro-magnetic radiation emitted from mobile phone. Ofcom 
established Sitefinder website which contains details of all mobile phone base stations and 
their emissions for base stations. The Sitefinder did not mention about the precise 
information of location of particular base station. The Information Manager for Health 
Protection Scotland requested information relating to grid references for each base station 
from Ofcom. Ofcom stated that information already available on the Sitefinder website and 
pursuant to Reg (6) (1) (b) of EIR there was no requirement to provide it in another format. 
The Information Manager stated that exceptions to disclosure in Reg 12(5) (a) and (c) applied 
that the disclosure of the information sought would compromise the security of the sites 
which provide the police and emergency service radio network and would also interfere with 
the IPRs of the mobile network operators (MNOs). The Information Commissioner ordered 
Ofcom to make such disclosure and he did not accept that the exception under Reg 12(5) (a) 
and (c). Ofcom appealed and the Tribunal found that the exceptions under Reg 12(5)(a) and 
(c) were engaged but that in each case the public interest in maintaining the exception did not 
outweigh the public interest in disclosure. The Tribunal held that the contemplated use of the 
data in those datasets for the purposes of epidemiological research would infringe those 
database rights, but would also constitute a “benefit” in the public interest. In the COA, it 
was observed that the purpose of legislation is to weigh the pros and cons with the 
presumption in favour of the disclosure, and concluded that the since EIR did not explicitly 
stated that of what amounted to public interest of such disclosure, therefore, it should be an 
implicit of an aspect of public interest benefit. The disclosure of the names of mobile 
network operators was considered in the public interest because the names clearly be a 
relevant factor in public debate arising out of epidemiological research.  
 
On the balance between public interest in the disclosure of the information and the public 
interest is served in maintaining its confidentiality, Australia has also the statutory parallel as 
                                                          
543 Altaras, n.542, at p.314. 
544 [2009] EWCA Civ 90; [2009] AC 48. 
104 
 
exemplified in the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI 1982).545 The purpose of the FOI 
1982 is to serve the broad public interest by improving openness and accountability and 
promoting participation of the public and to balance the competing interests for and against 
the disclosure of the information.546 Paterson and McDonaugh discuss cases that deal with 
the FOI 1982, for example Re Wiseman and Defense Service Homes Corporation547 where 
the request to have access to the information was refused because what the FOI concerned 
was more on the personal and private interest rather than public interest. In Re Kamingga and 
Australian National University548 the distinction was made between private and public 
interest in the application of public interest test. In this case, the Commonwealth 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal examined that the disclosure of the information that is 
against the interest of the public, it requires the balancing of competing interest between the 
public interest in the applicant’s right to know and the applicant’s personal interest to know 
about the information. Thus, in Australia, in providing justice to the individual, it was 
justified for public interest for right to know of the information.549 
 
To date, there is no similar provision in Malaysia as regards to the freedom of information.550 
Therefore, there is a need for Malaysia to have similar provision, as emphasised by Raja 
Azlan Shah J that: 
“the right to access to information has assumed increasing importance in recent years as one of the 
steps in achieving the concept of open government. I believe that we need a Freedom of 
Information, under which members of the public have a right to access specifically requested 
records, and that there should be made available, as a right within reasonable time. A Freedom of 
Information Act will greatly improve the climate of trust in this country”.551  
 
                                                          
545 Similar Act in the UK, the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000.  Section 2(2) provides where the public 
interest in maintaining the disclosure is outweighed the public interest in the disclosure of the information, the 
right to access of the information does not apply. See also 3.1.  
546 Hanbury-Sparrow [1997] A.A.T.A. 323, September 10, 1997 at 64, as stated in McDonagh M and Paterson 
M ‘Freedom of Information: Taking Account of the Circumstances of Individual Applicants’ (2010) P.L. 505 at 
p.518. 
547 (1987) 14 A.L.D. 301. 
548 (1992) 15 A.A.R. 297. 
549 McDonaugh and Paterson, n.546, at p.519. 
550 To date only one state in Malaysia, i.e. Selangor has passed the Bill, the Selangor Freedom of Information 
Act 2010, news available at 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?sec=nation&file=/2011/4/1/nation/20110401113453, accessed on 15 May 
2012. 
551 Azlan Shah ‘The Right to Know” (1986) J.M.C.L. Vol, 13, 1, at p.22. 
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To the same effect Munir and Yasin also emphasise the importance of having the freedom of 
information law in Malaysia by stating that “is not an ideal but a necessity”.552 The reason 
for Malaysia to have Freedom of Information Act is to improve transparency and 
accountability as a well-governed democracy government and to protect fundamental 
liberties of the right to information.553 
 
Other than public interest defence, there are other available statutory parallel rights that 
justify the disclosure of the information in the interest of the public and balancing the act of 
maintaining confidentiality. In the UK, the statutory rights have well developed, as have been 
through the HRA 1998 for the freedom of expression. In the context of environment, i.e. the 
EIR is closely significant to nanotechnology where it gives right to the public to access of the 
information upon request made by the relevant authority. In Australia, the introduction of the 
FOI Act is to serve the public interest and promoting participation of the public and to 
balance the competing interest for and against such disclosure of the information. In 
Malaysia, there are no similar statutory rights of the information which balances the act to 
disclose the information and right to confidentiality.554 The FOI as applied in Australia and 
UK may be persuasive for Malaysia to adopt a similar approach for nanotechnology.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The law of confidence is suitable to protect nanotechnology information based on the policy 
consideration and emphasised through the interviews conducted in this study. Furthermore, 
the law of confidence does not differentiate between products and services, and it lasts 
forever so long the information is kept secret. The law of confidence has been well 
established and by using Megarry’s J characteristics for confidentiality, the protection 
accorded under the law of confidence is quite straight forward at national or international 
law, except on the issue of proprietary rights of the information.   
 
                                                          
552 Munir A B and Mohd Yasin S H Information and Communication Technology Law, State, Internet and 
Information: Legal and Regulatory Challenges (Petaling Jaya, S&M: 2010), at p.34. They also examine in light 
of Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro where Malaysia is a party, it 
requires member state to guarantee the rights of citizens to access information related to environment. 
553 Ibid, at p.55. 
554 Freedom of speech in Malaysia is constitutionally guaranteed under Federal Constitution, Article 10. 
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In nanotechnology, the quality of secrecy can be maintained because the scientists and 
engineers are working toward new creation in their research. The concept of accessibility of 
the information is important generally, and particularly significant when the number of 
considerable people had known of the information in nanotechnology. This is because 
nanotechnology research is often devised by exclusive teams of researchers. Furthermore, 
because of the size differences between nanoscale and macro-scale, the mere availability of 
the information does not necessarily mean that the public has accessed to the confidential 
information. The reason is to understand the information in nanotechnology one may need to 
go through a thorough process of experiment and laboratories test. However, the relevant 
group of transmission will be relevant in the context of nanotechnology because if the 
information has been transmitted to the scientist or engineer who is directly involved in 
devising nanotechnology, the information may become public knowledge. Novelty in 
confidentiality is also important because breach of confidence is “provisional protection” for 
patent rights. The doctrine of springboard is also very important in consideration of the speed 
of development in nanotechnology. When the speed of technology is so rapid, there is a 
tendency for the other party to use the confidential information as a headstart without putting 
his own effort in. Therefore, this doctrine is important to prevent other party to use the 
information to the detriment of the ‘owner’ of the information. Nevertheless, this doctrine 
should be limited in time.  
 
The court applies the objective and subjective test in determining the quality of confidence. 
In nanotechnology the scientist and technologist must have sufficiently taken steps to secure 
their confidential information such as by applying secret code to the information, or by 
limiting the access to the information. They must also believe that the information is 
confidential and the public has no access to the information. The pragmatic and flexible 
cause of action may be essential for nanotechnology characterize by collaborative 
approaches. For contractual obligation, in order to interpret implied term nanotechnology the 
integrative approach may be significant to suit to multiple disciplines like nanotechnology. 
Equitable principle may also provide a cause of action for nanotechnology, when there is no 
answer in the contractual obligation. Nevertheless, there are choices of law applicable for 
non-contractual obligation as provided under Rome II Regulation especially when the 
information has the element of cross-border like nanotechnology.  
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In the contract of employment, all team participate in nanotechnology should be advised to 
expressly provide the confidentiality clauses or NDA. The mobility of employee especially in 
the university may also be made their obligation through NDA. Although proprietary interest 
may provide useful consideration as discussed in Honore, nevertheless, it shows less likely to 
be adopted by the court in Malaysia and UK in the near future. The party to a confidential 
information must not use or disclose the information without authorization of the party 
communicating it. In nanotechnology, since it is involved team members or teams of 
individuals, third parties recipient may be significant to determine whether the information 
has been used according to what was intended.  
 
Nanotechnology could potentially have risk or hazardous to the health, safety and 
environment, for example its level of toxicity. The scope and principle of public interest 
defence may be identified for nanotechnology. In considering the uncertainty of 
nanotechnology risk, the precautionary principle also may be adopted. There may be a little 
difficulty to balance the right to disclose and right to maintain such disclosure of information, 
since nanotechnology is still new and emerging. Thus, other statutory parallel rights may be 
useful for nanotechnology to access the information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
 
CHAPTER 4  
NANOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Legal commentators tend to assume that patent protection is the most suitable for 
nanotechnology.555 The qualitative interviews with key nano-technologists confirmed that 
patent-like protection is seen as necessary and desirable, although not the only route to 
protecting creative effort and fostering suitable models for research, development and 
commercialisation.  
 
This chapter discusses types of creation that nanotechnology is bringing about and whether 
these can be characterised as “inventions”. Given that there is no commonly accepted 
terminology for nanotechnology so far,556 this chapter critically examines how difficulty in 
defining nanotechnology could pose problems for patent law. This chapter investigates 
whether material at nanoscale can be regarded as novel, inventive and industrially 
applicability. It also discusses how ownership is determined in this complex and 
collaborative field. This chapter also examines whether nanotechnology could pose risk to 
the environment and offend against the principle of morality or public order. It also identifies 
whether nanotechnology requires specific defences or any defences are problematic.  
 
The case law in Malaysia is limited and so reference will be made mainly to UK and 
European patent laws, with some mention of US cases. In Malaysia, patents are governed by 
the Patents Act 1983 (PA 1983) and Patent Regulations 1986; in the UK, by Patents Act 
1977 (as amended) (PA 1977) and Patents Rules 2007 and Patent Fees Rules 2007 (as 
amended). As a contracting state of the European Patent Convention 1973 (amended 2000)557 
the UK law should correspond to the Convention through its patent Administration, 
                                                          
555 See for example Behfar B and Fernandez D ‘Intellectual Property in Nanotechnology’ (2002) Thin Solid 
Films, 420; Matsuura J H Nanotechnology Regulation and Policy Worldwide (London: Artech House, 2006) at 
p.37; Wolfson J R ‘Social and Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology: Lessons from Biotechnology and Other High 
Technologies, (2003) 22 Biotech L. Rep. 376 at 395; Lemley, n.25, at p.605; Newberger, n.25, at p.649. 
556 See 2.2.  
557 Convention on the Grants of European Patents, 1973 (EPC). 
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Regulations and Guidelines.558 The decision of the granting office, its Boards of Appeal 
(BOA) and Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBOA) of the European Patent Office (EPO) are 
persuasive authority in the UK.559 The EPC has attracted commentary, case law and 
comparison in its own right. 
 
4.2 Types of nanotechnology creation  
 
Patent law protects products and processes that are new, involve an inventive step and are 
industrially applicable.560 These are also the criteria of Article 27(1) of the WTO TRIPS 
agreement.  
 
Examples from case law suggests that there are different types of nanotechnology creation, in 
the US, the first nanotechnology case was Re Kumar561 concerning alumina nanoparticles 
useful for chemical-mechanical polishing of ultra-smooth surfaces. In the EPO EBOA for 
example considered a cellulose ester material of titanium dioxide having an average particle 
size of less than 100nm;562 fluid handling in micro fabricated analytical devices;563 
antireflective film consisting of titanium nitride with thicknesses in the nanometre range;564  
a method for treating or coating wood with an aqueous composition of copolymer particles 
with the range of 20 to 70nm.565  
 
Other patentable examples include the process of making aerogel from rice husk at 
nanoscale,566 sensory devices to detect molecules in the blood,567 the system of imitating 
                                                          
558 Some provisions of the UK PA 1977 Act ‘are so framed as to have, as nearly as practicable, the same effects 
in the United Kingdom as the corresponding provisions of the European Patent Convention’, Section 130(7). 
559 See for example Merell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v HH Norton & Co Ltd [1996] R.P.C. 76, per Lord 
Hoffmann at 82; Biogen v Medeva [1997] R.P.C. 1, per Lord Hoffmann at 41; Generic (UK) Ltd v Lundbeck 
A/S [2009] UKHL 12, per Lord Walker at para 35, Per Lord Mance at para 46 and per Lord Neuberger at para 
86. 
560 Section 11 PA 1983; Section 1(a)(b)(c) PA 1977; Art 52(1) EPC 2000. 
561 418 F.2d 1361 (Fed Cir 2005) (Newman J). This case set a precedent for future cases in nanotechnology, 
although the judge did not establish separate rules for nanotechnology patents. 
562 T 0006/02 Photodegradable Cellulose Ester Tow. 
563 T 0070/99 Fluid Handling in Micro Fabricated Analytical Devices. 
564 T 0453/97 Antireflective Coating for Use in Photolithography Case. 
565 T 0952/01 Method of a Coating a Substrate Case.  
566 Interviewee C who holds five different patents. 
567 Interviewee A – and also orthopedics devices such as arms and joint replacements.  
110 
 
nature called ‘bio-mimetic’,568 High Performance Varistos569 and bio-marking process.570 
Other examples for products and processes of nanotechnology include upstream 
manufacturing methods (methods, techniques and tools) and computational techniques; and 
downstream inventions such as – nanoelectronics (quantum dots); sensors (carbon nanotubes 
gas sensors, nanocantilever-based sensors); aeronautics/space travel (durable, light weight 
fullerenes); environmental clean-up (self-assembly monolayers, dendrimers); 
nanobiotechnology/nanomedicine (drug delivery systems, liposomes, nanoparticles and 
nanoshells, prosthethics, surgical robot, implantable smart devices).571 
 
The above cases and examples show that the “creations” of nanotechnology may involve 
products or processes. A creation can be modelled from macro-scale and be reduced into 
different forms at nanoscale, and it may also be a completely new product or process.572 
However, whether a mere down-scaling of product or process to nanoscale could be 
protected under patent law is not wholly clear.573 Whether a nanoscale creation would be 
considered as “invention” or “discovery” is discussed below.   
 
4.3 The patentability requirements 
 
The building up and manipulation of material at the molecular scale has caused scientists and 
technologists to encounter many surprising results. This section examines the challenges for 
nanotechnology inventions to meet patentability requirements.  
 
4.3.1 Invention or discovery at nanoscale 
 
The issue concerning nanotechnology is whether the reproduction of a known entity at the 
molecular structure would meet the requirement of patentability so as to be considered as an 
                                                          
568 Interviewee D – and also lab-on-chip which could stored huge amount of genetic information. 
569 See n.111. 
570 The use of label-free nano-sensor technique which is simple, portable, small and speed instant reading 
enables biomarker detection from whole blood for certain diseases such as cancer, see, n.111, at p.4. 
571 Bawa, n.67, at p.44. 
572 eg metal that could be manufactured at nanoscale, interviewee A. 
573 The same issue was posed by interviewee A. 
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“invention” and not merely a “discovery”.574 Some nano-materials are naturally occurring 
substances, are they therefore unpatentable, or would patenting block innovation?575 The 
development of nanotechnology has resulted in a blurring of the interface between invention 
and discovery576 and the boundaries may be hard to fully appreciate at the time of 
discovery.577  
 
Articles 27(1) of TRIPS sets a minimum standard for patentability for WTO member states to 
follow. The non-discrimination clause under patent law means that the availability and the 
scope of enforcement of patent rights should not unjustifiably discriminate between different 
technologies.578 These requirements of patentability may be a challenge for 
nanotechnology.579 
 
Malaysia’s PA 1983 provides a definition of ‘invention’ as well as a non-patentable list. 
Section 12 of PA 1983 defines invention as “an idea of an inventor which permits in practice 
the solution to a specific problem in the field of technology”.580 According to this provision, 
to constitute an invention, there must be a conception of an idea which is able to solve the 
problem in the relevant field of technology. The exclusion of discovery from patentability is 
provided under section 13 of the PA 1983.581  
 
In determining “invention” and “discovery” Purchas LJ has stated that: 
“there may be a critical distinction to be drawn between a claim to new knowledge or to a 
discovery “as such” which is not patentable under section 1(2) of the 1977 Act and a claim to a 
method embracing a discovery which may well be an invention which is patentable”.582 
                                                          
574 Discovery as such is not patentable under PA 1983; PA 1977; Art 52(2) EPC. 
575 Eg. Zech H ‘Nanotechnology – New Challenges for Patent Law?’ (2009) Vol. 6, Issue 1, ScriptEd 144 at 
p.151. 
576 Bastani B and Fernandez D ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Nanotechnology’, Menlo Park, CA; Fernandez 
and Associates, LLP, 2002, available at http://www.iploft.com/Nanotechnology.pdf, accessed 5 July 2009; same 
view, see Bowman, n.15, at p.311. 
577 Troilo, n.25, at p.38; this interface continues to reside in the patent law, and the boundaries should be 
continually policed and clarified, Vaver D ‘Invention in Patent Law: A Review and a Modest Proposal’ (2003) 
I.J.L.I.T Vol. 11, 286, at pp.305-306. 
578 Correa, n.229 at p.282. 
579 See for example, Koppikar V et al., ‘Current Trends in Nanotech Patents: A View from Inside the Patent 
Office’ (2004) 1 Nanotech Law & Bus. 24, at p.27.  
580 There is no similar provision in the UK and EPO to define what invention is. The PA 1977 provides only the 
non-exclusive list of non-inventions under section 1(2); see also section 125 of the PA 1977. See also per Lord 
Hoffmann in Biogen Inc v Medeva [1997] R.P.C. 1, at 41.   
581 Section 1(2)(a) PA 1977; Art 52 (2) (a) EPC 2000. 
582 Genentech Inc’s Patent [1989] R.P.C. 147, at 208. 
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By way of example Mustill L.J referred that “you cannot invent water, although you 
certainly can invent ways in which it may be distilled or synthesised.”583  
 
In relation to biotechnology, Genentech’s Patent584 the COA affirmed the view of Whitford 
J.585 This case related to human tissue plasminogen activator or ‘t-PA’. In deciding whether 
the main claim was an invention or discovery within section 1(2) PA 1977, Dillon L.J. stated 
that: 
“the claims ... are not claims for the discovery of the sequences as such, but claims in relation to 
the practical application of the discovery in the production of human t-PA by recombinant DNA 
technology. In my judgment, therefore, this patent does not fall foul of subsection (2) of section 1 
of the 1977 Act”.586 
 
Thus, if somebody has discovered a known entity in nature, but manages to put it to practical 
use, this may be patentable. The EPO Guideline provides:  
“if a new property of a known material or article is found out, that is mere discovery and 
unpatentable because discovery as such has no technical effect587 and is therefore not an invention 
within the meaning of Art 52(1). If however, that property is put to practical use, then this 
constitutes an invention which may be patentable. For example, the discovery that a particular 
known material is able to withstand mechanical shock would not be patentable, but a railway 
sleeper made from that material could well be patentable”.588  
 
The law requires human intervention for the discovery to be patentable. This has been 
incorporated in the Biotechnology Directive,589 Recital 20 of which reads: 
“…an element isolated from the human body otherwise produced by means of a technical process, 
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even 
if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element…”.590 
                                                          
583 Per Mustilll LJ in Genentech Inc’s Patent [1989] R.P.C. 147, at 264. 
584 [1989] R.P.C. 147. 
585 “It is trite law that you cannot patent a discovery, but if on the basis of that discovery you can tell  people 
how it can be usefully employed, then a patentable invention may result. This in my view would be the case, 
even though once you have made the discovery, the way in which it can be usefully employed is obvious 
enough.”, Per Whitford J [1987] R.P.C. 533, at 566. 
586 Ibid, at 240. 
587 The concept of technical effect is equally important for software patents, ‘computer programs…as such’ 
being excluded subject-matter under s1(2) and Art 52(2), see, eg, Merrill Lynch's Appn [1989] R.P.C. 561; 
Aerotel Limited v Telco Limited; Macrossan's Application [2007] R.P.C. 7 (Macrossan was a business method);  
Symbian Ltd’s Appn [2008] EWCA Civ 1066, [2009] R.P.C. 1. 
588 EPO Guidelines (2009) Chap IV, Part C, 2.3.1. Discoveries. 
589 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions 6 July 1998. 
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Thus, the known entity found should prove to have some technical contribution as the result 
of the human intervention. The human effort and skill to isolate substances from nature and 
identify their uses may lead to patentability; the court and the EPO have recognised this in 
Howard Florey/Relaxin,591 Harvard/Onco-Mouse,592 Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic 
Therapies593 and Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel.594 Based on these decisions, nano-
creations may benefit from the experience of patenting naturally occurring substances in 
biotechnology and from the technical requirement under computer programs and business 
methods.595 Nanotechnology involves synthesising and analysing structures and studying the 
interaction of individual atoms, controlling and manipulating chemical reaction at the atomic 
levels. If the study is only about the finding of naturally occurring materials rather than a 
practical product, it is only “discovery”.596 If all of this interaction of atoms can be proved to 
be the result of the human intervention by skills and effort which manages to put it into 
practical use, it may be considered as invention. Miniaturisation to nanoscale may be treated 
as an invention if it demonstrates enhanced technical effect as a result from its different size. 
The mere findings of previously unknown substances at nanoscale are “discovery” and as the 
cases in biotechnology show,597 if the elements or substances are purified from the naturally 
occurring substance, or synthesised they may be patentable if all other requirements 
(discussed below) are met.  
 
4.3.2 Novelty of nanotechnology  
 
The invention is new if it is not anticipated by the prior art.598 Malaysia, like UK and EPC, 
practises absolute novelty - anything in the world made publicly available either orally, 
written or through use or in other way shall form the state of the art. This disclosure to form 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
590 See also Art 3(2) and Schedule A2 PA 1977, paras 2 and 5. 
591 T741/91 [1995] EPOR 541. 
592 [2003] OJ EPO 473 (Opposition Division), at 491.  
593 [2003] R.P.C. 31, CA at 62. 
594 [2005] R.P.C. 9, Lord Hoffmann differentiated products of nature from inventions by stating that “an 
invention is a practical product or process, not information about the natural world”, at 196. 
595 N.587 above; see also HHJ Birss in Halliburton Energy Services v Comptroller-General [2011] EWHC 
2508(Pat) at paras 30-38. 
596 Kirin-Amgen v Hoescht Marion Roussel [2005] RPC 1659, paras 76-77, per Lord Hoffmann, holding that a 
claim to DNA sequence without any practical qualification of the product or process was only discovery. 
597 EPO Guidelines (2009), Part C chapter IV 2.3.1 states that finding of previously unrecognized naturally 
occurring substances are not patentable, but if the substance produce a technical effect, it may be patentable. 
598 Section 14 PA 1983; section 2 PA 1977; Art 54 EPC 2000. 
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the prior art also includes the contents of domestic patent applications having an earlier 
priority date.  
 
Does simply reducing the geometrical size make the subject matter new? If the prior art 
relates only to the macro or micro-scale, the nanoscale equivalent is generally not 
anticipated.599 The rules of anticipation and selection patents will be discussed below. 
 
As a general rule, mere scaling down does not confer patentability. In the US, it has been 
decided that simply reduced the size of the invention does not make it new in Re Gardner v 
TEC Systems INC600 the Federal Circuit examined that where the difference between prior 
art and the claims was a relative dimensions of the claimed device, and a device having the 
claimed relative dimensions would not perform differently from the prior art, the centralised 
prior art should be developed claimed device was not patentable.601 In Re Rose602 the 
claimed lumber package “of appreciable size and weight requiring handling by a lift truck” 
was held not patentable over prior art lumber packages which could be lifted by hand. 
Similarly, in Re Rinehart603 it was stated that "mere scaling up of a prior art process capable 
of being scaled up, if such were the case, would not establish patentability in a claim to an 
old process so scaled"604 and in Texas Instruments v ITC605 that the mere change in size 
because of improved miniaturisation by technological advance does not in itself avoid the 
devices from infringement. The cases show that mere downscaling of device or structure 
does not automatically novel. However, this situation could be distinguished in 
nanotechnology where the laws of classical physical and quantum mechanics meet. With 
creations in nanotechnology, there is not only a mere down-scaling to nanoscale, but 
properties change dramatically, and this may be patentable.  
 
 
                                                          
599 Schellekens, n.25 at p.51. 
600 725 F.2d 1338, 220 USPQ 777 (CAFC 1984). 
601 Gardner v. TEC Systems, Inc., 725 F.2d 1338, 220 USPQ 777 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830, 
225 USPQ 232 (1984). 
602 220 F.2d 459, 105 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1955). 
603 531 F.2d 1048, 189 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1976); the obviousness of downscaling under the EPC, see Trustees 
of University of Pennsylvania T0070/99   
604 531 F.2d at 1053, 189 USPQ at 148. 
605 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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4.3.2.1 Anticipation 
 
The principle of disclosure to the public and the rules of anticipation were highlighted in 
Malaysia in Heveafoam Asia Sdn Bhd v PF (Teknologi) Sdn Bhd.606 In this case Low Hop 
Bing J considered that the utility innovation607 was anticipated by a US Patent which was 
available publicly and publication of an article in a magazine and was therefore not new.  
 
The rule established for the prior art to destroy novelty is that there must be disclosure of the 
invention. The disclosure must be enabling to the person skilled in the art to perform the 
invention.608 In nanotechnology creations, disclosure at larger scale does not necessarily 
provide an enabling disclosure at nanoscale. The important point is that the disclosure must 
enable the person skilled in the nanotechnology to perform the invention. The principle of 
anticipation was decided in General Tire and Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co 
Ltd:609 
“to anticipate the patentee's claim the prior publication must contain clear and unmistakeable 
directions to do what the patentee claims to have invented … A signpost, however clear, upon the 
road to the patentee's invention will not suffice. The prior inventor must be clearly shown to have 
planted his flag at the precise destination before the patentee”.610 
 
This does not require the person skilled in the art to possess extra knowledge or need to 
conduct further experiment or acquire further knowledge.611 Applying the principles in these 
two cases, Lord Hoffmann in Synthon BV v Smith Kline Beecham612 explained that to avoid 
a serious risk of confusion, the concept of disclosure and enablement should be kept distinct. 
He explained that the disclosure was satisfied if it is capable of being performed, and the 
carried out of this performance may result that the patent being infringed.613 The meaning of 
enablement is “that the ordinary skilled person would have been able to perform the 
                                                          
606 [2001] 2 M.L.J. 660. 
607 Utility innovation is defined under section 17 PA 1983 as “any innovation which creates a new product or 
process, or any new improvement if a known product or process which is capable of industrial application and 
includes an invention”; it is a type of smaller invention, Azmi I M Patent Law in Malaysia: Cases and 
Commentary (Petaling Jaya: S&M, 2003), at p.7. 
608 See Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application [1991] R.P.C. 485. 
609 [1972] R.P.C. 457. 
610 Ibid, at 485-486. 
611 Hill v Evans (1862) 31 LJ Ch (NS) 457. 
612 [2006] R.P.C. 10(HL). 
613 Ibid, at 334. 
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invention which satisfies the requirement of disclosure.”614 Lord Hoffmann further stated that 
the test for enablement of a prior disclosure for the purpose of anticipation was the same as 
the test for enablement of the patent itself for the purpose of sufficiency. However, the 
application of these tests are different; in the case of sufficiency the skilled person is 
attempting to perform the claimed invention whilst in the case of prior art the subject matter 
may have disclosed the invention but is not identified as such. 
 
Applying these principles to nanotechnology, disclosure at the macro-scale does not 
necessarily mean that the nanoscale invention is anticipated. The disclosure must enable the 
skilled person to work the invention. If the prior art refers only the macro-level, the 
nanoscale invention may not be anticipated.615 Furthermore, as mentioned above, reducing to 
nanoscale can cause unexpected and surprising results.616  
 
It was decided by the EBOA that a generic disclosure of plastic material does not take away 
novelty of any specific example of increased photodegradility by addition of nanoparticles of 
Titanium.617 Similarly, the EBOA decided that nanocrystal Nickel material which was 
obtained by electrodeposition with crystal size less than 11nm was novel over identical 
material disclosed in the literature, but comprising macro-crystalline Nickel obtained by 
electrodeposition.618  
 
4.3.2.2 Selection patent 
 
Selection patent is another type of novelty previously recognised in the field of chemical 
inventions. Many substances are known to exist, but their functions are yet to be discovered. 
This may be relevant to nanotechnology because nanotechnology has been known for 
                                                          
614 [2006] R.P.C. 10(HL), at 335. 
615 All interviewees agreed that macro-scale and nanoscale is not the same thing; In Re Kumar 418 F.2d 1361 
(Fed Cir 2005) the Board of Patent Appeals stated that the claimed invention was obvious because the value of 
the claimed particle size distribution was overlapped with the previous patent of Rostoker; see also Baluch A S 
et al ‘In Re Kumar: The First Nanotech Patent Case in the Federal Circuit’ (2005) Nanotech Law & Bus. No. 2, 
Vol. 4, 342, at p. 345. 
616 See 2.2.2. For example, carbon is a poor conductor in bulk, but it becomes a good conductor when turned 
into nanotubes, Miller J C and Harris D L ‘The Carbon Nanotube Patent Landscape’ (2006) 3 Nanotech. Law & 
Bus. 427, at p.428; Interviewee C encountered a problem to encourage patent examiner that nanotechnology is 
different from technology at macro-scale. 
617 T 0006/02 (Photodegradable Cellulose Ester Tow).  
618 T 0915/00 Nanocrystalline Metals.  
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years619 but only recently has its functions and structures been appreciated. In case of 
chemical compounds, the principles established for chemical selection patent apply where the 
disclosure has been made in a broader group of compounds. The selection of a smaller group 
made from the larger group of substances previously disclosed in a broader terms may be 
patentable if disclosed non-obvious advantages.620  In nanotechnology for example, the sub-
range for semiconductor nanocrystals in the area between 2nm to 10nm is selected from a 
larger range known to the prior art of semiconductor crystals with size smaller than 1 
millimetre.621 Furthermore, the mere mention of certain substances is not novelty-destroying 
provided that the prior art does not anticipate by describing the existence of a substance,  
structures, functions, qualities and the method of making it.622 These are really helpful 
analogy to determine the novelty of a nanotechnology invention where geometry is already in 
existence or disclosed at the macro-scale, but certain of its functions, properties, structures 
are not yet discovered at the nanoscale. A size range may be claimed in which the novel and 
non-obvious advantages are present. Selection patents have been recognised to protect the 
original inventor, as regards the invention which he has made, and to encourage other 
researchers in the field to use their inventive powers to discover fresh advantages and to treat 
the discovery of such advantages of selected members of the group or class as patentable.623  
 
In the UK, the selection patent was accepted in IG Farbenindustrie’s Patents624 where 
Maugham J laid down an important principle for selection patent. The selection invention 
had been described in general terms and claimed in the originating patent. To be accepted as 
patentable invention, the selection patent must be novel, possess unexpected character or 
advantage and involve an inventive step.625  In order for selections patent to be valid where 
the individual compound had not been previously known for its advantage, Maugham J 
further laid down requirement that:626 
                                                          
619 See 2.3.  
620 Grubb P W, Patents for Chemical, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, 4th edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2004), at 
p.214. 
621 Huebner S R ‘The Validity of European Nanotechnology Patents in Germany’ (2008) Nanotech. Law & Bus. 
353, at p.354. 
622 MacQueen H et al. Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at p.441. 
623 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Witsiepe's) Application [1982] F.S.R. 303, at 309. 
624 (1930) 47 R.P.C. 289.  
625  Ibid, at 321. 
626 Ibid, at 322-323. 
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(a) the selection must be based on some substantial advantage to be secured by the use of 
the selected members (or avoiding some substantial disadvantage). 
(b) all members of the selected class must possess the advantage in question. 
(c) the selection must be in respect of a quality of a special character which can fairly be 
said to be peculiar to the selected group.  
 
However, this case was later criticised in the light of EPO jurisprudence, especially on (c), by 
Floyd J because Maugham J was only dealing with inventive step, but not an exception to the 
law of novelty.627  
 
EI. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Witsiepe's) Application,628 concerned a prior specification 
of ICI describing a series of polymers made by polymerising any one of nine glycols with 
terephthalic acid (TPA). The ICI specification stated the polymers had improved absorptive 
capacities whilst maintaining their softening points. It contained a specific suggestion of 
making such a polymer using 1,4 butane diol as the glycol; one of the nine glycols. However, 
the worked examples in the specification used ethylene glycol alone. The Du Pont 
specification was based on the discovery that one of these polyesters, namely made with 1,4 
butane diol and TPA, was useful in injection and high speed extrusion operations, especially 
for making hosepipes. It was common ground that the claim extended to the result of 
carrying out the prior ICI specification, provided that one had chosen the 1,4 butane diol. 
Nevertheless the HL held that Du Pont claim was novel. Lord Wilberforce concluded “it is 
the absence of the discovery of the special advantages, as well as the fact of non-making, that 
makes it possible for such persons to make an invention related to a member of the class”.629  
Compared to IG’s criteria by Maugham J, the Du Pont decision was consistent with the EPO 
on the general principle of novelty i.e. the specification of an earlier patent did not disclose 
an ‘individualised form’ of the co-polyester of 1,4 butanediol.630   
 
                                                          
627 Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd v Eli Lilly and Co Ltd [2008] EWHC 2345, at 97; Nonetheless, Floyd J 
held at [106] that the selection patent has survived under the 1977 Act. 
628 [1982] F.S.R. 303. 
629 Ibid, at 311-312. 
630 Dr Reddy’s Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd v Eli Lilly and Co Ltd [2008] EWHC 2345 at [91]-[94], per 
Floyd J.  
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In Ranbaxy UK Limited and Another v Warner – Lambert Company631 Pumfrey J observed 
that the nature of advantage will be taken into consideration in assessing obviousness which 
was highlighted in the previous case law. Pumfrey J stated that “unless the later patent states 
what the advantage possessed by the selected class is, it is merely an arbitrary selection 
among things already disclosed, and will lack novelty”.632 The decision was confirmed on 
appeal, holding that the allegation of anticipation will succeed if the specification gave clear 
and unmistakable directions to use common general knowledge to produce a specific 
material.633 
 
In Sanofi/Enantiomer634 Claim 1 of the application was directed to the dextrorotatory isomer 
of a specified compound and its pharmaceutically acceptable salts. The Examining Division 
had rejected it for lack of novelty over prior EP-A-0099802 which in its Example 1 disclosed 
the manufacture of the same compound in racemate form. EP-A-0 099 802 disclosed the 
existence of "enantiomers." The Technical Board of Appeal (TBOA) stated that the later-
claimed enantiomer was not new because the mention of enantiomers in the earlier 
description referred expressly to the fact that these enantiomers were considered to be an 
integral part of the invention claimed and were described in the form of an individual 
technical teaching which could be reproduced by the person skilled in the art.  
 
This case is relevant to nanotechnology where nanotechnology produces a divergent property 
of nanoscale structures of a known thing, thus conferring novelty and non-obviousness.  
 
HOECHST/Thiochloroformates635 held that the selection of a sub-range singled out from a 
larger range is novel when: (a) the selected sub-range is narrow; (b) the selected sub-range is 
sufficiently far removed from the known range by way of examples; (c) the selected sub-
range is not arbitrarily chosen from the prior art, but results to another invention (purposive 
selection). The TBOA stated that novelty can only be denied if there is unambiguous 
disclosure of such individual chemical configuration in the form of a technical teaching. The 
TBOA viewed that it was not sufficient that the configuration in question belonged to a 
                                                          
631 [2005] EWCH 2142 (Pat) at para 64. 
632 Ibid, at para 64. 
633 [2006] EWCA Civ 876 at para 41. 
634 [1996] EPOR 24. 
635 [1979-85] EPOR C987. 
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disclosed class of possible configurations, without specific pointer to the individual 
member.636  
 
In Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd v Eli Lilly & Co Ltd637 the respondent was the 
proprietor of a European Patent (UK) relating to olanzapine, a widely prescribed anti-
psychotic agent used for the treatment of schizophrenia. The appellant sought revocation of 
the patent on the grounds of lack of novelty in that olanzapine was a member of the 1019 
compounds previously disclosed by a ‘Markush’ formula. The long standing test of 
Maugham J in IG was rejected, and the COA took the opportunity to harmonise the position 
in the UK and at the EPO.638 In this case, Jacob LJ considered the “individualised” approach 
of the TBOA in Hoeschst Enantiomers639 and further stated that what amounted to 
“individualised description” is a question of degree and could include consideration such as 
the specificity of any indicated purpose for making the compounds.640  Thus, the Court found 
that the previous disclosure of olanzapine among 1019 compounds according to the Markush 
formula and as one of 86,000 compounds of a preferred class was not considered as an 
individualised description - Jacob LJ emphasised “this case is miles from that”.641 
 
Under UK and EPO law harmonised through the decision in Dr Reddy’s, a claim to a specific 
compound would not destroy novelty unless the compound was disclosed in “individualised 
description”. This is likely relevant in nanotechnology that the claim to a specific compound 
of the macro-scale would not destroy novelty, unless the claimed invention had been made 
known of its specificity for its purpose.  
 
4.3.3 Inventiveness of nanotechnology 
 
The invention has an inventive step if it is not obvious to the person who has ordinary skill in 
the art, having regard to any matter which forms part of the prior art.642 Does reduction in 
                                                          
636 Pfizer/Penem [1995] E.P.O.R. 207. 
637 [2009] EWCA Civ 1362; [2010] RPC 9 (CA (Civ Div)). 
638 Ibid, at 252-253. 
639 [1990] EPOR 337. 
640 [2009] EWCA Civ 1362; [2010] RPC 9 (CA (Civ Div)), at 236-237. 
641 Ibid, at 237. 
642 Section 15 PA 1983; section 3 PA 1977 states that ‘if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, having 
regard to any matter which forms part of the state of the art’, despite identical wording in EPC Art 56, EPO 
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size makes the invention obvious to the person skilled in the art in nanotechnology? This is 
because the mere downscaling of dimension may be obvious to the person skilled in the 
art.643 Who is considered the person skilled in the art in nanotechnology?  
 
Similar argument as in novelty above (4.3.2) applies here that nanotechnology does not 
merely involve making the invention into smaller version per se; the behaviour of the nano-
structures may change dramatically and unexpectedly. The industrial application of these 
findings should then be patentable for the reasons articulated by Whitford J in Genentech 
Patent.644 The BOA645 has considered that when the miniaturisation of analytical device 
produces an unexpected result, the miniaturisation is found to be an inventive step. This is 
regardless whether there is an apparent obviousness of the means to achieve it. In this case, 
the BOA was satisfied that the prior art disclosed in other documents cited by the appellant 
did not come close to the invention. The BOA confirmed the same conclusion in 
Nanocrystalline Metals.646  
 
4.3.3.1 Person skilled in multiple arts  
 
Unlike UK and EPC which requires the person to be skilled in the art, Malaysia’s test for 
obviousness is the person who is having ordinary skill in the art.647 However, it is submitted 
that this does not make the degree of obviousness in Malaysia different.648 Since 
nanotechnology does not involve a single technology, but is rather multidisciplinary, the 
question is how to determine the “art” and characterise the “person” skilled in the art. It is 
helpful to observe the principle adopted by the courts in other fields.  
 
The person skilled in the art possesses knowledge and skill in the relevant area of subject 
matter as Lord Reid stated in Mills & Rockley (Electronics) Limited v Technograph Printed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
uses “problem/solution” approach: see eg Bayer/Carbonless Copying Paper [1981] O.J EPO 206; but 
problem/solution approach was criticized in Alcan/Aluminium Alloys Case T465/92 [1995] EPOR 501.  
643 In Trustees of University of Pennsylvania T0070/99 where the BOA stated that mere downscaling of 
dimension is obvious. 
644 See n.585. 
645 T 0070/99 Fluid Handling in Micro Fabricated Analytical Devices. 
646 T 0915/00 Nanocrsytalline Metals.  
647 See section 15 PA 1983; section 3 PA 1977; Art 56 EPC 2000. 
648 See also the same view in Azmi, n.607, at p.123.   
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Circuits Limited.649 The patent specification should be disclosed clearly enough to enable the 
person skilled in the art to work the invention. As the court stated in Valensi v. British Radio 
Corp:650  
“the hypothetical addressee is not a person of exceptional skill and knowledge, that he is not to be 
expected to exercise any invention nor any prolonged research, inquiry or experiment. He must, 
however, be prepared to display a reasonable degree of skill and common knowledge of the art in 
making trials and to correct obvious errors in the specification if a means of correcting them can 
readily be found”.651 
 
In Windsurfing International Inc. v Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd,652 Oliver LJ considered 
that: 
“the hypothetical Skilled Man is, no doubt, (together with his cousins the Reasonable Man and the 
Officious Bystander) a useful concept as setting a standard and, in the instant case, as providing 
the touchstone by which the question of obviousness may be judged by the equally hypothetical 
Juror.”
653 
In Genentech’s Patent654 the person skilled in the art “would be a team of persons, each of 
whom would be the holder of a Ph.D. in a relevant field of science. They are thus necessarily 
persons of very considerable intellectual capacity”.655 The appropriate degree of knowledge 
and the skills possess by the person skilled in the art in a team are varied according to the 
relevant field in which they work.656 The person skilled in the art may be a team that has 
ordinary skills and received formal academic qualifications657 or they could be “in 
                                                          
649 [1971] F.S.R. 188, at 193. 
650 [1972] F.S.R. 273. 
651 Ibid, Per Russell LJ, at 310.  
652 [1985] R.P.C. 59. 
653 Ibid, at 71. 
654 [1989] R.P.C. 147; see also Halliburton Energy Services Inc v Smith International (North Sea) Ltd [2006] 
R.P.C. 2 at para 39 and 40. 
655 Per Dillon LJ [1989] R.P.C. 147, at 241. In healing the wound, for example a team is those who has practical 
interest in apparatus for facilitating the healing of wounds which may include clinician with regular experience 
of treating wounds, and biomedical engineer with experience in the manufacture of wound dressing, Kitchin J in 
Mölnlycke Health Care AB v Wake Forest University and Wake Forest University Health Sciences [2009] 
EWHC 2204 (Pat), at para 24. 
656 Genentech’s Patent [1989] RPC 147, Mustill LJ, at 278. In this case the different team of techniques involve 
such as protein sequencing, handling mRNA, building a library, making a probe. See also team approach of 
person skilled in the art in VDO ADOLF SCHINDLING/Illuminating Device v (Opposition by DIEHL) [1997] 
E.P.O.R. 146. 
657 Dredge v Parnell (1899) 16 R.P.C. 625, at 628 Lord Halsbury; Genentech’s Patent (1989) R.P.C. 147, 
Purchas LJ at 214. 
123 
 
appropriate cases, be a team—an assembly of nerds of different basic skills, all 
unimaginative”.658 
 
From this, it is clear that the UK person skilled in the art is quite ordinary in the context of 
the invention and can be anyone from a workshop technician (Saint-Gobain) to an “average” 
though a highly skilled biotechnology research team (Genentech).659 The skills and 
qualifications of the person should be varied according the fields that they are working in. In 
nanotechnology, the skills and background knowledge are varied, and according to different 
fields that they involved. Furthermore, not only single person is involved, but rather a team 
of people.660 However, it may be even more difficult to identify the correct team in 
nanotechnology than biotechnology because of the range of arts involved. On the level of 
skills they could possess, in nanotechnology, the skilled person would be the highly qualified 
“persons” as evidenced in Genentech and comprise persons with different skills and 
expertise/ fields of specialisation with the same common interest to the nanotechnology as 
evidenced in Mediummune Limited v Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd, Medical Research 
Council661 which referred to team of scientists with different background in areas such as 
immunology (particularly antibody structural biology), molecular biology and protein 
chemistry with common interest to antibody engineering. 
 
4.3.4 Industrial application 
 
The invention must capable of industrial application.662 An invention is having industrially 
applicable if it can be made or used in any kind of industry.663 The industrial application 
reflects that the invention is to have a concrete and technical character,664 to be applied in 
                                                          
658 Per Jacob LJ in Technip France SA's Patent [2004] R.P.C. 46, at 926; See also Jacob LJ in Saint-Gobain 
PAM SA v Fusion Provida Limited, Electrosteel Castings Limited [2005] EWCA Civ 177, referring to the 
person skilled in the art as “an unimaginative person (or team) in the research department of a company in the 
underground pipe manufacturing trade. He would have considerable knowledge of the problems of corrosion 
suffered by buried pipework.”, at para 4. 
659 They are not highly skilled expert or Nobel prize winner nor a lowest common denominator, but someone 
with  “the Skilled Person”, the Manual of Patent Practice, the PA 1977 Jan 2011, at 3.20.  
660 All the interviewees claim for the team approach in nanotechnology, for example D has to work with people 
from medical line, same with A. 
661 [2011] EWHC 1669 (Pat), at para 92. 
662 Section 11 PA 1983; section 1(1)(c) PA 1977; Article 52(1) EPC 2000. 
663 Section 16 PA 1983; section 4(1) PA 1977; Article 57 EPC 2000. 
664 Bently and Sherman, n.211, at p.393. 
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real world application and not just a matter of speculation. In Chiron Corporation and Others 
v Murex Diagnostics Ltd. and Others665 the COA referred to industrial applicability in its 
widest sense to include whether or not for profit, and it must have some useful purpose.666 
However, industrial applicability does not extent to scientific information where its practical 
application is yet to be ascertained.667 Based on the widest interpretation of the word 
‘industry’, this is likely pose little problem for nanotechnology, because nanotechnology is 
used in or applicable to many kinds of industry.  
 
4.3.5 Public order and morality 
 
Article 53 of the EPC 2000 provides that a patent shall not be granted for an invention the 
commercial exploitation of which would be against the “ordre public” and morality.668 
Article 27(2) of the TRIPS also permits members to exclude such inventions from 
patentability.   
 
In Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine synthetase inhibitors (Opposition by Greenpeace) 669  
Greenpeace argued that the invention could have the environmental concerns, citing surveys 
of Swedish farmers and Swiss citizens. The TBOA rejected the evidence and stated that a 
survey and opinion poll conducted were not sufficient in establishing that the subject matter 
is contrary to “ordre public” or “morality”. According to TBOA, there was no sufficient 
evidence to show for the actual disadvantages of the invention, and the balancing approach of 
advantages and disadvantages of the invention was seen as one of possible way of assessing 
patentability under Article 53(a) of the EPC.670 The invention was not against the principle of 
morality: the claimed subject matter did not relate to a misuse or destructive use of plant 
biotechnology and concerned activities or products which could not be considered wrong 
from the accepted standards of the European culture, rather the plant biotechnology was 
similar in its goal to the traditional selective breeding.671 It was observed that in order for the 
subject matter to be against the “ordre public” there must be sufficient evidence 
                                                          
665 [1996] R.P.C. 535. 
666 Ibid, at 607. 
667 Cornish and LLewelyn, n.307, at p.213. 
668 See also section 1(3) PA 1977; the EPO Guideline, Ch IV, 3.1; Section 31(1) PA 1983. 
669 [1995] EPOR 357. 
670 Ibid, at 373. 
671 Ibid, at 369-370. 
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substantiating that the patent would seriously prejudice the environment, and no such 
conclusive evidence had been presented in this case.672 
 
What likely damage could nanotechnology inventions bring to the environment? There are 
considerable ranges of concerns of potential environmental risk673 that result from 
nanotechnology. ETC Group states that nanotechnology potentially brings “horrendous 
social and environmental risks”.674 It was viewed that the potential risk to the environment 
likely came from chemical rather than electronic fields675 due to the exposure of particle to 
the environment and public health. It is felt that effective coordination and communication 
within the scientific community as well as international cooperation is needed in respect of 
public health, safety, the environment, risk assessment, consumer protection, methodology, 
nomenclature and norms.676 In nanotechnology, size is the main factor in determining the 
toxicity, the smaller a particle size is; the more toxic it proves to be.677 Thus, because of their 
size, nanoparticles are easily accessible to human body and able to cross the cells, tissues and 
organs as compared to larger size; while nanomaterials can easily access to the blood stream 
through human inhalation, ingestion and skin absorption.678 For example, carbon nanotubes 
have been shown to cause death of kidney cells and many types of nanoparticles have been 
proved to be toxic to human tissue and cell cultures.679 Another example is that although 
quantum dot is really useful as tagged marker, however certain size and materials of quantum 
dots have shown to be cytotoxic.680 However, as argued in Plant Genetic Systems above, 
since the uncertainty is still surrounding nanotechnology as to its effect to the environment 
                                                          
672 Ibid, at 372. 
673 Environmental risks mean that nanotechnology “might cause, tends to cause, or will cause negative 
impacts”, Allhoff, n.517, at p.2. 
674 See n.116. From the historical and sociological perspective, public respond initially to newly introduced 
technology and this attitude changes after the benefits start to emerge, for example in 1970s a recombinant  
DNA of bioengineered organisms was opposed by the public for the fear to damage the environment but it 
appears that the attitude has changed after bioengineering proved to produce synthetic insulin and 
pharmaceuticals application, Agovic A ‘Stem Cell Patents on a Knife Edge’ (2008) J.I.P.L.P. Vol. 3, 718, at 
p.719. 
675 Interviewee A. 
676 Missoni E and Foffani G ‘Nanotechnologies and Challenges for Global Health’ (2009) 3(1) Studies in 
Ethics, Law and Technology, at p.7; for the extended discussion on impact of nanotechnology in the health 
sector in India see Vivekanandan J ‘Nano Applications, Mega Challenges: The Case of the Health Sector in 
India’ (2009) 3(3) Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology at pp.2-3. 
677 Blackwelder B Nanotechnology Jumps the Gun: Nanoparticles in Consumer Products’ in Cameron N M and 
Mitchell M E (eds) Nanoscale: Issues and Perspectives for the Nano Century (New Jersey: JWS, 2007) at p.74. 
678 Ibid, at p.74. 
679 Ibid, at p.75. 
680 Collins J C in Cameron N M and Mitchell M E (eds) Nanoscale: Issues and Perspectives for the Nano 
Century (New Jersey: JWS, 2007) at p.122. 
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and public health (insufficient evidence could be adduced to establish that the said subject 
matter of nanotechnology is contrary to “ordre public” or morality”), it is more important to 
protection rather than refuse patents.  
 
The principle of ordre public was considered in HARVARD/Onco-Mouse681 where the 
Examining Division has decided that a careful weighing up of the risks to the environment 
and the positives aspects of the usefulness of the invention to the mankind should be given 
consideration. The acceptance of the notion of ordre public to include the protection of the 
environment was adopted and has been given a flexible approach by the TBOA in Plant 
Genetic Systems.682 
 
The extent of the test has become wider not only to the likelihood of the animal suffering or 
environmental risk and likelihood of the substantial benefits to the human that should be 
carefully weighing up. The TBOA opined that other considerations should be taken into 
account such as threat to evolution, increased trade in genetically manipulated animals, 
unacceptability of animals’ manipulation and the degree of suffering.683  
 
The TBOA has stressed the performing of the invention as commercial exploitation where 
stated that:  
“in this context, it is important to point out that it is not the fact of the patenting itself that is 
considered to be against ordre public or morality, but it is the performing of the invention, which 
includes a step (the use involving its destruction of a human embryo) that has to be considered to 
contravene those concepts”.684 
 
There is no doubt that nanotechnology invention may potentially pose damages or risk to the 
environment. The patent office has to carefully weigh the interest of the inventor against the 
human and environmental damage. However, a more careful consideration should be paid for 
both interests. With the ruling in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), the 
patent office should not only consider the commercial exploitation to determine whether the 
                                                          
681 [1991] E.P.O.R. 525. 
682 [1995] E.P.O.R. 357, at 366 
683 HARVARD/Transgenic animal [2005] E.P.O.R. 31. 
684 WARF/Stem cells [2009] EPOR 15; [2008] EWHC 2345; Rowlandson M WARF/Stem cells (G2/06): The 
Ordre Public and Morality Exception and its Impact on the Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells 
(2010) E.I.P.R. 67, at p.75. 
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nanotechnology invention is environmentally damaging, but should consider other aspects 
such as the nature and making and using of the invention. It has been suggested that the 
patent office should establish a special Ethics and Public Interest Panel that comprises 
experts from different background such as law, ethics, technology and members of the public 
in giving the consideration of whether the invention should or should not be patentable on the 
issues of ordre public and morality.685 This was also highlighted in the interviews conducted 
in this study, as desirable to include people from religious groups, scientists and policy 
makers. Furthermore, we may note the UKIPO’s practices which recognise inventions that 
relate to “green” or environmental-friendly technology, called “green patents” for example a 
manufacturing process which uses less energy or a recycling process.686 This is for 
nanotechnology for example the use of safe nanoparticles in eco-friendly applications.  
 
4.4 Technical and Administrative Issues 
 
The definitional issue of nanotechnology is still fragmented and debatable.687 The popular 
use of the prefix ‘nano’688 does not justify the assumption that nano-products and processes 
are patentable. The non-existence of a common accepted terminology and the 
multidisciplinary nature of nanotechnology create problems the patent offices to classify and 
examine the scope of invention at the nanoscale.689 This section examines the problems of 
nanotechnology classification and monitoring systems, searching the relevant prior art, 
determining the relevant patent examiners and examination and drafting the claims 
construction.  
 
 
                                                          
685 Vaver, n.577, at pp.306-307. 
686 Available at “Green Patents” http://www.ipo.gov.uk/news/newsletter/ipinsght/ipinsight-201007/ipinsight-
201007-5.htm accessed on 11 August 2010. 
687 See 2.2. 
688 This is the challenge because the applicant may use other term such as ‘microscale’ or ‘quantum dots’ to 
describe the nanotechnology invention, or the applicant may incorrectly describe his invention as 
‘nanotechnology’ although it may be not, so the search term of the word ‘nano’ alone is not a good search term, 
see for example Bleeker R A et al., ‘Patenting Nanotechnology’ (2004) materialstoday 44, at p.46; see 
discussion in 5.3.5.   
689 Creating issues for search-file allocation, multidisciplinary classification schemes; complete prior art 
searches, substantive examination and examiner recruitment, Scheu et al., n.43, at p.205. 
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4.4.1 Classification and monitoring system  
 
The problems of classification and monitoring occur because of multidisciplinary nature of 
nanotechnology and the fragmented understandings of the technology690 have attracted the 
attention of Patent Offices to come with a solution. For example, in 2004 the USPTO created 
a new classification reference system for nanotechnology, Class 977,691 as a cross reference 
digest for nanotechnology. This helps patent examiners to search for the prior art. In the 
USPTO, there exists “centres”692 which have been divided into seven technologies693and 
interdisciplinary nanotechnology patent applications will be decided according to the subject 
matter which is closest to the application at hand. Because of the unique nature of 
nanotechnology, it was seen as impossible to have a centre as such for nanotechnology.694 
One view was that if no centre is available to nanotechnology, it renders examiners 
unfocused in nanotechnology and would lead to less collaboration and communication with 
other various centres.695 Instead, it was suggested that a working group be established within 
each technology centre with the aim to identify patent application in their own field, 
formulate the examination guidelines, train the selected examiners and periodically discuss 
with other technology centres.696 It was suggested too that the multidisciplinary nature 
requires that the patent application should be assessed by a team of examiners (trained to 
recognise the inter-disciplinarity of nanotechnology application) rather than just one 
examiner and the efforts have been made to form a centralised command centre for 
nanotechnology application instead of multiple separate technology centres.697 
 
                                                          
690 See 2.2. 
691 USPTO under 35 U.S.C. §8. The term “nanostructures” is referred as an atomic, molecular, or 
macromolecular structure that (a) has at least one physical dimension or approximately 1 to 100 nanometres, 
and (b) possesses a special property, provides a special function, or produces a special effect that is uniquely 
attributable to the structure’s nanoscale physical size. 
692 “centre” is a technical division of technology at USPTO. 
693 This centre consisted of different technology of (1) computer architecture and software (TC 2100); (2) 
biotechnology, organic chemistry (TC 1600); (3) chemicals and materials engineering (TC 1700); (4) 
mechanical engineering, manufacturing and products, designs (TC 3700 and TC 2900); (5) transportation, 
construction, agriculture, national security and electronic commerce (TC 3600); (6) semiconductors, electrical, 
and optical systems and components (TC 2800); (7) communications (TC 2600), Miller et al, n.32, at p.69. 
694 The patent office remains open for a discussion and continues to re-visit the issues, see for example Bleeker 
et al., n.688, at p.46. 
695 Bawa, n.67, at p.47. 
696 Ibid, at p.47. 
697 Halluin A P and Westin L P ‘Nanotechnology: The Importance of Intellectual Property Rights in an 
Emerging Technology’ (2004) 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 220, at pp.227-228. 
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In 2006, the EPO introduced the tagging system to label nanotechnology (see Appendix 
4).698 The tagging system is a collaborative intellectual effort of many examiners from 
different technical disciplines.699 The tagging system is regularly being updated and 
improved to adapt the classification scheme to changes of technological development.700 
There are however limitations for the tagging system to operate. This is because the tagging 
relies upon the European Classification Entries, and not every nanotechnology patent 
published was tagged.701 Furthermore, the tagging system might operate to bias towards 
certain technology.702 Even, in the case that the patent is not classified under the European 
Classification, it may slip through the tagging system.703 In an effort to find the correct 
definition for trend watching nanotechnology patents and for interdisciplinary searches, the 
EPO has also formed a nanotechnology working group (NTWG).704 Generally the working 
group of nanotechnology at the EPO is to:705 
(a) create the special tagging system (Y01N)  
(b) catalogue the available information from journal articles and conference proceedings 
on nanotechnology to be appeared online and in-house at the EPO 
(c) implement policy for research assistance in nanotechnology 
(d) create an awareness to the EPO staff of the new development of nanotechnology, 
monitor case law and social impact of nanotechnology   
 
In a different jurisdiction, the JPO has also followed to classify nanotechnology system by 
introducing ZNM Class.706 The EPO is also developing the Patent Statistical Database 
                                                          
698 The classification includes (1) Y01N2 – nanobiotechnology; (2) Y01N4 – nanotechnology for information 
processing, storage and transmission; (3) Y01N6 – nanotechnology for materials and surface science; (4) 
Y01N8 – nanotechnology for interacting, sensing, and actuating; (5) Y01N10 – nanotechnology for optics; (6) 
Y01N12 – nanomagnetics. 
699 Scheu et al., n.43, at p.209. 
700 Ibid, at pp.207-208. 
701 Ibid, at p.209. 
702 Ibid.  
703 Ibid. In this regard, the tagging system Y01N net is decreasing with constant refinement of the European 
Classification by reclassification.  
704 Scheu et al., n.43, at pp.205-206, discuss that the definition has to match closely by the definition used in 
major industrial R&D programs and by the governmental funding programs where nanotechnology R&D has 
been given priority. 
705 Collin J ‘European Commission Action Plan on Nanotechnologies: A Brief Presentation with a View on 
Intellectual Property’ (2006) 3 Nanotech. Law & Bus. 80, at p.82. 
706 See for example in Escoffier L ‘A Brief Review of Nanotechnology Funding and Patenting in Japan’ (2007) 
4 Nanotech Law & Bus. 101, at p.107; Igami M and Okazaki T ‘Capturing Nanotechnology’s Current State of 
Development Via Analysis of Patents’ OECD, STI Working Paper 2007/4, Statistical Analysis of Science, 
Technology and Industry, DSTI/DOC (2007) 4, 23 May 2007, at p.12. 
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(PATSTAT) in a collaborative program with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). This database acts as indicators for the inventive activity across 
different technological fields, companies and economical activities and also provides useful 
assistance in advanced statistical research.707 At the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) level, the European Classification System (ECLA)/ International Patent 
Classification (IPC) Sub-Classes of B82B of Nanotechnology Classification was 
introduced.708 From 1 January 2011, a new symbol was introduced, B82Y and the used of 
tagging system Y01N was discontinued. This new code can be seen in Appendix 4. For 
example, a nanotechnology invention in Zeolite field might also be assigned to class C 
(Chemistry, Metallurgy) subclass C01 (Inorganic Chemistry) sub-sub class C01B39 Zeolites 
as well as C01B82B.  
 
The effort to classify nanotechnology should be encouraged and developed further. 
Commentators agree that a common unique definition for nanotechnology is unnecessary and 
is unrealistic for a new technology like nanotechnology.709 What is crucial for overcoming 
the differences in definitions and to better identify the important field is that nanotechnology 
should be broken down into sub-disciplines, and only these sub-disciplines would be 
compared.710 Currently, Trilateral cooperation is still ongoing which is focusing on a 
common definition for tagging and harmonisation of classification in nanotechnology, as 
                                                          
707 For brief information of PATSTAT, see at 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/be6342bb479cc0e8c12575770032025f/$file/patentinfo_
news_0901_en.pdf. 
708 See for example available at http://www.wipo.int/ief-projects/c452/c452-a02_usre.pdf, accessed on 14 
February 2011. But the class provided according to this ECLA/IPC classification is very narrow and not all 
patents can fit to this definition, and furthermore nanotechnology related patents are scattered in the ECLA/IPC 
classification scheme, see Kalinger C ‘IPR in Nanotechnology – Lessons from Experiences Worldwide’ 
Proceedings of the Workshop in the Frame of the INC 3 Conference, jointly organized by the European Patent 
Office and the European Commission, DG Research, 16 April 2007, Brussels, Belgium, available at 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/iprworkshop-proceedings_02052007en.pdf accessed on 14 
Feb 2011. The ECLA is an extension of the IPC and is used by the EPO. Both IPC and ECLA have divided into 
eight sections from A-H and further subdivided into classes, subclasses, groups and subgroups. The sections are 
A – Human necessities; B – Performing operations, transporting; C – Chemistry, metallurgy; D – Textiles, 
paper; E – Fixed constructions; F – Mechanical engineering, lighting, heating, weapons, blasting engines or 
pumps; G – Physics and H – Electricity, the EPO brochure (2009) available at 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/623ECBB1A0FC13E1C12575AD0035EFE6/$File/nan
otech_brochure_en.pdf accessed on 6 March 2011, at p.4. 
709 Hullman and Fycek, n.78, at pp.15-16. 
710 Ibid, at pp.15-16. 
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well as personal exchanges and comparison of examination process especially in the three 
offices.711  
 
By contrast, Malaysia is yet to have the classification for nanotechnology. The efforts of 
patent offices from the EPO, USPTO and JPO provide useful guidelines for Malaysia to 
adopt. The classification not only helps examiners to classify the invention or for 
examination purposes, but also to search and locate the available prior art. Unlike the practice 
in the EPO, USPTO and JPO, Malaysia does not have anything as such for cross reference 
digest and access to prior art for nanotechnology.712 Since nanotechnology involves more 
than one technology, the approach of classification should be according to the sub-discipline 
that concerned of the technology. For the unique terminology of nanotechnology, Malaysia 
should adopt the common terminology for nanotechnology, not only to alleviate the 
confusion among the scientific communities but also the legal communities. The monitoring 
system for nanotechnology will also need to be established.  The examiners and trainers in 
the patent office, their level of technical knowledge should be upgraded and improved from 
time to time to handle the complexities of nanotechnology. They should prepare themselves 
with cross-functional expertise across different sub-disciplines. The example of classification 
of sub-division that nanotechnology cut-across of several classes can be seen in Appendix 4, 
which is taken from the EPO.  
 
4.4.2 Patent examiners and examination purposes 
 
Nanotechnology is new and emerging, interdisciplinary by nature, cutting across many 
different fields. The patent examiners may not have the necessary level of knowledge to 
understand the technologies for the patent classification and examination purposes.713 The 
patent examiner will be highly specialised in his own field, but unlikely to be familiar in 
                                                          
711 Ibid, at p.5; the Trilateral Offices could adopt a common and homogenous policy to tag nanotechnology 
inventions in the future, Escoffier, n.706, at p.107. 
712 Interviewee C assumed that SIRIM will adopt later the nanotechnology terminology as far the standard 
requirement is concerned. 
713 See for example Halluin and Westin, n.697, at p.226; Bleeker, n.688, at p.44; It is difficult to estimate the 
number of patents covering in nanotechnology because of the lack of standardization of the terminology, 
Burger, n.33 at p.249. The role as examiner is important, challenging and critical and the examiner has to 
provide an effective, efficient and sound judgment of their patent examination, Linn R ‘Perspectives on 
Becoming a Successful Examiner’ (2009) 91 J. Pat & Trademark Off. Soc’y 418, at p.419. 
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other sub-disciplines. Furthermore, examiners may not necessarily receive sufficient training 
in new technologies, such as nanotechnology. Therefore, examiners may take the simplistic 
view that a particular ‘invention’ is nanotechnology; without knowing the fact that it may or 
may not sufficiently constitute nanotechnology.714 Indeed, the patent office has admitted that, 
given the complexities, it does not fully understand the technology.715 To overcome the 
situation, collaboration and team approach should be encouraged.716  
 
It is undoubtedly emphasis that the team approach for examination purpose of the patent 
would be very much appropriate mechanism to overcome the unique characteristic of 
nanotechnology. The team approach of the patent examiners comprises an individual expert 
in each respective field to represent the diverse fields of nanotechnology would be very 
helpful for the patent office.  
 
4.4.3 Prior art  
 
In order to assess novelty and inventive step, the examiner has to identify relevant earlier 
disclosures or “prior art”. This involves identifying appropriate areas of science, technical 
literatures and search, and selecting appropriate search terms that are relevant to 
nanotechnology. Lack of the level of knowledge of the multidisciplinary nature of 
nanotechnology also gives rise to the issue of determining the availability and the scope of 
the prior art.717 Thus, there is limited availability of prior art in nanotechnology because of 
multidisciplinary and new technology which is still not fully developed. Even, if there is 
availability of the prior art relevant to nanotechnology, nevertheless difficulty arises because 
                                                          
714 This is personal experience of the interviewee C; Almeling, n.82, at para. 35. 
715 From the perspective of the USPTO, see for example Tullis, n.25, at p.5; Halluin and Westin, n.697, at p.8; 
Norton V ‘What Nanotechnology Means for Intellectual Property’ (2002-2003) Managing I.P. 38, at p.39; 
personal experience of interviewee C saying that the invention was likely to be refused patentability because the 
patent examiners do not understand the nanotechnology. 
716 For example see Halluin and Westin, n.697, at p.227; Schellenkens who states that “a team of examiners is 
harder to fool than an individual examiner. At the same time, it must be admitted that a multidisciplinary team 
of examiners does not solve all problems” because it is still unclear of what standards to use for examining 
nanotechnology patents, n.25, at p.67. 
717 Section 14(2)(a) PA 1983 refers prior art as anything either by written or oral disclosure made available to 
the public disclose; Section 2(2) PA 1977; Art 54(2) EPC 2000. Re classification difficulties, see Escoffier, 
n.706, at p.107. 
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it is scattered everywhere among various disciplines of science and technology.718 Although, 
the prior art may be categorised under different sub-disciplines, it may overlap. This has 
caused a problem for examining nanotechnology patent applications.719 The effect of the 
situation may seem that subsequent researchers will not know the boundary of the 
nanotechnology patent scope extent, and whether their actions are likely to infringe the rights 
of other inventors.720 In classifying and locating prior art for example, the examiners may 
seek assistance from the industry and academia in order to increase prior art collection 
relevant to nanotechnology;721 and they may also get the second review in identifying the 
resources for nanotechnology prior art from other disciplines in case that the primary 
examiners might not realised them.722 For example in the UKIPO websites, in its system of 
non-binding opinions of validity and infringing invites such information by publication of the 
cases on the website. This is post-grant procedure or called ex-officio for evidence. 
 
A centralised nanotechnology prior art is inevitably important to be developed.723 The 
classification of nanotechnology in terms of a tagging system, as applied at the EPO is a 
good guideline to provide database for nanotechnology prior art, especially for Malaysia to 
learn.  
 
4.4.4 Specification and claims construction  
 
The challenges of nanotechnology in compliance with the principle of patent law may lie in 
the construction of the claims and interpretation of the claims as disclosed in the patent 
applications. The drafters and examiners may find it difficult to sufficiently provide clarity 
and a concise description of the claims to teach the person skilled in art to practise the 
                                                          
718 For the same view see Sharma K and Chugh A ‘Legal Aspects of Nanobiotechnology Inventions: An Indian 
Perspective’ (2009) Scripted Vol. 6, Issues 2, 433, at p.438; Burger, n.33, at p.248; Zekos, n.294, at p.118. 
719 Reich L D ‘Protecting Tiny Gizmos: The Patent and Trademark Office is Preparing for Nanotech 
Applications’ (2004) N.L.J., SI at SI; Tullis, n.25, at p.5. 
720 For an interesting discussion on this point Maebius S B ‘Key Considerations in Protecting Your Intellectual 
Property in Nanotechnology’ (2002) 4 J. Nanopart. Res. 373; Miller et al, state that at this stage nanotechnology 
infringement is hard to enforce because most of inventions are at the early research and relatively few products 
nanotechnology inventions, n.32, at p.226; Almeling gives an example on dendrimers, because of early and 
upstream research stage, there is not much available prior art and its boundaries are difficult to know, at n.82, 
para 21; Lemley, n.25, at p.623. 
721 Halluin and Westin, n.697, at p.228. 
722 Ibid, at p.228. 
723 Ibid, at p.223. 
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invention. 724  This new issue of claiming strategy is inevitably unavoidable in the complex 
technology like nanotechnology.725 The lack of classification also makes the claims more 
likely to be insufficiently disclosed because competitors will have difficulty in devising 
suitable sources to identify patents that they might infringe. What amounts to sufficiency for 
nanotechnology? 
 
Section 56(1)(b) of the PA 1983 provides for the ground of invalidation of patents if the 
claim or description does not comply with section 23.726 Regulation 13(1) of the Malaysian 
Patents Regulations 1986 (Regulations 1986) provides that the claims should be specified 
clearly, concisely and supported by the description.727 In other words it reflects the general 
legal principle that the extent of the patent monopoly, as defined by the claims should 
correspond to the technical contribution to the art.728  
 
Under Regulation 12 of the Regulations 1986, the claims must:729 
(c) disclose in such terms that can be understood and in a manner sufficiently clear and complete 
for the invention to be evaluated and to be carried out by a person having ordinary skill in the art, 
and state any advantageous effects of the invention with reference to the background art; 
… 
(e) describe the best mode contemplated by the applicant for carrying out the invention; (UK and 
EPO do not have a best mode requirement)  
 
This effect of these provisions has been decided in Heveafoam Asia Sdn Bhd v PF 
(Teknologi) Sdn Bhd.730 In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s invention was 
insufficiently disclosed and did not comply with section 23 of the PA 1983. The defendant  
                                                          
724 For example see Troilo, and adds however that the disclosure requirement sets boundaries to prevent the 
patentees at the macro-scale invention from expanding their inventions to the nanoscale, n. 25, at p.38 
725 Axford, L A ‘Patent Drafting Considerations for Nanotechnology Inventions’ (2006) 2 Nanotech. Law & 
Bus. 305, at pp.305-306. There is no effective “dictionaries” to interpret the nanotechnology claim construction, 
so the patent drafters have to exercise their diligence as lexicographers, Tullis, n.25, at p.2. 
726 Section 23 of the PA 1983 provides that ‘every application for the grant if a patent shall comply with the 
regulation as may be prescribed by the Minister under this Act’; section 14(5)(c) PA 1977; Art 84 EPC 
727 Section 14(3) PA 1977 which has been referred by EPO Guideline for Examination, Part C, Chap IV reads 
“the specification of an application should disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and 
complete enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the art” and Art 83 EPC 2000; 
whereas section 14(5)(c) PA 1977 provides that the claims must be disclosed in clear and concise and be 
supported by description, and Art 84 EPC 2000. 
728 Exxon/Fuel Oils [1994] OJ. E.P.O. 653, para 3.3. 
729 Section 14(3) PA 1977 
730 [2001] 2 M.L.J. 660. 
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argued that the claim was clear and precise enough to enable person skilled in the art of latex 
foam manufacture to understand and perform it. Low Hop Bing J determined that the 
defendant failed to comply with the requirement under Reg. 12(1) (c) and (e) of Regulation 
1986. His Lordship was of the view that the purpose and the meaning of the specification 
enable the public to evaluate and carry out of the utility innovation in as ample and beneficial 
a way as the patentee himself uses it. In this case, the judge further stated that the inventor 
failed to state the parameters including diameter, thickness and the pattern distribution of the 
annular bores clearly puts the secret of the utility innovation out of the public’s reach and as 
such it was invalid for insufficiency. The judge also stated that the defendant failed to 
describe the best mode contemplated by the applicant for carrying out the invention by 
omitting the parameters of the utility innovation, leaving one to a guessing of the relative 
values.  
 
What is “sufficient”? The specification of the application must an “enabling disclosure”. 731 
Enabling disclosure forms part of the requirement of ‘support’ required under section 5(2)(a) 
of the PA 1977, and one of the grounds for patent revocation for lack of enabling disclosure 
as provided under section 72(1)(c) of the PA 1977732. The HL stated the specification to have 
enabling disclosure to be ‘available to the public’ in Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application733 
In Biogen Inc v Medeva734 Lord Hoffmann emphasised the importance of enabling disclosure 
by holding that “the requirement of an enabling disclosure in a patent application is a matter 
of substance and not form. Its absence should therefore be a ground not only for refusal of 
the application but also for revocation of the patent after grant.”735 In assessing what was 
the appropriate amount to enable disclosure:  
“the specification must enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the monopoly 
claimed.736 If the invention discloses a principle capable of general application, the claims may be 
in correspondingly general terms. The patentee need not show that he has proved its application in 
                                                          
731 Such as to enable a person skilled in the art to work the invention.  
732 and Art 138(1)(b) EPC. 
733 [1991] R.P.C. 485, at 536. 
734 [1997] R.P.C. 1. 
735 Ibid, at p.47. 
736 See Pharmacia Corporation v Merck [2002] R.P.C. 75, per Aldous LJ (CA) at 800; Aldous LJ stated in 
American Home Products v Novartis Pharmaceuticals [2001] RPC 159, at 179 “I do not believe that the patent 
system should be used to enable a person to monopolise more than which he has described in sufficient detail to 
amount to an enabling disclosure if it was, it would stifle research”. 
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every individual instance. On the other hand, if the claims include a number of discrete methods or 
products, the patentee must enable the invention to be performed in respect of each of them”.737  
Thus, disclosure of a recombinant technique to make antigens in a prokaryotic host cell did 
not justify a claim to a monopoly of any recombinant method of making antigen because the 
claim was too broad. In Kirin-Amgen Inc v Transkaryotic Therapies Inc738 the COA stated 
that for section 72(1) (c) to operate, the question was whether the disclosure of the 
specification was enabling. Insufficiency was concerned with the enablement requirement 
and not the clarity or support: 
“in our view TKT's allegation is not a ground of insufficiency, it is an attack of lack of clarity 
dressed up to look like insufficiency. We can see no reason to stretch section 72(1)(c) to seek to 
cover issues of lack of clarity of claiming as patentees will not be able to establish infringement of 
unclear claims”.739  
 
“Biogen insufficiency” was clarified in H. Lundbeck A/S v Generics (UK) Limited & Ors, 
Arrow Generics Limited, Teva UK Limited and Teva Pharmaceuticals Limited740 where 
Kitchin J had based his decision on insufficiency on Biogen and stated that the claim 1 and 3 
were insufficient because claim 1 was a claim to a monopoly of the product (Citalopram). 
Lundbeck only disclosed one way of making it which would not entitle them to a monopoly 
of every way of making it. The COA overruled the Patent Court’s decision, stating that it is 
sufficient in a claim to a product (as opposed to a class of products as in Biogen) if the 
specification discloses one way of making it to the person skilled in the art, Jacob LJ 
explained that product claims can protect in two ways: 
“Firstly such a claim will have the effect of covering all ways of making the product including 
ways which may be inventive and quite different from the patentee's route. Secondly it will give 
him a monopoly over all uses of the patented compound, including uses he has never thought of. I 
elaborate on the second point a little. A patent can only be granted for a novel substance if the 
patentee specifies a use for it (absent this he has simply not made an invention at all — has added 
nothing to human knowledge). But once he has specified a use, his claim to the substance will 
cover any use.”
741 
                                                          
737 [1997] R.P.C. 1 at p.48. Earlier in Chiron Corporation v Organon Teknika Ltd [1994] F.S.R. the court 
assumed that it was enabling disclosure if the specification enabled single embodiment to be performed. 
738 [2002] EWCA Civ 1096; [2003] R.P.C. 3. 
739 Ibid, at 69. In Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoeschst Marion Roussel Ltd [2004] UKHL 46; [2005] R.P.C. 9 see obiter 
of Lord Hoffmann who supported Biogen in paras 111-117. 
740 [2008] EWCA Civ 311; 2008 WL 833673. 
741 Ibid, para 54-55. Arnold J interpreted Lundbeck and applied Biogen in Medimmune Limited v Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals UK Limited, Medical Research Council [2011] EWHC 1669 (Pat), para 475 but found the 
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Does “Biogen insufficiency” apply only where there are unusual claims, and not simple 
product claims?742 It has been emphasised that Biogen insufficiency is only limited to the 
form of claim and cannot be extended to an ordinary product claim where the product is not 
defined by a class of processes of manufacture.743 Furthermore, it was viewed that Biogen 
insufficiency is of ‘unusual nature’ and should be limited to the facts of the case.744 As 
regards to nanotechnology, it involves cross-disciplines which is less likely to disclose only 
one single or simple product (a claim which is difficult to provide in sufficiently clear and 
concise to be carried out by the person skilled in the art), but rather a class of product that cut 
across many disciplines. Thus, as Lord Hoffmann laid down the principle in Biogen, such 
claims in nanotechnology should cover all ways of making the product and enable the person 
skilled in the art to perform across the whole range of the claim.  
 
4.5 Ownership rights in nanotechnology  
 
Patent law grants the inventor the rights of ownership. The patent owner has the rights to 
exploit the patented invention, to assign or transmit and license their rights.745 The 
complexities and multidisciplinarity of nanotechnology challenge on the pre-existing 
problems in determining the right owner of the invention. Furthermore, research activities in 
nanotechnology are likely to arise from the government lab and university with public 
funding, where the question over allocation of the ownership is still uncertain.746 Being 
complex in nature, research in nanotechnology is formed on the basis of collaborative 
research. The partners in the collaborative research normally define their research goals and 
their undertaking responsibility which more often aims to meet the differing needs of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
disclosure sufficient. See, also Sandvik v Kennametal [2011] EWHC 3311 (Pat) at [106] to [124] per Arnold J, 
applied by Floyd J in Regeneron Pharmacueticals Inc v Genentech Inc [2012] EWHC 657 (Pat). 
742 Aplin T and Davis J Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: OUP, 2009) at p.582.  
743 Lord Hoffmann in H. Lundbeck A/S v Generics (UK) Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 311; 2008 WL 833673, 
para 35, upheld at [2009] UKHL 12. 
744 Freeland R and Blachman G ‘The Law of Insufficiency: Is Biogen Still Good Law?’ (2009) E.I.P.R. 478, at 
p.482. 
745 Section 36 of PA 1983. 
746 Interviewee C; in Australia ownership has proved a thorny problem in University of Western Australia v 
Gray [2008] F.C.A. 498, see also Monotti A L ‘Australia: Patents – Ownership of Academic Employee 
Inventions’ (2004) E.I.P.R. N-129. 
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parties.747  In the contract between employee and the employer of the university, the issue in 
determining what model should be adopted for a clear policy on ownership rights. The first 
issue is determining the “inventor”.748  
 
The case law lays down a two step tests in determining the “inventor”  i.e. identify the 
inventive concept and who is responsible for the inventive concept. In Henry Brothers 
(Magherafelt) Ltd v Ministry of Defence and Northern Ireland Office749 the proprietor argued 
that anyone who contributes to the claim in a substantial way must be regarded as an 
inventor. Therefore, according to the proprietor what is critical is whether the alleged co-
inventor took part in the actual devising to a significant extent. Jacob J did not agree with this 
contention and stated the one who in substance made the combination of elements and was 
responsible for the inventive concept was the inventor.750 This was approved later in the 
COA that it was necessary to identify the inventive concept and it was not just routine 
application of the engineering skill, however doubting to agree with Jacob J that the 
invention was a “combination”.751 The difficulty with this approach according to Rose and 
Roughton is that the invention was a combination in bringing together of things of  known 
attributes to achieve unknown result, and not all inventions are combinations of things, but 
had admitted that Jacob J’s approach cannot be wrong on the facts of the case in question.752 
Rose and Roughton commented that this approach assumed that one person or group of 
people are entirely responsible for the inventive concept, but it happens that different people 
make different contributions to an inventive concept.753 This is fairly true for nanotechnology 
that it is very likely more than one person to be responsible for different contribution to the 
inventive concept. 
 
                                                          
747 Monotti and Ricketson explain that industry research tends to be strategic and applied with direct 
commercial application whereas university traditionally tends to answer basic and fundamental questions, 
n.408,at p.125. 
748 Section 7(3) PA 1977, there is no similar definition in Malaysia or under EPC 
749 [1997] R.P.C. 693; [1999] R.P.C. 442 CA. 
750 Ibid, at 706.  
751 [1999] R.P.C. 442, at 449 
752 Rose D and Roughton A Entitlement in Roughton A et al. (eds) The Modern Law of Patents (London: 
Butterworths, 2005), at p.268. 
753 However stated that “it is impossible to provide any more guidance than that”, Ibid, at p.268-269. 
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The inventive concept was examined by Laddie J in IDA v University of Southampton’s 
Applications. 754 In this case, Laddie J argued that to identify the “inventive concept”, the 
person must come up with the inventive concept; the contribution made must be the 
formulation of the inventive step.755 Laddie J further determined that it may be impossible to 
distinguish between the contributions of a number of individuals to a single inventive 
concept.  Laddie J rejected that the inventors could be widened to include those who 
contributed to a patent for the purpose of making it an enabling disclosure. Commenting on 
Laddie J’s judgement, Rose and Roughton view that this approach will make all inventors 
rank equally, but the question may arise as to the portion of benefits in accordance with the 
magnitude of inventive contribution.756 
 
These principles were confirmed later in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc 
and another v Yeda Research and Development Co Ltd757 by Lord Hoffmann.758 The court 
took the view that someone is not inventor if he merely assists the inventor in making up the 
invention after the conception and or merely describes a well-known principle to the 
inventor.759  
 
As Rose and Roughton argued, it is entirely true to say that different people make different 
contribution to an inventive concept, and it is unwise to assume that only one person or group 
of people are responsible. This argument is fairly true for nanotechnology since inventor may 
constitute more than one, who contributes from different disciplines for the inventive 
concept. For an example as relates to nanotechnology, in making Lab-On-Chip760 in order to 
be considered as inventors, the scientist and the computer technologist must establish that 
they have made actual contribution to the making of the invention, to formulating the 
inventive concept or “heart” of the inventions not merely assisting in running the 
experimentation or testing. The cases demonstrate that it is difficult to prove what constitutes 
                                                          
754 [2004] EWHC 2109 (Pat); [2005] R.P.C. 11. 
755 Ibid, at para 47; and in the COA [2006] EWCA Civ 145; [2006] R.P.C. 21, at per Jacob LJ at 577.  
756 This is because since all inventors are regarded equal irrespective of their contributions, there is a concern 
whether equity will step in to solve it and so far there is no case law on this, Rose and Roughton, n.752, at p. 
269. 
757 [2007] UKHL 43; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1796. 
758 Ibid, at 1804. 
759 See also Radomsky L and Maebius S ‘Patent Ownership Challenges for Nanotechnology’ (2004) 1 
Nanotechnology Law & Bus. 159, at p.161. 
760 Interviewee D. 
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inventive concept and who contributes to inventive concept in non-nano situation. This 
situation will be more difficult in nanotechnology to prove the inventive concept for its being 
interdisciplinary in nature.  
 
Joint ownership761 is very significant in relation to nanotechnology because of its 
multidisciplinary nature. An agreement for collaborative work may specifically state that the 
inventions will be jointly owned, or will be owned by one or other of the parties. 762 Who is 
the “joint inventor”? If the person only made a suggestion which is included in the patent 
claim, he would not be considered as a joint inventor.763 Florey and Others’ Patent764 related 
to the invention of new antibiotic by a research team. It was examined that: 
“whatever their several contributions may have been, the members of a team pursuing different 
aspects of a research project under the direction of a team leader should, in any event, be entitled 
to an equal share in any benefit resulting from what must inevitably be regarded as a joint 
effort”.765  
This case concerned biotechnology and research conducted by team, which is relevant in the 
context of nanotechnology. As this case highlighted, the members of a team pursuing 
different aspects of a research project under the direction of a team leader would be entitled 
as a joint effort to an equal share of any benefit. In nanotechnology, a team research 
consisting of researcher from medical, biology, computer engineering, in designing and 
building bio-mimetic apparatus. All of the experts provide different aspects to the research 
project, and they may equally share the benefit arising from the research project. This is 
supported by decisions from older technologies such as Staeng Ltd’s Patent766 where a 
contributor with complementary expertise had alerted the other to a method of attaching 
cable braids to backshell adaptors was held to have come up with the idea behind the 
invention and not merely contributing advice or assistance. It would have been otherwise, if 
all he did was to articulate a known problem which was normally encountered in the field.767  
 
                                                          
761 Section 18(3) PA 1983; section 36(1) PA 1977. 
762 Marchese D ‘Joint Ownership of Intellectual Property’ (1999) E.I.P.R. 364, at p.365. 
763 Allen v Rawson (1845) 1 C.B. 551, 135 E.R. 656. 
764 [1962] RPC 186.  
765 Ibid, at 193. 
766 [1996] R.P.C. 183. 
767 Chandler P ‘Employees Inventions: Inventorship and Ownership’ [1997] E.I.P.R 262, at pp.262-263. 
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The precise issue of who devised the invention is less significant where the invention is 
produced by a research team all employed at the same company.768 The issue becomes more 
significant if the invention is produced by joint project of two different companies or 
institutions. It was suggested that those who are involved positively from the beginning in the 
making of the invention until the maturation of an invention are to be regarded as “joint 
inventors”.769 The reason being, it is not only that this approach maintains the good industrial 
relationship, but it is also reducing the difficulty in determining who was the actual deviser of 
the invention when it is involved a team of researchers.770   
 
The “actual deviser” is the person who in substance has contributed to the invention, and not 
merely provided some advice or assistance to the invention. He involves in inventive concept 
i.e. contributing sufficient input to enable the idea to be transformed into practicality. In 
nanotechnology “actual deviser” is not merely giving general information on how the size 
works differently at nanoscale, but he has also to show that the nanoscale information would 
have different practical application, for example771 chemical reactivity of the rice husk; nano-
robots that seek to destroy cancerous cell or devices that imitate nature (bio-mimetic) or 
nanoscale sensors device in detecting molecule in the blood. Joint ownership is very 
significant for nanotechnology as it involves multidiscipline fields. As discussed, for 
researchers in the same team, they would be considered as the joint inventors, and this may 
seem less problematic. For nanotechnology, it is not only involves a single research team, but 
it may involve different teams who are in the same research project. For researcher in 
different teams, are they still consider as joint inventors? Complex inventorship may lead to 
joint ownership and differences as quoted from Marchese “joint ownership is regarded by 
many legal practitioners as fraught with problems, and therefore to be adopted only as a last 
resort – one of the problem is the lack of certainty in the rules.”772 This is undoubtedly likely 
to occur in complex nanotechnology scenario. Unfortunately, with nanotechnology patents, 
these difficulties may be unavoidable unless ownership can be agreed among the parties in 
                                                          
768 Although it will still be necessary to mention the inventors; section 13 PA 1977; Article 62 EPC 2000. And 
most companies and institutions would have “rewards for inventors” scheme, Marchese, n.762, at p.365. 
769 Phillips J and Firth A Introduction to Intellectual Property Law 4th ed (Butterwoths, London: 2001) at p.67. 
770 Ibid, at p.67. 
771 These are examples from interviewees.  
772 Marchese, n.762, at p.364. 
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advance773 or it can be resolved through the employee invention code or employment 
contract that can be invoked against the employee.  
 
4.5.1 Inventions under contract of employment 
 
Most of nanotechnology research starts at the university or government’s laboratory, the 
issue of ownership between employee and employer becomes significant. Under Article 
60(1) of the EPC 2000, this is a matter for the relevant national law, section 39A of the PA 
1977 in the UK. Who in Malaysian law are the employer and employee in the contract of 
employment? Employee is “a person who works or has been worked under a contract of 
employment, or who is in employment under, or for the purposes of, any individual or 
organization.”774 The general rule is that any works done under the contract of employment 
shall be deemed to accrue to the employer, save in the absence of any provision to the 
contrary.775 The proviso provides that in the case that the invention acquires economic value 
greater than the parties could reasonably foresee at the time of concluding the contract of 
employment, the inventor shall be deemed to be entitled to equitable remuneration.776 This 
provision requires that invention made ‘in the performance’ and ‘in the execution’ of such 
work, in the absence of any provision stated otherwise shall be accrued to the employer. 
However, how the practice of this provision may be debatable because what constitutes “in 
the performance” and “in the execution” of the works is uncertain. The invention is deemed 
to accrue to the employer where the employee invents in the fields of activities of his 
employer by using data or means placed at his disposal by his employer.777 Under this 
provision (section 20(2) PA 1983) requires that when the contract of employment has not 
provided for any inventive activity, but the employee has used the data or placed for his 
activities, the invention made shall belong to the employer. This provision is also likely to 
create problems because of the wording “does not require him to engage in any inventive 
activity” and “using data or means placed at his disposal by his employer” look ambiguous in 
their application.  
                                                          
773 See also 3.3.2.  
774 Section 3 PA 1983, whereas the employer is defined as ‘in relation to an employee, means the person by 
whom the employee is or was employed’. 
775 Section 20  PA 1983. 
776 Section 20 (1) PA 1983. 
777 Section 20(2) PA 1983. 
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There was only one case in Malaysia dealing with the contract of employer and employee.778 
In determining whether there existed the contract of employment between the parties, the 
court in Transachieve Sdn Bhd v Econ PI Pile Sdn Bhd & Anor779 held that the documents 
produced were insufficient to prove that Wu Bong was actually an employee of the company 
when he made the invention. In this case, the inventor, Wu Bong invented “improvements in 
and relating to apparatus for pile driving” and taking the form of a hydraulic piling 
apparatus using a three hydraulic jacks system. Wu Bong later assigned his patent to Econ PI 
Pile Sdn Bhd. Transachieve Sdn Bhd claimed to be the rightful owner of the invention 
because Wu Bong had made the invention in his duties under the contract of employment. 
The company produced evidence to prove that Wu Bong was an employee such as 
remuneration vouchers,  certified attendance and wages of workers, payment for certain 
crane charges, quotation for piling works, minutes of the meeting and progress claim for 
piling works of the company. However Abdul Aziz J stated that none of the documents 
produced proved that Wu Bong was an employee of the company at the time of the 
invention. The court said that the salary vouchers indicated Wu Bong was an employee from 
April 1994, whilst in fact he had made the invention earlier than that. The court further stated 
that the payments received by Wu Bong in considering his involvement in the affairs of the 
company as were as executive director but not as employee. 
 
The dearth of court decisions in Malaysia, allows observing the practices in the UK. Section 
39 of the PA 1977 provides two situations when the employee’s invention belongs to the 
employer that is (1) the invention belongs to the employer if (i) if it has been made in the 
course of employee’s duties which can either be “normal duties” or “specifically assigned”; 
(ii) where circumstances such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from 
the carrying out his duties; and (2) the invention belongs to the employer (i) if it has been 
made in the course of the employee’s duties; and (ii) while making the invention, the 
employee had a special obligation to further the employer’s undertaking because of the 
nature of his duties and the particular responsibilities arising from it.  
 
                                                          
778 Even in the UK there is not much decided case law on the issue of employer-employee relationship. 
779 [1997] 4 C.L.J. 500 (HC). 
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The phrase “normal duties” was considered in Greater Glasgow Health Board's 
Application780 Dr Montgomery was employed as at Registrar and conceived the original idea 
for the invention not during clinical work but while he was involved in private study at home. 
The Hearing Officer examined that the invention did not belong to Dr Montgomery because 
it was connected with his primary duties as a clinician. On appeal, Jacob J stated that the 
word “circumstances” under section 39(1)(a) referred not on the general circumstances but 
on the particular circumstances surrounding the making of the invention. Thus, the invention 
was not related to his normal duties as Registrar, and he was doing it at home.781 
 
In LIFFE Administration and Management v Pavel Pinkava782 the appellant devised a system 
and related inventions in trading on an electronic exchange of various financial instruments. 
The COA stated that in the six months leading up the invention, the employee’s duties had 
been directed to the creation and development of credit derivatives systems, and therefore 
were characterised as “normal” rather than “specifically assigned”. The COA opined that the 
test was an objective test, the relevant invention was owned by LIFFE.783 In this case the 
court looked at what employee actually did and at the contract of employment. As such, it is 
possible for the normal duties of an employee to exceed of those terms stipulated in the 
employment contract.   
 
By contrast, section 20 of PA 1983 provides that rights to the invention made in the course of 
employment shall be deemed to accrue to the employer. Thus, employer asserts their rights 
over all patents generated in the course of employment. The section also states that employer 
also has rights over patents generated by the employee outside their employment contract 
where substantial data and place have been used. Some employer rewards the employee with 
remuneration where the invention has benefited the company and was successfully exploited. 
This section seems to give unfair treatment for the employee, where potentially in all 
circumstances, it assumes that all invention created in the course of employment is accrued to 
the employer. Thus, in light of UK law, Malaysia’s best move would be to amend this 
section, in particular for nanotechnology. The situations provided under the UK law, would 
                                                          
780 [1996] R.P.C. 207; see also Staeng Limited's Patents [1996] R.P.C. 183.  
781 Ibid, at 222. 
782 [2007] EWCA Civ 217; [2007] R.P.C. 30; see comment on this case in Chandler A ‘Ownership of 
Employee’s Inventions: Duties, Expectations and Variable Objectivity’ (2008) E.I.P.R. 164. 
783 [2007] EWCA Civ 217; [2007] R.P.C. 30, at 696. 
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be more convenient for employees who is working in nanotechnology. What could be 
considered as “normal duties” or “specifically assigned” in nanotechnology is based on the 
circumstances in each case. For example, “normal duties” and “specifically assigned” in 
developing bio-mimetic devices could be analysing the related data, testing and 
experimenting, how could the devices mimicking nature, and the use of the devices in 
detecting disease in the body. If the invention is created by the employee in his employment 
contract, this invention would belong to the employer. There are circumstances to consider 
too, as Rose and Roughton pointed out above such as term in the contract, instructions 
directed from the employer, employee’s qualification and degree of proximity with other 
technology would be taken into consideration to expect that the invention is resulted from 
carrying out his duties.784 He is also under obligation to further the employer’s undertaking 
because of the nature of his duties and particular responsibilities arising from it. What is 
important is that the ownership created in the course of employment would be vary according 
to the case by case basis, especially significant to emerging technology like nanotechnology, 
if not, it would have the potential to impede further development.  
 
The contract of employment related to the university context is worth exploring for 
nanotechnology. However, it is admitted that the course of employment in the university is 
rather important and complex.785 The issue becomes contentious, as Monotti and Ricketson 
state “IP issues have now moved to the forefront ... and the questions of ownership and 
entitlement have become of pressing concern to university administrators, academic, 
students, government and other outside bodies”.786 Hull and Toutoungi point out “the age-
old question--what is an academic actually employed to do?” 787 This entitlement dispute 
generally has been predicted to increase in the future where Jacob LJ has observed that: 
                                                          
784 N.752, at p.273. 
785 Interviewee C; see also Monotti, A, ‘Who Owns My Research and Teaching Materials – My University or 
Me? (1997) 19 Sydney L. Rev. 425, at p.428; McSherry C Who Owns Academic Work? (Cambridge: HUP, 
2001), strongly states that “the relationship between IP law and academia is not a simple one,” at p.65. 
786 Monotti and Ricketson, n.408, at p.10. 
787 Hull J and Toutoungi A ‘Topsy-Turvey or Just Down Under? A Case Note on University of Western 
Australia v Gray (2010) E.I.P.R. 43, at p.47; see also Poore come up with interesting questions relevant to the 
patent ownership in the university and joint collaboration such as (a) where do university’s inventions come 
from?; (b) who was the inventor?; (c) in the cross discipline collaborations, who devises the invention?; (d) 
whether the inventor has assigned the right to the third party? Poore A ‘Patently Too Far? University Inventions 
– Lessons from Cambridge’ (2006) Bio-Science Law Review available at 
http://pharmalicensing.com/articles/disp/1158246495_4509705f6bb6d accessed on 10 August 2007. 
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“we were told that in very recent years there has been (and are) a rash of entitlement cases before 
the Comptroller. No-one really knew why this jurisdiction (which in my time at the Bar was 
moribund) has recently come alive. There was some speculation about an increase in joint 
ventures, or an increase in the appreciation of the significance of patents. None of them really 
explain it”.788 
 
Ownership has always been problematic to determine, and this could be doubled for 
multidisciplinary fields of research collaborations programme like nanotechnology. In the 
UK, the ownership right governing the university employee has no specific provision, only 
the provisions under the section 39 above.  
 
In universities elsewhere, the rights of ownership normally derive from statutory or common 
law provisions, or an IP policy for the management of the IP.789 Some may refer to the 
Research and Development Agreements, the legal regimes governing inventions made by 
academic employee.790 Nevertheless, although universities provide their own IP policy, the 
details of allocation of the royalty or the ownership are not often clearly articulated and are 
ambiguous.791 The lack of clarity over IP in research collaborations has been recognised by 
the Lambert Review produced in 2003 which stated that: 
“when a research project is fully funded by the university and public sponsors, such as the 
Research Councils and Funding Councils, there is no question of business owning any IP that 
results. On the other hand, when a university carries out contract research that is fully funded by 
industry, the company will usually own any resulting IP. However it is much more difficult to 
agree the ownership of IP in research projects that have been funded by both universities and 
industry. Most business funding for university research is in this form. IP ownership is often 
strongly contested in these research collaborations, because the sponsors have different interests in 
the rights to exploit and use the IP. Universities say that they need ownership to ensure that their 
future research is not held back. Industry often argues that it needs ownership to protect the 
                                                          
788 IDA v University of Southampton [2004] EWHC 2107 (Pat) and on appeal [2006] EWCA Civ 145, at 578. 
789 However, the use of statutory and common law provision may not be a perfect way to determine the 
ownership rights at the university, Monotti, n.785, at p.470. 
790 Stallberg C G ’The Legal Status of Academic Employee’s Invention in Britain and Germany and its 
Consequence for R&D Agreements’ (2007) , at p.489. 
791 Interviewee C who strongly stated although in theory the royalty basis has been determined, but in practice 
the allocation of the royalty is still vague and this is reinforced by the low level of commercialization in IP. 
Malaysia lacks innovation hotspots to develop homegrown technology and this situation should be supported by 
the development of centres of basic and applied research to generate the idea and encourage the 
commercialization,  ‘Local Universities, Research Culture and Start-up Activities Still Weak’ The Star Online, 
20 Nov 2009, available at 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/11/20/business/514591&sec=business accessed on 8 Dec 
2009. 
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investment which will be required to develop the IP into a commercial product. There is no clear 
framework in the UK for IP negotiations to help the two sides balance their competing interests. 
Government, Research Councils and Funding Councils all devolve responsibility to universities to 
negotiate terms on a case-by-case basis”.792  
 
Since multidisciplinary, the issue of collaborative university research outside the written 
agreement is more complex in nanotechnology. The contract of employment and NDA in 
advance would be very significant.793 In the absence of such agreements, it is difficult to 
determine the ownership in the collaborative works like nanotechnology.  
 
In Australia, two important court decisions concerning the ownership rights at the university. 
In Victoria University of Technology v Wilson794 Prof Wilson and Dr Feaver had developed 
an electronic trade exchange system and related software programs made during the course 
of their employment at the Victoria University of Technology. Subsequently, they together 
with Mr Craig Astil formed a company, MP3. The issue before the court was who had the 
right over the invention? In this case the court stated that the IP policy which governed 
entitlement to inventions was not enforceable because it was not effectively passed and 
promulgated. The court added that the mere use of the university time and resources was 
insufficient to confer the right of ownership to the university. The court also said that as to 
whether the invention belongs to the university depended on the nature of the research 
undertaken by the employee. The duty to do research does not alone to make the university 
own the invention.795  
 
In University of Western Australia (UWA) v Gray796 Prof Gray invented treatment of liver 
cancer using microsphere technology. This research was carried out during his working hours 
at the university. In the contract of employment it was stated that his duties were to teach, 
conduct examinations, supervise and organise research. He applied for patent on the 
technology and UWA claimed the invention belonged to the university since it was created 
during the contract of employment. In Australia, there was no equivalent provision to section 
                                                          
792 HM Treasury, The Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration, Final Report, Dec 2003, available 
at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/lambert_review_final_450.pdf, accessed on 9 Jan 2010, at para 4.13-4.15. 
793 See 3.3.2.1. 
794 (2004) 60 I.P.R. 392. 
795 See also comment on this case in Monotti, at n.785 above. 
796 [2008] F.C.A. 498. 
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39 of the PA 1977 that governed invention made under the contract of employment. Under 
common law principles, in the absence of express terms, UWA had to rely on the implied 
term, that IP developed in the course of employment belongs to the university. French J 
rejected reliance on the implied term of the contract of employment. He said that in the 
absence of any enforceable express term, in the course of their research, the right of 
ownership belonged to the academic inventors. The decision by French J was upheld on 
appeal in the Full Federal Court which stated that Prof Gray had no duty to invent because 
his duties were to teach, undertake research and to organise research. Whether to invent or 
not is a matter of choice because Prof Gray had no obligation to perform duties from which 
invention might result. The Court also stated that there was no basis in implying into the 
contract of employment for the academic staff a duty not to disclose the result of research, 
even if such disclosure could destroy the patentability of an invention.797 
 
Based on the court’s decision, the disputes over IP ownership are becoming more 
contentious. Although a university may provide for entitlement of ownership on the basis of 
agreement, this does not always solve the problem. Hull observes that even with agreement 
in place, the potential for dispute should not be ignored especially in the areas of 
performance of the agreement or breaches of confidence or quality of work carried out.798 He 
further states that there should be in principle be less scope of conflicts of the ownership of 
IPRs provided that the parties have defined what they bring to the project and anything new 
arising in sufficiently clear terms which give no room for further interpretation, so that a 
lengthy and costly action could be avoided.799 In this regards, that is useful to examine the 
model that the university should adopt a clear ownership policy in their own organisation, 
though inevitably this research and inventions relates to future example of which is not 
known in advance. Monotti discusses two different models of extended ambit claims;800 the 
first model is to reject the extended ambit claims and sustain the statutory and common law 
principle but in certain situations there may be need for specific agreements for ownership of 
                                                          
797 See comments on this case by Monotti A L Australia: University of Western Australia v Gray – Patents 
(2010) E.I.P.R. N1; and Hull and Toutoungi, n.787 above.  
798 Hull J ‘Ownership of Rights Created in Sponsored Academic Collaborations – A Note on the IDA, Statoil 
and Cyprotex Decisions’ (2007) E.I.P.R. 6, at p.14. 
799 Ibid, at p.14; see also per Jacob J in “IDA v University of Southampton [2004] EWHC 2107 (Pat) and on 
appeal [2006] EWCA Civ 145; [2006] R.P.C. 21, at 579; The Lambert Report, n. 791, at para 3.34. 
800 These claims “assert ownership over general classes of future intellectual property to which a university 
otherwise has no automatic legal right. These extended ambit claims are to be contrasted with individual 
agreements that an originator signs before commencing particular research”, Monotti, n.785 at p.427. 
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the IP.801 Accordingly, specific agreements of ownership can increase the certainty of 
ownership rights of IP, and the university will be more focused on what types of IP it wishes 
to own.802 The second model is to consider that statutory and common law principle is not 
the only way to allocate the ownership but also to include extended ambit claims in all 
employment contracts to divert attention from employment duties alone.803 Extended ambit 
claims would be very helpful to enhance the clarity of ownership in case that there was a 
dispute of the university ownership on the grounds that the creation of patented invention is 
outside the duties of employment, while the creator had been using university-owned IP.804 
These two models are significant for nanotechnology multidisciplinary research and 
ownership. For the first model, it gives the element of certainty in determining the ownership 
because it is specifically stated in the agreements; whereas for the second model, it gives 
some flexibility that employment duties are not the only means to indicate the ownership 
arising from the collaborative research. There are however, other considerations would be 
taken into account in determining the ownership. These models would only act as a 
guideline; there should not be standard models for ownership rights to all research institutes 
for nanotechnology. This is because, not only that the technology is different, but also 
different institutions involved with different team members or people. So, to adopt a standard 
model it would give unfair advantage to one another in the collaborative research. Instead, it 
may be suggested that the agreements should be drafted with a view to ensure that all 
parties/team enjoy an equitable share. In the UK, however, section 42 of the PA 1977 renders 
contract terms unenforceable if they diminish employee’s rights over future inventions. 
However, as Jacob J stated, it may be better for the university to negotiate a contract which is 
more generous to the employee and enjoy certainty, rather than be locked into dispute. 
 
4.5.2 Employee compensation scheme 
 
Section 40 of the PA 1977 provides that an employee is entitled to a compensation award 
having made an invention for which a patent is granted where a patent is of “outstanding 
                                                          
801 Monotti, n.785, at p.466. 
802 Ibid, at p.467. 
803 Ibid, at p.468. 
804 Ibid, at pp.468-469. 
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benefit” to the employer. After the amendment in 2004,805 an employee is entitled to a 
compensation for not only that the patent, but also the invention that has been of outstanding 
benefit. In order for the employee to be awarded compensation, this provision requires that 
the invention has been granted a patent belongs to the employer taking into account the size 
and nature of the employer’s undertaking and whether it is just for the employee to be 
rewarded.  
 
This provision is silent of what constitutes “outstanding benefit” and it is difficult task to 
determine the meaning.806 There was a view that this provision is of little practical value and 
has been seen as unattainable threshold for the employee who intends to rely on it.807 It is not 
an easy task to determine what benefit has accrued as a result of patent because of 
“marketing expertise, consumer fads, eye-catching design appeal and the opening up of new 
overseas markets”.808 Furthermore, it is a lengthy process for the patentable invention to be 
converted into sufficiently established products in a market place for it to be considered as 
having outstanding benefit.809 The provision provides that the benefit means in the form of 
money and money’s worth.810 The benefit must be actual and not potential benefit.811  
 
In British Steel’s Patent812 the court stated that outstanding benefit implies superlative and to 
be a correspondingly stiff test to justify for an award of compensation.813 The size and nature 
of the employer’s undertaking must be looked at the total benefit obtained against the 
turnover and profits of the employer’s relevant business.814 Here the benefit in monetary 
terms was no more than 0.01 per cent of turnover or 0.8 per cent of profits. The monetary 
                                                          
805 It has been made through section 10 of Patents Act 2004; there is no similar provision in Malaysia. 
806 Howell C ‘Compensation at Last for Employee Inventors: Kelly v GE Healthcare Ltd’ (2010) J.B.L. 41, at 
p.47. 
807 Hobson N and Shafran T ‘Kelly and Chiu v GE Healthcare Limited’ (2009) E.I.P.R. 523, at p.523; see also 
Lee Y J and Langley M ‘Employee’s Inventions: Statutory Compensation Schemes in Japan and the UK’ (2005) 
E.I.P.R. 250, at p.252. 
808 Chandler P A ‘Employees’ Inventions: Outstanding Compensation’ (1992) J.B.L. 600, at p.602. 
809 Ibid, at p.601. 
810 Section 43(7) PA 1977. 
811 Stalberg, n.790, at p. 489; but after Kelly v GE Healthcare Ltd [2009] EWHC 181 (Pat); [2009] RPC 12 Ch 
see below. 
812 [1992] R.P.C. 117. 
813 Ibid, at 122; see also Memco-Med’s Patent [1992] R.P.C. 402, at 414. 
814 [1992] R.P.C. 117, at 126. 
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benefits are in the form of net benefit, that is all costs relating to invention’s or patent’s 
commercialisation or protection are to be deducted.815  
 
In GEC Avionics Ltd Patent816 the court stated that the word “outstanding” was something 
out of ordinary and not such as one would normally expect to arise from the results of the 
duties for which the employee was paid for.817 The court also stated that the benefit needed to 
be looked at in the total context of the employer’s activities to see whether it was 
outstanding.818  
 
The court was reluctant to define “outstanding” in Memco-Med’s Patent819 on the basis that 
“court will recognise an outstanding benefit when it occurs”.820 The court stated that it 
would be impossible to define this relative concept. The finding that a patent was of “vital 
importance” to the employer was also found to have been insufficient to amount to an 
“outstanding benefit”.821  
 
The cases above were not successful. Thus, it was viewed that the right for statutory right of 
the compensation scheme “was more theoretical than real”822 and was considered to be “a 
dead letter”.823 
 
The cases mentioned above were decided before section 40 was amended. Kelly v GE 
Healthcare Ltd824 concerned the two patents granted for two inventions on successful 
products called “Myoview”. The amounts of £1.5m in compensation were granted to two 
inventors from their former employer. The court examined that the two patents granted for 
the invention used in Myoview were of “outstanding benefit. The court assessed the benefit 
                                                          
815 Ibid, at 124; see also Bently and Sherman “investment of resources and effort required by the employer to 
move the invention from initial conception to practical, profitable reality”, n.211, at p.570. 
816 [1992] R.P.C. 107. 
817 Ibid, at 115. 
818 [1992] R.P.C. 107, at 115. 
819 [1992] R.P.C. 403. 
820 Ibid, per Aldous J at 414. In this case the size and nature of the employer’s undertaking is depending on 
circumstances of the whole or a division of the employer’s business. 
821 Ibid, at 417. 
822 Aplin and Davis, n. 742, at p.628. 
823 Grubb, n.620, at p.393. 
824 [2009] EWHC 181 (Pat); [2009] R.P.C. 12; See case comment on this by Hobson and Shafran, n.807; 
Howell, n.806; Odell-West A ‘Kelly v GE Healthcare Ltd: Employee Innovation in Health Care: Deciphering 
Ownership and the Alchemy of “Outstanding Benefit” (2010) E.I.P.R. 449. 
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to the employer of the patents were £50 million and 3 per cent would be a fair share to be 
awarded to the employees i.e. £1.5 million. The benefit considered in this case was that the 
patent protection “running many years into the future” which would have the effect of 
achieving the corporate deals.825 Floyd J tried to clarify “the collection of vague terms” and 
stated that outstanding means “something special” or “out of ordinary” and more than 
“substantial”, “significant” or “good”.826 According to Floyd J, to be outstanding “it must 
be something out of ordinary and not such as one would normally expect to arise from the 
results of duties that the employee is paid for”.827 Thus in this case, the patents were of 
outstanding benefit to the employer Amersham taking into account the size and nature of the 
undertaking. The benefit of patent protection was not limited only to profits from sales 
because the Amersham’s having a patented blockbuster radiopharmaceutical was a major 
factor in achieving corporate deals. In this way, according to the court, the patents helped to 
transform Amersham, and were of outstanding benefit.828  
 
Advocates argue that although the claims are still rare under the compensation statutory 
compensation scheme, nevertheless, the schemes ensure that companies maintain their  
internal arrangement to reward contribution made by their employees.829 From the standpoint 
of the employer, it was argued that the statutory compensation scheme is undesirable because 
the employee’s salary is sufficient for all requisite duties, and to compensate the employee 
would mean that he would get double payment.830 Whereas, the employee might argue that 
the profits gained by some of his inventions far beyond the level of payment received from 
his employer.831 It was viewed too that the claim for compensation is likely to be brought by 
the ex-employee rather than the existing employee.832 This is very important as Howell 
pointed out that “having a reputation as someone who brings such a claim may irretrievably 
harm your future prospects in the job market in seeking employment”.833 As far as academic 
                                                          
825 [2009] EWHC 181 (Pat); [2009] R.P.C. 12, at 391. 
826 Ibid, at 374; Floyd J admitted that this section was difficult to interpret and apply, at 372-273. 
827 Ibid, at 374. 
828 Floyd J [2009] EWHC 181 (Pat); [2009] RPC 12, at 374, at para 150. 
829 Available at the UK Patent Office, ‘Consultation on the Proposed Patents Act (Amendment Bill) available at 
www.patent.gov.uk/about/consultations/responses/patact/enforcement.htm accessed on 3 April 2010. 
830 Chandler, n.808, at p.600. 
831 Ibid, at p.600. 
832 Von Falck A and Schmaltz C ‘University Inventions’ (2005) I.I.C. 912.  
833 Howell, n.806, at p.53; see also Lee and Langley, who state that by bringing claims for compensation to 
court would appear that the employees would jeopardize their positions, or future promotion or employment  
prospects in the company, n.807, at p.253. 
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employees are concerned, and related to their nature of the work, they “can rarely expect 
financial rewards”.834 Furthermore, there is little evidence to say that those countries which 
have adopted a compensation scheme successfully would produce higher inventive activity 
than those countries which do not have the statutory compensation scheme.835 If the reward is 
granted on an individual basis, the researcher would be reluctant to share ideas to work 
collaboratively thereby stifling innovation and reducing creativity.836 
 
The provisions of section 40 are likely to be even more problematic to determine which 
inventions or patents have “outstanding benefit” where there is team work, not only within 
one company, but across of different teams from different companies and institutions. This is 
because the compensation awarded is linked to the individual inventions or patents, and the 
existence of research teams can create difficulty in determining who actually contributed 
what in terms of the relative size and individual contribution.837 Furthermore, the success of 
an invention also depends on R&D, because there are many stages of developing an 
invention to be put into the market place.838 Therefore, rewarding those employed inventors 
would be unwise decision without rewarding those who might contribute after an invention 
to its commercial success.839 Moreover, the individual researcher would be reluctant to share 
his idea with other researchers because compensation will be granted only to employed 
inventors. It is rather impossible for a nanotechnology researcher to work alone. For that 
reason, rather than to have to rely on a compensation scheme, it is desirable to adopt 
contractual agreements between employee and employer, in the forms of rewards schemes in 
a monetary basis such as salary increments, bonuses, share options; or a non-monetary basis 
such as career progression, greater autonomy in a research project or opportunity to work 
with high-calibre fellow professional that equitably reflect the contribution of all employees 
towards the success of an invention.840 It was also argued that the reward should be left to the 
employer who could assess the contribution of the researchers and developers in term of 
                                                          
834 Stallberg, n.790, at p.503; see also Monotti and Ricketson, n.408, at p.156; Bently and Sherman, n.211, at 
p.568. 
835 Phillips and Firth, n.769 at p.112. 
836 Howell, n.806, at p.42. 
837 Lee and Langley, n.807, at p.255. 
838 Company R&D projects normally involve team efforts where a researcher’s inventive activity builds upon 
the work of colleagues, Merges R P ‘The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions’ (1999) 13 Harv. J. L. & 
Tech. 1, at pp.20-21. 
839 Lee and Langley, n.807, at p.255. 
840 Ibid, at p.255. 
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salary, bonuses or promotion, without having named them as individual inventors.841 This 
argument is very significant in the context of nanotechnology to adopt contractual 
agreements between employer and employee in determining what sort of rewards scheme 
that are appropriate to the success of nanotechnology invention.  
 
Thus the UK statutory compensation scheme does not provide a good framework for 
nanotechnology as this scheme is designed for individual inventors, whereas, in 
nanotechnology invention is team-based and collaborative. What is important is that, it 
should give some flexibility in the contract, as argued by Lee and Langley that contractual 
agreements are “a sounder solution” than statutory compensation scheme as the decision 
makers are more familiar inside the industry or the technology concerned, and this is fairly 
wise to optimise the incentive and reward.842 Merges suggested four types of employer-based 
award scheme; (a) implicit career-path progression for significant inventions; (b) bonuses for 
significant inventions; (c) output-based bonus schemes and (d) schemes based on individual 
employee contribution and valuation of the invention.843 Furthermore, as Grubb pointed out, 
the statutory provision could pose a problem on the basis that even the term ‘outstanding 
benefit’ were to be redefined or interpreted;844 (a) if the invention was kept in secret as know-
how, or patent was refused because of prior art, the compensation would not be paid no 
matter how important the invention was; (b) “outstanding benefit” regards to the size of the 
company, where large companies because of different departments involved were less likely 
to get the compensation from those in smaller companies; (c) the compensation is due only 
from the employer at the time the invention was made, and in case that the employer sells the 
business, the employee has no claim against the new owner.  
 
4.6 Defences for patent infringement  
 
In principle, patent does not allow any unauthorised use of a patented invention. Once the 
patent has been granted, the owner has exclusive rights to exercise over the invention. If 
someone exercises the rights without the permission of the rightful owner, he is said to 
                                                          
841 Howell, n.806, at p.42. 
842 Lee and Langley, n.807, at p.255. 
843 Merges, n.838, at p.45. 
844 Grubb, n.620,at pp.393-394. 
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commit an act of infringement. However, this may not always be the case in certain situation 
the act done, for example by the use of patented invention in the experiment or the person has 
already used the invention prior to the grant of patent may not constitute infringement. Thus, 
the right holder of the patent would be limited of his rights to exercise over the patent. This 
section examines defences for patent infringement under patent law.  
 
In Malaysia, this limitation of the rights845 includes experimental use,846 prior use,847 implied 
licence to repair,848 parallel import,849 government use850 and Malaysia also has compulsory 
licensing.851 However, this thesis will not discuss of all of these limitations. Implied licence 
to repair depends on whether the invention is a product or process. In nanotechnology, the 
invention often concerned on the process852 rather than product, therefore, implied licence to 
repair may seem impossible to apply. Implied licence to repair means that repairing of 
nanoscale product falling short of remanufacture or remaking it: United Wire Ltd v Screen 
Repair Services.853 Again, at nanoscale there is little scope for this either. Parallel imports are 
also product specific. For government use,854 it could be argued that nanoscale does not seem 
to be different from other inventions in this regard. Therefore, this thesis only focuses on 
defences which are potentially especially relevant and or problematic to be applied to 
nanotechnology patent i.e. experimental use defence and prior user rights. 
 
4.6.1 The experimental use defence 
 
The legal development of the scope of experimental use defence has significantly different in 
different jurisdictions. Some countries (like Malaysia and UK) have provided through 
                                                          
845 Section 37 PA 1983. 
846 Section 37(1) PA 1983. 
847 Section 37 (2) (ii) and section 38 PA 1983. 
848 This is developed through case law whereby the user of patented article would have an implied right to repair 
and use of the article without commits an act of infringement. See the scope of implied licence to repair in Solar 
Thomson Engineering Co Ltd and Anor v Barton [1977] 17 R.P.C. 537. 
849 Section 58(A) PA 1983. 
850 Section 84 PA 1983. 
851 Section 48 PA 1983. 
852 For example the production process of carbon nanotubes in many different variants by IBM such as “a 
hollow carbon fiber having a wall consisting essentially of a single layer of carbon atoms”, US Patent No 
5424054.  
853 [2001] R.P.C. 24. 
854 Art 31 TRIPS refers “other use” in the footnote as the use other than that allowed under Art 30 of TRIPS, 
and this may include government use or the use by the third parties authorized by the government, Gervais, 
n.222, at p.381. 
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statutory provision;855 whilst the other countries has adopted the common law principle 
through judicial creations (such as Australia and the US). This gives the indication that the 
application of the scope of experimental is flexible, and to some extent uncertain.856 Legal 
commentators have also observed that experimental has been “ill-defined”857 and other has 
emphasised that “although the experimental use exemption is widely recognised” 
nevertheless “its metes and bounds are not clear, and its existence presents legal 
difficulties”.858 In a different jurisdiction, particularly US, discussion for the scope of 
experimental has attracted great concern.859 Before the decision in Madey v Duke 
University860 it has been emphasised that the scope has never been given a proper definition 
in the US law and “this vaguely defined doctrine is becoming less satisfactory”.861 Eisenberg 
observed that the scope of experimental is still uncertain: 
“it is difficult to discern the scope of this exception with any precision, inasmuch as experimental 
use becomes an issue only in patent infringement actions ... within this universe, the experimental 
use defense has been frequently raised, but almost never sustained. Nonetheless, courts have 
consistently recognized the existence of an experimental use defense in theory, although the 
defense has almost never succeeded in practice”.862  
                                                          
855 Originally common law based and enacted in statutory form. See classic example of common law principle 
of exception in Fearson v Loe (1878) 9 Ch D 48; Proctor v Bayley and Son (1889) 6 R.P.C. 106. 
856 Karp J P ‘Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exemption’ (1991) 100 
Yale Law J. 2169, at p.2172. 
857 Cornish W R ‘Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in European Community States’ (1998) I.I.C. 735, at 
p.752. 
858 Gilat D Experimental Use and Patents, IIC Studies, Vol. 16 (Weinheim: VCH, 1995), at p.3. 
859 See for example, Mueller J M ‘The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent 
Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Non-Profit Research and Development’ (2004) 56 
Baylor L. Rev. 917 states that the lack of statutory provision under the US patent law causes the industries to 
outsource the research and development at the foreign countries, and suggests for the general experimental use 
exemption for patent infringement, at p.972; Mueller J M ‘No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental 
Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools’ (2001) 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1, suggests for 
the US to adopt “liability-rule” model to compensate the patent owner in the form of “royalty-through 
approach” for unauthorised used of the patented research tools, where accessing to the research tool is difficult, 
at p.10; Rai A K ‘Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science’ (1999) 
94 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 77, proposing a broader scope for the experimental use defence to reduce 
transaction and creativity costs, at p.139. However, the court’s ruling in Madey v Duke was actually narrowed 
its scope in the university context.  
860 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
861 Eisenberg R S ‘Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use’ (1989) 56 
Univ. Chi. Law Rev. 1017, at p.1020; see also Merges R P and Nelson R R ‘On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope’ (1990) 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, which state that “the defense of “experimental use” can be 
involved by one accused of infringement … but the precise contours of the defense, which is derived solely from 
case law, are unclear”, at p.866, n.118. 
862 Eisenberg R ‘Patenting Research Tools and the Law’ (1997) Intellectual Property Rights and Research Tools 
in Molecular Biology 6, National Academy Press, available at http://stills.nap.edu/htm/property/2.html; see also 
Eisenberg, n.861  at p.1018. This is to qualify of what Eisenberg comments before Madey that the scope of 
experimental use defence is uncertain. See also the COA for the Federal Circuit in Roche Products Inc v Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co Inc 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) that research exemption was referred to as “truly narrow” 
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In the US, Madey related to research tools. Madey an ex-professor of Duke University 
(Duke) sued Duke for patent infringement for using his two patents on equipment used in the 
laboratory. Duke contended that being non-profit and educational institutions alleged the 
defence for experimental use applied because it was used for non-commercial and 
educational purposes. The Federal Circuit laid down a principle that the exception was only 
applied for “amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”. It was 
further stated that Duke was a major research university, purely scientific in nature and not 
for commercial purposes, but they still contribute to the university’s legitimate business 
objectives. Under Madey experiments on or about the invention are covered, but not 
experiments using the invention as a research tool. The decision in Madey is important 
although this study is aimed to discuss more closely the position in the UK (as persuasive for 
Malaysia) and Malaysia. Gowers mentioned that the experimental use defence is still unclear 
as what ‘use’ means; normally uses in relation to the subject matter of a patent are generally 
covered, and uses relating to different subject matter are not covered.863 The uncertainty is 
due to the case law being so limited, and this uncertainty would fear the researchers for 
infringing a patent and being sued.864  
 
Nanotechnology is perceived as the next technological revolution in the 21 st century and the 
development of nanotechnology may be similar to the development of biotechnology in the 
1980s and 1990s. During that time, biotechnology was not really transformed into the final 
products, but instead it covered basic laboratory materials and process, known as research 
tools.865 Reflecting the development in the biotechnology where experimental has been 
considered as of great importance, Burk and Lemley observe that it is “more likely to be 
applied in industries where reproduction and testing of products are necessary parts of the 
product development process” and further state that “experimental use as a defence to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
experiments conducted to obtain regulatory approval for pharmaceutical products were not within experimental 
use exception because they “have definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes”. This case 
inspired the European Union to introduce exception for clinical trials aimed of obtaining regulatory approval of 
human pharmaceutical products, as known as Bolar exemption:  Directive 2001/83 [2001] OJ L311/67 as 
amended by Directive 2004/27 [2004] OJ L136/34. 
863 There is definition of what is in relation, and what is different from the subject matter, and genes 
technologies fall within both categories, , H M Treasury, Glowers Review of Intellectual Property (2006) at 4.5 
(Gowers). 
864 Ibid, at 4.6. 
865 Feit I V ‘Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement’ (1989) 71 J. 
Pat. & Trademark Off. Sco’y 819, at p.819. In biotechnological, for example research tools has been referred as 
“those patented tools used in development of new biotechnological or pharmaceutical products that do not 
themselves physically incorporate the tool”, Mueller, n.859, at p.14. 
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infringement is likely to be particularly important where it is difficult or impossible to 
evaluate a product or design around a patent without reproducing the product itself”.866  
 
Research tools in nanotechnology are important, such as atomic probe microscopy, or 
scanning probe microscopy or carbon nanotubes, which act as basic building block for future 
research and development. Therefore, experimental use in nanotechnology will be very 
important, as with biotechnological invention; without it dynamic technological development 
may be impeded. Furthermore, nanotechnology research needs to be inventing around or 
improving of patented inventions. Added to this, in nanotechnology things may become 
complex because of patents being owned by different patentees. Although a defence of  
private and non-commercial use may support pure academic research, it is unlikely to be 
helpful in industrial and collaborative work, seen as important by interviewees.  On the basis 
of biotechnology context, and the unique characteristics underpinned nanotechnology, the 
scope of experimental should be given a proper interpretation, so as to avoid unjustified 
application of the defence for nanotechnology research invention.  The statutory provision of 
experimental use is shown in the Table 4.1 below.  
 
Table 4.1: Statutory provision of experimental use defence 
Provision Infringement Not infringement 
Section 37(1) PA 1983 Acts done for industrial and 
commercial purpose 
Acts done for scientific research 
Section 60(5) PA 
1977867 
Acts otherwise than for 
private and non-commercial 
purposes – section 60(1), (2) 
and (5)(a) see below 
Acts done privately and purpose 
are not commercial 
Acts done for experimental relating 
to the subject matter of the 
invention. 
                                                          
866 Burk D L and Lemley M A ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’ (2003) 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, at p.1648; see also 
Cook T ‘A European Perspectives as to the Extent to Which Experimental Use, and Certain Other, Defences to 
Patent Infringement, Apply to Differing Types of Research’, A Report for the Intellectual Property Institute, 
(London: Bird & Bird, July 2006), at p.122; Eisenberg R S ‘Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research’ (1987) 97 Yale L. J. 177 who states the importance of experimental use defence for 
biotechnological invention because “the experimental use doctrine offers a potential mechanism for reconciling 
the patent monopoly with the interest of the research community in building upon prior discoveries through 
subsequent research”, at p.230. 
867 This exception is from Article 27(b) of the CPC which exempts “acts done for experimental purposes 
relating to the subject matter of the patented invention”. 
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4.6.1.1 Scientific research and experimental purpose 
 
In Malaysia, the exception applies only to acts done for scientific research and not for 
industrial or commercial purposes, whereas in the UK the word used is “experimental 
purposes”. Whether the “scientific research” is equivalent to “experiment” or not, the case 
law decided in the UK is of interest to in Malaysia as judicial authority is so sparse.  
 
The issue came before the court to in Monsanto v Stauffer868 Falconer J drew the line 
between “reasonable trial and experiment”, and in stressing that allowable experiments must 
be confined to things done on small scale, he came close to drawing the line what was “non-
commercial.”  However, the approach was explored further in the COA. Dillon LJ rejected 
the argument made by defendant that “experiment” has been given a special treatment under 
Common law. Accordingly, the word “experiment” is only ordinary word or everyday 
language and which has never been a term of art under the law. Dillon LJ made a distinction 
between trials which were experimental and those which were in truth a matter of amassing 
statistics to further commercial exploitation.869  
 
The clear principle established in this case is that it is not an act of infringement if the act 
done to discover something unknown, or to test whether something known to work in a 
specific condition will work differently under different condition. The court added that the 
scope of experimental use does not apply in order to demonstrate that the product works to a 
third party or to amass information to satisfy them. Furthermore, Dillon LJ stated that the 
words “for experimental purposes” are not limited only to a laboratory or glasshouse. But the 
subject matter of experiments depend upon the nature of the product, as in Monsanto 
concerning herbicides or compositions to stimulate the growth of the plant, it would be an 
experiments to see if results obtained in the laboratory or glasshouse could be achieved in 
natural conditions in the open air where the product will have to be used.870 Dillon LJ further 
considered that whether experiment or not depended upon the facts of each case, and can 
include experiments designed with a commercial end in view. Nevertheless, the distinction 
                                                          
868 [1985] R.P.C. 515. 
869 Ibid, at 538-539. 
870 Ibid, at 537. 
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was drawn between trials which were experimental and those which were in truth a matter of 
amassing statistics to further commercial exploitation.871  
 
This decision is in accordance with the wording of the section 37(1) of the PA 1983.872 The 
word “scientific research” is similar to the meaning of “experiment” which is to find new 
facts, but not to demonstrate old facts. Thus, in nanotechnology context, scientific research 
could include experiments or research to discover something like aerogel using rice husk or 
to find out whether this rice husk to make aerogel works at nanoscale range, or a new use of 
carbon nanotubes as to they are stronger or lighter.873 It may be that commercialisation of 
research results would require a voluntary or compulsory licence. 
 
The principle in Monsanto has been expanded further in Smith Kline & French Laboratories 
Limited v Evans Medical Limited874 where Aldous J agreed and stated that acts done for 
experimental purposes included experiments with a commercial end in view and the purposes 
must relate to the claimed subject matter of the patent.875  
 
The German Federal Supreme Court considered an experimental use exception in Clinical 
Trials I.876 The Germany Federal SC concluded that Patent Act exempts all experimental acts 
as long as they serve to gain information and to carry out scientific research into the subject-
matter of the invention, including its use. This included the utilization acts for experimental 
purposes undertaken with the subject-matter of the invention to discover the effects of a 
substance or possible new unknown uses.  It did not matter also whether experiments are 
used only to check the statements made in the patent or else to obtain further research results, 
and whether they are employed for wider purposes, such as commercial information.877  
 
                                                          
871 [1985] R.P.C. 515, at 538-539. 
872 Azmi, n.607, at p.417; furthermore, as in common law rule of the exception that included experimental 
activities exempted from patent infringement, for example in Frearson v Loe (1878) 9 Ch D 48, at 66. 
873 Interviewee C. 
874 [1989] F.S.R. 513. 
875 Ibid, at 523-524. 
876 [1997] R.P.C. 623. 
877 Ibid, at 638-639; this slighly broader approach may reflect the lack of compulsory licensing provisions. 
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It was also observed in Clinical Trials II878 that the Germany Federal SC that clinical 
experiments with a genetically engineered pharmaceutical will always be based on 
commercial considerations. The intention that is an activity begun and carried out for 
research purposes cannot be categorised as infringement merely on the basis of the fact that 
the results of the research will not solely serve research purposes but also will serve 
commercial purposes as well. An activity is rather exempted and therefore permissible if it is 
oriented towards clearing up uncertainties with regard to the object of the patented invention 
or bringing out new discoveries about said object, provided these activities with research 
purposes relate to the object of the patented invention.879 
 
Whether the use of the invention was for experimental purposes, but mixed with other 
purposes, has been considered in Corevalve Inc v Edwards Lifesciences AG.880 The issue 
was whether Corevalve had a valid experimental defence because where valves were 
supplied to selected hospitals and cardiologists were trained to use them. The court held that 
the permitted use of the invention was for experimental purposes, a difficulty arose if it had 
mixed purposes, and it would be a necessary to consider the defendant’s preponderant 
purpose. Corevalve preponderant purposed were threefold: (1) to establish confidence in their 
product within the relevant market; (2) to generate immediate revenue of a substantial 
character; and (3) to gain information about clinical indications and, possibly, future 
modifications to be made to the physical structure of the device in the light of experience. 
The court held that purpose (3) was not Corevalve preponderant purpose, and there was an 
infringement. 
 
Based on cases above, this study strongly argues that the word “scientific research” in 
Malaysia is equivalent to “experiment” in the UK law. Malaysia should adopt a similar 
approach when deciding whether the acts done for scientific research as in for experimental 
purposes. Scientific research, which may be basic or applied881 or may include experiments 
carried out to find new facts, to discover unknown facts but not demonstrate to the third party 
that the invention works, and include experiments with commercial end in view. As the 
                                                          
878 [1998] R.P.C. 423. 
879 Ibid, at 438-439. 
880 [2009] EWHC 6 (Pat); [2009] F.S.R. 8.  
881 See for definition in Loughlan P ‘Of Patents and Professors: Intellectual Property, Research Works and 
Universities’ (1996) E.I.P.R. 345, at p.346; also Eisenberg, n.866, at p.230. 
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German court held that, experiment constitute to gain the information and to carry out 
scientific research into the subject matter of the invention including its use is also persuasive. 
Experiment also includes checking statement made in the patent or to obtain further research 
results relating to the invention or for a wider research purposes including commercial 
information relating to the invention. If the purpose is mixed other purposes, the court 
considers the preponderant purposes of the conduct.  
 
4.6.1.2 Acts done for industrial or commercial purpose 
 
It is clear that infringing acts are done for “industrial or commercial” purposes. In Smith 
Kline & French Laboratories Limited v Evans Medical Limited882 Evans claimed that their 
experiment was done for private and non-commercial purpose to produce evidence for 
amendment proceedings. However, the experiment provided useful information which could 
have commercial. Aldous LJ considered that the court is required to consider the purpose of 
the alleged infringing act and then decide whether that purpose was commercial or not. The 
difficulty arises to determine acts done primarily for purposes which are not commercial, but 
having a commercial benefit. In this case, Evans contended the only purpose of their 
experiment was private, but admitted that in carrying out those experiments they may have 
acquired information which would be of commercial use to them. The court has to consider 
what the purposes of the acts whether commercial or non-commercial and this was a 
subjective test. If there was a dual purpose, there would be infringement. If, however, all the 
purposes were not commercial, the fact that knowledge gained could and might be of 
commercial benefit would not preclude the act from falling within the exception and 
therefore, was not an infringement. As observed in Mosanto and Clinical Trials I, the 
commercial nature or commercial intent of an activity does not, within reason affect the 
assessment of whether or not it is undertaken for experimental purposes. In Clinical Trials II, 
it was observed that commercial orientation does not from the outset turn the experimental 
activity into an impermissible infringement.  
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4.6.1.3 Experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention 
 
In Smith Kline & French Laboratories Limited v Evans Medical Limited883 Aldous LJ has 
rejected the argument that the words “relating to the subject matter of the invention” should 
be construed narrowly with the intention to exclude experiments directed to the commercial 
exploitation of the invention. Aldous LJ considered the decision in the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Micro-Chemicals Ltd v Smith Kline and French Inter-American Ltd884 that the 
experimental activity relating to subject matter of the invention was “a limited experiment to 
establish whether the experiment could manufacture a quality product commercially in 
accordance with the specification of a patent”.885 Aldous LJ summarised that section 
60(5)(b) involves acts done for experimental purposes, which may include the act done with 
a commercial end in view; and the acts must have a real and direct connection with the 
claimed subject matter.886  
 
How to determine the subject matter of the invention was decided in Auchiloss and Anor v 
Agricultural and Veterinary Supplies Limited and Ors887 where the court examined that “the 
subject matter of the invention must be ascertained from the patent as a whole”.888 In 
Germany, the Federal Supreme Court in Clinical Trials I889 has concluded that the 
experiment must itself relates to the subject matter of the invention, but the defence did not 
permit the invention in question to be used within the framework of an experiment relating to 
different subject matter. The Court pointed out that:  
“since the Patents Act excepts from the effect of the patent, without other limitation, all acts for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention, the permissibility of such 
experiments cannot depend on further purposes for which they are undertaken ...”.890 
 
In Clinical Trials II, the exception applied regardless of the purpose for which these results 
would ultimately be used. As the exception provides a broader scope of the concept of 
experiment, the provision requires that the experiment must be related to the object of the 
                                                          
883 [1989] F.S.R. 513. 
884 (1971) 25 DLR 79, at 89 
885 [1989] F.S.R. 513, at 522.. 
886 Ibid, at 523. 
887 [1997] R.P.C. 649 (Pat); [1999] RPC 397 (CA). 
888 Ibid, at 406. 
889 [1997] R.P.C. 623. 
890 Ibid, at 645. 
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patented invention and “it follows from this that the object of the invention must itself be the 
object of the experimental activities for the purpose of obtaining results”.891 
 
These two cases (Clinical Trials I and II) establish the principle the experiment is exempted 
from patent infringement although with the commercial aim, and this commercial aim does 
not prohibit the operation of the true experimentation. This broader principle is narrowed by 
the restriction provided under second limb i.e. that the experiment must relate to the subject 
matter of invention.892 These decision from the German Federal Supreme Court is perceived 
as the direction that to be followed in the European Community.893  
 
It is interesting to note that much of the concern of exception arises in the context of patents 
to research tools, for example in protecting various discoveries relating to gene sequences or 
biological receptors.894 It is inevitable that almost every research activity involves the use of 
research tools and provided that such use is a tool for researching into something different it 
will not be covered under the exception in the UK/Europe.895 Eisenberg observes that using 
an invention for its intended purpose and experimenting on it is consistent with the principle 
of patent law in balancing the rights of the parties involves and points out that “if the public 
had absolutely no right to use the disclosure without the patent holder's consent until after 
the patent expired, it would make little sense to require that the disclosure be made freely 
available to the public at the outset of the patent term”.896 In Australia, there was 
recommendation made by the Australian Government Advisory Council on Intellectual 
Property897 of following the European wording of the exception as well as the TRIPS which 
relates to “do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent”.898 Cook 
argues that this reflects the concern on research tool patents, and observes that this concern 
failed to consider the critical role in context of the “in relation to the subject matter of the 
                                                          
891 [1998] R.P.C. 423, at 431. 
892 Cook T ‘A European Perspectives as to the Extent to Which Experimental Use, and Certain Other, Defences 
to Patent Infringement, Apply to Differing Types of Research’, A Report for the Intellectual Property Institute, 
(London: Bird & Bird, July 2006) at p.29. 
893 Ibid, see also Cornish, n.857, at p.753. 
894 Cook, n.892, at p.125. 
895 Ibid, at p.126. 
896 Eisenberg, n.861, p.1017. 
897 Advisory Council on Intellectual Property “Patents and Experimental Use” Oct, 2005 available at 
http://www.acip.gov.au/library/acip%20patents%20&%20experimental%20use%20final%20report%20final.pdf 
, visited on 5 February 2012 (ACIP). 
898 Ibid, at p.61. 
165 
 
invention” as in the European provision.899 Cook suggests that whether experimentation on 
or experimentation using the research tool, it would be better to consider a particular research 
tool in issue, rather than research tools as a class.900 Thus, according to Cook, if patented 
research tools are an impediment to research, rather than amend the exception defence, he 
suggests to follow the Swiss model by the introduction of compulsory licence of the use only 
of patented biological research tools.901 The advantage of this approach is that it would not 
apply to the manufacture and supply of the research tools by competitors of the research tool 
patentee, and by the actual use of the research tool it would not deprive the research tool 
patent of value.902  
 
4.6.1.4 Act done privately 
 
The scope has been observed by the court in Smith Kline & French Laboratories Limited v 
Evans Medical Limited.903 In this case the patentees owned three patents relating to drugs 
known as cimetidine.  Evans, one of the applicants for licences, purported to carry out 
experiment to one of the patent, i.e., on polymorph patent. The patentees claimed for 
infringement. In determining whether the act done privately under section 60(5)(a) of the PA 
1977, Aldous LJ stated that: 
“This word [privately] appears to me to be used as the opposite of “publicly” and to be used in the 
sense of denoting that the act was done for the person’s own use. This constructions of the word 
“privately” is consistent with the rest of the subsection which provides that even if the acts are 
done privately in the sense of for the person’s own use, there will be infringement if the acts are 
done for commercial purposes”.
904 
 
The principle that can be derived from this case was that, the “act done privately” and with 
commercial purposes will not be covered. This is equally reflected to the conjunctive “and” 
used under section 60(5) (b) PA 1977. To determine that the “act done privately” is exempted 
from patent infringement, the defendant must show the act done was not for commercial 
                                                          
899 Thus, Australia excludes from the scope of the defence the normal exploitation of research tools inventions, 
but the defence applies to any other invention such as research into a research tool invention in order to 
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900 Ibid, at p.127. 
901 Cook, n.892, at p.127. 
902 Ibid. 
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purposes. Cook observes “private and non-commercial use” is actually attracted of little 
debate because it entails no difficulty to interpret.905 Whereas in Malaysia “acts done for 
industrial or commercial purposes” arguably means that any private acts which are not 
deemed not to be acts done for industrial or commercial purposes are covered under the 
exception. Thus, private acts or public acts for research or educational purposes will be 
exempted from infringement; so long they do not have predominantly industrial or 
commercial purposes. However, Gowers suggested that the used of “private” is problematic 
and insufficient especially in the universities context as they are increasingly conducting 
research in collaboration with other organisations, and was concerned that publicly funded 
research may not qualify for the exception.906 Moreover, in today’s situation, it is difficult to 
find the purely academic institution without commercial involvement.907 This is true 
especially for nanotechnology that almost always arises in the university’s research 
collaborations using publicly funded research and the investments are huge in 
nanotechnology development908 thus “private” may be difficult to satisfy and it is unlikely 
that the acts will not involve the element of industrial or commercial purposes.  
 
4.6.1.5 The approach of for experimental nanotechnology 
 
What could be the most appropriate approach for experimental nanotechnology? The right 
balance of the interested parties needs to be struck, so that it encourages commercial benefits 
and also promotes technological progress.909 Based on practices, the trend of scope of 
experimental use defence has adopted the narrow structure, i.e. that exemption only for 
‘purely’ experimental activity.910 However, this situation is less relevant in the current 
                                                          
905 Cook, n.892, at p.18. 
906 Gowers, n. 863, at 4.10. 
907 Bor F ‘Exemptions to Patent Infringement Applied to Biotechnology Research Tools’ (2006) E.I.P.R. 5, at 
p.12; The emphasis of changing university’s structure from purely academic to commercialization, see for 
example in Sani R ‘Commercialising Research to Boost Innovation’ 10 August 2009, News Straits Times, 
available at 
http://technu.nst.com.my/Current_News/techNu/Monday/TechTalk/20090810102007/Article/index_html; 
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910 Di Cataldo V The Experimental Use of the Patented Invention: A Free Use or An Infringing Use? in Prinz zu 
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situation of research institutions like universities. This has been pointed out by Cornish, who 
emphasises that nowadays trends of the research are not merely focused on the academics, 
but the structure has moved to a more commercialised oriented, including the collaborative 
commercial research.911 Some commentators, for example Eisenberg warns that too narrow 
interpretation for the experimental exemption might block the development of a new 
technology and too broad scope of the application of the defence might cause the industries 
to rely on secrecy rather than patent protection.912 She emphasises that the balance of the 
interested parties such as the research user, the public and scientific community need to be 
taken into consideration to promote the knowledge and “without an experimental use 
defense, it is possible that no one would be able to build on the inventor’s discovery until the 
patent expired”.913  
 
Reflecting Eisenberg view, Article 30 of the TRIPS provides criteria for granting the 
defence, which states that: 
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided 
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties”. 
 
The scope of Article 30 is difficult to determine; it resembles Article 9(2) of the Berne, 
which is a kind of three steps test for copyright.914 Article 30’s three criteria (as underline 
above) are cumulative. 
 
It is arguably that it is limited exception under Article 30 that the rights for the patentee’s is 
only allowed to be curtailed under specific circumstances for experimental purposes.915 The 
“normal exploitation” refers to that an exception is not allowed if the exploitation is likely to 
have a considerable importance.916 Thus, for example a research tools in the normal 
                                                          
911 Cornish, n.857, at p.752.  
912 However she admits that it is impossible to avoid of these potential problems entirely, Eisenberg, n.866, at 
p.224. 
913 Ibid, at pp.224-225. 
914 Gervais, n.222, at p.380. Article 9(2) of the Berne states that “it shall be a matter for legislation in the 
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interest of the author”. 
915 ACIP, n. 897, at p.21. 
916 Gervais, n.222, at p.240. 
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exploitation includes acts done for experimental purposes, and exception would need to 
exclude from its scope.917 The word “taking into account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties” may seem to broaden the scope of exception than that under Berne.918 This 
legitimate interest means that conforming to or sanctioned to or authorised by law or 
principle.919  Acts done for research, experimentation or education purposes relating to the 
invention without having industrial or commercial element will be covered under Article 30 
since it is unlikely to be unreasonably prejudiced the interest of the patent owner.  
 
In determining the appropriate scope of the experimental use defence for nanotechnology, it 
is desirable to observe various approaches for the scope of the defence to be applied, as 
follows:  
(a) narrower scope - restrictive and consistent with the function of the patent law.920 
(b) broader scope - to encourage the progress of the technology.921 
(c) balance the interest of the competing policies – liberal approach where the effect of 
the experimental activity on the incentives policy is minimal, and strict approach 
where the experimental of a patented inventions would only contribute small to a 
progress of the research.922 
(d) amend the exception – to clarify research exception to facilitate experimentation, 
innovation and education modelling Swiss model of research exception.923 The 
clarification is important to enable researchers to examine, learn from and improve 
upon inventions.924 
(e) flexible approach – This serves the purpose in encouraging improvement to patented 
inventions and the law needs to be flexible to adapt with new technologies and 
                                                          
917 ACIP, n.897, at p.21. 
918 Gervais, n.222, at p.380. 
919 Ibid, at p.240.  
920 Karp, n.856, at p.2170. 
921 Feit, n.865, at p.822. 
922 Gilat, n.858, at p.17. 
923 Gowers, n. 863, at para 4.12; Swiss model of research exception reads as follows: The effects of a patent do 
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experimental and research purposes in order to obtain knowledge about the object of the invention, including its 
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development of  a plant variety; (f) to biological material obtained in the field of agriculture which was due to 
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924 Ibid, at para 4.11. 
169 
 
uses.925 The exception should not have too broad which would deprive the whole 
value of patents, nor should be too narrow because there are other solutions that are 
potentially targeted the specific issues and business practices such as competition law 
remedies, compulsory licensing, or compulsory licensing tailored to the use only 
certain research tool as modelled from Swiss approach.926 
 
Having informed of the advantages and disadvantage of too broad and too narrow scope of 
the exception, this study strongly argues that the scope for exception should be applied 
flexible to nanotechnology. The reason being that since nanotechnology is still new, 
emerging and multidisciplinary - narrowing the scope would impede the development of 
nanotechnology research development, whilst broadening the scope would deprive the value 
of the patent.927 Furthermore, the principle of exception has to consider the interest of the 
parties (the patentee, the researcher and the public) in line with the aim of patent law in 
promoting the development of the technology, as exemplified in Clinical Trials I928 and 
Clinical Trials II.929 Since Malaysia exception does not mention in “relation to the subject 
matter of invention” this may provide better position to nanotechnology i.e. any scientific 
research would be covered under the exception as long as it does not have the industrial or 
commercial purposes.  
 
4.6.2 Prior user right 
 
The novelty is destroyed by prior disclosure of the invention to the public. However, prior to 
the patent filing, other than the applicant himself, there might be other person who has 
already making, using or keeping the invention secretly. This person, if he carries the act in 
good faith and has made a serious preparation to use the invention, may use the defence of 
                                                          
925 Bor, n.907, at p.14. 
926 Cook T ‘Responding to Concerns about the Scope of the Defence from Patent Infringement for Acts Done 
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928 [1997] R.P.C. 623, at 643. 
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prior user rights. This situation allows the prior user right to legally continue the exploitation 
of the invention which would normally an infringing act.930 In applying the defence, the 
interested parties involvement must be maintained, that the right granted to continue the use 
of the invention will not jeopardise the rights of the patentee and at the same time to preserve 
the interest of the prior user.  
 
Having said this, prior user right has been referred to as “in the middle of the imaginary 
trade-secret-patent spectrum” because it recognises to choose trade secret commercial use in 
substitution of a patent right with an acceptable limitation on the risk.931 Nanotechnology 
may involve this more on the process side,932 prior use of a process is more likely to remain 
secret than, say, the manufacture of a patented product. Thus, the scope of prior user right 
may become more problematic for process inventions.933 
 
4.6.2.1 Statutory protection  
 
Compared to other litigations, although most countries have the provision of prior user 
right,934 it has been observed that prior user rights rarely are litigated.935 This may lead to 
“double-barrelled assumption” that either the clauses are not important therefore the case 
                                                          
930 Kupferschmid K M ‘Prior User Rights: The Inventor’s Lottery Ticket’ (1993) 21 A.I.P.L.A. Q. J. 213, at 
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Patent an Invention?’ (1990) 2 Intellectual Prop. in Bus. 13, at 14.  
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Takenaka T ‘Harmony with the Rest of the World? The American Invent Act’ (2012) J.I.P.L.P Vol. 7, No.1, 4, 
at p.5.  
935 See for example Kupferschmid, n.930, at p.233; see also Neukom which gives the number prior user rights 
litigation in France and West Germany, at n.934, p.166; See also Osterborg L ‘Towards a Harmonised Prior 
User Right within a Common Market System’ (1981) 12 I.I.C. 447 states that in 1960s and 1970s, only four 
cases involving prior user right in France, and in Italy there was no cases on prior user rights because Italy 
adopted prior user right in their provision in 1979, at pp.456-458.  
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arise is little, or the clauses do not properly work and therefore fail to work as significant role 
of the defence.936 Furthermore, the provision of the prior user right is still ambiguous.937 
However, this does not necessary means that the prior user rights are not important. Prior 
user rights are significant in safeguarding the investment made by the prior user and 
developing local industries938 because the absence of the prior user right as pointed out by 
Neukom “effectively penalises domestic industry vis-a-vis foreign competitors by deciding 
against it”.939 This is because on the basis of fairness, prior user rights will ensure that their 
investment will not be destroyed when the patentee patented his invention.940 In terms of 
economic theory justification, Harriel argues that if the prior user is prevented from 
continuing his commercial effort, this would unlikely stimulate his individual motivation and 
hinder the commercial viability of the activity.941 
 
The international protection for prior user right is protected under Article 4B of Paris which 
reserves the right to the domestic legislation to make provision concerning prior user rights.  
This provision granted the right acquired by the third parties before the date of the first 
application that serves as the basis for the right of priority. This right granted to the person to 
continue the infringing activity commenced before the priority date. It is argued that Article 
30 of the TRIPS also covers prior user rights.942 
 
In Malaysia, prior user rights refer that at the priority date of the patent application, the 
person in good faith has made serious preparations towards making the product or using the 
process which is the subject of the invention claimed in the application.943 The right of prior 
user includes the right to exploit the patented invention. The right is qualified by the proviso 
which states the product made or the process made by the person in Malaysia has the 
territorial effect. This safeguards the local right from local infringement, and this is not 
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explicit in the UK.944 The rights shall not be assigned or transmitted except as part of the 
business of the person concerned.945 
 
In the UK, section 64 of the PA 1977 provides that where a patent is granted for an invention, 
a person, in the UK before the priority date of the invention does in good faith an act which 
would constitute an infringement if it were in force.946 Alternatively, the person makes in 
good faith effective and serious preparation to do such act, has the right to continue to do the 
act, but the right does not extend to granting a licence to another person to do the act.947 If the 
act was done or the preparations were made in the course of business, the person is entitled to 
the right may authorise the doing of act by any of his partners for the time being in the 
business and he may assign the right or transmit the right to any person who acquires the part 
of the business in the course of which the act was done or the preparations were made.948 
 
4.6.2.1.1 Acting in good faith of making the product or using the process  
 
Although the provision is silent as to the meaning of good faith, nonetheless there is not 
problematic to determine whether the act is in good faith or bad faith. For example, if the 
prior user has independently obtained the information and has created the invention, he is 
said to act in good faith. However, if he is unlawfully or fraudulently obtained information, 
for example by way of breach of confidence he is acting in bad faith. To determine good faith 
or bad faith is rather complicated when the research involves a team. This is particularly 
important for nanotechnology invention, if one or more has left the team, good faith may be 
difficult to prove. In Kakkar v Szelker949 the two research units from England and Swedish 
had jointly collaborated research project on anticongulant materials. In this case it was 
showed that a team member had filed a patent without the others. The court had no 
jurisdiction to determine the constructive trust claims involving a team because the patent 
                                                          
944 See also in the context of traditional knowledge, prior user right has been recognized with respect to the 
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2005/07 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=838107 accessed on 29 June 2010. 
945 Section 38(2) PA 1983. 
946 Section 64(1)(a) PA 1977. 
947 Section 64(1((b) PA 1977. 
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was proceeding in the EPO. Thus, in a team member like nanotechnology research projects, 
as this case expounded, it is very difficult to determine the element of good faith.  
 
4.6.2.1.2 Serious preparation of making the product or using the process in Malaysia 
 
The judicial interpretation of this limb is very limited.950 There is no meaning provided of the 
words “serious preparation”. The prior user must show that he has made “serious 
preparation”; and whether sufficient for him to show that he has in possession of the 
invention?951 This is not the case since serious preparation requires more than a mere 
possession of the invention. Therefore, mere attempt to solve a certain problem or mere 
knowledge of an invention are insufficient to invoke prior user right defence.952 In 
nanotechnology, serious preparation may include huge investment in buying the appropriate 
tools such as AFM or STM. These nanotechnology research tools are important to measure 
the surface and the quantities of electrical, magnetic and chemical properties of the products 
or processes. Serious preparation in nanotechnology may also include the methods of 
fabrication and characterisation of materials, such as using top-down and bottom-up 
approach to construct advanced products at the atomic precision. The cost incurred, the time 
spent, and preparing for such exploitation should be taken into consideration in determining 
whether the act is serious preparation.953 In case of developing aerogel from rice husk serious 
preparation would include anything related to the physical or technical preparation such as 
making and buying the relevant equipment to be used as nanoscale or developing and using 
silica from rice husk. Another example in lab-on-chip analysis for DNA, serious preparation 
includes making and buying the relevant nanoscale tools and equipment which might be 
related to the medical or getting the materials ready for example by matching the DNA 
sample. 
 
                                                          
950 See for example Cohen and Davies, n.937, at p.240. 
951 For example Osterborg points out that under France law, prior user right arises by merely possessing the 
invention, n.935, at p.448. 
952 Kupferschmid, n.930, at p.237, cited Brown-Bridge Mills Inc v Eastern Fine Paper Inc, 700 F.2d 759, 765-
766, 217 U.S.P.Q. 651, at 657 (5th Cir. 1983) that requires for the actual reduction of the invention into practice. 
This often involves the physical construction of the invention and testing of the invention to determine its 
intended purposes. 
953 With similar view, see Kupferschmid, n.930, at pp.249-250. 
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Under UK law, it requires that the prior user has made “serious and effective preparations” 
to do “an act which would be infringing if it was carried out after the grant of patent”. This 
means that if before the priority date, any non-commercial activities may not be able to 
invoke the prior user right defence to commercialise later, unless and otherwise he can prove 
that he has made effective and serious preparation of the acts. However, since there is no 
such provision under Malaysian law, it is not prevented the defendant to rely on the prior 
user right if his prior non-commercial use to be transformed into the commercial use later.  
 
The court’s decision on serious preparation can be seen in Helitune Ltd. v Stewart Hughes 
Ltd954 which concerned a patent related to a method of detecting the degree of unbalance of 
helicopter rotor blades using an “active system”. In this case the defendant alleged that he 
had carried out acts before the priority date of the patent and had made serious and effective 
preparation to do such acts, therefore was entitled to continue the acts under the defence.  
The court rejected the defence because at the priority date of the patent the defendant was 
only developing passive tracking and was not making preparation to transform the tracker 
into a product. In determining what constitutes “effective and serious preparation”, Aldous J 
considered that: 
“At the priority date of the patent, the defendant had not sold an active tracker. It had, however, 
produced a prototype of an active tracker using a laser with a view to its further development. The 
position had not been reached where the defendant had decided to sell active trackers, and by the 
priority date its efforts were concentrated on producing a passive tracker. I do not believe the 
defendant had reached the stage of making effective and serious preparations to sell an active 
tracker, and, therefore, section 64 does not give it a defence to the action”.955  
 
4.6.2.1.3 Exploitation of the patented invention 
 
The exploitation of the rights includes in the case of product by making, importing, offering 
for sale, selling and using the product;956 and in the case of process the exploitation includes 
using the process, and a product obtained by means of the process. The question arises here is 
                                                          
954 [1991] F.S.R. 171. 
955 Ibid, at 208. 
956 Section 36(3)(a) PA 1983. 
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to what extent the scope of exploitation957, including improvement or modification is allowed 
to the prior user? Aldous J in Helitune Ltd v Stewart Hughes Ltd958 stated that the acts of 
infringing are only referred under section 60 of the PA 1977. Therefore, the person has the 
right to continue carried out the act although the product or process may be different to some 
degree. The court also stated that if the person used an infringing process, and after the 
priority date he has altered the process, this act did not amount to an infringement. In this 
case, the effective and serious preparations are not limited to the act of the same types, but it 
may extent to a different degree. In Helitune, it was suggested that “the act even though to 
the product and process may be different to some degree” would assume that it is 
significantly covered from macro-scale to the nanoscale. If this construction is correct, this 
suggest that prior user, say, a specific geometry at macro scale might be permitted under the 
defence to diversify into nanoscale. However, this act does not extend him to expand to the 
other technology as Laddie J determined in Lubrizol Corp. and anor v Esso Petroleum Co. 
Ltd959 by stating that: 
“The act which the alleged infringer is entitled to continue to conduct by virtue of section 64(2) is 
the act which he was committing before the priority date. It is that specific act of commerce which 
he is entitled to continue. I have difficulty in accepting that by, for example, manufacturing 
product A before the priority date, he was thereby given a right to manufacture any product after 
the priority date. In my view, section 64 is intended to safeguard the existing commercial activity 
of a person in the United Kingdom which is overtaken by the subsequent grant of a patent. It is 
not meant to be a charter allowing him to expand into other products and other processes”.
960 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the challenges that nanotechnology posed to the current patentability 
requirements. The mere down-scaling an invention into nano-size did not automatically 
confer patentability. However, nano-range was not only the size that matter, but the property 
has also changed, which could confer patentability. It set out that in nanotechnology, the 
person skilled in the art involved various fields according to the fields that they are working; 
                                                          
957 The word “exploitation” may extent the right to a non-commercial nature which Kupferschimd argues that it 
is highly relevant to the university for its non-manufacturing nature, which should not be treated differently 
from larger corporations, n.930, at p.239.  However, this contention is doubtful, since the current nature of the 
university has changed to promote for commercialisation.  
958 [1991] F.S.R. 171. 
959 [1992] R.P.C. 281, Hugh Laddie QC sitting as Patent Court Council.  
960 Ibid, at 295. 
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in team of individuals, it proved difficult to identify the correct individuals or teams. 
Nanotechnology could also potentially pose risk to the environment within the concept of 
morality and public order. This gave consideration to the patent office to weigh on the 
commercial exploitation and other aspects in considering whether the invention could be 
environmentally damaging.  
 
The multidisciplinary and no commonly accepted terminology of nanotechnology led to the 
technical and administrative issues including classification and monitoring system. The 
patent office such as EPO and USPTO has introduced the tagging system for nanotechnology 
classification. It was recognised that the patent examiners were unable to understand 
nanotechnology. For this reason, the team approach should be adopted representing their 
different fields.   
 
For joint ownership within a team of individuals, it was less problematic to determine the 
right of ownership of the invention, but not between different teams of people, and the 
agreement should be made in advance to clearly state the right of ownership. The issue 
became more pressing the contract of employment. It was suggested to state the ownership 
rights in the form of written agreement. In the absence of any agreement, the issue become 
even more complex in the collaborative works like nanotechnology. The statutory employee 
compensation scheme was seen undesirable because it was granted on the individual basis 
and it was difficult to determine “outstanding benefit” in team approach like nanotechnology.  
 
This chapter concluded that experimental defence and prior user right are more problematic 
to be applied for nanotechnology. For experimental use defence, it was recognised that the 
flexible approach should be adopted in considering the emerging technology like 
nanotechnology to encourage commercial benefit and promote technological development. 
For prior user right, it was found difficult to identify the element of good faith and to 
determine effective and serious preparations of the acts.  
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CHAPTER 5  
COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGNS PROTECTION FOR 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the law of confidence and patent law both provide 
important protection for nanotechnology. However, other IPRs may be applicable to 
nanotechnology,961 including Copyright, Designs and Trade Marks. This chapter questions to 
what extent these forms of IP are applicable to nanotechnology and what problems are posed 
by nanotechnology.   
 
5.2 COPYRIGHT AND NANOTECHNOLOGY  
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
Copyright protects a wide range of subject matter or ‘works’. As regards nanotechnology, it 
has been suggested that a molecular architecture of nanotechnology may be protected under 
Canadian copyright law, though probably not as a sculpture or work of artistic craftsmanship, 
but may be as a work of architecture.962 Works must be within categories of protectable 
subject matter specified under Malaysian Copyright Act 1987 (CA 1987) and UK Copyright 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988). They must also meet the requirement of 
originality and expression in material form. This section examines: 
(a) are nano-creations “works”?  
(b) are nano-creations artistic or literary works?  
(c) could nano-structures in two dimensional designs protect three-dimensional nano-
structure objects?  
 
                                                          
961 Interviewee C and D. 
962 see Abe K L ‘Nanotechnology Law: The Legal Issues’, paper presented at the 2005 ICE Technology 
Conference, Edmonton, 8 November 2005) at 
http://www.fasken.com/web/fmdwebsite.nsf/AllDocSearch/3BD4F7125D39AD5B852570BB0080ABCD/$File/
NANOTECHNOLOGY.PDF, accessed on 26 October 2009; the same author in 
http://www.slideshare.net/lisaabe/nanotechnology-law-the-legal-issues, accessed on 14 April 2012.  
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5.2.2 International attitudes of protection for nano-creations 
 
 Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works963 
1886 (Berne) reads: 
“The expression ‘literary and artistic works’ shall include every production in the literary, 
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as 
books, pamphlets and other writings; ... works of drawing, painting, architecture [included 
only since the Berlin Act of 1908], sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic 
works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; 
works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works 
relative to geography, topography, architecture or science. [emphasis added]”. 
 
Could a nano-creation be a “production” or “work” in the context of Berne? “Production” has 
never been defined but it seems that the work must come into existence before the copyright 
protection is granted.964 At least in general nano-structures presuppose a “production in the 
scientific domain”. Berne applies to all productions related to literary, scientific and artistic 
domains. Gervais observed that the non-exhaustive list was progressively broadened,965 and 
this contention does not make it impossible to include nano-creations that related to writings, 
drawings, architecture, works of applied art, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to 
science.  
 
Schricker has also stated “it does not seem totally superfluous to try to develop some ideas 
about copyright protection for scientific creations”966 but goes on to say that “strengthening 
the copyright position of scientific works seems far from feasible and even appears 
anachronistic”.967 The position is described by Ricketson in the following terms:-  
“The boundaries propounded here as to what is to be protected are broad but nonetheless 
distinct-namely “productions in the literary, scientific and artistic domain”. While the 
adjective “scientific” is somewhat mysterious, it seems that it was not intended to extend 
to such things as inventions and discoveries--the province of patents--but rather as a 
                                                          
963 1971 revision with 1979 amendments. 
964 Ricketson S and Ginsburg J International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond (Oxford: OUP, 2006), at para 8.03.  
965 Gervais, n.222, at p.222; the list acts only illustrative part of the literary, artistic and scientific domains, 
Ricketson and Ginsburg, n.964, at para 8.01. 
966 Schricker G Protection of Scientific Creations Under Patent and Copyright Law in Prinz zu und Pyrmont W 
et al (eds) Patents and Technological Progress in a Globalised World: Liber Amicorum Joseph Straus (Berlin: 
Springer, 2009), at p.60. 
967 Ibid, at pp.63-64. 
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description to capture works relating to scientific matters or of a scientific character (as in 
the listed examples of “illustrations, geographical charts, plans, sketches and plastic 
works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science”).968 
 
This suggests that at least the scientific works mentioned may protect some aspects of 
nanotechnology. However, there are several stumbling blocks for nanotechnology in 
copyright. First, copyright law may not protect scientific creations if they are mere ideas or 
abstractions without further elaboration,969 for example mere ideas about structures for 
carbon-nanotubes, dendrimers, or DNA motors.  
 
Article 9(2) of TRIPS states that “copyright protection shall extend to expressions970 and not 
to ideas, procedures, method of operations or mathematical concepts as such”. As it relates 
to scientific productions, TRIPS only excludes the ideas “as such”, which could give WTO 
Member States certain discretion in dealing with scientific creations.971 Based on this 
discussion, Berne and TRIPS do not expressly exclude protection for nano-works; however, 
with new creations we may expect some new questions as regards to the availability and 
scope of copyright protection.972 It will be assumed that since there is no clear provision to 
exclude the protection of “nano-works”, the creation of “nano-works” may be protected 
under existing copyright laws if the work is original.  
 
Secondly, a “work” needs to be identified under national laws. This could either be the nano-
structure itself, or drawings or writings relating to it; to this we turn next.  
                                                          
968 Ricketson S ‘Threshold Requirements for Copyrights Protection under the International Conventions’ (2009) 
W.I.P.O. Journal 51, at p.54; See further Ricketson and Ginsburg, n.964 at para 8.06. 
969 Schricker, n.966, at pp.61-62. All of these scientific ideas, theories or common terminology must be 
expressed because they are highly useful in scientific works, Gienas K ‘Scientific Works: Another Dimension 
of Copyright Protection’ (2008) J.I.P.L.P. Vol 3, 801, at p.80. In Anya v Wu [2004] All E.R (D) 413, Dr Anya 
claimed that the defendants without acknowledging him as the author of the original ideas had published papers, 
in breach of the, original right of attribution.  Lewison J struck out the claim and examined that the purpose of 
the moral rights were concerned to the attribution of the author and were not grant any credit for anyone 
providing an intellectual “assist”. On appeal Neuberger L.J emphasized that pure scientific ideas behind 
scientific papers are not protectable under copyright law [2004] EWCA Civ 755, at para 8; See comments on 
this case at http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2004/02/no-moral-rights-for-non-authors.html; and 
http://www.mwe.com/info/news/euroip0304.pdf , both accessed on 14 April 2012. 
970 The “expression” may include all forms of expression and may be synonym to the “literary and artistic 
works” under the Berne, Gervais, n.222, at p.222. 
971 Schricker, n.966, at p.62. 
972 Gervais, n.222, at p.221. 
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5.2.3 Nano-creations  
 
Different types of original work are protected provided they are within the categories 
specified in the Malaysian and UK Copyright Acts,973 as well as meeting the requirements of 
originality and expression in material form.974 Copyright-protected works include literary, 
artistic, musical and dramatic and other works such as sound recordings, films, broadcasts, 
and performer’s rights.
975 The presumption can be made that the categories of work most 
relevant to nanotechnology are artistic and literary works. It is argued that, although these 
two categories may be relevant, protection may be very difficult to establish. 
 
5.2.3.1 Nano-creations in artistic works 
 
The various types of artistic work include graphic work, photograph, sculpture or collage, 
work of architecture, and work of artistic craftsmanship.976 There is no clear meaning of what 
constitutes an “artistic work”. It has been suggested that the words should be construed 
according to their ordinary meaning, mainly produced for aesthetic quality.977 The term 
“artistic” should be defined to include something that is visually significant which the public 
wish to acquire because of its visual appearance978 as evidenced in Interlego AG v Tyco 
Industries Inc979 where drawings were held not to be original artistic works because there was 
no visually significant alteration or modification to earlier drawings. Therefore, as compared 
to literary works, artistic works are viewed and appreciated in a visual sense.980 This may 
seem problematic to apply to nanotechnology, although nano-structures may be rendered 
visible through use of imaging apparatus. Whether nano-creations are works of architecture, 
artistic craftsmanship, sculpture and graphic works, are discussed below. 
                                                          
973 It was held in Creation Records v News Group Newspapers [1997] E.M.L.R. 444 that photo shoot scene was 
not  within any recognised category of work; the categories indicate that the works are protectable type, Pila J 
‘Copyright and its Categories of Original Works’ (2010) O.J.L.S. 229, at p.242.  
974 For  interesting observation whether fixation is always required  for material form see Adeney E Unfixed 
Works, Performers' Protection, and Beyond: Does The Australian Copyright Act Always Require Material 
Form? (2009) I.P.Q. 77; but since nanostructures materials are material this may not be relevant. 
975 Section 7(1) CA 1987; Section 1 CDPA 1988. 
976 Section 3 CA 1987; section 4(1) CDPA 1988. 
977 Azmi I M ‘Slurry Pump and the Obscurity of Artistic Works’ (1994) E.I.P.R. 123, at p.125 further suggests 
that any works under artistic works category must be characterized as artistic within the fine arts sense. 
978 See for example, Torremans, n.200, at p.188; Laddie H et al The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs 3rd 
edn (London: Butterworths, 2000), at p.195. 
979 [1989] A.C. 217 at 266. 
980 Ricketson and Ginsburg, n.964, p.436; see also Colston and Galloway, n.217, at p.305. 
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5.2.3.1.1 Nano-creations in works of architecture 
 
In nanotechnology, are molecular or atomic structures protectable as architectural works 
under copyright? The example could be the architectural designs of nanotubes, or buckyball. 
A work of architecture includes a building or a model for a building.981 The “building” 
includes any fixed structure or part.982 Architectural plans, drawings, models are protected 
under copyright law.983 As mentioned above, molecular architecture of nanotechnology may 
be protected under Canadian copyright law.984 Berne does not define what constitutes “work 
of architecture”. Ricketson and Ginsburg consider it is not confined to buildings but extends 
to other structures that are fixed to the ground such as monuments, arches, fountains, and 
steps.985 The work of architecture may also be a “fixed structure” which may be carried out 
on site or erected and fixed there, any fixed structure may include for example such as a 
landscape garden.986   
 
Although the phrase ‘irrespective of artistic quality’ in section 3(a)/4(1)(a) does not apply to 
architectural works under 3(b)/4(1)(b), it has been suggested that works of architecture do not 
require “fine art quality” 987 or “aesthetic judgment”988 in order to qualify for copyright. The 
main problem, however, is the requirement that the structure be “fixed”. If this means “of 
fixed shape”, then nano-structures would qualify. However, if it means “fixed to the ground”, 
as indicated by Ricketson and Ginsburg i.e. “non-portable”, then architectural copyright 
would not be available for nano-structures. The editors of Copinger & Skone-James on 
Copyright note of the UK CDPA 1988 that, “the word fixed was intended to distinguish 
protected structures from those which were not intended to be protected, such as moveable 
engineering structures (e.g. a ship): Hansard , HL Vol.493, col.1071.”989  It was held in 
Burge v Swarbrick990 that a boat was not a work of architecture. 
 
                                                          
981 Section 3 CA 1987; section 4(1)(b) CDPA 1988. 
982 Section 4(2) CDPA 1988; section 3 CA 1987. 
983 Ricketson and Ginsburg, 964 at p.441. 
984 See n.962 above.  
985 Ricketson and Ginnsburg, n.964, at p.442. 
986 Laddie H al., n.978, at p.194. 
987 Ibid, at para 4.28. 
988 Garnett K et al. Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 15th edn, (London: S&M, 2005), at para 3-64. 
989 Ibid, para 3-63, n.7. 
990 [2007] H.C.A 17; [2007] F.S.R 27(Australia). 
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In ordinary architecture the plans and models are much smaller than the building. Would it 
matter if plans for nano were at normal scale, much bigger than the work of nano-
architecture? If by using visualising tools, it may have the potential to be protected under the 
works of architecture. If nano-structure is not a work of architecture, then there would be 
protection for the plans as ordinary drawings, but the scope of that protection would be 
limited by section 51 and 52 of the UK CDPA 1988 and section 13A and 13B of Malaysian 
equivalent. The better view is probably that nano-creations are not works of architecture 
because of the requirement of fixed sructure (fixation has its own special meaning in 
copyright).  
 
5.2.3.1.2 Nano-creations in works of artistic craftsmanship  
 
It is the most difficult task for the court to define artistic craftsmanship.991 Commentators say 
that the public should wish acquire it because of visual appearance.992 Example works of 
artistic craftsmanship include hand-painted tiles, stained glass, pottery and product of high 
class printing, bookbinding, cutlery, needlework and cabinet making.993 Is artistic quality 
required? Although the Acts are silent on artistic quality, the inclusion of “artistic” indicates 
that some artistic element is needed.994 
 
The HL in George Hensher Ltd v Restawile Upholstery (Lancs) Ltd995 decided that both 
elements of “artistic” and “craftsmanship” are important. The judges came up with different 
elaborations (as discussed below) as applied later in Merlet v Mothercare996 where Walton J 
decided that the work must be a work of art and the designer’s intention was important.  
 
                                                          
991 Dworkin G United Kingdom in Stewart S M (ed) International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights 2nd ed 
(London: Butterworths, 1989), at p.493; Torremans, 200, at p.189; see also Thomson J ‘Works of Artistic 
Craftsmanship: What is Happening in this “Formidable Area of Complexity” (2010) E.I.P.R. 113, at p.114; the 
difficulty in defining ‘artistic’ has caused great difficulty at national and international level, Sterling J A L 
World Copyright Law 2nd ed (London: S&M, 2003) at p.259. 
992 Laddie et al. n.978, at p.195; it requires manual dexterity which leads the public to acquire not because of its 
functionality, but because of its visual appearance, Torremans, n.200 at p.192. 
993 Dworkin, n.991, at p.493. 
994 See also Azmi, n.977, at p.126; Torremans, n.200, at p.189. 
995 [1976] A.C, 64. 
996 [1986] R.P.C. 115. 
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However, what sort of artistic quality is relevant in nanotechnology? Based on the court's 
decisions in Hensher and Merlet, the maker must consciously intend to create a work of art as 
emphasized by Lord Reid, Lord Morris and Lord Kilbrandon. The nano-work should be 
intended to give pleasure, satisfaction, emotional or intellectual value in the eyes of the 
public as contended by Lord Reid. Furthermore as expounded by Lord Simon, for a nano-
work to be artistic, special training, skill and knowledge is needed for the production of 
work. Lord Morris suggested that to be called “artistic” something additional and different is 
required, but did not elaborate on what was necessary. Lord Morris further added that the 
work must be viewed and judged in an objective way. Lord Kilbrandon argued that since 
“artistic” is common speech, it requires no interpretation by experts, or opinion of the public 
at large and it is for the judge to determine whether the object falls within the scope of 
common meaning of the word. For nano-structures, therefore, experts including scientists, 
technologists or lab technicians may not be helpful in determining whether the nano-works 
are artistic. In determining what constitutes “craftsmanship”, Viscount Dilhorne stated that 
the work of craftsmanship is something made by hand and not in mass production – this 
would be fatal for protection of nano-structures and stated that the presence of distinctive 
features of shape, form and finish would suffice to make the work “artistic”. Lord Simon 
however, stated that there is no requirement to equate “craftsmanship” and “hand-crafted”, 
which means that this would not disqualify the work as an object protected under law. Thus, 
as nano-structures are always produced by the help of machines, this is of particular 
relevance to nanotechnology. The phrase of “work of artistic craftsmanship” according to 
Lord Simon “implies a manifestation of pride in sound workmanship – a rejection of shoddy, 
the meretricious, the facile. … the craftsmanship – not the work itself – must in addition be 
artistic”.997  
 
However the Australian High Court has taken a different view in Burge v Swarbrick998, 
which concerned the “plug” from which a mould for a boat hull could be derived. In this case 
the Court considered that in determining whether a work is artistic craftsmanship, it did not 
depend on the beauty or aesthetic appeal of the work, but “the determination turns on 
assessing the extent to which the work’s artistic expression, in its form, is unconstrained by 
                                                          
997 1976] A.C. 64, at 89, and gave example of craftsmanship which was not artistic for instance a cobbler, a 
dental mechanic, a pattern-maker, a boilermaker, a plumber, a wheelwright and a thatcher, at 94. 
998 [2007] H.C.A. 17. 
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functional considerations”.999  The Court further determined that the expression “artistic 
craftsmanship” was not incompatible with machine production thus, a prototype like a plug 
might be considered as “work of artistic craftsmanship”.1000 The Court emphasized that there 
is “freedom of design choice”1001 and “a real or substantial artistic effort”1002 of the maker in 
devising the work of artistic craftsmanship. 1003 Thus, if nano-structures are to be considered 
as works of artistic craftsmanship, the freedom of the maker to create the designs must be 
unconstrained by functional consideration, which is likely with nanotechnology.  
 
The New Zealand High Court in Bonz Group (Pty) Ltd v Cooke1004 gave the meaning that the 
craftsman is “a person who makes something in a skilful way and takes justified pride in his 
workmanship,” whereas an artist “is a person with creative ability who produces something 
which has aesthetic appeal”.1005 Thus, to constitute artistic craftsmanship it must combine 
work of the craftsman and artist; Tipping J observed “if two or more people combine to 
design and make the ultimate product I cannot see why that ultimate product should not be 
regarded as a work of artistic craftsmanship”.1006 The approach of creative ability and 
aesthetic appeal as in Bonz was adopted by Evans-Lombe J in the UK in Vermaat (t/a Cotton 
Productions) v Boncrest Ltd (No.1).1007 He stated that designs for patchwork bedspreads and 
cushion covers did not exhibit the element of creativity, although they may be pleasing to the 
eye. Both cases demonstrate that different persons could produce the artistic element and the 
craftsmanship; so long there is a link between the two. In Shelley Films Limited v Rex 
Features Limited1008 the plaintiff claimed copyright infringement in costumes, prostheses and 
film set. The plaintiff claimed that the costumes and set as works of artistic craftsmanship, 
and the prostheses as sculpture or alternatively work of artistic craftsmanship. The court held 
that there was significant artistic and creative objective in the costumes and therefore 
copyright existed in respect of the work of artistic craftsmanship. As regards to film set, the 
court distinguished Merlet (judged in isolation of the baby, mother and the garment) but held 
                                                          
999 [2007] H.C.A. 17, at 83. 
1000 Ibid, at 59-61. 
1001 Ibid, at 75. 
1002 Ibid, at 52. 
1003 Ibid, at 59-61. 
1004 [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 216. 
1005 Ibid, Per Tipping J, at 223. 
1006 Ibid, at 223. 
1007 [2001] F.S.R. 5. 
1008 [1994] E.M.L.R. 134. 
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copyright could exist in the set made from numerous components if “imaginatively 
conceived and implemented overall as a work of artistic craftsmanship”.1009  
 
It is clear under UK law that nano-creations work are not artistic craftsmanship as observed 
under Hensher and Merlet where the intention of the designer is given more significant and 
the production made by hand. In Australia, the position is different where the extent of the 
designer’s artistic expression is unconstrained by functional consideration, this will be a 
problem for nanotechnology although artistic craftsmanship not being incompatible with 
machine production may provide a generous treatment for nano-creations. New Zealand and 
now the UK has combined the element of creative ability and aesthetic appeal which may be 
relevant for nanotechnology since nano-creations involve a team of individuals.  
 
5.2.3.1.3 Nano-creations in sculpture  
 
“Sculpture” has involved different articles for example plaster shapes of toasted sandwich 
maker1010 or a wooden model Frisbee used to make mouldings for plastic Frisbee.1011 But 
“sculpture” may not include for example plasticine models for dental impression trays1012 or 
the collection of different objects around a swimming pool,1013 or functional manufacturing 
moulds.1014 In identifying whether helmets worn by characters in a film were “sculpture”, the 
SC in Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth1015 upheld the decision of Mann J1016 and the COA1017 by 
stating that the helmet being used as prop was purely utilitarian in function for the purpose of 
the film production, and therefore was not “sculpture.”1018  It is difficult to argue after 
Lucasfilm that nano-creations are “sculpture” in the UK since utilitarian functions of the 
work are not covered. The position highlighted in Lucasfilm is likely to be followed by the 
courts in Malaysia.  
 
                                                          
1009 [1994] E.M.L.R. 134, at 143. 
1010 Falconer J in Breville Europe v Thorn EMI [1995] F.S.R. 77, at 94.  
1011 Wham-O Manufacturing Co v Lincoln Industries Ltd [1985] R.P.C. 127, at 157. 
1012 J & S Davis (Holdings) v Wright Health Group [1988] R.P.C. 403. 
1013 Creation Records v News Group [1997] E.M.L.R. 44. 
1014 Metix (UK) Limited v G H Maugham Ltd [1997] F.S.R. 718. 
1015 [2011] UKSC 39; [2012] 1 A.C 208. 
1016 [2009] F.S.R. 103, at 121. 
1017 [2010] Ch 503, 79 and 80. 
1018 [2011] UKSC 39; [2012] 1 A.C 208, at 44. 
186 
 
5.2.3.1.4 Nano-creations in graphic works 
 
Graphic works include painting, drawing, diagram, map, chart or plan; engraving, etching, 
litograph and woodcut1019 irrespective of artistic quality. Copyright protects, for example 
sketches for dress designs,1020 and the drawings of exhaust pipes,1021 indeed any drawings 
and plans (for example architect’s plan or sketches for buildings);  plans and drawings for 
“nano-strcutures” may be considered as graphic works. However the protection does not 
extend to reproducing the nano-structures themselves, as discussed below. For this, the SC in 
Lucasfilm has recognized that the design and copyright law in the UK provides for the 
“graduated range of protection” for three-dimensional objects.1022  
 
5.2.3.2 Nano-creations in literary works  
 
Section 3(1) of CDPA 1988 defines “literary work” as “any work, other than a dramatic or 
musical work which is written, spoken or sung...”. Literary works also include tables or 
compilations, other than a database; a computer program; preparatory design material for a 
computer program; and a database.1023 Section 178 of the CDPA 1988 defines “writing” to 
include any form of notation or code, whether by hand or otherwise and regardless of the 
method by which, or medium in or on which, it is recorded, and that “written” shall be 
construed accordingly. Examples of literary works where the protection was granted were 
examination papers,1024  five-letter “Liber Code” for sending messages,1025 football pools 
coupons1026 and television programmes.1027 Peterson J stated that “literary works” are those 
“expressed in print or writing, irrespective of the question whether the quality or style is 
high”.1028 However, literary work did not exist for an invented word like “EXXON” because 
it did not provide “information, instruction or pleasure of a literary kind”,1029 or song 
                                                          
1019 Section 3 CA 1987; section 4(2) CDPA 1988. 
1020Bernstein v Murray [1981] R.P.C. 303. 
1021 British Leyland v Armstrong [1986] R.P.C. 279. 
1022 [2011] UKSC 39; [2012] 1 A.C 208, at para 48. 
1023 Section 3 CA 1987 instead provides a long list of what literary work includes novels, plays, dramas, letters, 
reports, lectures, tables or compilations, computer programs, etc. 
1024 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601. 
1025 D P Anderson & Co Ltd v Liber Code Co [1917] 2 K.B. 469. 
1026 Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273. 
1027 Independent Television Publications Ltd v Time Out [1984] F.S.R. 64. 
1028 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601, at 608. 
1029 Exxon Corpn v Exxon v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] Ch 119, at p.88. 
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titles1030 or the printed tables at the front of the diary as common knowledge1031 and 
individual command names and collection of complex command in a computer program. 1032 
The discussion of literary works for biotechnology may provide some insight for 
nanotechnology at least to the general proposition that creations at nanoscale could be 
“works”. 
 
A literary work in DNA molecule may arise in the form of presentation in text-form such as 
the four letter ATCG1033 alphabet of a DNA sequence, each letter denoting one nucleotide in 
DNA, and the 20-letter alphabet for the amino acids of proteins.1034 The string of letters may 
qualify for copyright protection as a literary work, and the text may exist in different form for 
example electronic.1035 The written message provides a significant link in the information 
chain that leads from a naturally occurring substance to a commercial product, and thus has 
the potential for copyright protection.1036 However, to be protectable as literary work, the law 
requires certain minimum of elaboration of structure and a certain minimum length of 
message, not, for example, a short sequence of a few letters used to design probes for gene 
library screening.1037 There is little judicial guidance on how synthesised molecules of DNA 
could be protected in the UK, and thus it was considered that the protection is of limited.1038  
 
There is no doubt that the elucidation of a DNA or protein sequence involves a very 
substantial skill and labour that may satisfy the originality requirement.1039 Although some 
may argue that the work might not be original because it is copied from nature, this may be 
                                                          
1030 Francis Day v Twentieth Century Fox [1940] A.C 112; but newspaper headlines were given copyright 
protection in Shetland Times v Jonathan Wills [1997] F.S.R. 604 as substantial part of the articles. Now see 
Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2010] F.S.R. 20 that the “data capture process” 
reproducing an extract of 11 words are regarded as “reproduction” within Article 2(a) Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ 
L167/10 (Infosoc Directive). 
1031 Cramp v Symthson [1944] A.C. 329. 
1032 Navitaire Inc v EasyJet Airline Co [2005] E.C.D.R. 17. 
1033 The four bases that make up DNA: adenosine, thymine, cytosine and guamine. 
1034 Karnell G W G ‘Protection of Results of Genetic Research by Copyright or Design Rights’ (1995) E.I.P.R. 
355, at p.355; it is a long piece of string in four types of different shaped bead and each of this bead 
representing a nucleotide, Peeters M and Hird S ‘UK Protection for Recombinant DNA – Exploring the 
Options’ (1991) E.I.P.R. 334, at p.334. 
1035 Karnell, n.1034, at p.355. 
1036 Laddie et al,n.978, at pp.1708-1709 (2011). 
1037 Ibid, at pp.1709-1710 (2011). 
1038 Peeters and Hird, n.1034, at p.334; there was no court’s decision on the copyright protection for DNA 
sequences, Karnell, n. 1034, at p.355. 
1039 Laddie et al, n.978, at p.1710 (2011). 
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rejected as the originality resides if further independent, useful labor, knowledge and 
judgment have been dedicated on its creation.1040 Copyright is capable of subsisting in a 
scientific record consisting of a series of a letter or other character symbolising the sequential 
of DNA, proteins and similar constructs found in molecular biology and the recorded 
sequence is of sufficient length.1041 Therefore, the extent to which the record is original or 
not depends on whether the structure recorded was wholly elucidated from nature or whether 
it was the result of the author’s skill and labour.1042 The infringement may occur when the 
molecule whose structure has been elucidated from nature by reproducing in writing the 
elucidated sequence of the molecule, but it is not by making a molecule to that sequence.1043  
 
Although nano-creations could learn from DNA, the argument of DNA molecule as a literary 
work to be applied to nanotechnology is not strong enough to support the view that 
nanotechnology could be considered as a nano-structure literary work. This is because, unlike 
DNA molecule, nano-creations do not appear in a string like DNA with written message to 
be considered as “literary works”. Furthermore, there is difficulty in proving infringement. 
Equally, based on laws and cases, there are not many suggestions that copyright is available 
for the DNA, particularly because of its functional nature. Thus, the only comfort from the 
DNA case is that the commentators envisage that copyright may operate at nanoscale. 
 
5.2.3.3 Reproduction of two-dimensional of nano-creations to three-dimensional objects 
  
In Malaysia, prior to the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1996 “artistic work” was defined to 
include two dimensional work of paintings, drawings, etchings, lithographs, woodcuts, 
engravings and prints, and three-dimensional works related to geography, topography, 
architecture or science.1044 It is an infringement of copyright to make a three-dimensional 
object from a two-dimensional artistic work, and to make two-dimensional work to a three-
dimensional object. The questions whether drawings were capable to be protected as ‘artistic 
works” and whether three-dimensional products of two-dimensional drawings were eligible 
                                                          
1040 Laddie et al, n.978, at p.1710 (2011), at p.1710. 
1041 Ibid, at p.1711. 
1042 Ibid, at p.1711. 
1043 Ibid, at p.1701. 
1044 See for example the view which states that the old definition of ‘artistic works’ under old Copyright law has 
been criticized as being unwarranted, Lim H G ‘Copyright in Functional Drawings? The Linatex Case and 
British Leyland Revisited/ [1994] 1 M.L.J. xc, at p.xc. 
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to be protected under section 3 of the CA 1987, were considered in Peko Wallsend 
Operations Ltd & Ors v Linatex Process Rubber Bhd.1045 In this case, the plaintiffs were the 
Australian-based companies which designed, manufactured and distributed “slurry pump” 
worldwide. The plaintiffs contended that defendant’s copying, reproducing or manufacturing 
any slurry pump’s parts or mould by way of reverse engineering was an infringement of the 
plaintiff’s copyright to such parts and moulds and the three-dimensional form of the 
plaintiff’s slurry pump parts and moulds. In this case the issue was whether engineering 
drawings were ‘artistic works’ capable of being protected under the CA 1987.1046 The HC 
rejected the defendant’s argument that engineering drawings have no artistic quality and do 
not qualify to be protected under copyright law under section 7 of the CA 1987. The Court 
held that the works were protected irrespective of their quality and the purpose for which 
they were created. The definition under section 3 does not qualify the type of drawings 
eligible for protection and the provisions are wide enough to cover engineering drawings, 
therefore, engineering drawings are included under definition of artistic works. Siti Norma 
Yaakob J stated that: 
 “Parliament must have intended to extend the scope of the protection to cover all types of 
drawings, regardless of their quality and purpose of their creations.”1047 
 
Thus, according to this case copyright in “artistic works” includes engineering drawings i.e. 
the two-dimensional and it has been extended to cover the three-dimensional products which 
have been reproduced from the engineering drawings. The decision triggered the copyright 
amendment in Malaysia to delimitate between copyright and design law.1048 Section 13A and 
                                                          
1045 [1993] 1 M.L.J. 225. The decision in this case has attracted considerable academic discussion, see for 
example Azmi, n.977 above; Khaw L T ‘Recent Amendments to Malaysian Copyright Law’ (1997) E.I.P.R. 81; 
Khaw L T ‘Copyright Law in Malaysia: Does the Balance Hold?’ [2004] 31 J.M.C.L. 23; Sangal P S 
‘Malaysian Copyright Law under Revision: Why and How?’ [1997] I C.L.J. Iviii; Khaw L T Copyright Law in 
Malaysia 3rd ed (Petaling Jaya, LexisNexis: 2008), Chapter 3; Lim, n.1044 above.  
1046 In UK before the amendment of Copyright Act 1988, under Copyright Act 1956 it was held that the 
copyright existed in the prototype furniture and design drawings in LB Plastic Ltd v Swiss Products Ltd [1979] 
R.P.C. 551, and the HL decision in British Leyland Motor Corp v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd [1986] R.P.C. 279 
in which copyright was asserted in drawings of the car exhaust pipe. 
1047 [1993] 1 M.L.J. 225, at 233. The similar approach has been adopted in Goodyear Tire & Rubber & Anor v 
Silverstone Tire & Rubber Co Sdn [1994] 1 M.L.J. 348 where the court accepted that the copyright protects 
two-dimensional and extend to the three-dimensional works. 
1048 Section 7(5) CA 1987 for example provides that copyright should not exist for any design which is 
registered under any law relation to industrial design; section 7(6) CA 1987 states that copyright protection 
ceases to exist for a design which is capable of being registered but which has not been registered once the 
article has been reproduced more than 50 times by an industrial process. The copyright protection is lost once 
the non-registered has been reproduced industrially; the amendment has curtailed the role of copyright in 
industrial process and functional articles as decided under Peko’s case would no longer be protected, Sangal, 
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13B of CA 1987 and CDPA 1988 equivalent section 51 and 52 will be given more 
discussion.  
 
Section 13A of CA 1987 provides that it is not an act of infringement of copyright to make of 
any article to a design document or model recording or embodying a design for anything 
other than artistic work or a typeface. Under this section, “design” is defined to mean that the 
design of any aspect of the shape or configuration (whether internal or external) of the whole 
or part of an article, other than a surface decoration.1049 A design document is referred as any 
record of a design, whether in the form of a drawing, a written description, a photograph, 
data stored in a computer or otherwise.1050 This section reflects the CDPA 1988, section 
51.1051 Therefore, case law under section 51 of the CDPA 1988 is persuasive in Malaysia. 
This section states that the design must be “for” something. The design in the design 
document or the model must have been created as a step toward or as a part of the process of 
producing an article based in the design that is for the subsequent production of another 
article.1052 What constitutes “design” and “design document” was discussed in Mackie 
Designs Inc v Behringer Specialised Studio Equipment (UK) Ltd & Ors1053 where the 
plaintiff, claimed the literary, alternatively the artistic copyright in circuit diagrams for an 
electrical equipment mixer. It alleged that the defendant had analysed mixer and its circuits 
to produce a “net list” of the components and their interconnections. The questions were (a) 
whether the circuit diagrams were design documents within the meaning of section 51 of the  
CDPA 1988; (b) if so, whether the defendants had a defence to copyright infringement under 
section 51. It was held that the circuit diagram was a design document within the meaning of 
the Act and it did not have the appropriate UK connection to qualify for unregistered design 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
n.1045, at p.lxvi; Khaw, argues that the amendment of the provision has created a “minefield of uncertainties 
for design owners”, n.1045, at p.107. But now section 7(6) has been deleted with new amendment in 2010. 
1049 Section 13A (2) CA 1987. 
1050 Ibid. 
1051 In the words of Pumfrey J in Mackie Designs Inc v Behringer Specialised Studio Equipment (UK) Ltd & 
Ors [1999] R.P.C. 717 stated that “copyright protection was no longer to be available to what can be 
compendiously described as ordinary functional commercial articles. This principle applies to all industrially 
produced articles...”, at 723.  
1052 Laddie H et al., n.978, at paras 59.30-59.38. 
1053 [1999] R.P.C. 717; see also BBC Worldwide v Pally Screen Printing [1998] F.S.R. 665 it was held that it 
was not an infringement of the famous TV programme characters ”Teletubbies” to be printed on various items 
such as T-shirts; Lambretta Clothing Ltd v Teddy Smith (UK) Ltd [2005] R.P.C. 6 stated that the reproduction 
of design such as colorways for sweater was protected under under section 51; Flashing Badge Co Ltd v Groves 
[2007] E.W.H.C. 1372 (Ch); [2007] F.S.R. 863, it was held that the extent of section 51 does not applied to 
design for surface decoration of badges. 
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right. The defendant had copied the plaintiff’s circuit board, in the form of a ‘net list’, thus 
they had copied an article made according to the design and the defence under section 51 
applied. The defendants’ net list and circuit diagrams did not thus infringe the plaintiff’s 
copyright.  
 
Based on the above section, unless nano-creation is itself an artistic work, copyright in 
drawings and plans for it will therefore not be infringed by reproducing the nano-structure.  
Section 13B is similar to section 52 of the CDPA 1988 which provides that where artistic 
work has been exploited by making an industrial process, articles falling to be treated for the 
purpose of this section seen as copies of the work. In relation to an artistic work copying 
means the making of a copy in three-dimensions of a two-dimensional work and the making 
of a copy in two dimensions of three-dimensional work. The limitation provided under 
section 13A and 13B suggests that it is very difficult to protect the artistic design which has 
been applied industrially in Malaysia. Malaysia could follow the lead in the UK to protect the 
artistic design by the route of unregistered design, as discussed in the next section below.  
 
5.3 TRADE MARKS AND NANOTECHNOLOGY 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
Special tools, such as STM in case of forming IBM letters, have been used to manipulate the 
atoms to place marks on nanoscale devices.1054 In another example, a team from Monash 
University has created Electron Beam Lithography instrument that managed to write or mark 
nano-sized objects or surfaces to a size less than 10nm.1055 
 
Thus it is possible to mark products at nanoscale, though visualisation techniques such as 
AFM and STM are needed to perceive them. Macro marks, for example on packaging, can be 
used to signify the source of nano products or services. Thus trade mark law is relevant. The 
main legal issues examined here are:  
                                                          
1054 See n.76. 
1055
Press Release, A Giant Step for Nanotechnology’ 30 September 2009, at 
http://www.monash.edu.au/news/newsline/story/1504 accessed on 1st Oct 2009. 
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(a) whether marks at nanoscale be considered as “marks” or “signs”;  
(b) can TM protects the shape of nano-creations; and  
(c) whether the use of “nano” word marks on product which contain (or do not contain) 
nanoparticles give rise to distinctiveness and deceptiveness problems. 
 
5.3.2 Nanoscale marks 
 
Can marks at nanoscale be considered as “marks” or “signs” under TRIPS, Malaysia and 
UK/EU law, and if so, how are they classified? Article 15 TRIPS reads:  
“Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods and services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting trade mark. Such 
signs, in particular words including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and 
combinations of colours as well as any combinations of such signs, shall be eligible for 
registration as trademarks. Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant 
goods or services, Members may make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired through 
use. Members may require as a condition of registration, that signs be visually perceptible”. 
 
TRIPS requires the sign to be distinctive. It is generally accepted that if the sign lacks 
distinctiveness, it does not mean that the protection is excluded if the sign has acquired 
distinctiveness through use.1056 There is no limit of signs that are protected, and the definition 
of signs covers a very broad range.1057 The member states may also provide that the signs are 
visually perceptible. Thus, TRIPS allows but does not require the exclusion of non-visually 
perceptible marks from registration, as in smell and sound marks.1058 There is a clear 
difference of “visually perceptible” under the TRIPS and EU law (TM Directive and TM 
Regulation) because EU demands the sign to be capable of distinguishing and to be 
“represented graphically”, whilst the TRIPS demands that the sign be distinctive and 
“visually perceptible” only as an optional extra.1059 Accordingly, the wording under the 
TRIPS renders the meaning to be either; (a) a sign may not be registered if it cannot be 
                                                          
1056Correa, n.580, at p.177; Tritton G et al Intellectual Property in Europe 3rd ed (London: S&M, 2008) 
1057 Gervais, n.222, at p.266. 
1058 Ibid, at p.267, n.306; Tritton, n.1056, at p.236; Phillip J Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy (Oxford: 
OUP, 2003) , at p.65 Blakeney M ‘The Impact of the TRIPS Agreement in the Asian Pacific Region’ (1996) 
E.I.P.R. 544, at 548. 
1059 Phillips, n.1058, at p.65. 
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seen;1060 or (b) a sign may be registered where it can be seen or not provided it is visually 
supported with description to educate the consumer of the nature of the mark.1061  
 
Clearly, the intention of TRIPS is to require member states to protect marks that are visually 
perceptible. However, TRIPS does not prevent non-visually perceptible marks to be 
protected (as in case of smell and sound) if they are distinctive in character. This may include 
nano-marks, although they are not visually perceptible, but they are capable of 
distinguishing. The discussion below examines whether nanoscale marks are protected under 
Malaysia and UK/EU law. 
 
The law that governs trade mark registration in Malaysia is the Trade Marks Act 1976 (TMA 
1976)1062 and Trade Marks Regulations 1983.1063 Both came into effect on 1 September 
1983.  Section 3(1) of the TMA 1976 defines ‘mark’ to include a device, brand, heading, 
label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral or any combination thereof.1064 The 
definition of “mark” is very wide but not an inclusive and open definition.1065 Unlike TRIPS 
and EU law, Malaysian law does not use the words “any sign” to indicate even wider 
scope.1066 The definition of “mark” under the TMA 1976 is related to the visual 
characteristics of goods, or the presentation of goods and services to serve the function of a 
trade or service mark.1067 This is because, applying the rule of “ejusdem generis”, all the 
listed marks have the same character i.e. are visually perceptible. Thus, according to the 
TMA 1976 many non-traditional signs that cannot be classified as “marks” are excluded 
from registration. By contrast, many countries including the UK have adopted a wider scope 
of interpretation that any sign can be registered if it is capable of being represented 
graphically.1068 The above definition particularly emphasises visual perception which makes 
it difficult for Malaysian law to be applied to nanotechnology, as nanotechnology cannot be 
                                                          
1060 As the position in Malaysia, discussed below. 
1061 Phillips, n.1058, at p.65, as for example the position in UK/EU. 
1062 For the legislative history, see Kwang T B Trade Mark Law and Practice in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
Butterworths Asia, 2001), pp.1-15. 
1063 PU (A) 355/1983. 
1064 The same section defines “trade mark” as mark that is “used or proposed to be used in relation to goods 
and services for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the 
goods and services”. 
1065 Kwang, n.1062, at p.53; contrast of section 1 of the UK Trade Marks Act 1994 of the words “in particular”.  
1066 Azmi, I M Trade Marks Law in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: S&M Asia, 2004), at p.2. 
1067 Kwang, n.1062, at p.54. 
1068 Azmi, n.1066, at p.2. 
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seen by the naked eye. Therefore, the study focuses more on the meaning of “sign” under the 
UK/EU trade mark law. However, since TRIPS is permissive of non-visible marks as argued 
above, it does not assist in displacing the “ejusdem generis” rule. 
 
In the UK, the passage of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (TMA 1994) is to implement the EU 
Trade Marks Directive (TMD).1069 The Community Trade Mark (CTM) was also 
introduced.1070 Section 1(1) of the TMA 1994 and its EU equivalents refer to “trade mark” as 
any sign including words (including personal names), designs, letters, numerals, or the shape 
of the goods and their packaging, provided that they are capable of being represented 
graphically and capable of distinguishing goods and services of one undertaking from those 
of another.1071 The law offers no discrimination for registration of any signs, only that they 
have to perform certain requirement prescribed under the law1072 that there must be a sign; 
that the sign has to distinguish between goods and services and that the sign is capable of 
being represented graphically. Accordingly, the word “sign” comprises a broad 
expression1073 which indicates “anything which can convey information”.1074 The failure to 
comply would render the sign invalid for registration, for example marks which are devoid of 
any distinctive character.1075 Although the examples of sign given in the TMA 1994 indicates 
that the sign should be “visually perceptible”, nevertheless this does not mean that non-
visually perceptible mark will be excluded, such as in smell1076 and sounds,1077 so long as the 
                                                          
1069 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States 
relating to trade marks. Now replaced by consolidated version the Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008, 
OJ L 299/25. 
1070 Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 of 20 Dec 1993, now replaced by consolidated version, Council Regulation 
(EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 OJ L 78/1. 
1071 See also Article 2 TMD; Article 4 CTM. However the intention of the legislation is not to be an exhaustive 
list , Firth, A. et al., Trade Marks: Law and Practice, 2nd edn, (Bristol: JPL, 2005), at p.21. 
1072 Section 1(1) is read together with section 32(2)(d) TMA 1994. 
1073 Morcom C et al. The Modern Law of Trade Marks 3rd edn (London: LN, 2008) at p.53. 
1074 Jacob J in Philips Electronic NBV v Remington Consumer Products [1998] R.P.C. 283, at 298 “I appreciate 
that this is extremely wide, but I can see no reason why to limit the meaning of the word. The only qualification 
expressed in the directive is that it can be capable of being represented graphically”.  
1075Section3 (1)(b) TMA 1994; Art 3(1)(b) TMD; Art 7(1)(b) CTM which inter alia provides other absolute 
grounds for registration. See the decision in Dyson Ltd v Registrar of Trade Mark [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. (14) 303 
where the ECJ refused to grant registration of the transparent bin of a vacuum cleaner because it was mere 
property of the product and did not constitute a “sign” within the meaning of Art 2 TMD. 
1076 See for example Ralf Sieckmann v Deutsches Patent – und Markenamt [2003] R.P.C. 38; Vennootschap 
Onder Firma Senta Aromatic Marketing’s Application [1999] E.T.M.R. 429. 
1077 See for example Shield Mark BV v Joost Kist (t/a Memex) [2004] R.P.C. 17. 
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mark is capable of distinguishing and it can be represented graphically. The broader 
definition of sign may include gestures and tastes1078 as well as colours.1079  
 
The position under UK/EU law provides a strong argument for nanotechnology to consider. 
Generally, the law treats non-visual marks the same as other marks, but they may differ in the 
requirement that they are capable of being represented graphically.1080 Eligibility for 
protection of non-visible but perceptible marks such as smells and sounds provides a good 
consideration on how nanoscale marks may attract trade marks protection. Indeed, 
nanotechnology may help to deliver smell mark; nano-encapsulation methods are available 
for production of aromatic compounds in perfumes using nanoparticles such as gold-
palladium.1081 Nano-encapsulated fragrance may be embedded for example into textiles, 
shoes and other materials such as ceramics.1082  
 
It has been regarded that it is unlikely for the smell to be represented precisely, and the 
problem may arise too for nano-marks, unless supported by some other form of 
representation.1083   
 
The decision of the ECJ in Ralf Sieckmann v Deutsches Patent – und Markenamt1084 is 
important to consider for nano-marks. In this case the applicant sought to register a scent as 
trade mark for services in different classes under Nice Agreement and the description by the 
applicant that the sign is “the pure chemical substance methyl cinnamate” The sample of the 
scent has been deposited as “balsamically fruity with a slight hint of cinnamon”1085 The 
                                                          
1078 Bently and Sherman, n.211, at p.806. 
1079 See Libertel Groep BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] [2003] E.T.M.R. 63; [2004] F.S.R. 4, at 73. 
1080 Non-visual marks are also referred to ‘non-traditional marks; they sometimes overlap with other IP rights 
such as utility patents, design patents and design rights, Firth A Signs, Surfaces, Shapes and Structures – The 
Protection of Product Design under Trade Mark Law in Dinwoodie G B and Janis M D, eds Trade Mark Law 
and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research in Intellectual Property (Cheltenham, Northampton: EE, 
2008) at p.499; MacQueen et al., n.622, refer them as ‘unusual marks’, at p.571. 
1081Available at http://nanogloss.com/nanotechnology/applications-of-nanotechnology-in-perfumes/ accessed on 
7 October 2011; a team of scientist from Lehigh University and Cardiff University have uncovered producing a 
cleaner method of producing spices and perfumes using gold-palladium for dental, medical and laboratory uses, 
available at http://www.physorg.com/news10337.html.  
1082 Available at http://nanogloss.com/nanotechnology/applications-of-nanotechnology-in-perfumes/ accessed 
on 7 October 2011. 
1083 See TM Manual Chapter 3 para 16.3. 
1084 [2003] R.P.C. 38; the principle of Sieckmann was later applied in Eden SARL v OHIM [2006] E.T.M.R. 14 
concerning “the smell of ripe strawberries”, at 188. 
1085 [2003] R.P.C. 38, at 688 para 13. 
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Court referred to Article 2 of the TMD on the question whether the sign which is not capable 
of being perceived visually may be represented graphically by description in words, or by 
way of chemical formula or by depositing a sample or by any combination of them. It was 
held that if the sign is not capable of being perceived visually, the graphical representation 
must satisfy seven principles that are: (a) clear; (b) precise; (c) self-contained; (d) easily 
accessible; (e) intelligible; (f) durable; (g) objective.1086 The Court considered that the written 
description “balsamically fruity with a slight hint of cinnamon” fails to describe in clear, 
precise and objective manner and the deposit of an odour sample has not been regarded as 
graphically represented. 
 
The non-visual mark was not excluded from trade mark registration so long as it could be 
represented graphically, although it challenging to satisfy the requirement “graphical 
representation”.1087 It is equally argued that although the requirements under Sieckmann have 
attracted criticism and doubt,1088 nonetheless it would not necessarily prevent non-visual 
marks in nanotechnology to be represented graphically. As experienced in Sieckmann, the 
problem of satisfying the graphical requirement is likely to arise in nano-smell marks. Thus, 
the sign will continue to receive bar from registration, unless some of ‘representation’ can be 
devised possibly analogous to musical notation.1089 Of course, many nanoscale marks will be 
scaled down version of ordinary visual marks rendered into quantum dots. Here the issue of 
perceptibility and trade mark function will be crucial.1090 
 
The Trade Mark Registry Work Manual lists down the ingredient requirement for the sounds 
mark to be accepted that are; (a) to avoid sound marks to be examined as if it is word or 
device mark, the applicant has to state clearly that the mark is sound mark; (b) the graphical 
representation of the sign is showing by musical stave divided into measures and showing a 
                                                          
1086 [2003] R.P.C. 38, at 693 para 55. 
1087 See in Re John Lewis of Hungerford Limited [2002] R.P.C 28, ‘the smell, aroma or essence of cinnamon” 
related to furniture is to be contrasted with the earlier decision of the “the smell of the fresh cut grass” in 
Venootschap Onder Firma Senta Aromatic Marketing’s Application [1999] E.T.M.R 429. There may be 
doubtful as the capability of smell mark to be registered in the EU, see for example Burrell R and Handler M 
‘Making Sense of Trade Mark Law’ (2003) I.P.Q. 388, at p.395. 
1088 The criteria set out in Sieckmann are likely very difficult to satisfy although it is not the intention of the 
court to rule the possibility of registering olfactory marks, Turner-Kerr P Trade Mark Tangles: Recent Twists 
and Turns in EC Trade Mark Law’ (2004), E. L. Rev. 345, at p.346; see also MacQueen et al. n.622, at p.572; 
the difficulties also arise in term of the practical matter of intelligible recordal, Morcom et al, n. 1073, at p.55; 
see also Phillips, n.1058, at p.156-157. 
1089 Ibid, para 16.3.1 
1090 See n.76; n.106; n.258 and 5.3.6.  
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clef, musical notes and rests, indicating relative value, and sharps, flats, and naturals.1091 It 
was argued that when the issue of graphical representation was discussed, and some 
discussion was misdirected, forgetting the purpose and functions of trade marks.1092  
However, for nanotechnology, it could be argued similar to sounds mark that there is no bar 
for protection if the marks are represented graphically. 
 
Other non-visual marks that are interesting discussion for graphical representation are 
colours mark. It is observed that it is likely challenging for single colour mark to acquire 
registration.1093 In Libertel Groep BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau1094 the applicant sought to 
register an “orange” colour in relation to the communication equipment and services in 
Classes 9 and 35 to 38. The Court referred to Article 3(1)(b) of the TMD on whether specific 
colour per se could have a ‘distinctive character’. The Court applied the seven principles of 
Sieckmann. The Court argued that mere sample of colour does not sufficiently satisfy the 
criteria under Sieckmann and colour could deteriorate over time.1095 As regards distinctive 
character, the Court stated: 
“A colour per se, not spatially delimited, may, in respect of certain goods and services, have a 
distinctive ... The latter condition cannot be satisfied merely by reproducing on paper the colour 
in question, but may be satisfied by designating that colour using an internationally recognised 
identification code”.1096 
Thus to overcome the problem of graphical representation of  colour or to identify specific 
colour, the practice is to refer to an international recognised classification for example 
Pantone®, RAL and Focoltone® as well as RGB profile to verify the electronic image of the 
colour.1097  As experienced in shape marks (discussed below), a certain colour may be 
refused registration because of the policy consideration that it should be freely available to 
anyone to use, and unless it can be proved that the colour has acquired distinctiveness 
through its use.  
                                                          
1091 Manual TM, Chapter 3, para 16.4. 
1092 See Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer observation in Sieckmann observed that the object of a trade 
mark is to enable consumers to identify goods and services by their origin and quality, at 492-492.  
1093 See McCutcheon J ‘How Many Colours in the Rainbow? The Registration of Colour Per Se under 
Australian Trade Mark Law (2004) E.I.P.R. 27, at p.27, n.14; also Turner-Kerr, n.1088, at p.350. 
1094 [2003] E.T.M.R 63  
1095 Ibid, at 814 and 818.   
1096 [2003] E.T.M.R 63 at 819  
1097 TM Manual Chap 3, 16.1.1. 
198 
 
The rule of “graphically represented” in Sieckmann that applies to non-visual marks may be 
applied equally for nanotechnology. A study conducted in the EU trade mark system1098 
found that the majority of the user associations viewed that the requirement of “graphical 
representation” was outdated and asked for a more liberal approach for representation in non-
traditional marks, and suggested the need to change the wording of the law, however the 
legal security being maintained.1099 It has been proposed that “graphical representation” 
should be removed from the basic definition of the signs and instead it should appear in a 
separate paragraph that signs may be registered if they are represented in a manner that 
satisfies the requirements of registration.1100  If the purpose of the proposal is to allow for a 
more liberal approach for the requirement of graphical interpretation, this contention could 
provide an interesting argument for nano-marks. The requirement of graphically 
representation may be satisfied, for example, colours by adhering to the international 
recognised colour code,1101 or sonograms1102 in sound mark or chromatograms1103 in smell 
mark. If the liberal interpretation is allowed, and as argued by Phillips of the technological 
advancement,1104 the graphical representation of nano-marks may be represented by other 
means. 
 
Proper representation of the sign is also significant to identify it for an infringement case.1105 
Section 10(4) of the TMA 1994 and Article 9(2) of the CTM provide the activities which 
constitute use of a sign for the purpose of infringement. The listed activities are non-
exhaustive and the use of the sign for infringement purposes is to be given a broad 
meaning.1106 This is because, the use includes other than by way of graphical representation 
as stated under section 103(2) of the TMA 1994, and would include oral use as in smell and 
                                                          
1098 Study on the Overall Functioning of the European Trade Mark System, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law, Munich, 15 Feb 2011, accessed via 
ec.europe.eu/internal_market/…/20110308_allensbach-study_en.pdf visited on 19 March 2012 (MP Study). 
1099 Ibid, at para 2.9 
1100 Ibid, at 2.15 
1101 Libertel, [2003] E.T.M.R 63, at para 37; MP Study, n.1098, at para 2.5. 
1102 There is no evidence any ECJ decision that rely on sonograms  to present sounds graphically, and 
sonograms without musical notes are accepted in OHIM in accordance of Rule 3 of the Implementing 
Regulation, if the representation in the form of a graphic representation together with a sound file of the sound 
itself, MP Study, n.1098, at 2.7. 
1103 There is no evidence in the ECJ decision rely on this too, MP Study, n.1098, at 2.8 
1104As argued by Phillips that to some extent with the development of technological advancement the 
requirement of graphically represented could be challenged, n.1058, at p.66 
1105 Keeling D et al. Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names 15th edn (London: S&M, 2011), at para 14-
010 
1106 Ibid, at para 14-011 
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olfactory cases, and other form of use which is not capable of unaided human perception 
such as use as a keyword in an internet referencing service.1107 The same argument may be 
made in case of nanoscale marks. Thus, signs need not be “visible”, but the sign need to be 
perceptible in use. For example nanoscale marks of manipulated 35 xenon atoms to form 
IBM letters.  
 
5.3.3 Nano products and classification 
 
In the current classification scheme of goods and services, for example in the Nice 
Classification1108 there is no specific class that refers to nanoscale goods and services. 
However, for example Class 1, 4 or 7 are general enough to cover nanoscale marks. In this 
regard, can one use bulk classification, for example Class 1 for chemicals used in industry, if 
nano-mark is on individual components? This assumption may be correct by analogy with 
colour marks, as evidenced from Blue Paraffin Trade Mark.1109 In this case, the applicant had 
been selling blue-dyed paraffin and in the mind of public, had become associated with the 
applicant. The applicant applied to register under the name BLUE PARAFFIN (BP).  The 
opponents opposed registration on the ground that they had continuously sold paraffin under 
their trade mark name Token Blue (TB) and the registration of BP would unfairly prejudice 
them and their customers in the lawful conduct of their business in the marketing and sale of 
paraffin as TB. They also argued that the mark was not distinctive and not adapted to 
distinguish. Whitford J stated that there may have been other blue coloured paraffins sold 
prior to the date of application for registration. The words BP or the word “blue” alone was 
accepted as being distinctive. The extent to which distinctiveness was established as at the 
date of application was distinctiveness for all practical purposes. Whitford J further argued 
that there was no reason why anyone should want to colour paraffin blue except for the 
purpose of benefiting from the appellant company’s reputation. The word BP had no direct 
reference to the character of Paraffin, as the nature of Paraffin is colourless. The word “blue” 
served to distinguish the appellant's goods from others'. On appeal Buckley LJ considered 
that no other trader could have any reason to dye paraffin in blue except for the purpose of 
                                                          
1107  Ibid, and refer to Google v Louis Vuitton and Others C [2010] E.T.M.R. 30, at para 69.  
1108 Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purpose of the 
Registration of Marks, Sept 28, 1979 (NC). 
1109 [1977] R.P.C. 473. 
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benefitting from the applicant’s company reputation, therefore no other trader could have any 
proper occasion to use of the word “blue” to describe their own product. In dismissing the 
appeal, Buckley LJ stated that the words BP possess at least to some extent an inherent 
aptitude to distinguish the paraffin of the applicant’s company and was registrable.   
 
Applying the rule in this case by analogy to the nanoscale marks, the class of goods available 
for all traders is the paraffin, and if they produced paraffin in different colours, and 
distinguishable, the different colours in relation to paraffin is registrable. By analogy, if mark 
is on individual components, one may use the bulk classification for example chemicals in 
relation to nanotechnology.  
 
5.3.4 The shape of nano-creations 
 
In nanotechnology, there are various shapes that may be available, for example the tubular 
shape of nanotubes either in single, double or multi-walled shapes. The shape of goods or 
their packagings are eligible for registration if it indicates origin to the average consumer. 1110 
However, in certain situations, consumers are unlikely to associate the shape with the origin 
of the particular trade’s goods.1111 Shapes may vary from one particular sector to the other, 
and a particular shape may be perceived as trade mark in one particular field and but not in 
another.1112 Basic geometric shapes will not be noticed by consumers and will not capable of 
distinguishing.1113 For example a soap bar shape in a rectangular parallelepiped with rounded 
edges that is commonly used for soaps will not enable the relevant public to distinguish 
immediately of the trade origin.1114  
 
                                                          
1110 Bongrain’s Application [2005] RPC (14) 306 (CA); Betafence Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2005] 
EWHC 1353 (Ch). (Deputy Judge Floyd QC); for example consumer identify the origin of the car’s grille 
although there are a lots of available by the existing models, as in DaimlerChrysler Corp v OHIM  [2003] 
ETMR 87 
1111 Henkel v OHIM [2004] ECR I-1725 (para 52) 
1112 Bently and Sherman, 211, at p.825 
1113 Ibid, at p.825 
1114 CFI in Procter & Gamble v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) 
[2003] E.T.M.R. 43, at 558; the average consumer for nanotubes is more than one such consumer, see further at 
5.3.7.  
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To be protected, the shape should not exclusively falls within the statutory exclusion and 
have a distinctive character. The express limitation of the shape marks protection is provided 
under section 3(2) of the TMA 19941115 which reads: 
A sign shall not be registered as a trade mark if it consists exclusively of – 
(a) the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves 
(b) the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result or 
(c) the shape which gives substantial value to the goods 
 
Although the test for distinctiveness is similar as applied to other marks,1116 it is very 
unlikely consumers associate the function of shape marks as indication of its origin. This in 
itself, could mean not only that the applicant has to show that the mark is distinctive but that 
he also has to concern himself with what the message a sign conveys ‘is’, and most 
importantly how the consumer perceives the mark.1117  
 
Among the earlier rulings of shape marks was a case concerning the registration of shape 
marks for non-alcoholic beverage under the old Trade Marks Act 1938. Lord Templeman 
viewed that ‘a bottle is not a mark’.1118 Nevertheless, it was ruled that three-dimensional 
marks are not explicitly excluded from the trade mark registration.1119 However, it has been 
perceived as problematic to treat the shape registrable as trademark.1120 The reasons for 
objections on the registration of shapes as trade mark are because (a) shapes of goods and 
their packaging cannot act as signs for the purpose of trade mark and it is difficult to prove 
distinctiveness; (b) the concern that if the trade mark protection is granted for the shapes it 
                                                          
1115 Article 3(1)(e) of the TMD; Article 7(1)(e) CTMR; there is no provision concerning shape marks in 
Malaysia TMA 1976. 
1116 Discussed above in colour, smell and sound marks.  
1117 Burrell et al, n.1087, at p.147, further state that consumers need to be ‘educated’ in order for them to 
associate and understand shape as a badge of origin, without which the sign lack distinctiveness, at p.153. 
1118 Re Coca-Cola Co [1986] 1 WLR 695, at 698; See for instance Unilever Ltd’s (Striped Toothpaste No.2) 
Trade Marks [1987] R.P.C. 13. See Franzosi, M, ‘What is Trade Mark? – A Challenge to the House of Lords’, 
(1987) E.I.P.R 63 who rather disagreed with the decision of  his Lordship and stated that a practitioner should 
not question whether a certain shape or design is or not a container but whether it is sign or not a trade mark 
which could be perceived from different point of view, at p.63. 
1119For example, see Unilever Ltd’s (Striped Toothpaste No.2) Trade Marks [1987] R.P.C 13; Lego Juris A/S v 
Mega Brands Inc [2007] E.T.M.R. 11, where the Community Office (OHIM) refused to register the shape of the 
lego bricks under Article 7 (1) (e) of the CTMR, and now ECJ has ruled on LEGO [2010] ETMR 63. However, 
there is an action under common law of passing-off available for shape marks, for example see Reckitt & 
Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (1990) 1 W.L.R. 491. 
1120 See Firth A et al. ‘Shapes as Trade Marks: Public Policy, Functional Considerations and Consumer 
Perception’ (2001), 23 E.I.P.R 86, at p.98; Torremans, 200, at p.382; Burrell et al., n.1087, at p.139. 
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may potentially lead to overly broad protection;1121 (c) the protection granted might overlap 
with other IPRs for example designs law, copyright and patent.1122 This perpetual monopoly 
created by shape marks could vitiate the legitimate interest of the consumers to access to the 
designs and shapes.1123 However, this does not mean that shape marks or their packaging are 
excluded from trade mark protection.1124  
 
The effect of statutory interpretation has given the scope of shape marks registration to be 
treated narrowly because of the words “signs which consists exclusively”.1125 Although there 
are many possibilities of the statutory interpretation, however Firth suggests that this 
subsection could satisfactorily mean that the sign consists exclusively of the shape of the 
goods or their packaging without any other element such as word or logo other than features 
of the shapes and this shape for which the registration is sought conveys one of “forbidden” 
meaning covers under subsection (a), (b) and (c) regardless whether it conveys other 
meaning.1126 This effect is to treat shape as non-registrable despite distinctiveness.1127 The 
effect of the word “exclusively” under section 3(2) (a) (b) (c) denotes that if some features of 
the mark fall outside the exclusion then the mark is registrable.1128 The interpretation of this 
subsection has been confirmed by the ECJ in Henkel KgaA v Deutsches Patent-und 
Markenamt.1129  
 
For the purpose of this study, discussion focuses more on limb (a) and (b) of section 3(2). 
Limb (a) concerns the ‘nature’ of the product itself. This shape may be determined by the 
                                                          
1121 Registration can be renewed repeatedly for example the existence of the Red Triangle Logo for beers was 
first registered as a trademark under the UK law in 1st January 1879 and it is still in force. 
1122 Burrell at al., n.1087, at p.144; Dutfield G and Suthersanen U Global Intellectual Property Law 
(Cheltenham: EE, 2008) at p.145.  
1123 Sanders A K ‘Some Frequently Asked Questions about the 1994 UK Trade Mark Act’ (1995) E.I.P.R. 67, at 
p.67; Dutfield and Suthersanen, n.1122, at p.145. 
1124 Consumers for example in the US come to realize and associate shape marks with particular traders, Burrell 
et al, n.1087, pp.140-143. 
1125 Helbling T ‘Shapes as Trade Marks? The Struggle to Register Three-Dimensional Signs: A Comparative 
Study of UK and Swiss Law’ (1997) I.P.Q. 413, at p.431. Foliard-Monguiral A and Rogers D ‘The Protection of 
Shapes by the Community Trade Mark’ (2003) E.I.P.R. 169, at p.169.  
1126 Firth gives possibility of different interpretation of the method of construction of this section and this 
interpretation is consistent with the rules of grammar and syntax and excludes other non-shape element from 
being subjected under section 3(2), n.1120, at pp.91-92 
1127 Ibid, at p.91 
1128 Burrell et al, n. 1087, at p. 161; Phillips v Remington [1998] R.P.C. 283, at 304 “if any feature of the shape 
which is not trivial does not fall within one of the exclusions, the exception do not apply”. 
1129 [2005] E.T.M.R 45, at 582. 
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function of the goods.1130 This could also debar a symbol of goods, which may include the 
whole goods or part of it.1131 The court ruled that the purpose of this limb is to make shape 
available for use by the public at large.1132 However, the interpretation of this limb has been 
argued where the applicant sought to register trade marks for “ice cream dessert products”, a 
well-known “Wall’s Viennetta”, where it was argued that the limb applied only to naturally 
occurring shapes rather than artificially created shapes such as a “Viennetta”.1133 It was 
further suggested however that this section should be constructed in a very strict way and 
narrowly, because if not almost every shape will be excluded from registration.1134  
 
Limb (b) concerns the shape of the goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result. The 
operation of this subsection is perceived as complementary to the principle of the patent 
system.1135 This exclusion does not mean that all goods which produce a technical result will 
be refused registration, but only extend if ‘significant’ aspects of the shape to the 
achievement of a technical result.1136 The exclusion of the shape which necessary to achieve 
technical result is given preference over the distinctive character. In interpreting whether the 
shape solely achieve the technical result, Jacob J in Phillips v Remington1137 concluded that 
the shape in the case consisted exclusively of a shape which is necessary to obtain a technical 
result.  
On Appeal, Aldous LJ commented that: 
“The subsection must be construed so that its ambit coincides with its purpose. That purpose is 
to exclude from registration shapes which are merely functional in the sense that they are 
motivated by and are the result of technical considerations. Those are the types of shapes which 
come from manufacture of patentable inventions”.
1138  
He further concluded that: 
 “the restriction on the effect of the words “which is necessary to obtain a technical 
result” is not overcome by establishing that there are other shapes which can obtain the 
same technical result. All that has to be shown is that the essential features of the shape 
                                                          
1130 Sanders, n.1123, at p.68. 
1131 Firth, n.1120, at p.92. 
1132Aldous J in Philips v Remington (1999) R.P.C. 809, at 820.  
1133 Societe des Products Nestle SA v Unilever Plc (Unilever Plc’s Trade Mark Application [2003] R.P.C. 35 at 
658; [2002] EWHC 2709 (Ch) Jacob J at 658. 
1134 Firth, n.1120, at p.92. Folliard and Rogers, n.1125, at p.169. Helbling, n.1125, at p. 431. 
1135 Sanders, n.1123, at p.68. 
1136 However, in practice all shapes of goods and packaging enjoy certain technical function, Helbling, n.1125, 
at p.427. 
1137 [1998] R.P.C. 283, at 309. 
1138 [1999] R.P.C. 809, at 821. 
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are attributable only to the technical result. It is in that sense that the shape is necessary to 
obtain the technical result. To adopt the meaning suggested by Philips will enable a 
trader or traders to obtain registration of all the alternative shapes that were practicable to 
achieve the desired technical result. That would result in the subsection being given a 
meaning which would not achieve the purpose for which I believe it was intended”.
1139 
 
As discussed above, shape marks are less likely to be registered because of difficulty in 
proving distinctiveness as the consumer may not associate the shape marks with the origin of 
the goods. Furthermore, allowing shapes to be protected, would give a potential monopoly to 
traders. To date, certainly, there is no position as to the protection of shape of nano-creation 
under Malaysian law. In the UK/EU position, probably the position would be that shape of 
nano-creations are unlikely to be protected because of the effect of limb (a) and (b) of the 
above provision, as normally nanotechnology arises because of its nature of the shape itself 
and the shape which is necessary to obtain a technical result. The functional characteristics of 
the shape marks may overlap with other IP rights, for example design right and patent law. 
Thus, arguing in light of nanotechnology which is mainly significant for its functional and 
technical characteristics, for example, function of carbon nanotubes, furthermore nano-shape 
marks are unlikely seen as indicating trade origin.  
 
5.3.5 The use of word “nano”  
 
Nowadays, there is popular use of the prefix “nano”1140 and the use of the prefix could be 
descriptive or deceptive if the “nano” word is affixed to the goods or used for services that do 
not incorporate nanotechnology.1141   
 
Consulting the UK Trade Mark Registry, there are various marks for products and services 
that incorporate nanotechnology, for example Termix Na.No for Combs and Hairbrushes; 1142 
Nano Park for business management and leisure park;1143 Nano Snowboards for clothing and 
                                                          
1139 Ibid, at 821-822; and the decision was confirmed in the ECJ [2002] ETMR 81, at 974. 
1140 Interviewee C and gave example in Taiwan that the word “nano-marks” are popular used.  
1141 This is referred to “Nano-imposters”, signifies the goods or services that used prefix “nano” but does not use 
or incorporate nanotechnology, Du Mont J J ‘Trademarking Nanotechnology: Nano Lies and Federal 
Trademark Registration’ (2008) 36 Am. IP. Law Ass’n Q.J. 147, at n.18. 
1142 Class 21 NC. 
1143 Class 35 and 41 NC. 
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snow boards;1144 Baxi Nano for boilers;1145 Swansea Nano S Swansea Nanotechnology 
scientific and technological services and development of computer hardware and 
software;1146 Nano Safety for medical, veterinary, agriculture, horticulture, forestry 
services;1147 Nano Silver for chemicals, building materials, paints, bleaching and 
pharmaceutical and veterinary preparations;1148 Nano Silver Antibacterial Technology for 
hand tools, apparatus for lighting, heating, steaming and calculating and processing machine 
and equipments.1149  
 
Section 3 of the TMA 1994 covers signs which do not fulfil the requirements of Section 1(1) 
and cannot be registered, and signs may be registered only with the evidence of 
distinctiveness acquired through use.1150 The provisions preclude registration for signs which 
are devoid of any distinctive character, for descriptive signs and for generic signs which are 
customary in the trade.  
 
The discussion of descriptive marks in case law is useful consideration for the use of the 
word “nano”. In British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd1151 Jacob J has considered 
that a meaningless word or a word inappropriate for the goods concerned such as “North 
Pole” for bananas was distinctive, but a common laudatory word like “Treat” was devoid of 
any distinctive character in the absence of its use.1152 In Procter & Gamble Co v OHIM 
(Baby Dry)1153 the ECJ ruled that the combination of “baby” and “dry” was capable to be 
distinctive and was not simply descriptive in nature. The Court held that the descriptiveness 
must be assessed not only to each word separately but also to which they form part. The 
Court viewed that although the word “baby” and “dry” may form part of expression in 
everyday language in relation to the nappies, however, their “syntactically unusual 
                                                          
1144 Class 25 and 28 NC. 
1145 Class 11 NC. 
1146 Class 42 NC. 
1147 Class 16, 41, 42, 44 NC. 
1148 Class 1, 2, 3, 5, 19, 27 NC. 
1149 Class 8, 9 and 11 NC. 
1150Article 3 of TMD; Article 7 CTM; and the example for this is “Magic Nano”, Du Mont, n.1140, at p.153; see 
Libertel, [2003] ECR I-3793. 
1151 [1996] R.P.C. 281. 
1152 British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] R.P.C. 281, at 306. 
1153 [2002] Ch. 82. 
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juxtaposition” is not a familiar expression in the English language to describe the nappies or 
their essential characteristics.1154  
 
In OHIM v Wm Wrigley Jr Co (Doublemint)1155 OHIM refused to grant the application to 
register chewing gum mint flavour called “Doublemint” on the ground it was descriptive. 
The CFI has referred to the decision in “Baby-Dry” and allowed the registration on the 
ground that “Doublemint” was not exclusively descriptive.  The adjective ‘double’ was 
unusual when compared with other English words, such as ‘much’, ‘strong’, ‘extra’, ‘best’, 
‘finest’ and when combined with ‘mint’ it had two distinct meanings (a) twice the usual 
amount of mint; (b) flavoured with two varieties of mint. ‘Mint’ is a generic term which 
could refer to spearmint, peppermint and other culinary herbs. However, ECJ has overturned 
the decision if at least one of its possible meanings designates characteristics of the goods 
and services concerned. The ECJ also stated that the registration of such signs should be 
refused because of policy consideration that signs and indications that relate to the 
characteristics of goods and services may be freely used by anybody.1156 
 
As relates to nano-marks, the application to register two words “Nano Silver” for beds, 
mattresses, table covers, bed linen and pillow covers under Class 20 and 24 of the NC was 
rejected under Section 3(1) (b) and (d) of the TMA 1994 because the word “Nano Silver” has 
become customary in trade.1157 The objection was mainly raised because the marks consist 
exclusively of the words “Nano Silver” being a sign which may serve in trade to designate 
the nature of the goods such as beds, mattresses, table and bed linens that contain nano silver. 
It was stated by the examiner that nano silver is important and widely used in electronics 
goods, clothing, textiles, medical products especially for killing bacteria and viruses. It was 
argued by the applicant that the words “nano silver” is “extremely unusual in the context of 
the goods identified” and stated that the marks refer to a “high tech” application of 
technology to non-technical goods and the average consumer be aware of this fanciful 
                                                          
1154 Ibid, at 108. 
1155 [2004] E.T.M.R. 9. 
1156 See also Nichols v Registrar [2004 ECR I-8499 (AG Colomer, para 43). 
1157 In the Matter of Application No 2405309B; the examples of signs have already become generic include 
LINOLEUM, Yo-YO, ASPIRIN and CELLOPHANE, Bently and Sherman, at p.839; the word “Bravo” was 
refused registration because “Bravo” was seen by the relevant consumer as a word of praise, and not capable of 
distinguishing, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co [2000] ECR I-6959; If the consumer‘s perception of nanotechnology 
is growing the use of “nano” word marks are likely to become generic, see Du Mont, n.1140, at p.153. 
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application and would perceive the mark as an indicator of trade origin and not a descriptive 
reference to goods incorporating nano silver. The application was rejected because the word 
“nano silver” was widely used descriptively in trade in relation to types of the goods 
including woven and non-woven materials. Thus, the words “Nano Silver” in relation to 
beds, mattresses; table covers; bed linen and pillow covers is clear i.e. that the consumer 
would expect them to incorporate “nano silver”. The average consumer would not consider 
“nano silver” denoting of trade origin and therefore registration was refused.  
 
Applying the decided cases, the application to register word “nano” may give rise to the 
problem of descriptiveness or deceptiveness of the product and services. For example 
“Carbon Nanotechnologies” for carbon nanotubes or “Quantum Dot” for products or services 
that incorporated semiconductor nanocrystals,1158 the application may be rejected for being 
descriptive because the consumer is unable to associate to trade origin. Similar contention 
can be made for the use of word “nano” for deceptiveness purposes, the registration may be 
refused since it confuses the public perception, and create uncertainty over 
nanotechnology.1159 Due to policy consideration, the word “nano” should be kept freely 
available to anyone to use for appropriate services and products.  
 
5.3.6 The average consumer in nanotechnology 
 
The rule of “capable of distinguishing” must be assessed according to the eyes of the average 
consumer. The perception of the average consumer was viewed as crucial for assessing when 
a mark which was initially barred from registration under Article 3 (1) (b), (c) and (d) but 
would have acquired sufficient distinctiveness through use is to be registered.1160 In judging 
whether a mark was devoid of distinctive character which had acquired its distinctiveness 
through use, the perception of an average consumer was deemed to be decisive.1161 The rule 
for average consumer is that he is “normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not 
proceed to analyse its various details”.1162 Thus, for example the distinctive character of a 
                                                          
1158 Miller et al, n.32, at p.231. 
1159 Du Mont, n.1140, at p.164. 
1160 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2002] E.T.M.R. 81, at 969-970. 
1161 Phillips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2003] R.P.C. 2. 
1162 Sabel BV v Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport [1998] E.T.M.R. 1, at 8; Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. 
GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] E.T.M.R. 690, at 698. 
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sign which consists of shape of a product must be assessed in light of the presumed 
expectations of an average consumer of the category of goods or services in question who is 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect.1163 In assessing the 
misleading nature of the statement or description in question, the court may admit evidence 
of a consumer research poll or an expert’s report to assist its judgment.1164 However, the true 
fact is that the average consumer has little chance to make direct comparison between 
different products concerned but has to rely only on the imperfect recollection and 
consequently their level of attention is likely to vary according to the different categories of 
goods and services.1165 Furthermore, where there is likelihood of confusion of different 
categories of goods or services, the perception of marks in the mind of average consumer 
plays a decisive role. The standpoint of the relevant public will be very important for the 
Registry and the Court for the purpose of determining whether a sign is registrable or not 1166 
and for nano-marks, the relevant public may be scientists or technologists. 
 
In assessing distinctiveness, national courts may take into account a range of factors, on the 
inherent characteristics of the mark including element of descriptiveness of the goods and 
services; its market share; intensive and long-standing use of the mark; amount of its 
investment in promoting the mark; the relevant section of the public which could identify the 
mark as badge of origin.1167 It concluded that as a result “it is not possible to state in general 
terms, for example by referring to given percentage relating to the degree of recognition 
attained by the mark within the relevant section of the public, when a mark has a strong 
distinctive character”.1168  
 
Normally, it is easier for the consumer to opt for visual marks which are attractive, unusual 
or appealing. However, if the signs are related to the non-visually perceptible, how do the 
relevant consumers ‘see’ that the signs are trademarks and identify their trade mark function? 
                                                          
1163 Phillips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2003] R.P.C. 2, at 26; Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2002] E.T.M.R. 81, at 969; see also Gut Springenheide 
GmbH, Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1383, at 1407; Lloyd Schuhfabrik 
Meyer Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] E.T.M.R. 690, at 697-698. 
1164 [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1383, at 1407.  
1165 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] E.T.M.R. 690, at 698. 
1166 For example in Libertel Groep BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] E.T.M.R. 63; [2004] F.S.R. 4 “For the 
purposes of determining whether a colour per se is registrable as a trade mark it is necessary to take as a 
standpoint that of the relevant public”, at 74-75.  
1167 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] E.T.M.R. 690, at 697. 
1168 [1999] E.T.M.R. 690, at 699. 
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There was always the case that the consumer perceives the sign as indicating the functions or 
characteristics of the goods rather than origin and it has been suggested that to overcome this 
situation is to educate the consumers first in order them to treat those sign as trade mark. 1169 
This statement could be important for nanotechnology as the consumer may not perceive the 
mark as indicating trade origin, therefore, the information should be well educated to the 
consumer in order for them to appreciate nano-marks. The level of attention1170 of an average 
consumer in nanotechnology is likely to vary depending on the products or services 
concerned, for example group of technologist, or scientist, or technician which dealt with 
nanotechnology. It is useful to categorise the average consumer based on nano-products of 
different types. For example, the IBM letters of nano-marks, the average consumer could be 
the lab scientists or the technologist that in particular involved in manipulating the atoms; or 
for shape of carbon nanotubes, the average consumer could involve more than one such 
consumer that could distinguish carbon nanotubes with different shapes, its functional and its 
technical function (this suggests that the shape will be functional therefore non-registrable); 
for Nano Silver, the average consumer could be the consumer in general, carefully handling 
and buying the products; nano-encapsulation smell for textiles and accessories, the average 
consumer could also be the consumer in general; for nano word marks for example Nano 
Snowboards, the average consumer would be the consumer of the goods in general; for other 
cosmetic products that enhanced with nano “word”, the average consumer could be 
dermatologist; for certification and collective nano-marks, the average consumer could be the 
ordinary consumer or the buying companies that comply with the safety and environmental 
regulations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1169 McCutcheon, n.1093, at pp. 164-165. 
1170 Davis J Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn) (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at p.201, cited Procter & Gamble Co v 
Office of Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2004] E.T.M.R. 89, at 1205 where the COA decided that the 
level of attention in everyday consumer goods such as shape and pattern of washing machine and dishwasher 
tablets is not high, However, this view should be contrasted with the decision of the CFI in Doublemint’s case 
[2004] E.T.M.R.9 that the numerous meanings of DOUBLEMINT were actually apparent to an average English 
speaker and for its very nature of having vague and fanciful meaning, it would not be so for the non-native 
English speaker, and therefore would not be descriptive.  
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5.4 DESIGNS AND NANOTECHNOLOGY 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
Design protection is arguably available to protect nanotechnology features although the 
arguments experience some difficulties. The contention is that not only the nature of 
nanotechnology itself, and its suitability as subject-matter, but also the inherent nature of 
overlapping rights in the IPRs regimes as well as complexity in the design law protection 
itself, pose problems. The last point is exemplified in the practices of the UK design system 
that protects design within five different types - (a) UK registered design; (b) UK 
unregistered design right; (c) the Community registered design; (d) the Community 
unregistered design and (e) copyright law (especially for  surface decoration).  
 
In Malaysia, the protection of industrial design is provided under the Industrial Design Act 
1996 (IDA),1171 or under copyright law.1172 The scope and protection of registered design law 
in Malaysia seems unlikely to protect nano adequately because of the “eye-appeal” 
requirement. Thus, the discussion on the position in the UK and EU Directive may provide 
relevant consideration for Malaysia. The creation of sui generis rights of Semiconductor 
Chips under unregistered right in UK law provides a good discussion for nanotechnology. 
The questions that are relevant here are; (a) do nanotechnology creations comprise “designs” 
within the meaning of design law?; (b) does the size of nanoscale creations pose problems for 
design law?; (c) is their (non) visibility fatal to design law? 
 
Examples of design may be features or appearance of devices such as nano-bots,1173 or nano-
robotics systems in medicine,1174 the functional design of orthopaedic devices for arms and 
joint replacement,1175 the molecular design that mimicks nature called “bio-mimetic”,1176 and 
                                                          
1171 Act 552, has come into force on the 1st September 1999. 
1172 See 5.2.3.3.  
1173 Interviewee C. 
1174 See for example in Hamdi M and Ferreira A Modeling and Characterization of Bio-Nanorobotic System 
(Netherlands: Springer, 2010) at p.1. 
1175 Interviewee A. 
1176 Interviewee D. 
211 
 
the design of bio-compatible dendrimers (very large, tree-like molecules) for cancer 
diagnosis.1177  
 
5.4.2 International protection for design law 
 
Article 2(7) of Berne provides that it is at the discretion of Union members to determine the 
extent of the application and the conditions of protection to the works of applied art and 
industrial designs and models. If works have been protected as designs and models in the 
country of origin, they shall be entitled in another country to special protection afforded to 
designs and models. However, works will be protected as an artistic works if there is no 
special protection granted in that country.1178  
 
Another international treaty which is important for the design protection is the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris).1179 Article 1(2) of Paris 
recognises industrial designs as subject matter of protection under industrial property. There 
is no guideline of what constitutes ‘industrial designs’, their nature or conditions of 
protection; only it provides for the regulatory guidance in relation to the national treatment, 
priority of filing, marking requirement, grace period for renewal etc.1180  Art 5quinquies 
requires merely that industrial designs “be protected in all countries of the Union”.  
TRIPS requires WTO member states to protect industrial design under Article 25 (1) which 
states that: 
“Member shall provide for the protection of independently created industrial designs that are new 
or original. Members may provide that designs are not new or original if they do not significantly 
differ from known designs or combinations of known design features. Members may provide that 
such protection shall not extend to designs dictated essentially by technical or functional 
considerations”. 
TRIPS provides no guideline on what constitutes the subject matter of industrial design nor is 
any reference be made to works of applied art and industrial designs,1181 but rather it reflects 
                                                          
1177 Cheng Y et al, n.252, at p.2673. 
1178 See 5.2.2 that “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain. 
1179 March 20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as amended on September 28, 1979  
1180 Suthersanen U Design Law in Europe (London: S&M, 2000), at pp.432-433, these regulatory guidance 
implicitly suggest for the registration based system for design protection. 
1181
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the mixed nature of industrial designs which is subject matter of industrial property and 
works of applied art which is protectable subject matter under copyright law.1182  Industrial 
design is most often regarded as a form of protection that concerns the aesthetic appearance 
as applied to the useful object or article and whose purpose is appeal to the eye of the 
potential buyer.1183 Furthermore, TRIPS does not specify any system of protection, either 
registered or unregistered, nor whether any examination is required.1184 Members are only 
obliged to protect ‘independently created’ industrial designs that are new or original. The 
concept of ‘independently created’ is more of a  subjective nature i.e. the design has been the 
creation of his own acts and not copied from the existing ones,1185 whereas “new” is an 
objective element.1186 The condition of “independently created” suggests copyright-type 
protection for industrial designs, but as long as the requirement of novelty is an alternative, 
the requirement is ambiguous–as long the design is independently created, it does not need to 
be new for it to be protected.1187 However, the novelty requirement takes precedence over 
independent creation to the fact that the members are not obliged to protect independently 
created designs if it is not new.1188  
 
It is unclear whether members could adopt both conditions i.e. new and original and whether 
they could adopt additional criteria.1189 The criteria of novelty or original, due to the word 
                                                          
1182 De Carvalho N P The Trips Regime of Trademarks and Designs (The Netherlands: KLI, 2006), at p.395. 
Thus, the word “industrial designs” under the TRIPS includes all types of aesthetic, useful and functional 
designs, protectable subject matter as “works of applied art” or “works of artistic craftsmanship” protected 
under copyright and utility models, Dutfield and Suthersanen, n.1122, at p.167. 
1183 Gervais, n.222, at p.326 and further adds that this normally referred to visual ornament, characteristics of 
such an article or its external appearance. 
1184 Correa, n.229, at p.261; this is the choice of system of protection either upon registration, or through 
unregistered design right or through the copyright system, see Phillips J Protecting Values in Industrial Designs 
in Correa C and Yusuf A (eds) 2nd ed. Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement 
(London: KLI, 1998) at p.223. 
1185 Correa, n.229, at p.261;Gervais, n.222, at p.327; Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.397. 
1186 Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.437, queries that in what sense ‘original’ is different from ‘independently created’. 
Independently created means that the design has been the creation of his own acts, not copied, Correa, n.229, at 
p.261; this would probably excludes a design that was copied or imitated existing ones, Gervais, n.222, at p.327. 
1187 De Carvalho, n.1182, at pp.396-397. 
1188 De Calvalho, n.1182, at p.397; the novelty concept does not make any reference whether to be absolute or 
local and this requirement varies between different countries, Correa, n.229, at p.262.  
1189 Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.437, for example the EC Design Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on Legal Protection of Designs (Design Directive) and Amended 
Community Design Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs 
(Design Regulation) requires a design to be novel and have individual character. In Bailey (t/a Elite Angling 
Products) v Haynes (t/a) RAGS) [2007] F.S.R. 10 in the Patent county Court concerned the alleged 
infringement of both a UK unregistered design right a Community unregistered design right (CUD). In 
considering the claim based on the CUD, Judge Fysh stated that “Finally, according to the rubric to Article 4 of 
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‘or’ rather than ‘and’ have been suggested as not cumulative;1190 but these criteria could also 
be regarded as combination by the Member States.1191 Musker strongly stresses that the 
requirement of new or original is only for the sake of general principle, “that old or copied 
designs should not be re-monopolised, rather than as mandating particular ways of 
implementing the tests which achieve this result; otherwise, one would struggle to find any 
country in compliance with TRIPS”.1192  
 
The Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs was 
revised in 1999 to make it more user-friendly for common law and examination systems1193. 
At present neither Malaysia nor the UK are members, although the EU is. Under the 1999 
Act, the Community Design system could be used as a starting point for Hague filing, 
alternatively an international application could be filed directly by a person with nationality, 
domicile, habitual residence or real and effective industrial or commercial establishment 
within the territory of a Contracting Party. Hague does not lay down substantive provisions, 
so could only be used if the laws of target states provided for protection of nano-designs. 
 
The laws at the international level allow for various interpretations among Members – they 
may opt for design protection according to their own national laws through registration 
system, or unregistered system or copyright-like protection. The situation at the international 
level of protection has greatly contributed to (or at least allowed the continuation of) 
divergence in modes of protection. As relates to nanotechnology, similar argument as in 
copyright protection for nanoscale works can be made to the nanoscale design.1194 Berne, 
Paris and TRIPS do not seem to exclude the protection of design at nanoscale, although they 
may not expressly include such design. Therefore, the assumption can be made that at the 
international level, there is no specific rule and the position is totally unclear whether 
member states should protect nanoscale design. Thus, it is a matter at the national law as to 
protect nanoscale design or not. As the research questions above highlight, the answers to all 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Regulation, novelty and the possession of individual character are threshold “requirements for protection”, 
at 53. 
1190 Gervais, n.222, at p.327. 
1191 Phillips, n.1184, at p.223. 
1192 Musker D Community Design Law: Principles and Practice (London: S&M, 2002), at pp.23-24. 
1193The Geneva Act was adopted by Diplomatic Conference on July 2, 1999. For texts, see 
http://www.wipo.int/hague/en/legal_texts/.  
1194 See 5.2.2. 
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three research questions are unclear as regards the international treaties, but there seems to be 
no impediment to protection at the national or regional level. 
 
5.4.3 Complex nature of design protection 
 
The complexity at the international level is mirrored in national laws. Different forms of 
protections emanate either in the IPRs generally or in the design protection regime itself.  
What could be the correct IP approach protection for the design protection?1195 The fact that 
various types of protection which could either exist in parallel or in cumulative ways is also 
responsible for further diversity in design protection.1196 With the aim to approximate 
specific national laws concerning registered industrial designs between member states, the 
Design Directive was implemented. Further, with the aim of EC single market 
harmonisation, the Design Regulation created the Community registered design (CRD) and 
the Community unregistered design (CUD). Various national laws in Europe represented a 
number of approaches for design protection.1197 The existing designs system has been 
described by Howe that “the upshot is an area of law of labyrinthine complexity”1198 and 
‘design' as “a slippery concept and operates in different fields of endeavour”.1199 
Potentially, design protection could overlap with other IPRs – such copyright,1200 patent,1201 
trademarks,1202 passing-off,1203 breach of confidence1204 and unfair competition.1205 Cornish 
and Llewelyn emphasise that:  
                                                          
1195 For an extensive discussion of the “design approach” over purely copyright protection, see Kur A ‘The 
Green Paper’s “Design Approach” – What’s Wrong with it?’ (1993) E.I.P.R. 374. 
1196 Co-existing in parallel means that the design is protected under one regime in preference of another and 
cumulative protection means to allow for simultaneous or concurrent of two or more regimes, Correa, n.229, at 
p.258. 
1197 For a survey prior to harmonization of Design Directive of various aspects of designs law in selected 
European countries i.e. Benelux, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK see Firth A ‘Aspects of Design 
Protection in Europe’ (1993) E.I.P.R. 42 at pp.44-47. 
1198 Howe M Russell-Clarke and Howe on Industrial Designs 7th ed (London: S&M, 2005), at p. 2. 
1199 Firth, n.1197, at p.42. 
1200 For example designs may be embodied in copyright materials such as drawings, plan and blueprints, 
Torremans, n.200, at p.317. See also British Leyland Motor Corp v Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd [1986] AC 557; 
[1986] All E.R. 850. 
1201
The legislative wording of “aesthetic creation” under Article 52(2)(b) EPC was not intended to reduce the 
overlap between the patent with designs, but patents with copyright, thus gives advantage for the design to have 
double protection either patents or copyright, nonetheless triple protection is quite rare, Musker, n.1192, at p.76.  
1202 See decision in Phillips Electronics BV Remington Consumer Products [1998] R.P.C. 283. Logos and labels 
of trade mark may be eligible for design protection and the fears of unwanted overlap between designs and 
trademark would appear exaggerated - in Germany the problems of overlapping between designs and 
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“intellectual property in industrial design occupies a midway point between patents and 
copyright, at the one pole, and trade marks at the other, but like the earth’s equator, it is not easy 
to fix if you only have a compass”.1206  
This is similar to the exposition made by Suthersanen:  
“the subject of design protection enjoys a rather ambivalent status in the IP world, suffering 
jurisdictional encroachments under copyright, patent, utility model, trade mark and unfair 
competition laws”.1207  
 
Although it may be argued that it should be possible to define precisely the areas of industrial 
designs and artistry and patentable invention, there are indeed no defining lines and this 
could lead to many practical problems.1208 Other instances - where functional designs can be 
protected under the designs right, this could inevitably overlap with patents and utility 
models, and shape designs could overlap with trademarks registration and unfair competition 
law.1209 The wide conception of protectable subject matter demonstrates the difficulty of 
drawing the overall picture of design protection.1210 The scope of protection, the subject 
matter, the requirement of protection, the term of protection vary considerably from country 
to country – some require absolute or local novelty, some require originality, some require 
aesthetic elements or distinctiveness of the designs.1211  
The rules of design protection are uncertain as Franzosi states that:  
“the problems of legal protection of industrial design are not at all easy. The rules of law are 
different in different countries; differences are substantial because the laws are based on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
trademarks are said to have remained practically unknown, Kur A ‘Protection of Graphical User Interfaces 
under European Design Legislation’ (2003) I.I.C. 50, at p.60-61. 
1203 See a decision in Benchairs v Chair Centre [1974] R.P.C. 429; and to be contrasted in Hodgkinson & Corby 
and Roho v Wards Mobility Services [1995] F.S.R. 169. 
1204 See Carflow Products v Linwood Securities [1996] F.S.R. 424; Valeo Vision SA v Flexible Lamps [1995] 
R.P.C. 205. 
1205 Hilty R M The Law Against Unfair Competition and Its Interfaces in Hilty R M and Henning-Bodewig F 
(eds) Law Against Unfair Competition Towards A New Paradigm in Europe? (Berlin: Springer, 2007), at pp.39-
41. 
1206 Cornish and Llewelyn, n.307, at p.567. 
1207 Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.1. 
1208 Morris A I and Quest B Design: The Modern Law and Practice (London: Butterworths, 1987), at p.2. 
Because of the hybrid nature of designs, it is difficult to classify either as an industrial work or as artistic work, 
Reichman J ‘Design Protection and the Legislative Agenda’ (1992) 55 Law and Contemporary Problems 281, at 
287; and also Dutfield and Sutheranen state that the difficulty nature to categorise either as industrial work or 
artistic work, partly due to the ambiguity of the term ‘design’, n.1122, at p.167. 
1209 Musker, n.1192, at p.75. 
1210 Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.103. 
1211 Correa, n.229, at p.258. 
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different philosophies. The application of these rules is far from being certain. It might even be 
suggested that some decisions seem based more on chance than on logic or law”.1212  
 
The inherent complexities within design protection, and overlap with other IPRs would cause 
double complexities to be applied in nanotechnology due to its multiple fields and cross 
disciplines. It seems from the above discussion that design law complexity would be 
extremely problematic for nanotechnology, even if protection is available. Discussion below 
examines the design protection for nanotechnology under Malaysian, UK and its European 
counterparts.  
 
5.4.4 Nano-creations design under Malaysian law 
 
The law which protects industrial designs in Malaysia is the IDA and the Industrial Designs 
Regulation 1999. The meaning of ‘design’ under IDA is mirrored to the definition of design 
under the old UK Registered Design Act.  
 
Section 3(1) of the IDA defines ‘industrial designs’ means features of shape, configuration, 
pattern and ornament applied to an article by any industrial process or means being features 
which in the finished article appeal to and judged by the eye. Section 3(1) excludes methods 
or principles of construction and features of shape or configuration of an article if they 
dictate solely by the function and depend upon the appearance of another article.  
 
Under this section, industrial design is to protect the features of shape, configuration, pattern 
or ornament applied to an article by an industrial process.1213 The industrial design also must 
                                                          
1212 Franzosi M ‘The Legal Basis of Industrial Design: Unfair Competition as a Basis of Protection’ (1990) 
E.I.P.R. 154, at p.154, and further states that there should be more than one principle of industrial property law 
available for the design protection, at p.156. 
1213 For example the pattern can be geometric, free, regular or irregular especially in the textile and wallpaper 
industries, whereas ornament normally applied to other article for decorative purposes especially in the pottery 
and ceramics industries, Abdul Jalil J Industrial Designs Law in Malaysia: Cases and Commentary (Petaling 
Jaya: S&M Asia, 2004) at p.20. In the UK under earlier Registered Designs Acts, see the meaning of these in 
Re Clarke’s Registered Design: Clarke v Julius Sax & Co Ltd (1896) 13 R.P.C; Dover v Nurnberger Celluloid 
Waren Fabrik Gebruder Wolff [1910] 2 Ch 25; For an extensive meaning of ‘industrial design’ see for example 
Woodring C C ‘A Designer’s View on the Scope of Intellectual Property Protection’ (1996) A.I.P.L.A. 
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be features which in the finished article that are appealed or judged by the eye.1214 This is 
important to note that only industrial design that appealed to the eye could be registered, 
which means that the appearance of the registered design was a material factor in attracting 
consumer i.e. the article’s appeal was seen to reside in its shape, pattern, or 
ornamentation.1215 The protection also excludes the designs that depend upon the appearance 
of another article also known as “must-match”. This provision is likely to reject the 
protection of spare parts because normally spare parts are functional in nature or must match 
in the case of bodywork spares. For this ground alone spare parts will be excluded under the 
Malaysian industrial design law, though they can be protected under copyright law and patent 
laws.1216 However, this provision is of more general application, not limited to the spare parts 
only. Although the wide coverage of the definition of the designs, including two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional features, nevertheless, the requirement of ‘eye-appeal’ may seem 
problematic to be applied to nanotechnology. Thus, it appears that features of feature of 
shape, configuration, pattern or ornament applied to an article and judged by the eye require 
more for the visibility of the design. Furthermore, the law in Malaysia does not protect the 
design alone, but the design that applied to an article. The answer the above research 
questions is less likely to suggest that nanoscale creations are protected in Malaysia, 
particularly “eye appeal” requirement is fatal for each of them.  
 
5.4.5 Nano-creations design under UK and EU law 
 
UK registered design is protected under the Registered Design Act 1949 (as amended by the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (RDA) and the Registered Designs Regulations 
2001).1217 With the amendment of the CDPA 1988 to exclude copyright protection from 
many designs under section 51, a new right was introduced, the unregistered design right. 
This right modelled the hybrid quasi-copyright type of protection with the intervention for 
the need of an automatic, short-term protection for both functional and non-functional three-
                                                          
1214 The eye-appeal test was held in Redland Tiles Ltd & Ord v Kua Hong Brick Tile Works [1996] 2 M.L.J. 62, 
Per Abdul Aziz J, at 62. 
1215 Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc [1988] A.C. 217. 
1216 Abdul Jalil, n.1213, at p.72 and p.75. 
1217 SI 2001 No. 3949, which implemented Directive 98/71/EC; The Registered Designs Regulations 2003 SI 
2003 No. 550 amended the Act in relation to Community Designs. 
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dimensional designs.1218 The design does not need to be registered and the period of 
protection is shorter than the maximum for registered design or copyright protection, even 
under section 52. It is often seen as protecting three-dimensional design but configuration 
arguably can be in two-dimensional form.  
 
Subsequently the Design Directive was introduced and implemented in the UK. The Design 
Directive is intended to harmonise the substantive laws of design protection among the 
member states and to overcome the problems of free movement of goods resulting from 
different level of protection in the member states.1219 The EU has also introduced 
Community-wide protection under the Design Regulation for registered and unregistered 
designs.1220 A single registration of the design is effective for all member states and is 
administered by the Office for Harmonisation of the Internal Market (OHIM) in Alicante. 
The substantive law of the Design Regulation is similar to the Design Directive.1221  
 
There are certainly various types of protection of designs in the UK; the situation has been 
described as “multi-layered, complex and lacking in logic”1222 and “absurd maze.”1223 
Against this background Calls for Evidence and business surveys were conducted by the 
UKIPO in response to the Hargreaves report on the lack of evidence that design law supports 
business innovation, and whether there is a need to change the design law in the UK. 1224 
What is clear from the responses to the Calls for Evidence is that there is no appetite for 
                                                          
1218 Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.233; Reichman J H Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property 
Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in Correa C M and Yusuf A A Intellectual 
Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (eds) (2nd edn) (The Netherlands: KLI, 2008), at p.57 
n.241. 
1219 Davis, n.1170, at p.315; Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.26; The harmonisation of the registered system among 
member states necessary for the smooth functioning of the internal market, see also Recital 1, 2 and 3 of the EC 
Design Directive; See also a commentary of the Design Directive as implemented, has resolved some major 
difficulties in the English law especially related to copyright and design regime, in Scanlan G and Gale S 
‘Industrial Design and the Design Directive: Continuing and Future Problems in Design Rights?’ (2005) J.B.L. 
91, at pp.93-111. 
1220 The aim of the Design Regulation is to achieve a unitary system by creating a two-tier systems of rights of 
the CRD and supplement by the CUD, Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.26; see also the Green Paper which states that 
the aim of registered design is to create certainty of what design merit for protection and what is not, and the 
introduction of unregistered was also to reduce the legal certainty, at para 4.3.9. 
1221 The scope and extent of protection of design under the Community Designs Regulation was found to be 
narrow in Procter & Gamble Co v Reckitt and Benckiser (UK) Ltd [2006] EWCH 3154 (Ch); [2008] F.S.R. 8; 
see case comment on this by Connor I ‘The Design Trigger: Case Comment of Procter & Gamble v Reckitt 
Benckiser’ (2007) E.I.P.R. 293; see also Brazell L ‘Court Defines on Designs’ (2007/08) Euro. Law 10.  
1222 Bently and Sherman, n.211, at p.612. 
1223 Cornish and Llewelyn, n.307, at p.598. 
1224 See ‘IPO Assessment of the Need for Reform of the Design Intellectual Property Framework’ December 
2011, UKIPO, at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/hargreaves-designsassessment.pdf, accessed on 27 April 2012. 
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reducing the term of protection afforded by the UK unregistered design to three years to 
match Community unregistered design as this would reduce the protection currently 
available. Respondents also advise against a simple abolition of UK unregistered design right 
for the same reason. The meaning of design and its scope of protection under RDA, Design 
Directive and Design Regulation are very similar.  
 
5.4.5.1 Nano-creations under registered design  
 
The definition of design refers to the ‘appearance’ of the whole or part of a product. The 
word ‘appearance’ does not necessarily mean that the design has to be attractive or 
aesthetic.1225 The question is what constitutes ‘appearance’?1226 In other words, given the 
nature of no requirement of eye-appeal, does the appearance of a product indicate that the 
visual perception is significant? According to Musker, given the ordinary meaning, the word 
‘appearance’ refers to visual perception.1227 Suthersanen, suggests that the word covers a 
wide interpretation to include any economic value that attached to the appearance of the 
product; and this ‘appearance’ implies any element which can be perceived by human senses 
for example the weight, flexibility of a product or the tactile impression.1228 However, 
Suthersanen further argues that the word is unlikely to be extended to protect products 
characterised by its smell or sound that affect the aural or olfactory sense.1229 Massa and 
Strowel state that the word ‘appearance’ means that the design may be part of the product 
which could either visible or tactile.1230 This could mean that the appearance needs to be 
reasonably fixed, which is probably true for many nano-structures. 
 
The Green Paper in assessing the ‘appearance’ refers it in general term which “excludes 
those features of product which cannot be perceived by the human senses”.1231 Along the 
line, Recital 111232 of the Design Directive refers to protection of those “features shown 
                                                          
1225 Musker, n.1192, at p.12; see Recital 14; see also Bently and Sherman, n.211, at p.628. 
1226
The concern of the “appearance of a product” has been made through Recital 10 of the Design Directive; see 
Recital 10. 
1227 Musker, n1192, at p.12. 
1228 Suthersanen, n.1179, at p.28. 
1229 Ibid, at p.29. 
1230 Massa C-H and Strowel A ‘Community Design: Cinderella Revamped’ (2003) E.I.P.R. 68; at p.71. 
1231 The Green Paper at 5.4.7.3.  
1232 See Recital 11. 
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visibly in an application” and Recital 131233 of the Design Directive refers to the “informed 
user viewing the design” regarding individual character. In nanotechnology, the ‘informed 
user’ of nano has visualising equipments such as STM and AFM. Commenting on the basis 
of these recitals, Musker strongly views that the ‘appearance’ should be given a wider 
meaning to include vision and touch.1234 The same contention viewed by Franzosi in 
interpreting the ‘appearance’ means the aesthetic elements which may be perceived by the 
human eye or by the touch.1235 Sykes opines that the definition of ‘appearance’ of the first 
reading would suggest that some features which must be perceptible visually/visual 
impression.1236  
 
The question is whether the design needs to be visible to the eye? Or could it be include other 
features which may be perceived by other sense? There is no specific requirement that the 
design must be visible to the naked eye.1237 For example, with the aid of visualizing device 
namely a computer, the design icon is of the important part of the appearance of the article 
which attracts people to buy.1238 Earlier EU drafts excluded Semiconductor Chips from 
protection because of its invisibility, and now the exclusion was removed.1239  
 
In answering the question as to whether this provision could include features which may not 
be directly perceived by the eye or touch – for example by using special tools like glasses 
and microscopes, Franzosi claims that the indicative nature of the list (lines, contours, 
colours, shape, materials and ornamentation) is likely to suggest that there is nothing to 
prevent from defining features which may be directly or indirectly recognised by human 
beings.1240 This question is important for nanotechnology on the same stance that only 
                                                          
1233 See Recital 13.   
1234 Musker explains that Recital 11 is just a guideline to the normal practice of registering visual representation 
of the appearance of designs; whereas Recital 13 using the word ‘viewing’ is to be treated as an example rather 
than to limit it and strongly stresses that this interpretation is the most consistent with legislative history. 
However he adds that Recital 11, and possibly Recital 13 could be used to interpret “design” to restrict it to 
visible features, and visually assessed, n.1192, at pp.13-14. 
1235 Franzosi M in Franzosi M (ed) European Design Protection: Commentary to Directive and Regulation 
Proposals (The Netherlands: KLI, 1996), at p.4; see Recital 11 of the Design Directive. 
1236 Sykes J Intellectual Property in Designs (UK: LXB, 2005), at p.110. 
1237 See Dutfield and Suthersanen, n.1122, at p.167; Torremans, n.200, at p.324 nevertheless explains that by 
referring to Recital 14 and Recital 11 and “appearance” of design definition states that this is still concerned 
with the “look and feel”. 
1238 See Per Jacob J in Apple Computer Inc v Design Registry [2002] E.C.D.R. 19, at 193. 
1239 Musker, n.1192, at p.17. 
1240 Franzosi in Franzosi, n.1235, at p.41.  
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special tools could be used to “see”. Therefore, the invisibility of the design features or items 
at sub-visible scale can be considered ‘products’ under the Design Regulation and the 
“design” is not only limited to the features of shape visible only to the naked eye, thus, there 
is no reason for not protecting of the mere appearance of structures at the nanoscale.1241  
 
However, as regards to the EU design law, Koschtial claims the presumption can be made 
that the design which can only be seen with the aid of technical tools will not be justifiable 
and therefore cannot be termed as ‘visible’ under the European law.1242 According to 
Koschtial, the correct interpretation of the visibility is that “visible to the average observer 
with ordinary effort. This means that one can demand that the observer uses glasses but not a 
microscope”.1243 This may not be true for nanotechnology since the average observer may be 
among experts including technologist with the ordinary effort (without having to go through 
the thorough lab testing or experiment for example), the design of nanoscale creation is 
‘visible’ for them.   
 
In answering the question whether designs can comprise features which are invisible or not 
completely visible to the human eye, Sykes states that the word “appearance” under 
registered design and Community designs does not suggest that the design or features have to 
be visible to the human unaided.1244 Thus, Sykes strongly suggests that where the designs or 
features are so small that cannot be perceived by human senses unaided; they should qualify 
for the legal protection.1245 This is a view to support for the protection of invisible designs 
like nanotechnology, although they cannot be perceived by the human senses, can be 
protected under the existing registered design law of the EU and its Member States.  
 
The non-exhaustive list of characteristics covers a wide range of designs, as the Commission 
for the Green Paper (Green Paper) concluded that the definition of “design” should be broad 
to cover "the two-dimensional or three-dimensional features of the appearance of a product 
... which are capable of being perceived by the human senses as regards forms and/or 
                                                          
1241 Jenkins, Protection of Microscopic and Nanoscopic Structures Through Design Registration, Patent Issues, 
Nanotechnology Special Edition, 2009, available at http://www.jenkins.eu/my-uploads/nanotech-special-
edition-spring-2009.pdf, accessed on 15 Jan 2010, at p.3. 
1242 Koschtial U ’Design Law: Individual Character, Visibility and Functionality’ (2005) I.I.C. 297, at p.310. 
1243 Ibid, at p.310. 
1244 Sykes, n.1236, at p.115. 
1245 Ibid, at p.115. 
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colour.”1246 The word ‘capable of being perceived by human sense’ clearly suggests that the 
appearance of the product must be perceived by the human sense, may include sight and 
touch (reinforced by the requirement for visibility in use of parts of complex products). This 
appears to be problematic for nano-design. In Lindner Recyclingtech GmbH v Franssons 
Verkstäder AB1247 concerned a complex product as a machine for shredding and the 
component part was chaff cutter and which rotates and cut up the material inserted into the 
shredding machine. The appellant argued that the operator cannot see the operation of the 
step rotor in normal use because it was covered by the material to be shredded. The appellant 
also argued that while spinning, the step rotor cannot be seen properly.  The Third BOA 
stated that at certain limited degree, the step rotor is visible in normal use. The BOA 
concluded that the provision of Article 4(2)(a) of the Community Design Regulation does not 
require that the component part has to be visible in its entirety.1248 In Lindner it was 
suggested that visibility some of the time is enough, but nano-creation is visible none of the 
time unless it visualized with special tools.  
 
Design right does not subsist in features of appearance of product which are ‘solely dictated 
by technical function’.1249 The purpose of the exclusion is to prevent technological 
innovation being hampered as provided under Recital 14 of the Designs Directive, and to 
ensure that the designers could not create a monopoly over the design.1250 The words ‘solely 
dictated by function’ suggest that if there is the design freedom of choosing the features, 
means that the design is not dictated solely by its function and therefore, protected.1251 The 
exclusion from protection of design features “dictated solely by technical function” may 
suggest problematic for nanoscale creations, as they normally involve technical function.  
The phrase ‘solely dictated by function’ appears in the Design Directive and Design 
Regulation, is similar to the RDA 1949 prior to EU harmonization. However, was originally 
interpreted differently from its earlier construction under UK law, particularly by the HL in 
                                                          
1246 Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Industrial Design. Working Document of the Services of the 
Commission. III/F/5131/91 – EN, June 1991 at 5.4.7.1; available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1785/01/design_gp_1.pdf  
1247 [2010] E.C.D.R. 1. 
1248  Ibid, the Third BOA, at 8-9. 
1249 Section 1C(1) RDA; Article 7 of Designs Directive; Article 8(1) Design Regulation. 
1250 See Oren (Isaac) v Red Box Toy Factory Ltd [1999] FSR 785, at 14 and 15; see Lindner Recyclingtech 
GmbH v Frassons Verkstader AB [2010] E.C.D.R. 1, at 28. 
1251 Colston and Galloway, n.217, at p.496. 
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Amp v Utilux Pty Ltd.1252 It was more generous interpretation to the Community design 
which was based upon so-called ‘multiplicity of forms’ which means that if more than one 
design could perform the technical function, each design would not be ‘solely dictated by 
function’. This concept has it root from French and German origin, and was endorsed by 
Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Phillips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer 
Products Ltd.1253 This approach, which produced divergent results under trade mark law and 
design law, was followed in design cases in the UK (Landor & Hawa International Ltd v 
Azure Designs Ltd).1254 However, doubt was been cast on this interpretation by Third BOA, 
OHIM in Lindner Recyclingtech GmbH v Frassons Verkstader AB.1255 The BOA held that, 
despite the possibility that other designs could achieve the same technical result, the design 
was dictated solely by function in that, assessed objectively. The relevant of the product’s 
appearance were chosen exclusively to achieve functional performance rather than to 
enhance its visual appearance. In the BOA’s view, this interpretation was the correct one on 
both a literal and a teleological approach. Furthermore, the BOA referred to withdrawal by 
the French Courts from the multiplicity-of-forms analysis and while recognizing that good 
design combines form and function, and that Community design legislation explicitly does 
not require aesthetic merit or eye-appeal, but the BOA rejected the argument that purely 
functional designs were therefore protectable.1256. 
 
Based on Lindners’ ruling1257 despite other design could have the possibility of achieving the 
same result, the design is said to have dictated solely of technical function. If the 
interpretation Lindner is correct, this would likely to exclude all possibility of protection for 
nanoscale creations. Thus, it could be argued that there is very little chance of registered 
design/Community design being available for nano-creations, as per Malaysia, and no further 
consideration will be given to the requirements for protection as registered designs, or 
unregistered Community designs. However, there is another route that could be possible to 
protect nano-creations as under UK unregistered design which relates to the technical 
features. 
                                                          
1252 [1971] F.S.R. 572 where the HL held that the product’s configuration was solely dictated by its technical 
function if every feature of the design was determined by technical consideration. 
1253 [2002] ECR I-5475. 
1254 [2006] EWCA Civ 1285. 
1255 [2010] ECDR 1. 
1256 [2010] E.C.D.R. 1, at para 34. 
1257 Applied in Dyson v Vax [2010] F.S.R. 39; [2011] EWCA Civ 1206.  
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5.4.5.2 Nano-Creations design under UK Unregistered Design  
 
Section 213 (2) of the CDPA 1988 defines ‘design’ as any aspect of the shape or 
configuration (internal or external) of the whole or part of an article. The subject matter 
protection of unregistered design is also broad and protects functional and aesthetic features 
of shape and configuration.1258 The protection granted under unregistered design is of 
comparatively shorter duration i.e. normally 10 years from the first marketing of articles with 
a maximum of 15 years from the creation for the design.1259 Section 213 excludes the 
protection of a method or principle of construction and design right also does not subsist in 
features of shape or configuration of an article which enable article to be connected or placed 
against another article so that either may perform its function or are dependent upon the 
appearance of another article to form an integral part.1260 Design right also does not subsist in 
surface decoration because it is protected under copyright law or registered design.1261  
 
The provision is silent as to whether the design features must be visible to the naked eye. The 
High Court in Ocular Sciences Limited v Aspects Vision Care1262 held that there was no 
reference has been made under the CDPA 1988 that the features must appeal to and are 
judged by the eye. The intention of the Act was to give the protection for the functional 
design. Laddie J stated that:  
“The eye may not be able to distinguish the shapes but that does not mean that they are not 
different. That being so, it seems to me that it is not possible to exclude detailed dimensional 
shapes on the ground that they are not designs. This does not mean that mere changes in scale 
produce different designs”.1263  
 
Similarly, in Fulton Co Ltd v Totes Isotoner (UK) Ltd1264 noted that “unregistered design 
right extends beyond the visually appreciable to other aspects of the design of an article”.1265 
In other words, the design does not need to be visible to the eye. In nanoscale creations, the 
                                                          
1258 A Fulton Co Ltd v Grant Barnett & Co Ltd [2001] R.P.C. 257; Landor & Hawa International Ltd v Azure 
Designs Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1285; [2006] ECDR 31; Dyson v Qualtex [2006] R.P.C. 769; see also Saez V 
M ‘The Unregistered Community Design’ (2002) E.I.P.R. 585, at p.585. 
1259 Section 216 CDPA 1988. 
1260 Section 213(3)(a)(b) CDPA 1988, so-called ‘must-fit’ and ‘must-match’ exclusions. 
1261 Section 213(3)(c) CDPA 1988. 
1262 [1997] R.P.C. 289. 
1263 Ibid, at 423. 
1264 [2003] EWCA Civ 1514; [2004] R.P.C. 16. 
1265 Ibid, at 311; it was observed too the design right was not limited to the design which appealed to the eye by 
Mummery LJ in Farmers Build Ltd v Carrier Bulk Materials Handlings Ltd [1999] R.P.C. 461 at 481. 
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design is not visible to the naked eye. Furthermore, the insertion of the word ‘internal’ 
features indicates that the design also needs not to have visual appeal.1266 Moreover, small 
modifications which are invisible to the eye may give rise to design right, for example in the 
field of nanotechnology where the designs are occurred at a subocular level.1267  
 
5.4.5.2.1 Aspects of the shape and configuration 
 
The ‘design’ under unregistered design right covers any aspect1268 of shape and configuration 
that applies to the whole or part of an ‘article’.1269 A single article will normally embody not 
a single design right, but different design rights subsisting in the whole or part of every 
aspects of shape and configuration of the article.1270 “Shape and configuration” usually refers 
to the three-dimensional features1271 for example the rib of hot water bottle was configuration 
in Cow (PB) & Co Ltd v Cannon Rubber Manufacturers Ltd.1272 It may be argued that 
features at nanoscale can be developed as feature of configuration rather than surface 
decoration.  
 
In Sales v Stromberg,1273 the court rejected argument and held that there is no reason for not 
accepting a simple shape a protectable design for an article. This case could provide a strong 
argument for nanotechnology that a known and simple geometry shape at nanoscale creations 
may be protected under design right. Furthermore, as discussed in Ocular Laddie J stated that 
there was nothing in the CDPA 1988 that indicates that a shape with detailed dimension was 
excluded from the design protection (although it may not be necessary). Therefore, as Laddie 
                                                          
1266 Laddie et al., n.978, at p.2175. 
1267 Coulthard A and Bently L ‘From the Commonplace to the Interface: Five Cases on Unregistered Design 
Right’ (1997) E.I.P.R. 401, at p.402. 
1268 In A Fulton Co Ltd v Totes Isotoner (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1514; [2004] R.P.C. 16 Jacob LJ stated 
that “but to my mind the notion conveyed by “aspect” in the composite phrase “design of any aspect of the 
shape or configuration of the whole or part of an article” is “discernable” or “recognisable” at 311. 
1269
“shape” and “configuration” appeared in the law of registered designs prior to Design Directive 
harmonization. 
1270 Howe, n.1198, at p.186. 
1271But does not necessarily mean that only three-dimensional designs will be protected, see for example 
Mackie Designs Inc. v Behringer Specialised Studio Equipment (UK) Ltd [1999] R.P.C. 717 Pumfrey J held 
that the design on components and interconnections on a printed circuit board was ‘configuration. (the claim 
failed under copyright because of section 51 CDPA 1988 and under design right because the claimant was 
American and the design did not qualify for protection. The decision could be important if there are thin film of 
nano-products. 
1272 [1959] R.P.C. 347. 
1273 [2006] F.S.R. 7. 
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et al. provide examples that the shape of micro-engines which are small enough to be fitted in 
a living cell or the shape of a molecule which has been made to a particular shape are 
possible to be protected under the unregistered design right.1274 They observe that “if this is 
correct then logically it should be possible to protect the shape of all man-made articles 
whether large or small. If this is correct then logically it should be possible to protect the 
shape of a molecule which has been made to a particular shape”.1275 
 
5.4.5.2.2 Design for an article 
 
Unregistered design right protects the design, rather than the article itself. The courts in the 
UK have emphasised that the law does not protect the article, but the design applied to which 
it relates to an article. For example in C & H Engineering v Klucznik & Sons Ltd1276 and in 
Electronic Techniques (Anglia) Ltd v Crithley Components Ltd1277 Laddie J noted that:  
“the design right provisions are not concerned with protecting particular articles but with 
protecting certain types of designs… This appears to emphasise that what the Act is 
concerned with is the design itself rather than the substrate on which it is recorded or to 
which it is first applied”.
1278  
In Farmers Build Ltd v Carier Bulk Materials Handling Ltd1279 Mummery LJ observed that 
“design right does not, for example, subsist in a fork: it subsists in an aspect of the shape and 
configuration of the handle or the prongs of a fork”.1280 The court of appeal examined that 
individual parts and combinations of parts of agricultural machines were all “articles” with a 
shape and configuration.1281  
 
As argued by Laddie et al (in the passage quoted above at 5.4.5.2.1), there seems to be no 
problem to protect shape or configuration scaled down to the molecular level under 
                                                          
1274 Laddie et al., n.978, at p.2171. 
1275 Ibid, at p.2171. 
1276 [1992] F.S.R. 421, Per Aldous J at 428; see also case comment on this by Turner J ‘A True Design Right: 
C&H Engineering v Klucznik and Sons’ (1993) 1 E.I.P.R. 24, at 24. 
1277 [1997] F.S.R. 401. 
1278 Ibid, at 418. 
1279 [1999] R.P.C. 461. 
1280 Ibid, at 483; see also Scholes Windows Ltd v Magnet Ltd [2002] F.S.R. 10 - it was held that the definition 
of design does not incorporate the nature and purpose of the article itself or material structure of the article. 
Mummery LJ held at 180 that “the property right is in the design of any aspect of the shape or configuration of 
the horn. It is not a right in the article itself. It is not a right in the idea of a particular construction, use or 
application of the article itself”. 
1281 See per Laddie J in Ocular Sciences Limited v Aspects Vision Care [1997] R.P.C. 289, at 423. 
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unregistered design right. This for example, may include features of shape or configuration 
of nano-bots or nanotubes. Although they are normally functional in nature, this is not a 
problem for UK unregistered design right. Nor does UK unregistered design protection 
require visibility to the eye as discussed above at 5.4.5.2. However, under design right, the 
design must be “for” an article. Laddie et al appear to assume that a man-made molecule is 
an article. The difficulty may arise to consider whether a nano-creation is indeed an “article”. 
However, some interesting observations from semiconductor chip protection under modified 
UK design right could provide a significant consideration for nano-scale creation (discussed 
below at 5.4.5.3) and support the view that molecules and nano-creations could be 'articles'. 
 
5.4.5.2.3 Originality 
 
The design right should be original to be protected. Section 213(4) of the CDPA 1988 states 
that a design is not ‘original’ if at the time of its creation, the design it is commonplace in the 
design field in question. The design is original if the design is not copied from the existing 
design as in Farmers Build v Carrier Bulk1282, and in Fulton v Grant Barnett;1283 and the 
author has expended sufficient skill and labour for the creation of the design.1284 If the design 
is not similar to other designs, and it was not copied, the design is said not to be in 
commonplace.1285 The word ‘commonplace’ has been highlighted by Laddie J in Ocular 
Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd1286 that: 
“any design which is trite, trivial, common-or-garden, hackneyed or of the type which would 
excite no peculiar attention in those in the relevant art is likely to be commonplace. This does 
not mean that a design made up of features which, individually, are commonplace is necessarily 
itself commonplace. But to secure protection, the combination must itself not be commonplace 
... In many cases the run of the mill combination of well known features will produce a design 
which is itself commonplace”.
1287 
                                                          
1282 [1999] R.P.C. 461, at 481.  
1283 [2001] R.P.C. 257, at 272 Per Park J that must have been consciously designed rather than arising 
accidently; but see Guild v Eskandar [2003] F.S.R 23 paras 44-56 recognising that accidental feature could 
contribute to originality of design because it was perpetuated on purpose, but holding in the circumstances that 
the design lacked originality.  
1284 Howe, n.1338, at p.201. 
1285 This is objective test to compare the design with earlier well known design in the design field in question at 
the time of its creation, Farmers Build v Carrier Bulk [1999] R.P.C. 461, at 482 per Mummery LJ; see also 
Bently and Sherman, n.211, at p.696. 
1286 [1997] R.P.C. 289. 
1287 Ibid, at 429 and stated that certain designs for contact lenses were commonplace, at 430. 
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This is because as Mummery LJ pointed out that it would be wrong to interpret 
‘commonplaceness’ broadly because the purpose was to “safeguard against situations in 
which even short-term protection for functional designs would create practical 
difficulties”.1288 Some may suggest that ‘commonplace’ may be “akin to novelty”.1289  
 
The design which is commonplace in a design field will “be ready to hand” rather than 
something that “has to be hunted for or found at the last minute”.1290 Therefore, this may 
include the old design if such design were still available for designers or members of the 
public to view it.1291 As to whether the design is similar or in the same field, the court will 
examine it from the eyes of customer and not the designer who is an expert in the field. 1292 
Comparing the design in question with designs in the same field, the closer the similarities 
are between the two, the more likely that the later design is in the commonplace.1293 But, 
where similarities between the design and the existing one within the same field were a result 
of the fact that both designs were modelled on the human form, the court held that the later 
design was not commonplace, because of differences in details of the features.1294  
 
Since nanoscale design is different in design field, i.e. based on size or property difference, 
the design may be considered as original either within the nano-structures itself, or between 
nano-structures and macro-structures. Design structures would be considered not 
commonplace as they are different in details of the features, and the property at nano-
structures operates differently. Therefore, the customer, who is among the expert scientist 
and technologist, would regard nano-structures as original either within the nano-structures 
or between nano-structures to macro-structures.  
 
 
                                                          
1288 Farmers Build v Carrier Bulk [1999] R.P.C. 461, at 481; see also Scholes Windows v Magnet [2000] F.S.R. 
432, 443; Fulton v Grant Barnett, 273, at para 50 that commonplace to be interpreted narrowly rather than 
widely.  
1289 C & H Engineering v F Klucznik & Sons Ltd [1992] F.S.R. 421 at 428, Aldous J. 
1290 Ultraframe (UK) v Eurocell Building Plastics [2005] R.P.C. 36, at 60; see similar view that the Court of 
Appeal concerned that the design in the field at the time of creation of the design in issue in Scholes Windos v 
Magnet [2002] E.C.D.R. 196; [2002] F.S.R. (10) 172. 
1291 Bently and Sherman, n.211, at p.697; see the decision in Scholes Windows Ltd v Magnet Ltd [2002] F.S.R. 
171, CA para 44 per Mummery LJ  
1292 Fulton v Totes [2003] RPC (27) 499, at 509; Scholes Windows v Magnet [2002] E.C.D.R. 196; [2002] 
F.S.R. (10) 172 at paras 49-50. 
1293 Bently and Sherman, hahan.211, at p.698. 
1294 Spraymiser Ltd & Snell v Wrightway Marketing Ltd [2000] E.C.D.R. 349. 
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5.4.5.3 Semiconductor chip protection  
 
The pressure from the semi-conductor industries to protect integrated circuits led the US to 
enact sui generis protection of the semiconductor - the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 
19841295 for the protection of the original ‘mask’1296 work. Furthermore, semiconductor 
topography designs are required to be protected by the Treaty on Intellectual Property in 
Respect of Integrated Circuits; however this treaty has not yet received enough ratification to 
come into force.1297 In 1986, the Council Directive on the legal protection of topographies of 
semiconductor products1298 required member states to enact laws relating to semiconductor 
topography. In compliance with the Directive, the UK design protection of semiconductor 
topography was created under unregistered design right – by the Design Right 
(Semiconductor Topographies) Regulations 1989 (Semiconductor Regulations).1299 
 
The integrated circuit (IC) gives effect to program instructions through a circuitry fixed on 
semiconductor material in layered form.1300 The IC is an electronic circuit where the 
elements have been integrated into some medium in order for the IC to perform different 
functions i.e. to store information and to perform logical operations on the information 
especially in the computing industries.1301 IC or chips are available on various applications 
such as computers, hi-fi sets, electronic management circuits for cars and timer circuits for 
washing machines.1302 Interestingly, with the new applications, products and systems have 
boosted the growth of IC in the past and continue to develop for the future to enhance its 
                                                          
1295 Pub L No 98-620, Title III, Stat 3347 (codified) at 17 USC 901-914, Supp II 1984). 
1296 ‘mask’ is a method of producing the circuitry on the surface of the chip, Cornish and Llewelyn, n.307, at 
n.94, at p.599 
1297 Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 26 May 1989. Pursuant to 
Article 3(1) requires that compliance of this Treaty to protect semiconductor topography, which states “Each 
Contracting Party shall have the obligation to secure, throughout its territory, intellectual property protection 
in respect of layout-designs (topographies) in accordance with this Treaty”. 
1298 Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the Legal Protection of Topographies of 
Semiconductor Products. 
1299 SI 1989/1100, which revoked the Semiconductor Products (Protection of topography) Regulations 1987. As 
compared to the creation of sui generis protection under the Semiconductor Products (Protection of 
Topography) Regulations 1987, this 1989 is simply a design right created by the introduction of the UK CDPA 
1988, Laddie et al, n.978, at pp.2244-2245; For a more discussion of the usefulness of the legislative approach 
to protect semiconductor topographies through specific design protection and the extent to which the legislative 
and its theoretical have served the practical purposes, see generally Karnell, n.1034, at pp.649-658. 
1300 Cornish and Llewelyn, n.307, at p.598. 
1301 Christie A Integrated Circuits and Their Contents: International Protection (London: S&M, 1995), at p.10. 
For more detail discussion of technological background of the integrated circuits, see at Chapter 1, and for more 
details elaboration of the functional and physical characteristics of integrated circuits, see at App. A. 
1302 Laddie et al., n.978, at p.2237, n.1. 
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computing performance and speed, memory density and increasing functionality, which is 
possible by introduce a new structures that carry the silicon technology down to below 10nm 
feature sizes.1303 This indicates that chips are nearly down to nanoscale, which may suggest 
that this model of semiconductor protection may be applicable to nanotechnology.  
 
Similar to unregistered design right, semiconductor topography right protects against copying 
rather than conferring a monopoly rights.1304 The requirement of original and not 
commonplace are applied also to semiconductor chip. However, the differences between 
unregistered design right and Semiconductor Chip is on the definition and the specific 
characteristics of semiconductor designs.1305 
 
Regulation 2(1) of the Topography Regulations defines ‘semiconductor topography’1306 as: 
“a design within the meaning of section 213(2) of the Act” which is a design of either 
of the following: 
(a) the pattern fixed, or intended to be fixed, in or upon – 
(i) a layer of a semiconductor product, or 
(ii) a layer of material in the course of and for the purpose of the manufacture of a 
semiconductor product, or 
(b) the arrangements of the patterns fixed, or intended to be fixed, in or upon the layers of a 
semiconductor product in relation to one another 
 
This strongly suggests that ‘designs’ within the meaning of section 213(2) generally 
include invisible designs at very small scale. 
 
The Semiconductor Regulations also defines ‘semiconductor product’
1307 as: 
                                                          
1303 See for example Arden F ‘Future Semiconductor Material Requirements and Innovations as Projected in the 
ITRS 2005 Roadmap’ (2006) Materials Science and Engineering, Vol. 134, 104, at p.105; semiconductor chip 
feature is from 90nm, in Hunt and Mehta, n.38, at pp.282-283.  
1304 Howe, n.1198, at p.371. 
1305 Ibid, at p.371. 
1306 Article 1(1)(b) of the Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Topographies of Semiconductor Products 
((87/54/EEC) O.J. No L 24/36 (Topography Directive) defines “topography” as the ‘topography’ of a 
semiconductor product shall mean a series of related images, however fixed or encoded; 
(i) representing the three-dimensional pattern of the layers of which a semiconductor product is 
composed; and 
(ii) in which series, each image has the pattern or part of the pattern of a surface of the semiconductor 
product at any stage of its manufacture 
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“an article the purpose, or one of the purposes, of which is the performance of an electronic 
function and which consists of two or more layers, at least one of which is composed of 
semiconducting material and in or upon one or more of which is fixed a pattern appertaining to 
that or another function” 
Again, this identifies a very small semiconductor chip as an ‘article’ within the meaning of 
the Act, suggesting that nanoscale creations can also be ‘articles’. 
 
Regulation 2(2) of the Semiconductor Regulations requires the Regulations to be construed 
‘as one’ with CDPA, except where the context otherwise requires and Regulation 3 provides 
that “in its application to a design which is a semiconductor topography”, Part III CDPA 
(relating to design right) shall have effect subject to provisions which go to qualification, 
ownership and duration, rather than the underlying subsistence of design right. Many of these 
differences were required by the Directive and they do not undermine the general conclusion 
that design right applies to very small scale creations generally. 
 
Interestingly, design right in the form of semiconductor topography right seems to cope well 
with chip design which is clearly “configuration” rather than “shape”. It can subsist in an 
aspect of the three-dimensional pattern in the whole or part of a semiconductor product, and 
of the design of any part of the pattern applied to the whole or any part of an individual 
layer.1308 Based on the Regulation above, semiconductor topography constitutes two types of 
designs i.e. the pattern fixed to a layer of a semiconductor product, and the arrangement of 
the pattern fixed in or upon the layers of a semiconductor product in relation to one another.  
 
“Pattern” refers to the physical aspects of IC design/semiconductor topography that exist at 
the individual layer, whereas ‘arrangement’ refers to the physical aspects of IC design that 
exist at the multi-layer level.1309  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1307 Article 1(1)(a) of Semiconductor Directive defines “semiconductor product” as a ‘semiconductor product’ 
shall mean the final or an intermediate form of any product: 
(i) consisting of a body of material which includes a layer of semiconducting material; and 
(ii)  having one or more other layers composed of conducting, insulating or semiconducting material, the 
layers being arranged in accordance with a predetermined three-dimensional pattern; and  
(iii) intended to perform, exclusively or together with other functions, an electronic function. 
1308 Laddie et al, n.978, at p.2239. 
1309 Christie, n.1301, at p.33. 
232 
 
It has been said that the pattern which can exist “upon” a semiconductor layer poses 
difficulty because the manufacturing of semiconductor devices will normally involve the 
laying down of a pattern of metal conductors on the surface of the actual semiconductor chip 
to transfer current between the semiconductor devices, and between devices and the 
integrated circuit’s external pins.1310 The pattern that laid down on a surface is similar to a 
printed circuit board and this printed circuit board is within the definition of ‘design’ under 
unregistered design right.1311 Other than “upon” a semiconductor layer, the issue becomes 
more problematic on the patterns which are “in” a semiconductor layer.1312 This is because 
manufacturing semiconductor devices normally involves the “doping” of region of a crystal 
substrate with small amounts of impurities which create an excess of electrons or “holes”.1313 
These regions according to Howe do not exist in the form of a physical shape of an article 
which can be seen and touched, but there is a configuration of different regions within a 
single physical article that are slightly different material.1314 The Regulations assume that 
such configuration is referred to the internal materials, but not existing as an external tangible 
shape as has been implicitly inferred from the wording a pattern fixed “in” the semiconductor 
layer.1315 Christies argues that since there is no limitation for the specific dimensions, both 
shape and configuration refer to the three-dimensional aspects of design,1316 and therefore, 
the layout of a ‘quantum’ IC device would be included under the definition of design.1317 
This provides a good analogy for nanotechnology since there is no specific dimension 
mentioned. The meaning of the ‘pattern’ is the physical aspects of the integrate circuit design 
at the individual layer design, and the ‘arrangement’ is referred as the connection of the 
pattern at multi-layers; therefore, the physical aspects of integrated circuit is within the 
meaning of ‘semiconductor topography’ as long as the integrated circuits is a ‘semiconductor 
product’.
1318 Furthermore, there is no requirement that semiconductor topographies have 
visual appeal, their only merit being in their layout to give efficient way of connecting the 
components.  
 
                                                          
1310 Howe, n.1198, at p.372. 
1311 Ibid. 
1312 Ibid. 
1313 Ibid. 
1314 Ibid. 
1315 Ibid. 
1316 The definition of ‘design’ under section 213(2) CDPA 1988. 
1317 Christie, n. 1301, at p.31.  
1318 Ibid, at p.33. 
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The definition of semiconductor product refers to the ‘article’ which consists of two or more 
layers. Therefore, a single-layer article is outside the definition of the definition of 
‘semiconductor product’.1319 The definition also includes that at least one of which of the 
layers of the product must compose a semiconducting material. Thus, semiconductor 
topography/IC made of a superconductor or a polymer is outside the definition. 1320 
Semiconductor product is also defined to perform electronic functions, and a purely 
mechanical micro-machine would not come under the definition, but a hybrid optoelectronic 
optical processor would.1321 
 
The discussion above of the design right protection for semiconductor gives very useful 
lesson for nanotechnology. Design right is deemed to be the appropriate mode of protection, 
despite the functional character of semiconductor topographies. The pattern and arrangement 
of the layers of a semiconductor product indicates that the semiconductor functions and 
design is in the internal features of the product. Thus, visibility of the semiconductor is not 
significant in order for the rights to arise. Furthermore, there is no specific dimensions 
mentioned which is useful analogue for nanotechnology. All of these suggest that 
unregistered design right is suitable for nanotechnology protection.  
 
However, despite the advantages, the unregistered design may have the drawback. Currently 
its usefulness is limited because of the restrictive qualification provisions, as evidenced by 
Mackie designs1322 where Pumfrey J observed that “citizens of the United States of America 
are not entitled to design right under the CDPA unless habitually resident in the European 
Union or one of the comparatively limited list of qualifying countries”.1323 There has been 
talk of its abolition is alignment with EU design criteria,1324 but in other jurisdiction, it was 
recommended to be adopted more widely, for example the US has special regime for boat 
huls and is thinking of introducing unregistered protection for fashion design. Thus, in 
                                                          
1319 Ibid, p.34; but this could be argued as it was suggested in Mackie Designs Inc v Behringer Specialised 
Studio Equipment (UK) Ltd [1999] R.P.C. 717 that a layer might be a ‘configuration’ like a circuit board, 
within the scope of ordinary design right.  
1320 Christie, n.1301, at p.34. 
1321 Ibid, at p.34. 
1322 Mackie Designs Inc v Behringer Specialised Studio Equipment (UK) Ltd [1999] R.P.C. 717. 
1323 Ibid, at 724. 
1324 See for example, IPO Assessment of the Need for Reform of the Design Intellectual Property Framework’ 
December 2011, UKIPO, at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/hargreaves-designsassessment.pdf, accessed on 27 April 
2012. 
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answering research question for unregistered design right, nanoscale creation comprises 
‘design’ within the meaning of the design. There is no impediment to protect nanoscale 
creations, as exemplified in the Semiconductor Chip protection, and non-visibility of nano-
creations are less likely to pose problem for the protection. Therefore, the approach of 
unregistered design in the form of Semiconductor Chip law is convincing and preferable as 
Semiconductor Chip would protect small functional and aesthetic element of design.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
Nano-creations related to copyright, trademarks and designs are not expressly excluded nor 
included at the international level. This demonstrated that this subject matter of IPRs have 
the potential to be applied to nanotechnology. In copyright, it showed that nano-creations 
related to artistic and literary works are more relevant, but nevertheless because of technical 
and functional characteristic of nanotechnology, they proved to be less relevant for  
protection.   
 
The list of marks under Malaysian law has demonstrated that they are related to the visual 
characteristics of the goods which gave indication that nano-marks cannot be protected in 
Malaysia. The word “signs” in the UK/EU law are wide enough to include invisible marks 
like nano-marks. The graphical representation has been tested to non-visually perceptible 
marks in colours, smell and sound, which could be useful for nano-marks. Furthermore, it 
was recognized that the meaning of sign for infringement demonstrated that the sign need not 
to be visible, but only perceptible in use. The classification of goods and services under NC 
has indicated that it capable to include nano-marks. It was further stated that nano-shape 
marks are less likely to be protected because of its technical character, unless the shape 
associated to the trade origin. The used of the word “nano” could give rise to the issue of 
descriptiveness and deceptiveness because consumers are unlikely to associate to the trade 
origin of the products or services.  
 
The non-visibility of nano-creations has indicated that it was unfortunate to be protected 
under design law in Malaysia. Even in the UK/EU law, the protection provided under design 
is complex not only within different protection under design law itself but also overlapping 
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rights with other IPRs. This proved to be even more complex in multidisciplinary like 
nanotechnology. Under UK registered design, the requirement that the design does not mean 
to be visible to the eye explained some favourable treatment to protect nano-creations. 
However, after Lindner, non-visibility and technical characteristics of nanotechnology 
proved to be less relevant to be protected under registered design/community. This gave 
consideration that, the protection provided under UK unregistered design right by way of 
Semiconductor Chip proved to be a good model for protection for functional and technical 
characteristics like nano-creations, especially for Malaysia to adopt.  
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CHAPTER 6  
TERM OF PROTECTION FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the respective terms of protection for the IPRs which seem 
realistically to apply to nano-creations. The question of term of protection is often inversely 
related to the scope or strength of protection, for example copyright has long term but 
comparatively weak protection, while patents have a shorter term and strong protection. 
There are limited literatures available for term of protection across the variety of IPRs in 
comparing to the IPRs itself. This chapter examines what order of magnitude of term of 
protection might be appropriate for nanotechnology, and whether a fixed term or a term 
depending upon time of launch is more apt?  
 
6.2 Term of protection for law of confidence 
 
Unlike the patent term of duration for twenty years protection, the duration of protection 
under the law of confidence continues as long as the information is kept secret. For example, 
the secret recipe of the carbonated drink Coca-Cola has been kept secret until now.1325 For 
this protection to operate, reasonable efforts have to be made to keep the information secret, 
either through NDA or other measures such as using a secret code, or secret encryption and 
limiting access to the information.1326 Nevertheless, it is hard also to maintain confidentiality 
in certain situations, for example when the technology is easily discovered through reverse 
engineering.1327 Therefore, it is said that “secrets leak out like water, even from the most 
secure organisations, and it is not always easy to put the genie back in the bottle”.1328 This is 
reflected in nanotechnology because not only is the technology complex and 
                                                          
1325 See for example Sutton P J et al., ‘Nanotechnology Licence Pitfalls’ (2009) J.I.P.L.P., Vol. 4, No. 3, 176, at 
p.177; Norton, n.715, at p.41. 
1326 Other example such as secret access procedures and firewalls, use separate computer systems without the 
internet, or separate network access for sensitive information; label “confidential” for softcopy and hardcopy 
documents in Chaudhry R et al. ‘Can Your Firm Keep Its Secret’ (2008) Managing I.P. 109, at p.112. 
1327 Mars UK Ltd v Teknowledge Ltd [2000] F.S.R. 138; see also Freedman C ‘The Protection of Computer 
Software in Copyright and the Law of Confidence: Improper Decompilation and Employee-Poaching’ (2000) 
J.I.L.T., Vol.8, No.1, 25, at pp.28-36.  
1328 Monotti and Ricketson, n.408, at p.95.  
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multidisciplinary, but there are likely to be various parties involved in maintaining the 
secrecy of nanotechnology information. Complex technology like nanotechnology may have 
the advantage of being difficult to reverse engineer. But nevertheless, given the various 
parties involved in dealing with nanotechnology information, it may be very hard to maintain 
confidentiality with large numbers of confidantes,1329 even with measures to control the 
information from leaking out. Thus, although capable in principle of protecting 
nanotechnologies for an indefinite term1330 and preferred by interviewee B, confidentiality 
has the danger of sudden loss of protection. In practice it is rare for confidential to continue 
to have value more than ten years.1331  
 
6.3 Patent term of protection 
 
Patent protection depends upon disclosure, but is patent duration appropriate and effective 
for nanotechnology, since it is still emerging and developing? Twenty years' potential 
protection is provided under TRIPS. This section argues that, if the period of twenty years is 
too short for nanotechnology, Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs) as for 
pharmaceutical and plant products may be desirable, and questions to what extent do SPCs 
provide a good lesson for nanotechnology?  
 
The question of what is the appropriate length of patent protection “is a vexed one”.1332 This 
is because, some technologies, including nanotechnology takes a longer period to be made 
available to the public than others.1333 TRIPS term of patent protection is the maximum of 
twenty years calculated from the filing date.1334 In conforming to TRIPS, Malaysia and UK 
                                                          
1329 See Dunford & Elliot v Johnson & Firth Brown [1978] F.S.R. 143 where the disclosure of information was 
made to 43 per cent of the shareholders, and Lord Denning considered that “This widespread use of the 
information drives a hole into the blanket of confidence: especially when that information is being used—or, 
shall I say misused—for the benefit of some potential shareholders, and not for the benefit of the others. So 
much so that it would not be reasonable that the stipulation for confidence should be enforced”, at 148. 
1330 Some may claim that due to size structure, there is less likelihood of reverse engineering in nanotechnology, 
see for example Sutton et al, n.1325, at p.177. 
1331 Bird and Bird ‘From Idea to Market-Place: An Introduction to UK Technology Law’ (3rd ed) (1991), at p.10 
1332 Ang S ‘Patent Term Extension in Singapore for “Pharmaceutical Products”’ (2005) E.I.P.R. 349, at p.349 
1333 For example, interviewee C stated that the technology is still at the age of infancy in Malaysia and whilst 
interviewee D stated that nanotechnology will have to take a long time to develop in Malaysia. 
1334 Article 33 TRIPS.  
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adopted the maximum period of renewal of twenty years from the date of filing.1335 The 
patent takes effect on the date in which the grant notice is published in the journal of the 
Patent Office.1336 The period for twenty years' protection reflects the non-discriminatory 
provision of the TRIPS to apply to all technologies.1337  
 
This period of twenty years applicable to all inventions has been referred by Christie and 
Rostein as “one size fits all”.1338 According to them, in order to test whether the twenty years 
is fit for all inventions, the optimum duration of patent protection must be determined, and 
compared with the duration of protection provided by the current patent system.1339 They 
argue that one size does fit all if the duration of protection provided by the current system is 
within the optimal duration, and not if there is substantial divergence between what is 
optimal in theory and what is provided in practice.1340 After discussion on different economic 
theories of different variables and assumptions to determine the optimal duration, they 
observe that it is not possible to know exactly what the optimal duration is.1341 From patent 
renewal data they observe that on average only 50% of patents survive eight years after grant 
and only 15% until the full standard duration.1342 They found that there is some difference in 
renewal rates on different technologies – for high technology such as biotechnology, medical 
engineering and pharmaceuticals; patents tend to have the highest renewal rates, whereas in 
low-technology, the patent tends to be the lowest renewal rates.1343  When comparing the 
features of optimal system of duration of patent with the current patent system, they conclude 
that the current system of patent protection of maximum 20 is matched with the optimal 
system because; (a) the twenty years of protection is greater than 8 years after the grant of 
                                                          
1335 Section 35(1) PA 1983 or 15 years from the date of the grant of the patent whichever is longer; Section  
25(1) PA 1977 and Art 63(1) EPC 2000; Whereas in some countries for example the US, the period is 
calculated from the grant of patent, Gervais, n.222, at p.404; But recently with the new amendment to include 
first-inventor-to-file in the US, the claimed invention is from effective filing date: America Invents Act, 
available at ://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/bills-112hr1249enr.pdf, visited on 17 March 2012. 
1336 Section 25 PA 1977. 
1337 Art 27(1).  
1338 Christie A F and Rotstein F ‘Duration of Patent Protection: Does One Size Fit All’? (2008) J.I.P.L.P Vol. 3 
No.6, 402 at p.402 
1339 Ibid, at p.402. 
1340 Ibid, at p.402. 
1341 Ibid at pp.404-405. Optimal duration or optimal patent length is modeled by equating the marginal social 
benefit with the marginal social cost of the patent over time, Lampe R and Niblett A ‘The Economics of Patent 
Design: A Selective Survey’ (2003) I.P.R.I.A Working Paper No 06/03 available at 
http://www.ipria.org/publications/wp/2003/IPRIAWP06.2003.pdf accessed on 17 Mac 2012. 
1342 However admit that this generalization does not differentiate between different industrial or technological 
sectors, Christie and Rostein, n.1338, at p.405. 
1343 Ibid, at p.406. 
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patent, and being longer than the optimal duration of protection; (b) the patentee has right to 
choose the duration of protection and the size of renewal fee increases over time; (c) the 
maximum duration of protection can be either increased or decreased based on case-by-case 
basis.1344 Christie and Rotstein affirm the current system because the duration of protection 
provided is within reasonable bounds of the optimal duration of protection.1345 Equally, the 
argument may be useful for nanotechnology that the maximum twenty years may be 
appropriate to protect and develop nanotechnology invention. It may prove to be true for 
nanotechnology, as for other technologies discussed above, that 50% of patents are dropped 
by about eight years after grant and only about 15% survive to full term, given the nature of 
nanotechnology that moves quickly. However, renewal rates may also prove greater for 
nanotechnology and many more patents survive to full term, suggesting that a maximum 
period of twenty years is not sufficient to protect nano-technological inventions. In this case, 
would SPCs be desirable? The experiences of the implementation of the SPCs may provide 
useful guidance.   
 
6.3.1 Supplementary Protection Certificates for nanotechnology 
 
Under the current patent system, the initial term of patent protection is four years and is 
renewable yearly up to a maximum of twenty years. Extra protection for up to five years may 
be granted for pharmaceutical products through the EU Regulation on Supplementary 
Protection Certificates for Medicinal Products (MPR).1346 By granting an extra five years for 
pharmaceutical products, the ECJ held that this is to encourage research in the 
pharmaceutical products and offset regulatory delays.1347 The introduction for the SPCs for 
medicinal products is also supported by the economic justification that SPCs protects.1348 For 
                                                          
1344 Christie and Rotstein, n.1341, at pp.407-408., and in (c) above they observe that the mechanism is similar to 
SPCs type for increasing the period, and compulsory licensing for decreasing the period, 
1345  Ibid, at p.408. 
1346 Initially by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992, now replaced by codifying Regulation 
(EC) 469/2009 of 16 June 2009. The question whether to increase or decrease the maximum patent term of 
protection is a difficult question based on the factors such as the patentees, industries and the development of 
the respective technology, Phillips and Firth, n.769, at p.77. 
1347 Farmatilia Carlo Erba SRL’s SPC Application [1999] ECR I-5553; [2002] 2 CMLR 253; [2000] RPC 580; 
see also the Preamble of the MPR. 
1348 Supplementary Protection Certificates Report, Common Law Institute of Intellectual Property (1991) at p.2 
(SPCs Report), at p.16 which states that “since in practice SPC’s will be applied for only for successful 
products, in effect they will protect successful investment and innovation. In fact, therefore, they will protect 
directly an economic interest protected only indirectly by the patent system”. 
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example in Prozac (fluoxetine), the basic patent expired in 1995, and SPCs expired in 2000 
where in the UK about 80% of total sales revenues were granted during SPCs term, whereas 
in Germany where no SPCs were granted, the sales declined from 1995 onwards and in 1998 
eleven generic versions of fluoxetine were being marketed there.1349 Some new products are 
more complex and take more time to be established, developed and brought to market1350 and 
this may also be true for nanotechnology.  
 
SPCs take effect after the expiry of the basic patent term and a maximum  additional five 
years is given on account of the procedures for pharmaceutical products to undergo testing 
and marketing authorisation before placing the products into the market.1351 Therefore, the 
SPC is a type of “legal instrument to compensate for the period elapsed between filing of a 
patent application directed to a new medicinal product and the eventual authorisation by the 
national authorities of the marketing of that medicinal product”.1352 Such processes to 
determine level of toxicity of a new substance, its pharmacology, biochemistry, 
pharmacokinetics and clinical efficacy may take longer time compared to normal 
inventions.1353 This approval process affect the term of patent monopoly, that has been 
reduced, sometimes described as “patent term erosion”.1354 This general statement regarding 
extra time of five years given to the pharmaceutical products may provide a useful analogy 
for nanotechnology. Nanotechnology having unique characteristics and being a complex 
multidisciplinary technology may well be required to go for complex testing and marketing 
authorisation before placing products into the market place. For example, nanomaterials or 
                                                          
1349 Huenges M and Bühler D ‘Patent Term Extension’ (2008) Managing I.P. 92, at p.92. 
1350 SPCs Report, n.1348, at p.2. 
1351 See for example, Davis, n.1170, at p.261; Moore J W ‘Patent Term Restoration for Pharmaceutical Product 
in Europe: The Supplementary Protection Certificate’ (1998) 14 C.I.P.R. 1387, at p.138. However, it is not an 
extension of patent term, but arises in its own right, Klix N and Hermann B ‘Bitter Pill for the Pharmaceutical 
Industry’ (2006) J.I.P.L.P., Vol 1. No.10, 639, at p.640; see also SPCs Report which based on the economic 
justification for patent system, SPCs creates a new and different kind of IP, n.1348, at p.16. However, unlike 
EU, in the US offers patent term extensions under 35 US §156 and  regulatory bodies such as the US Food and 
Drug Administration offer advice to the patent office in granting patent term extensions, Hayes C ‘Patent Term 
Extension for Enantiomeric Medicines: A Global Overview’ (2012) J.I.P.L.P. Vol. 7, No.3 180, at 185. 
1352 Klix and Hermann, n.1351, at p.640. 
1353  SPCs Report, n.1348, at p.4. 
1354 Curley D ‘SPCs as Targets for Litigation’ C5 Presentation, 18 Feb 2009, at 
http://www.slideshare.net/duncancurley/c5-presentation-18-february-2009; the testing of efficacy and safety of 
the product can take up to 8 years that leaves the effective patent term of 12 years, Katzka C’ Interpretation of 
the Term ‘Product’ in EU Council Regulations 1768/92 and 1610/96 on Supplementary Protection Certificates 
(2008) J.I.P.L.P. Vol. 3, 650, at p.650. 
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nanoparticles may have to undergo a process of testing in determining the level of its 
toxicity, harmful effect, or risks to the environment, or skin related problems.  
 
Because of the administrative process of marketing and authorisation, the industries tried to 
urge that SPCs should be applicable to other products as well.1355 In answering the demand, 
the SPC for plant products was introduced1356 and the more recently enacted regulation on 
medicinal products for use in paediatrics.1357 The regulation below provides a useful 
guideline in the context of nanotechnology invention. The scope of protection offered by 
SPCs has been explored through the meaning of ‘product’ which is protected.  
Art 1 (a) of the MPR defines ‘medicinal product’ as:  
“any substance or combination of substances presented for treating or preventing disease in human 
beings or animals and any substance or combination of substances which may be administered to 
human beings or animals with a view to making a medical diagnosis or to restoring, correcting or 
modifying physiological functions in humans or in animals”.1358  
 
Art 1(b) of the MPR refers the ‘product’ as “the active ingredient or combination of active 
ingredients of a medicinal product.”1359  
The contentious issue which often came before the court concerns what amounts to 
“product.”1360 In Massachusetts Institute of Technology1361 it was stated that this definition 
covers the active ingredient or combination of active ingredient and does not extend to the 
combination of one active ingredient with other non-active ingredient.  In this case, the ECJ 
pointed out that “the expression ‘active ingredient’ is generally accepted in pharmacology 
not to include substances forming part of a medicinal product which do not have an effect of 
                                                          
1355 Torremans, n.200, at p.155.  
1356 Regulation (EC) NO. 1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 Concerning 
the Creation of a Supplementary Protection Certificate for Plant Protection Products.  
1357 Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006/ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
Medicinal Products for Pediatric Use, now incorporated into Reg 469/2009.  
1358 For a guideline of SPCs for Medicinal and Plant Product, see for example the UKIPO, Supplementary 
Protection Certificates: Guide for Applicants, September 2009 available at 
http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/info/spctext.pdf, accessed on 15 April 2010. 
1359 Note that no guidance has been given as to the term “active ingredient”, Klix and Hermann, n.1351, at 
p.640; this cause a problem of interpretation for the patent office, see Katzka, n.1354, p.651. The ECJ in 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology [2006] R.P.C. 34, at 876 states that in the absence of any definition of 
the concept of “active ingredient” in the MPR, the meaning and scope of those terms must be determined by 
their usual meaning in everyday language, citing Denmark v Commission [1988] E.C.R. 169, at 9, and P DIR 
International Film Srl v Commission [2000] E.C.R. I-447, at 26. 
1360 Wittkopp A ‘An SPC’s Filing Date May Affect It’s Duration’ (2008) Managing IP 177, 142, at p.142. 
1361 [2006] ECR I-4089. 
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their own on the human or animal body”.1362 In Yissum Research & Development Co. of the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem v Comptroller- General Patents,1363 the ECJ held that the 
term ‘product’ under Article 1 of the Regulation is not intended to be decisive, but in any 
case the second medical use of known active ingredient is not covered under the definition. 
The provision has been interpreted restrictively to include only ‘active ingredient’ per se or 
combination of ingredient which have both activity (Massachusetts); and does not include the 
second medical use of active known ingredient (Yissum), thus preventing any artificial of 
non-active ingredient. It is not only the restrictive interpretation of the ‘product’ but it is also 
the conditions of obtaining SPCs which are set out under Article 3 of the MPR which states: 
(i) the product is protected by a basic patent1364 in force; 
(ii) a valid authorization to place the product on the market as a medicinal product has been granted; 
(iii) the product has not already been the subject of a certificate; 
(iv) the authorization referred to in (b) is the first authorization to place the product on the market as a 
medicinal product. 
 
All of these criteria must be satisfied, if not would be ground of invalidity under Regulation 
15. In Farmitalia Carlo Erba Srl1365 the court held that for the purpose of Article 3 of the 
Regulation, the product as medicinal products includes all forms of it to enjoy the protection 
under the basic patent, but the certification will not be granted for products that are not 
protected by a basic patent in force. If more than one patent covers on the product, the 
certificate will be granted for each of the basic patents.1366  If the basic patent has already 
lapsed, the SPCs will not be granted, although the products might have some useful novel 
use. Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd’s Applications1367 concerned on a dispute over SPCs in 
term of the ‘product’ they are certified to cover. The issue was whether the invention and the 
product to be authorised are one of the same. In this case, the court held that certification 
cannot be granted for the combination of an anti-ulcer agent with two specific antibiotics if 
the patent only refers to the anti-ulcer agent. If a different use is found which is not related to 
the use referred in the basic patent, which may be true for nanotechnology, the certificate 
                                                          
1362 [2006] ECR I-4089, at 17-18, thus preventing SPCs use for ‘evergreening’. 
1363  [2007] OJ C96/19. 
1364 Art 1(c) MPR defines “basic patent” as “a patent which protects a product as defined in (b) as such, a 
process to obtain a product or an application of a product, and which is designated by its holder for the 
purpose of the procedure for grant of a certificate”. 
1365 [2000] R.P.C. 580. 
1366 Biogen Inc v Smithkline Biologicals SA [1996] ECR I-717, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 704; see also Torremans 
n.200, at p.152, n.15. 
1367 (No.3) [2004] R.P.C. 37. 
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would not be granted. The certificate will only be granted for the product which has been 
referred in the basic patent. This may be fatal to nanotechnology that brings a surprising 
result. In BASF AG’s SPC Application1368 it was held that only the active ingredient will be 
granted the certification and the first marketing authorisation will be considered for the 
product and any subsequent authorisation for the active ingredient produced by a patented 
improved manufacturing process cannot be the basis of the issuance of SPCs. Despite, this 
may cause serious weakness for nanotechnology because any subsequent authorisation for 
the new medical use of an active ingredient would not be considered as the first marketing  
authorisation. Care may need to be taken in drafting the subject-matter of SPCs for 
nanotechnology. In recent case, Attorney General Trstenjak has clarified the scope and 
substance of Article 3(d) on the first authorization to place the product on the market as a 
medicinal product in Neurim Pharmaceuticals (1991) Ltd v Comptroller-General of 
Patents1369 based on schematic-teleological interpretation. AG gave opinion that a SPC for a 
product which is protected by a basic patent in force may be granted only where the first 
authorization which permits the product to be placed on the market as a medicinal product is 
within the scope of protection under the basic patent. It was observed that the fact that the 
same product had been authorized previously as a medicinal product for human use or a 
veterinary medicinal product does not preclude the grant of SPC based on a later 
authorization to place that product on the market as a new medicinal product, provided that 
the first-authorised medicinal product is not within the scope of protection conferred under 
the basic patent.1370 
 
Potentially, nanotechnology could also be subject to stringent authorisation before the 
products enter into the market. This is because nano-product is still new and emerging, and 
its benefits and risks may not be certain yet. A ‘precautionary’ approach to release of 
products may be needed.1371 Furthermore, research and development in nanotechnology is 
still not fully established, which means that a lot of time and cost would be needed. If the 
administrative process of authorisation for nanotechnology product to enter into the market is 
longer than what has been granted through the basic patent, nanotechnology may learn from 
                                                          
1368 [2000] R.P.C. 1. 
1369 Case C-130/11 
1370 Ibid, at para 73 
1371 See for example Cheyne I ‘Gateways to the Precautionary Principle in WTO Law’ (2007) J. Env L. 155, at 
pp. 171-172; and see discussion in 3.4.2.3.  
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the practices for SPCs especially related to nanotechnology medicinal products to 
compensate patentees for the effectively reduced lifetime of their patents. Of the same 
grounds as in medicinal products, nanotechnology may be identified for SPCs. This is 
because the restrictive interpretation of ‘product’ as discussed above and the strict condition 
to be satisfied, for example condition of the ‘basic patent’ and ‘first marketing authorisation’ 
suggest that the SPCs type can be extended to nanotechnology, particularly on nano-
medicine without much adjustment.  
 
6.4 Trade marks term of protection 
 
Article 18 of the TRIPS provides that the registration for trade mark is renewable indefinitely 
and each renewal shall be a term of not less than seven years. According to Gervais, the 
reason why there is no time limit for trademark renewal is because the purpose of trademark 
is to protect the mental link between a product or service and its source of origin.1372 The 
registration of trademark is renewable indefinitely if the mark continues to be used. The 
requirement of use to is provided under Article 19 of the TRIPS. The registration may be 
cancelled after a minimum of three uninterrupted years of non-use, unless the trademark 
owner has valid reason of obstacles to such use. The obstacles of such use include import 
restrictions or other government requirements for goods or services protected by the 
trademark and the need of approval or renewal to market the product in agri-food or 
pharmaceutical compound.1373 As discussed above, this may well apply also to the products 
of nanotechnology. 
 
In Malaysia section 32 of the TMA 1976, the period of trade mark registration is for a period 
of ten years and it is renewable. Section 42 of the UK TMA 1994 provides also the trade 
mark registration is for a period of ten years from the date of registration and the period is 
also renewable for further periods of ten years in accordance of section 43.  
 
The term of trade mark protection renewable indefinitely is based upon the actual and 
genuine use. Article 5 of the Paris and Article 15(3) of the TRIPS make no compulsory for 
                                                          
1372 Gervais, n.222, at p.282. 
1373 Ibid, at p.283. 
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the requirement of use, but nevertheless trade mark use has been referred as a means of trade 
mark registration. Recitals of the Trade Mark Directive1374 states that: 
“Whereas in order to reduce the total number of trade marks registered and protected in the 
Community and, consequently, the number of conflicts which arise between them, it is 
essential to require that registered trade marks must actually be used or, of not used, be 
subject to revocation”. 
 
Trade mark registration may be revoked if within the period of five years after the 
completion of registration procedure it has not been put in genuine use in the UK and there is 
no proper reason for non-use.1375 The use has been suspended for an uninterrupted period of 
five years and there are no proper reasons for non-use.1376 The use of trade mark must be of 
genuine use. In Ansul BV v Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV1377 the ECJ considered that “genuine 
use” means the actual use of the mark. Genuine use denotes use that is not merely serving 
solely to preserve the rights conferred by the mark.1378 The ECJ determined that the use must 
be consistent with the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of 
the origin of goods or services and to distinguish the product or service from others.  The 
ECJ added that ‘genuine use’ of the mark entails use of the mark on the market for the goods 
of services protected by that mark and not just internal use by the undertaking concerned. In 
assessing whether there has been genuine use of the trade mark, the ECJ argued that regard 
must be made to all the facts and circumstances1379 relevant to establishing whether the 
commercial exploitation of the mark is real particularly whether such use is viewed as 
warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for 
the goods or services.1380 But the ECJ in La Mer Technology Inc v Laboratoires Goemar 
SA1381 has pointed out that when the use of trade mark serves a real commercial purpose, 
“even minimal use of the mark or use by only a single importer in the Member State 
concerned can be sufficient to establish genuine use within the meaning of the Directive”.1382 
                                                          
1374 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States 
relating to trade marks. See also Cornish and Llewelyn, n.307, at p.728. 
1375 Section 46(1)(a) TMA 1994; Article 12 TM Directive. 
1376  Section 46(1)(b) TMA 1994; Article 10 TM Directive. 
1377 [2003] E.T.M.R. 85. 
1378 Ibid, at para 36 
1379The circumstances include the nature of the goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale 
and frequency of the use of the mark, at para 39. 
1380 [2003] E.T.M.R. 85, at para 38. 
1381 [2004] E.T.M.R. 47. 
1382 Ibid, at para 27. 
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In Laboratoire de la Mer Trade Mark (No.2)1383 it was considered by Blackburne J that 
limited use was not considered as genuine use.1384 The CFI’s decision in Kabushiki Kaisha 
Fernandes v OHIM 1385 determined that genuine use must be present in a substantial part of 
the territory and should exclude minimal or insufficient use and concluded that: “genuine use 
must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence of effective and sufficient use of the 
trade mark on the market concerned”.1386  
In assessing use, according to Bugge and Gregersen:  
“consideration should be given to customers, products and … the usual marketing activities. 
As regards the intensity of use for the purpose of complying with the requirement concerning 
genuine use, this will depend on the nature of the goods and services in question. The product 
market may be very narrowly defined so that the demand for the sales intensity of, e.g., a 
special alcoholic liquor is moderate as compared to usual sales”.
1387 
 
It was observed that the concepts of use, non-use and genuine use are complex and 
sophisticated but requires no definition, and should be left in its own dynamic especially in 
the rapidly changing business where new ways of techniques of sales, marketing and 
commerce are developed and applied.1388 The use must be ‘serious’ and slight use is 
insufficient.1389 Unless there is proper reason for non-use, the mere use in order to maintain 
trade mark registration from revocation was insufficient to prove genuine use as considered 
in Re Invermont Trade Mark.1390 
 
The court’s decision above showed that trade mark continues to last and renewable 
indefinitely if proves to have use. The use must be genuine use, not merely a token use. The 
period of protection may also be applicable for nano-marks if the marks prove to be genuine 
use. The term of protection for nano-marks may be renewed indefinitely if the trade mark use 
indicates the connection of nano-marks with the trade mark function, as observed in Ansul’s 
                                                          
1383 [2004] EWHC 2960 (Ch); [2005] F.S.R. 29. 
1384 Ibid, at para 34. 
1385 [2003] ETMR 98. 
1386 Ibid, at para 47. 
1387 Bugge J J and Gregersen P E P ‘Requirement of Use of Trade Marks’ (2003) E.I.P.R. 309, at 311. 
1388 Pretnar B Use and Non-Use in Trade Mark Law in Phillips J and Simon I (eds) Trade Mark Use (Oxford: 
OUP, 2005), at p.27. 
1389 Isaac B Use for the Purpose of Resisting an Application for Revocation for Non-Use in Phillips J and Simon 
I (eds) Trade Mark Use (Oxford: OUP, 2005), at p.227,n. 17. 
1390 [1997] RPC 125; see also Imperial Group v Philip Morris [1982] F.S.R. 72 where the proprietor had no real 
intention to use the mark, but only to maintain the registration in order to stop rival business to introduce other 
trade mark. 
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case. There is no reason for trade mark revocation of registration if nano-mark is genuine use 
in relation to the goods or services for the purpose of indicating of trade mark origin. 
However, care must be made for not granting the protection of the underlying creations 
similar to the shape marks, because consumer may identify a product by its distinctive shape 
as a result of technical feature in the product rather than its trade mark origin. Furthermore, 
this is to avoid the monopolisation of shape entirely because of its functional if the term of 
protection is too long.1391   
 
6.5 Design term of protection  
 
Article 26(3) of the TRIPS requires that the protection for industrial designs is minimum 10 
years which is satisfied by the 10 year minimum under UK unregistered design right, albeit 
not fully exclusive in the last 5 years. Table 6.1 shows term of protection for unregistered 
design right and semiconductor chip protection in the UK. 
 
Table 6.1 design right term of protection 
Law  Creation of design Publication of design Expiry of design 
Unregistered design 
right (CDPA 1988) 
Section 216 
-fifteen years after 
recorded, or an article 
was made to the 
design 
-ten years from the 
date of first sale if 
articles made to the 
design are made 
available for sale or 
hire  
 -fifteen years after 
recorded or article 
made 
-ten years from the 
date of first sale 
Semiconductor 
Regulations 
Regulation 6 
-fifteen years recorded 
in a design document 
or made to an article  
-another ten years 
from first marketing  
 -fifteen years if fail to 
market the design 
-25 years if succeed to 
market the design  
 
                                                          
1391As Lord Templeman observed under Trade Marks Act 1938 in Coca-Cola Trade Marks [1986] R.P.C. 421 of 
the danger that the shape would become “total and perpetual monopoly”, at 457. 
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Under the UK design right, the period of protection for design right is shorter than the 
registered design and copyright.1392 The period of design right is fifteen years after the design 
was recorded or was made to the design. Furthermore, if the article was made available for 
sale or hire within first five years from the end of calendar year, the period is ten years from 
the date of first sale. Unlike copyright, the duration of the design right is more akin to patent 
because its functional character is considered as an industrial property and the profit for the 
investment can be generated within a short period.1393 The way to determine the term of the 
design right also should consider the right “balance between the innovation (creation of a 
new designs) and production levels (item produced to the design)”.1394 Nano-creation design 
may enjoy the term of protection offered under unregistered design right for fifteen years 
from the creation of the design or ten years from the marketing of the design because the 
period would give some adjustment for time to create and market of the design. This term of 
protection suggests that there may be a real period of ten years from filing of the design. 
 
Article 38 of the TRIPS provides for the term of protection for layout-designs (topographies) 
of integrated circuits. Where registration is a condition for protection, TRIPS requires the 
term of protection to be for ten years from the date of the filing an application for registration 
or from the first commercial exploitation. If registration is not required as a condition for 
protection, the protection for layout-designs is of not less than ten years from the date of first 
commercial exploitation. The member states may also provide that the protection shall lapse 
fifteen years after the creation of the layout design. A member states would be complying 
under this provision by applying the shorter of the terms, provided that the correct stating 
date is followed.1395 Whereas Article 8 of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits1396 provides for eight years term of protection for integrated circuit.  
 
According to Regulation 6, if the owner semiconductor design fails to market his design in 
fifteen years, his design right expires, but if he able to market his design before fifteen years 
                                                          
1392The reason is to reflect the policy consideration that the design right should be lesser i.e. to encourage the 
registration simply as registered design, MacQueen et al., n.622, at p.332. 
1393 Torremans, n.200, at p.352. 
1394 Ibid, at p.352 adds that these ten years allow the continuation of the design to be created, as well as do not 
deprive others for the use of the design. 
1395 Gervais, n.222, at p.420. 
1396 See 5.4.5.3.  
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expires, he will be able to enjoy another ten years from first marketing.1397 Thus, for 
example, if the design owner of semiconductor markets his article fourteen years after he first 
created the design, he can enjoy another ten years which is total 24 years from first 
creation.1398 The term of protection of the TRIPS seems to have adopted UK unregistered 
design approach of ten years. Nano-creation design may enjoy the term of protection as 
exemplified under semiconductor chip for fifteen years of the making of the article. As 
argued in the interview conducted in this thesis,1399 cycle of innovation in semiconductor 
chip needs time to mature, other than the existing fifteen years of protection; another ten 
years term of protection from the first marketing of the article may be suitable for nano-
design creation.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
In summary, confidentiality lasts forever provided the information is being kept secret. This 
may be good for protecting nanotechnology. However, confidentiality is more vulnerable 
term for large teams involved like nanotechnology and of reverse engineering. The patent 
term of twenty years is likely to be sufficient as the period under the TRIPS applicable to all 
inventions as “one size fits all”. If the term proved to be insufficient, nanotechnology may be 
identified for SPCs, specifically nano-medicine. Trade mark is renewable indefinitely 
provided that the mark is used genuinely – to indicate the origin function of the product 
rather than protecting underlying creations as evidenced in shape marks. Design provides 
various term of protection for nano-creations and based on the discussion, the magnitude of 
period of protection that may be right for nanotechnology is between ten to 25 years which is 
involved UK unregistered design to registered design and patent plus SPCs. 
                                                          
1397 Howe, n.1198, at p.374. 
1398 Unlike in the ordinary design that would expire a year after first marketing in similar circumstances, ibid, at 
p.374. 
1399 Interviewee A. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
This thesis has examined the development of nanotechnology, especially in two comparator 
jurisdictions, Malaysia and the UK, and canvassed perceptions of nanotechnologists as to its 
likely trajectory and as to appropriate forms of intellectual property (IP) protection. Based on 
these findings, together with relevant scientific, policy and legal literatures, it discussed the 
various forms of IP protection potentially available for nanotechnology, both those 
particularly stressed by interviewees and other forms. It compared the various forms of IP as 
regards an important aspect – their duration. 
 
Nanotechnology can be recognised as one of the important areas of worth tackling, for being 
new, emerging, unique and the law is still undeveloped, especially for Malaysia. It is typified 
by its small scale from range of 1nm to 100nm, signifies as 10-9 and thus is a technology that 
can be appreciated only with the assistance of special tools. Interestingly, as size is reduced 
and the laws of classical physics change to the laws of quantum mechanics, the properties of 
given structures behave differently from macro-scale. Some creations involve adaptation of 
things known at macro-scale to take advantage of these effects. Many valuable creations 
involve things previously unknown being crafted to behave in a way previously unknown.  
 
For this, the main questions were; can IP (including but not limited to patents) cope with this 
intermediate but surprisingly different zone, which cuts across boundaries between many 
technical disciplines? Is the balance between protection and non-protection appropriate for 
this scale, given the survey of the technology and its key practitioners? Or do new forms of 
IP have to be set up?  From the analysis discussed in this study, it is evident that the existing 
forms of IP are sufficient to cater for the issues posed by nanotechnology. However, the 
discussion also proved that there are significant legal and administrative challenges which 
must be taken into consideration with regard to the IP protection for nanotechnology in 
Malaysia (in particular). 
 
251 
 
There are no special forms of IP protection for nanotechnology in Malaysia and there is 
greatest need to protect as the technology is emerging. This thesis has focused on the main 
arguments that current IP forms are sufficient to protect nanotechnology, and thus the idea of 
devising of sui generis protection is undesirable. Rather, it is recommended to rely on and 
possibly develop the forms of IP already recognised and protected at the international, 
regional and national level. This thesis has strongly argued that the current IPRs are indeed 
sufficient to govern the issues related to nanotechnology. The debates on sui generis 
protection for databases and computer programs show that the creation of sui generis rights 
gives rise to the problem in protecting those technologies, especially at the supra-national 
level.1400  When new technology is introduced, it is not necessary that the new law has to be 
created. The important thing is that the new technology be tested in consideration of the 
existing law. However, it must be admitted to a certain extent that the existing laws of IP are 
challenged because of the unique characteristic posed by nanotechnology. This thesis 
identified gaps in the provisions, and certain modifications that are desirable to better protect 
nanotechnology in the future. Therefore, this law must be adapted in certain respect to take 
fully account of the legal and scientific principles of nanotechnology.  
 
In order to do this, it has been necessary to analyse the nature of nanotechnology based on its 
scope and development, which required analysis from various legal and scientific 
understanding, as well as informed from key technologists conducted through qualitative 
interviews. The analysis and guidance from this thesis are hoped to provide a platform for 
legal framework for IP protection of nanotechnology in Malaysia. The general conclusions 
from the chapters will now be recapitulated.  
 
Chapter Two introduced and explained the basic scientific understanding of nanotechnology 
in the selected jurisdiction. This chapter focused on what is nanotechnology, and how is its 
development important in determining the legal pattern for nanotechnology. This chapter 
analysed that nanotechnology cannot be discretely and uniquely defined because of its 
multidisciplinary and unique characteristics. It also found that, this fragmented and imprecise 
                                                          
1400 See for example Diver L ‘Would the Current Ambiguities within the Legal Protection of Software be 
Solved by the Creation of a Sui Generis Property Right for Computer Programs?’ (2008) Vol.3, No.2 125, at 
p.137; Christie A ‘Designing Appropriate Protection for Computer Programs’ (1994) E.I.P.R. 486, at p.488; 
Aplin T ‘The ECJ Elucidates the Database Right’ (2005) 2 I.P.Q. 204, at p.208; see also discussion in Derclaye 
E The Legal Protection of Databases: A Comparative Analysis (Cheltenham: EE, 2008). 
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definition may be highly critical for the legal analysis, though less problematic for the 
scientific analysis. This chapter explored that to date there is little agreement of what 
nanotechnology is and there is no satisfactory working definition for nanotechnology. 
Nanotechnology has been defined according to its size range, size dependent property, 
function and its effect and combination of these. However, there is still no precise definition 
that could be adopted, which suggested that a sui generis right is impossible to frame for 
nanotechnology. This chapter also proved that the defining terminology would be significant 
to determine the scope of IPRs for nanotechnology. Thus, without clear definitional 
boundaries, the task of creating new sui generis rights is difficult if not impossible. 
 
The selected jurisdictions have identified prioritised areas of nanotechnology to be developed 
in the future, especially in Malaysia and the UK. Although other jurisdictions may not be the 
main discussion under study, Australia and the US have been considered from time to time, 
as compared with the chosen jurisdictions, there are similarities and differences of prioritised 
areas, and they are also advanced in nanotechnology initiatives. Malaysia and UK are 
compared in their nanotechnological development. This thesis has found that both 
jurisdictions are having similar focused areas in health and medicine. This finding indicates 
that SPCs type protection may prove desirable for nanotechnology as discussed in Chapter 
Six. However, it was also found that there are other focused areas that differ from Malaysia 
and the UK, particularly molecular farming. In comparing between Malaysia, UK and 
Australia, it was found that other than similarities between the jurisdictions especially in 
health and medical areas, there are significantly different focused areas in Australia, in 
mining and agricultural industry. Since this thesis is only looking at the overlap areas of 
interest in the jurisdictions, the different areas are not covered in this thesis. These findings 
could be useful as subject matter of study for the future research. Prioritisation of 
nanotechnology in the jurisdictions showed that the sector can hardly wait for new IPRs to be 
devised. Furthermore, there were no evidences to show that these jurisdictions have 
developed separate IP protection for nanotechnology, for example the US. Although 
advanced in their nanotechnology development, nonetheless no sui generis right for 
nanotechnology has been introduced. Therefore, this strengthens the earlier contention made 
in this study that it is not only difficult and undesirable but also unnecessary to devise a new 
law. 
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Unlike most other current scientific and technological fields, nanotechnology is new, 
emerging and multidisciplinary in nature. These unique characteristics suggested that many 
different forms of IP subject matter are relevant for nanotechnology, not just patents, which 
meant discussion in this study. Furthermore, observation through the historical background 
and its trajectory development suggested that nanotechnology is significant for all IPRs and it 
has developed without a separate IP regime. The interviews with key technologists have also 
suggested that all IPRs are relevant for nanotechnology. These findings suggest that all forms 
of IP are significant and needed to be discussed in this thesis.   
 
Reinforced from the qualitative interviews conducted in this study, and consulting through 
literatures, this thesis demonstrated that the most appropriate forms of IPRs for 
nanotechnology are breach of confidence and patents, discussed  in Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four respectively. Other forms of IP protection are also proved to be important 
including copyright, trademark and design law as discussed under Chapter Five. The analysis 
from interviews and the technological development of nanotechnology have showed that 
there are strong parallels between nanotechnology and the previous technologies including 
biotechnology, information technology and semiconductor chip. The previous technologies, 
to a certain extent, share similar issues which could provide useful analogy for 
nanotechnology.  
 
Chapter Three discussed the protection of nanotechnology by the law of confidence.  The 
law of confidence has been regarded as the most appropriate form of protection for 
nanotechnology. This was evidenced from the interview analysis conducted in this study. 
Equitable approach for breach of confidence is judicially well established to protect 
nanotechnology. The law of confidence has suggested that protection of information at 
macro-level law is flexible and pragmatic enough to protect nano-level information. The 
protection provided by the law of confidence is wider to protect any confidential information, 
and this could include nanotechnology information which has technical value and trade secret 
information. Furthermore, confidentiality requires no process of registration, no limitation of 
the term and no difference between products and process, goods and services. Surprisingly, 
although TRIPS is the only instrument at the international level to protect confidential 
information, nevertheless there arises a common understanding at the national and 
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international level to protect secret information, as well as the cross-border flow of 
information.  
 
The quality of confidence may be developed by scientists and engineers in nanotechnology 
by engaging themselves in creation of research. As long as the information is not public 
property or public knowledge, the information is said to have the quality of confidence. 
Nonetheless large team of individuals in nanotechnology are less likely to maintain 
confidentiality, however arguments can be made that the property at macro-level and nano-
level is different. This could mean that the mere availability of nanotechnology products does 
not necessarily mean that the confidentiality has lost, and the relevant groups who have 
received the information must have some interest to the information disclosed, which could 
involve scientists and technologists. Normally nanotechnology involves the basic research, 
therefore in order to secure the information before publication or applying for patent, the law 
of confidence is the best mechanism to protect the information. 
 
The contractual obligation by means of express agreement or NDA is the most suitable in 
considering the speed of nanotechnology that moves quickly. In the absence of contractual 
obligation, the term can be implied based on objective test that the scientists or technologists 
ought to have realised that on reasonable ground, the information was imparted in 
confidence. Nanotechnology may adopt the integrative approach by combination of necessity 
test and business efficacy and purposive test to determine the obligation of confidence. 
Similarly, in case of employment contract, when the employment contract ends, the 
obligation could be made in the form of express agreement. However, the difficulty would 
arise in implied term as nanotechnology involved teams of people, often university personnel 
enjoying academic freedom, in determining types of information that belong to him or his ex-
employer. If the contractual obligation is not established, the equitable principle would come 
to play.  
 
The law of confidence protects unauthorised use of the information beyond of what is 
intended. In team of individuals like nanotechnology, third parties recipient may be made 
liable for breach of confidence if transmitted beyond what was intended or misused of the 
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confidential information. This may be done within a team member itself, or between a 
different team.  
 
The principles and the scope of public interest defence are examined to nanotechnology 
especially related to health, safety and environment risks that nanotechnology could bring. 
The difficulty may arise in balancing the right of disclosure and maintaining confidentiality 
as new technology like nanotechnology. Therefore, the balancing the interest has showed 
some parallel with other statutory rights in accessing the information for example in relation 
to personal, environmental and freedom of information. It was observed that Malaysia should 
have similar provision, for example in relation to freedom of information to protect 
fundamental liberties of the right of information especially relevant to nanotechnology. 
 
From the interviews conducted in this study, patent law is also important form of IP 
protection for nanotechnology. This was observed under Chapter Four. This chapter 
highlighted that types of nano-creations are products and processes and they can be 
categorised as “inventions”. The practices of biotechnology, computer program and business 
methods have provided guidance in determining the scope of protection for nano-inventions. 
It also demonstrated that the current patentability requirements are tested for nanotechnology. 
It then set out that mere reducing the size into nanoscale does not automatically confer 
patentability. However, it was pointed out that nanotechnology did not only involve 
miniaturisation, but also the properties behave different, which could be protected. It also 
showed that mere down-scaling of the invention might be obvious to the person skilled in the 
art. Again, this could be arguable because it is not only the size that matters in 
nanotechnology, but also the property. It was found that since nanotechnology can be used or 
made in any kind of industry, the requirement of industrial applicability is less problematic. 
Nanotechnology could also pose risks to the environment within the concept of morality and 
public order. Therefore, patent offices should consider balancing the interests of the inventor, 
other human interests and environment. Furthermore, consideration should not only be made 
to the commercial exploitation, but also other aspects such as the nature of the inventions and 
making and using the invention whether they are environmentally damaging.  
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This chapter explained that difficulty in defining and multidisciplinary of nanotechnology 
have proved to be problematic in classifying and monitoring nanotechnology, searching 
relevant prior art, determining the relevant patent examiners and drafting of claims 
constructions.  It was found that the tagging system has been developed in classifying and 
monitoring nanotechnology as evidenced from the EPO and USPTO. This is also significant 
in identifying and searching for relevant prior art for nanotechnology. This chapter explored 
that patent examiners could not understand nanotechnology because they are more 
familiarised in their own fields rather than others. This led to have team approach to 
overcome the unique characteristics of nanotechnology that comprises of different experts 
representing their own respective fields.  
 
This chapter also considered the issue of ownership for nanotechnology inventions. It was 
recognised that there was difficulty in identifying the inventive concept in various disciplines 
involving nanotechnology. It set out that in joint ownership, it was less likely to pose 
problem if the parties in a team have prepared the agreement in advance to equally share the 
benefit arising from the research project. The agreement could also be made when it involved 
the different teams as the case for nanotechnology. It was examined that Malaysian law has 
assumed that all inventions created in the employment contract will belong to the employer. 
Whereas in the UK, to determine whether the employer owned the inventions or not, all are 
depended upon two situations provided under section 39 of the PA 1977. It demonstrated that 
ownership created under employment contract would vary on a case by case basis. This 
showed that it is significant to agree the ownership created in the employment contract under 
a written agreement. However, the issue became contentious for collaborative research 
outside the written agreement especially relevant for nanotechnology. For this, the ownership 
should be made clearly in the employment contract or NDA to ensure all parties had enjoyed 
equitable share. This chapter was essential as it examined that the provision of employee 
compensation scheme has proved to be less generous for multidiscipline like 
nanotechnology. The individuals basis of reward scheme could lead to the difficulty in 
identifying who actually contributed to the invention and this could also impede the 
development of nanotechnology.  
 
257 
 
This chapter also gave consideration to determine the patent defences and found that 
experimental use defence and prior user right have proved to be problematic for 
nanotechnology. Research tools such as carbon nanotubes, STM and AFM are important for 
nanotechnology development. Thus, the experimental use defence is significant to ensure that 
the use of the research tools did not infringe the patent. There are various approaches to 
implement experimental use defence including narrow, broader and flexible approach. It 
explained that if narrow approach is adopted, it could bar the progress of technological 
development and if broader approach is adopted, although it could encourage the progress of 
technology, but the company might prefer to use secrecy rather than patent. Thus, this study 
has concluded that flexible approach would be appropriate for nanotechnology considering 
its emerging and multidisciplinary, as well as the interest of parties involved. Prior user right 
has also proved to be difficult especially in determining the element of good faith for team 
members of nanotechnology. The effective and serious preparations are also allowed from 
specific geometry at macro-scale to nanoscale, but may prove otherwise if used or applied to 
other applications. Since nanotechnology’s property behaves differently at different size, this 
also proved critical for the defence of prior user right based on different sizes.  
 
It was also deemed prudent to examine the other types of IPRs (copyright, trademark and 
designs) that potentially relevant to nanotechnology. This was discussed in Chapter Five.  
This chapter explored the extent that the subject matters of IP applicable to nanotechnology. 
It discussed that at that the international attitudes towards protection of nano-creations, there 
was neither express exclusion nor express inclusion, which could be assumed that nano-
creations could be protected in principle. This chapter explained that all of these IP subject 
matters may be applicable to nanotechnology, with certain difficulties.   
 
It was demonstrated that the ‘work’ under copyright could include “nano-work” and mainly 
relevant to artistic and literary works. Since artistic works are appreciated because of visual 
appearance, this was found to be problematic for nanotechnology although perceptible with 
the assistance of imaging apparatus. It was decided in Lucasfilm that purely utilitarian 
function was not work of sculpture, and this trend of court’s interpretation suggested that the 
same trend will be followed by the courts in Malaysia. It was further pointed out that in 
relation to literary works; this chapter gave response in light to the copyright for DNA. DNA 
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molecule in literary work could provide some insightful for nano-creations. However, the 
contention was found to be weak except copyright may operate at nanoscale because of 
technical characteristic of the DNA and it was hard to prove infringement.   
 
Chapter Five gave further consideration by exploring whether “sign” could include nano-
marks. This led to examine that the word “sign” was broad enough to include marks at 
nanoscale. It was stated since the requirements of “graphical representation” have been tested 
in connection to the non-visually perceptible marks as in colours, smell and sounds; it proved 
that it was equally applicable to nano-marks. Furthermore, it showed that although classes of 
goods under Nice Classification were general, it did not mean that marks on nanoscale 
products are excluded. However, Malaysian law proved to be less generous to protect nano-
marks because the lists of “mark” referred are having similar visual characteristics. This 
chapter also recognised that the shapes of nano-products are unlikely to be protected as 
trademarks considering the technical characteristics of nanotechnology and the problem of 
monopolisation of the shape.  
 
Nowadays, the word “nano” has popularly been used in relation to products and services 
which gave rise the issue of descriptiveness or deceptiveness. It was further pointed out that 
it was difficult to establish that the word “nano” is not descriptive or deceptive because 
normally consumers are unable to associate “nano” with the trade origin. This chapter also 
considered the average consumer for nanoscale marks, consisting of various parties including 
scientists, technologist, lab technician etc.  
 
Chapter Five also investigated whether nano-creations comprise designs, and whether non-
visibility poses problems to design law. This chapter demonstrated that the requirement of 
“eye-appeal” has limited the scope of the protection for nano-creations under design law in 
Malaysia. Conversely, in the UK/EU, the protection for nano-creations could be granted, but 
with certain difficulties. It was observed that the difficulties arise because of complex in the 
design law itself, and the likelihood of the design overlapped with other IPRs. This chapter 
recognised there was no requirement that the design should be visible to the eye, except for 
parts of a complex product, both under UK registered design/Community design and UK 
unregistered design which has suggested that design could include nano-creations. It was also 
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recognised that the product under registered design could exist in different forms, including 
nano-forms. However, since nanotechnology is identified because of its technical 
characteristics, the protection under registered/Community design proved to be less generous 
for nano-creations. Therefore, it proved critical to consider the protection under UK 
unregistered design right by looking at the Semiconductor Chip model. It explained that 
Semiconductor Chip model has proved to be successful in protecting Semiconductor Chip; it 
was very small enough that could reach nano-size and its internal layers has suggested for 
non-visibility to the eye. The conclusion of Chapter Five contributed to the unregistered 
design right model for nanotechnology that could be identified especially for Malaysia. 
 
Chapter Six focused on the issue of whether the terms of protection under existing IP are 
appropriate or whether a more suitable term can be identified for nanotechnology. This 
section has argued the existing term of design and patent protection is adequate to protect 
nanotechnology, based on the magnitude between ten years to the period of 25 years in 
considering the newness of the technology, the fact that it moves rapidly and the need for 
commercialising nanotechnology effectively. Confidentiality lasts forever if the information 
has been kept secret by all means for example using secret code or NDA. However, complex 
and multiple disciplines that involve various parties in nanotechnology make it less likely to 
maintain secrecy. Furthermore, confidentiality has the danger of sudden loss, for example by 
reverse engineering.  
 
This thesis has observed that the period of twenty years provided under the TRIPS for patents 
is probably sufficient for nanotechnology. The non-discriminatory term of protection for any 
technology provided under the TRIPS has been called as “one size fits all” is arguably 
sufficient to protect nanotechnology. This is because the period of twenty years is within the 
reasonable bounds of the optimal duration to protect nanotechnology creations. Nevertheless, 
another extra period of five years could be identified as provided under SPCs if 
nanotechnology would have to undergo period of testing and authorisation, for example in 
determining level of toxicity. Furthermore, new and complex technology would need an extra 
time to develop before bringing the product into the market. The case law proved that for the 
granting of SPCs, the word “product” has been interpreted rather restrictively as well as its 
conditions which suggested that SPCs may be identified only in relation to nano-medicine. 
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Trademark term is renewable indefinitely provided that the marks are in genuine use. The 
indefinite term relates to the function of trademark that is to associate the product or service 
with the trade origin. The use must be in genuine use, and this does not include the slight use 
or the mere use of maintaining trade mark registration. The requirement of 'genuine' is 
significant because the protection does not extend to the underlying creation like shape marks 
for its technical character. The term should not be too long for the policy consideration in 
avoiding monopolisation. This is equally true for nanoscale marks, which may be identified 
for their technical character, for example the shape of nanotubes. The shape of nanotubes 
should be made available to everyone to exploit.    
 
There are various term of protection under design law comprises the period from ten years to 
25 years, except for short lived design as in Unregistered Community Design, created with 
toys and fashion industries in mind, the term is three years. The various periods have 
indicated that the period of improvement of the design after its creation and the period of the 
prior launch of the article to the market. The magnitude of ten to 25 years would be 
appropriate to nano-creations in considering the nature of nanotechnology that moves 
quickly.  
 
7.1 Suggestions and recommendations  
 
Based on the conclusions made in this study, there are several suggestions and 
recommendations regarding the way in which the proposed legal framework could be better 
relating to IP and nanotechnology, as outlined below: 
 
Chapter Two: 
 
I. Historical background and trajectory of nanotechnology have shown that the 
importance to project nanotechnology development for the future. It also 
demonstrated that nanotechnology has developed without special IP rights, 
reinforced that sui generis right for nanotechnology is undesirable. The key 
milestone of nanotechnology development has identified that the duration for the 
development is based on magnitude. 
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II. Nanotechnology should be developed without special IPRs regime because law is 
flexible enough to cope with new technology including nanotechnology, as 
exemplified also in previous technologies including biotechnology and ICT.  
 
III. Nanotechnology development under both jurisdictions, Malaysia and the UK 
(EU) has demonstrated that medical or health are overlapping areas, which 
suggested for the patent protection. The areas also illustrated that pattern of 
duration that could be identified under SPCs for nanotechnology. Furthermore, 
nanoelectronics have also been identified important areas which suggested for 
unregistered design right, especially for Malaysia to adopt.  
 
Chapter Three: 
 
I. This study has considered the proprietary rights in the information. It was 
demonstrated that both jurisdictions; Malaysia and UK have rejected the 
notion of proprietary analysis of the information and this has been predicted to 
continue in the near future. It was stated that when the contract of employment 
ends, it is difficult to determine the implied term, thereby preventing 
exchanging of ideas or free movement of the employee to another company. 
This has suggested that proprietary analysis by Honore’ could provide sound 
theoretical basis, albeit not in the near future. 
 
II. In consideration of the speed of nanotechnological development, the 
springboard doctrine has been identified as significant to balance the interest 
of the plaintiff and encourage competition. 
 
III. Steps should have been taken by scientists or technologists to secure their 
confidential information by way, for example secret code, limited access, or 
limit to control and use of confidential information.  
 
IV. In collaborative works involving nanotechnology, the obligation of confidence 
should be made in advance through contractual agreement or NDA to stipulate 
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clearly the information should not be made or used without authorisation. In 
the absence of express term, the court would rely on the circumstances of a 
contract to imply the obligation of confidence. For being complex and 
multidisciplinary like nanotechnology, the court should adopt an integrative 
approach of combining the test of business efficacy and purposive approach in 
maintaining interests of the different parties involved. 
 
V. Tort principles should be applied to the breach of confidence claims involving 
the conflict of laws as provided under Rome II Regulation. The Treaty should 
provide a framework for nanotechnology which would generally have the 
cross-border element. 
 
VI. It was recognised that public interest defence relevant to nanotechnology 
considering for example the use of nanoparticles may have the potential risk, 
harm and danger to the human and environment. As the potential effect of 
nanotechnology is still uncertain and unknown, the principle of precautionary 
principles would be important for nanotechnology. The precautionary 
principle should be applicable to nanotechnology because there are tenable 
grounds that the release of nanomaterials into environment would give serious 
harm to the human and environment. Furthermore, the toxicity effect of 
nanotechnology has indicated that the negative consequence was irreversible. 
 
VII. There are other statutory rights to access of the information in order to balance 
the interest of new and emerging technology like nanotechnology and at the 
same to preserve the interest of the public of not to expose the danger from the 
technology, for example under HRA, EIR and FOI. The FOI which has 
applied in the UK and Australia are persuasive for Malaysia to enact the same 
laws for nanotechnology. 
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Chapter Four: 
 
I. There was no doubt that nanotechnology could potentially pose risk to the 
environment which against the principle of morality and public order. The 
patent office should balance the interest of the inventor against the human and 
environment, in consideration not only the commercial interest but also other 
aspects such as the nature invention. It was found that the patent office should 
establish the special Ethics and Public Interest Panel comprised different 
experts to decide whether or not the invention is against public order or 
morality. Malaysia should follow the practices of the UKIPO which 
recognised the “green” or environmental-friendly invention to be used for 
example nanoparticles eco-friendly applications.  
 
II. The research has also found that the fragmented and non-satisfactory 
definition of nanotechnology has led to the problem of classification and 
monitoring system for nanotechnology. Malaysia should adopt the classifying 
and monitoring system developed by other patent office such as EPO, USPTO 
and JPO as guidelines for classification and examination purposes; and to 
search and locate the relevant prior art for nanotechnology. Multidisciplinary 
like nanotechnology, the approach of classification should be according to 
sub-disciplines that concerned of the technology. 
 
III.  The level of patent examiners’ knowledge of the patent office also should be 
upgraded and improved (for example by cross-functional expertise) to handle 
the issues related to nanotechnology. Given the complexities of 
nanotechnology, collaboration and team approach should be adopted.  
 
IV. A centralised database of prior art should also be developed to provide 
database for nanotechnology prior art. This should be able to solve the 
problem of limited availability of prior art or to trace the scattered available 
prior art for nanotechnology. The examiners should get the assistance, for 
example, from academia and industries to locate and classify prior art; and 
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they also can ask for the second review, for example, the UKIPO has engaged 
in the websites the non-binding opinions of validity and infringing invites 
information by publication of the cases on the websites. Malaysia should 
follow this move in classifying resources for nanotechnology prior art.  
 
V. Joint ownership is very important in relation to nanotechnology. Joint inventor 
in the same team has shown less problematic in determining the ownership. 
However, when it involved different teams under the same research project, 
this may not be true. Thus, ownership should be agreed in advance among the 
parties or by way of employment contract or employee invention code. In a 
collaborative works of nanotechnology, the agreement should be drafted with 
a view that all individuals/teams enjoy an equitable share, and should be made 
in certainty. 
 
VI. The issue of ownership between employee and employer is relevant to 
nanotechnology because the research normally starts at the university or 
government’s laboratory. In Malaysia, the law governing the invention under 
employment contract has given more generous towards the employer, where it 
assumed that all inventions created in the employment contract belong to the 
employer. In contrast, the position in the UK has proved that there are two 
situations the invention belong to the employer provided under section 39 of 
the PA 1977. Thus, Malaysia should adopt to amend section 20 of the PA 
1983 especially for nanotechnology because under UK law the phrase “normal 
duties” and “specifically assigned” in nanotechnology would vary according 
to circumstances in each case. 
 
VII. Employee compensation scheme was seen undesirable for nanotechnology 
because the reward was granted individually, whereas nanotechnology 
involved team of individuals. This has demonstrated that the researcher would 
reluctant to share his ideas to work collaboratively and thereby impeding the 
technological development and provides disincentives. The statutory 
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employee compensation scheme did not provide a good framework for 
nanotechnology instead contractual agreements should be given preferable. 
 
VIII. The phrase “scientific research” under Malaysia PA 1983 is equivalent to 
“experiment” under UK PA 1977. The approach of deciding the acts done for 
scientific research as in for experimental purposes should be adopted by 
Malaysia. 
 
Chapter Five: 
 
I. Section 13A and 13B of Malaysian copyright law (equivalent to section 51 
and 52 of the UK) has limited to protect artistic design which has been made 
industrially. To give generous treatment for nano-creations, Malaysia should 
follow the UK lead in protecting artistic design by the route of unregistered 
design. Furthermore, unregistered design right through semiconductor chip 
has protected non-visible and small scale design which could suggest being 
the best model for nano-design. 
  
II. The definition of “mark” under Malaysia TMA 1976 has limited the scope of 
nano-marks protection because it is related to the visual characteristics of the 
goods and services. Thus, instead of “mark”, Malaysia should follow UK/EU 
to use “sign” which is wider to include nanoscale marks. 
 
III. The word “nano” should be refused for trade mark registration if for 
deceptiveness because it confuses the public perception and creates 
uncertainty over nanotechnology. The word “nano” should freely available to 
anyone to use for policy consideration. 
 
IV. “Eye-appeal” requirement under section 3(1) of IDA should be removed in 
order to protect nano-design. 
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Chapter Six:  
 
I. The period of twenty years under patent is appropriate to protect and develop 
nanotechnology. However, it showed that nanotechnology could potentially 
have subjected to marketing authorisation which could suggest for SPCs type 
of protection. Nevertheless, because of restrictive interpretation of the 
“product” and strict conditions under SPCs, it has suggested that SPCs could 
be extended to nano-medicine without much adjustment. 
 
II. The term of nano-marks is renewed indefinitely if proved to be genuine use. 
The trade mark use indicated that the consumer has associated nano-marks 
with trade mark origins and not merely on its underlying creations as similar 
to shape marks. This in particular important to avoid monopolisation of the 
technical characteristic of shape marks. This is because, for example, the 
shape of nanotubes should be made freely available. 
 
III. The protection under design started from ten to 25 years has indicated that 
leeway is allowed to give for improvement of the nano-creations before the 
launch into the market. This thesis has concluded that the right magnitude of 
duration for nano-creations are between ten to 25 years which reflect the 
duration under unregistered design to registered design, and patent plus 
SPCs. 
 
It is submitted however that further research could be useful in the promising areas of 
mining, agriculture and molecular farming, such as in ascertaining whether and to what 
extent that the plant variety rights are applicable protection for nanotechnology. Equally, the 
researcher would like to suggest that a future research scope and impact of compulsory 
licensing could also meaningfully be carried out for nanotechnology. 
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APPENDIX 1 
DOCTRINAL AND COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
1.1 Introduction of legal research 
 
In this study, the methodological approach employs doctrinal and comparative legal analysis. 
This section examines the doctrinal and comparative analysis and justifies their usefulness and 
appropriateness for the current study.  
 
Legal research relates to the various principles and relationship of “how the law works”.1 This is 
to understand the operation of the law and legal system in matters concerning the sources of law, 
operation of judicial precedent, equitable principles, statutory interpretation, the judicial decision 
making process and the relationship between domestic and international law.2  
Kissam identifies the purpose of legal research broadly as to:3 
(a) classify and categorise cases, statutes and other legal materials into separate legal 
elements; 
(b) synthesis various elements of cases and statutes together into a consistent and useful legal 
standard or legal rules; 
(c) clarify and resolve the doctrinal issue; 
(d) produce teaching materials and all kinds of educational guides; 
(e) understand legal doctrine or legal process by explanation of causes, analysing of 
consequence and interpretation of meaning; and 
(f) critique legal doctrine or legal process as to whether appropriate methods are being used 
or whether the values are achieved. 
 
Kissam’s approach is significant in classifying, categorising and synthesising IP laws especially 
from Malaysia and the UK in order to identify the common rule which may be suitable for 
nanotechnology. In clarifying and resolving the doctrinal issues, this study examines how 
nanotechnology is protected under the current IPRs. However, according to (d), this is not the 
                                                          
1 Stott D Legal Research (2nd edn) (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999), at p.1. 
2 Ibid, at pp.1-2. 
3 Kissam P C ‘The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship’ (1988) 63 Wash. L. Rev. 223, at pp.230-239, however admits 
that these purposes are complex and overlapping. 
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main purpose of this study to produce of teaching materials and all of educations guides, but it is 
hoped to have some values and practices in the future. In order to understand legal doctrine or 
legal process this study explains, for example the justification of the most appropriate form IPRs 
over the others. In analysing the consequence and interpreting the meaning, this study 
investigates for example what constitutes confidentiality in nanotechnology. This study also aims 
to critique whether the legal doctrine or legal process is appropriate for nanotechnology. Thus, 
the list provided by Kissam is relevant to this study and manages to validate the approach 
employed throughout this thesis.  
 
This study adopts doctrinal legal research in analysing legal rules of IPRs and nanotechnology, 
both under Malaysian and UK law. This study also engages a comparative analysis of the law in 
Malaysia and UK as well as, where relevant, European laws and other international instruments. 
However, this wider and limited jurisdictional material may be treated as persuasive rather than 
authoritative. Therefore, in this study, doctrinal and comparative law are not treated mutually 
exclusive, but rather complement each other.4 It is hoped that the approaches employed are able 
to reflect the aim of the study that is to assess the scope and development in selected legal 
jurisdictions in relation to IPRs over nanotechnology and to propose a legal framework for 
Malaysia.  
 
1.2 Doctrinal analysis 
 
Doctrinal analysis5 tries to ask “what the law is in a particular area”.6 It is a type of “black-
letter”7 rules in analysing, interpreting and clarifying of the legal rules and principles of the law. 
                                                          
4 The legal doctrinal itself plays a vital part to achieve the objective of comparative analysis, Warrington M and Van 
Hoecke M ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards New Model for Comparative Law’ 
(1998) I. C. L. Q. 495, at p.522. 
5 Also known as "traditional legal scholarship”, Jones G ‘Traditional’ Legal Scholarship: A Personal View in Birks 
P B H (ed) Pressing Problems in the Law: What Are Law Schools For?  Vol. 2 (Oxford: OUP, 1996), at p.9; 
Dobinson and Johns in McConville M and Chui W H Research Methods for Law (eds) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007) refer as “theoretical legal research”, at p.18; also called “the definitive form of legal 
scholarship”, Murphy W T and Roberts S ‘Introduction’ (1987) 50 M.L.R. 677, at p.677. 
6 Dobinson and Johns, n.5, at pp.18-19. This contrasts with the natural sciences research which tries to explain 
natural phenomena through causal relationship between variable, Chynoweth P Legal Research in Knight A and 
Ruddock L (eds) Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) at 
p.30. 
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The formulation of legal ‘doctrine’ through the analysis of legal rules can be found in the 
primary legal materials such as statutes and cases.8 The collection and analysis of the case law 
and relevant legislation are primarily important to demonstrate how the law has been developed 
in relation to the judicial reasoning and legislative enactment.9 Traditionally, doctrinal analysis 
has been successfully applied in relation to legal analysis, legal synthesis and policy 
argumentation.10 This is the prime task of legal scholars for the law to be in the future, as Lord 
Goff states that: 
“the prime task of the jurist is to take the cases and statutes which provide the raw material of the law 
on any particular topic; and, by a critical re-appraisal of that raw material, to build up a systematic 
statement of the law on the relevant topic in a coherent form, often combined with proposals of how 
the law can beneficially be developed in the future. There has thus been provided for all lawyers, 
practitioners and students, an established framework for the consideration of each problem as it 
arises”.11  
On the basis of authoritative texts of primary and secondary sources, the aim of doctrinal 
research is to systematise, rectify and clarify the legal rules.12  
 
Doctrinal analysis plays an important role in developing legal system and has considerably been 
emphasised, Birks who advocates that “traditional legal research and scholarship which 
criticises, explains, corrects and directs legal doctrine is still and must remain in the heart of the 
law school’s research”.13 Similarly, Jones argues that:  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “black-letter” as “one or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well 
settled. The term refers to the law printed in book set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black” ; Black’s Law 
Dictionary (9th edn) (United States: A Thomson Reuters); it is “the black or Gothic type that was traditionally used 
in formal statements of legal principles or rules at the start of a section, which was typically followed by a 
descriptive exposition or commentary” Salter M and Mason J Writing Law Dissertation: An Introduction and Guide 
to the Conduct of Legal Research (New York: Pearson, 2007) at p. 48, and at p.44, n.1; In emphasising the role of 
comparative law and black-letter rule, Örücü points out that “traditional black-letter law-oriented (rule-based) 
comparative law research is normative, structural, institutional and positivistic, and would not use any approach 
other than  the reading of statutes, cases, parliamentary debates and doctrinal works, and would regard description 
and identification to be the final stages of the inquiry”, Örücü E Methodology of Comparative Law in Smits J M 
(ed) The Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006) at p.449. 
8 Chynoweth, n.6, at p.29; the doctrinal analysis is characterised by unique method of reasoning and analysis, Vick 
D W ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) J. Law & Soc. Vol. 31, No.2 163, at p.178. 
9 Dobinson and Johns, n.5, at p.19. 
10 Kissam, n.3, at p.234. 
11 Lord Goff ‘Judge, Jurist and Legislature’ (1987) 2 Denning L.J. 79, at p.92. 
12 McConville M and Chui W H Research Methods for Law (eds) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) at 
p.4. 
13 Birks P B H (ed) Pressing Problems in the Law: What Are Law Schools For?  Vol. 2 (Oxford: OUP, 1996), at 
p.ix. 
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“to dismiss doctrinal writing as expository is to dismiss the skills of synthesis, evaluation and criticism 
which have always been the hall-marks of leading texts and articles. It also ignores the fact that the 
doctrine is still the heart of English law”.14  
Therefore, according to Rhode doctrinal analysis remains the method of choice among the 
majority of legal scholars, because it requires no special expertise beyond what has been taught 
through the training of the traditional law school and this analysis has the capacity to influence 
and assist practitioners, judges and policy makers in drafting and implementing legislation.15 
However, Levmore claims that the doctrinal analysis requires intellectually demanding tasks by 
stating that: 
“ the messy work product of the judges and legislators requires a good deal of tidying up, of synthesis, 
analysis, restatement, and critique. These are intellectually demanding tasks, requiring vast knowledge 
and the ability (not only brains and knowledge and judgment, but also Sitzfleisch) to organize 
dispersed, fragmentary, prolix, and rebarbative materials. These are tasks that lack the theoretical 
breadth or ambition of scholarship in more typically academic fields. Yet they are of inestimable 
importance to the legal system and of greater social value than much esoteric interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship”.
16  
Thus, doctrinal research is not simply finding the correct legal rules per se, but the researcher 
also has to engage with the process of selecting and weighing materials based on the 
authoritative, hierarchical and social context of the interpretation of the legal rules.17  
 
The function of doctrinal analysis is interpreting, analysing and evaluating legal rules and the 
legal system. Doctrinal analysis also plays a role as a basic building block of other studies such 
                                                          
14 Jones, n.5, at p.11; Doctrinal analysis is still dominant mode of legal scholarship, see Posner P A ‘The Legal 
Situation in Legal Scholarship’ (1980-1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1113, at p.1113; historically, theoretical and text-based 
doctrinal research have been dominated the law schools in the UK, see Genn D H et al. Law in the Real World: 
Improving Our Understanding of How Law Works’ Report Summary, The Nuffield Inquiry of Empirical Legal 
Research, Nov 2006, at p.4. 
15 Rhode D L ‘Legal Scholarship’ (2001-2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, at p.1339; the predominant effect of 
doctrinal has become synonymous to the legal study, Vick, n.8, at p.177.  
16 Levmore S ‘In Memoriam: Bernard D Meltzer (1914-2007)’  U. Chi. L. Rev. 409, Vol 74, No. 2, at p.437; Siems 
views that the overriding principles which have been developed by the legal scholar require them to construct the 
area of law in a consistent manner, Siems M M ‘Legal Originality’ (2008) 28 O.J.L.S. 147, at p.153; this 
formulation requires rigorous analytical skill, see also Jones, n.5, at p.14; the close reasoning and greater attention to 
textual context are themselves involved intellectual skills, Bradney A ‘Law as a Parasitic Discipline’ (1998) J. Law 
& Soc. Vol. 25, No.1, 71, at p.76; the doctrinal legal research was always evaluative and critical, see Tiller E H and 
Cross F B ‘What is Legal Doctrine?’ (2006) Nw. U.L.Rev. Vol. 100, No.1 517, at p.518. 
17 Dobinson and Johns, n.5, at pp.21-22. 
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as historical of comparative studies of law.18 The other functions of doctrinal analysis are to 
describe and interpret the law beyond than just merely reporting the legal rules and to 
systematise the law by way of reinterpreting differing concepts, rules and principles.19 
 
Apart from being emphasised as important, doctrinal analysis has also received criticism for 
being too theoretical without a real world application, as Rhode observes that: 
 “much conventional legal analysis is not done well. It exhaustively exhumes unimportant topics or 
replicate familiar argument on important ones. Too little effort is made to connect law to life by 
assessing the real world consequences of analytic frameworks. Of course to do so in systematic 
fashion would require significant time, money, and expertise, which is precisely what most authors 
of doctrinal works are happy to avoid. The result is that on many key legal issues, we are glutted 
with theory and starved for facts”.20  
 
Not only that, some criticised doctrinal analysis as being “merely descriptive or expository, or 
about the dry, mechanical application of rules”.21 Collier has criticised doctrinal analysis as 
“impoverishes the questioning spirit of both law student and teacher”22 and as “an intellectual 
strait-jacket on understanding of law and society”.23 It also has been observed by Bradney that 
doctrinal research which used to dominate the law schools through the internal evidence of the 
court judgements and statutes has now entered its final death throes.24 The criticism of doctrinal 
analysis according to Bradney appeared in two different situations i.e. it ignores the questions 
outside the legal range and treats them as something less important; and it concepts are 
complexed and complicated without able to bridge the gap to other disciplines. 25 
 
Although the accepted paradigm for legal research is legal doctrinal analysis due to new sources 
and the types of modern research, the emphasis has shifted requiring the researcher to engage in 
                                                          
18 Vick, n.8, at n.86, pp.177-178; see also Warrington and Van Hoecke state that doctrinal forms an essential part of 
any legal system, n.4, at p.522. 
19 Warrington M and Van Hoecke, n.4, at pp.523-528. 
20 Rhode, n.15, at p.1340. 
21 Vick, n.8, at p.179. 
22 Collier R ‘The Changing University and the (Legal) academic Career – Rethinking the Relationship between 
Women, Men and the ‘Private Life’ of the Law School’ (2002) 22 Legal Stud. 1, at p.19. 
23 Ibid, at p.27. 
24 Bradney, n.16, at p.71, however claims that this statement does not mean that doctrinal analysis is no longer done. 
25 Ibid, at pp.76-78. 
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a wider context rather than a restrictive doctrinal research methodology.26 The trend of legal 
study has now changed, not only on purely “black-letter” law, but also other important 
approaches such as interdisciplinary, social-legal study, empirical study, comparative study etc.27 
It has been claimed also that the doctrinal research is too narrow in its scope and application 
because of reference primarily on the legal text, and the non-doctrinal approaches represent the 
broader approach taken into consideration of methods from other disciplines such as social 
sciences and humanities.28  
 
The doctrinal analysis of legal rules is crucial for legal research and it continues to pervade legal 
research. This study is no exception and adopts the doctrinal analysis and approach. In relation to 
the IP protection for nanotechnology, the critical analysis has been engaged in analysing the 
appropriate and adequate legal rules protecting nanotechnology. However, the doctrinal analysis 
may not be able to satisfy all the questions relevant to IP protection for nanotechnology, as 
reflected from the criticisms of doctrinal analysis noted above and as  Hutchinson’s view that the 
researcher should be able to understand, appreciate and critique different available 
methodologies to build a more academic and critical view of law.29 For this reason, this study 
does not attempt to treat doctrinal analysis in isolation or as the only important method for legal 
research but comparative analysis between Malaysian and the UK law will also be given 
consideration. This is because as Warrington and Van Hoecke argue doctrinal analysis provides 
groundwork and insights for the comparatists to reconstruct the legal landscape.30 On the basis of 
                                                          
26 In addition to the doctrinal methodology, the legal researcher may engage in social science research such as 
qualitative and quantitative, comparative research, case studies, benchmarking and content analysis, Hutchinson T 
‘Developing Legal Research Skills: Expanding the Paradigm’ (2008) 32 Melb. U. L. Rev. 1065, at pp.1082-1084; 
and, at p.1094. 
27 For an extended discussion of different types research in law, of not promoting or discrediting one after another 
see Siems, n.16 above; see also the discussion of legal research relationship at the core of humanities such as classic, 
history, philosophy and political theory in McCrudden C ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) L. Q. R. 
632; For an interesting exposition benefits of interdisciplinary approaches see Vick, n.8 above; for a good 
consideration of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, and why it develops rapidly and what future it may hold, see 
Posner R A ‘Legal Scholarship Today’ (2001-2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1313; For a useful observation of the 
empirical legal research which is increasingly important for the policy makers, the judiciary, academics, 
practitioners and law reformers, see Genn, n.14 above.  
28 McConville and Chui, n.12, at p.5; See also Hutchinson T C and Burns K ‘The Impact of “Empirical Facts” on 
Legal Scholarship and Legal Research Training’ (2009) The Law Teacher, 43(2) 153, state that doctrinal legal 
research has never been taught explicitly to the legal researcher within the traditional legal territory, at p.161. 
29 Hutchinson, n.26, at pp.1086-1087. 
30 Warrington and Van Hoecke, n.4, at p.522. 
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historical and technological perspective, this study is trying to look at the scientific and legal 
principles underpinning nanotechnology in response to earlier technologies.  
 
1.3 Comparative legal analysis 
 
There is no decisive meaning of what might be considered as comparative law and comparative 
method.31 Several attempts have been made to define the term comparative law and its method.  
Some scholars refer as the process of comparing legal system – Zweigert and Kötz, for example 
advocate that comparative law involves “an intellectual activity with law as its object and 
comparison as its process”.32 Similarly, Gordley refers it as a process of comparing the law of 
different legal systems;33 and De Cruz defines comparative law as a systematic study of the legal 
rules which seeks to compare two or more legal systems, legal traditions, or institutions as a 
method of comparing legal systems which produces results on the legal systems being 
analysed.34 Some other scholars place emphasis on similarities and differences, for example 
Jansen claims that comparative law is a special legal subject which explores the similarities and 
differences of different cultural and social phenomenon.35 Dannemann also demonstrates that 
“comparing legal systems involves at least to some degree exploring both similarities and 
differences”.36 Husa notes that comparative study “concern those who seek similarities, those 
                                                          
31 Örücü E Unde Venit, Quo Tendit Comparative Law? in Harding A and Örücü E (eds) Comparative Law in the 21st 
Century (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) at p.1 and admits that comparative law is a distinct subject 
on its own right, at p.4; see also comparative law has been perceived as a discipline and an independent subject in its 
own internal structure, see Samuel G ‘Comparative Law and Jurisprudence’ (1998) 47 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 817, at 
p.817; but see different view by Gutteridge which emphasises that comparative law is a study and research in law, 
and not a distinct branch of law, Gutteridge H C Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of 
Legal Study and Research (Cambridge: CUP, 1946) at p.1. Gordley J ‘Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline?’ 
(1998) 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 states that comparative law is not a distinct disciplines, at p.607; Palmer V V ‘From 
Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2004) Global Jurist Frontiers, Vol. 4, Issue 
2, 1 emphasises that comparative law is only a method and not a substantive body of knowledge, at p.2. 
32 Zweigert K and Kötz H Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd edn) (trans. Weir T) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), at p.2 add that should put extra dimension of internationalism, that is comparative of different legal system of 
the worlds rather than comparison of different rules in a single legal system; Örücü, n.31, disagree with this 
definition, states rather “circular and vague”, at p.1. 
33 Gordley, n.31, at p.607. 
34 De Cruz P Comparative Law in a Changing World (London: Routledge and Cavendish, 2007) at p.232 and at p.4; 
see also Palmer, n.31, at p.2. 
35 Jansen N Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge in Reimann M and Zimmermann R (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at p.306. 
36 Dannemann G Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences? In Reimann M and Zimmermann R (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at p.384; see also Schlesinger R B ‘The Past and 
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who stress differences; those interested in western law, those interested to non-western law; 
those who are generalists and those who are country-specialists”.37 Some include international 
dimension, for example Rheinstein discusses that “comparative law has something to do with 
world outside of our own country, ... that it is concerned with law as a supra-national 
phenomenon”.38 Similarly, Sacco explains that “comparative law examines the way in which 
legal institutions are connected, diversified and transplanted from one country to another”.39 
Likewise, Wilson argues that comparative law provides advantageous for future development of 
the national legal systems.40 Furthermore, as pointed out by Green comparative law provides 
special significance for the international lawyer.41  
 
The growing interest for comparative legal research has become increasingly important. There is 
a large volume of studies describing the significance of comparative legal research. For example, 
Koopmans claims that the twenty-first century may be considered as the era of comparative 
methods and explains that: 
“Over the least ten or fifteen years the legal climate seems to be changing. There is more awareness 
that comparative methods may lead the lawyer somewhere, and that comparative materials may be a 
source of inspiration for legal decisions – whether by legislative bodies or by the courts. This evolution 
may be influenced by the process of European integration; it may also just result from the fact that we 
are living closer together (the “global village” situation); it may, finally, be an autonomous process, 
occasioned by the lawyer’s search for fresh perspectives, in particular when completely new legal 
problems are to be solved”.42  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Future of Comparative Law’ (1995) 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 477 who states that “to compare means to observe and to 
explain similarities as well as differences”, at p.477. 
37 Husa J ‘About Methodology of Comparative Law – Some Comments Concerning the Wonderland…’ Maastricht 
Faculty of Law Working Paper 2007/5 downloadable via http://ssrn.com/abstract=1085970, visited on 12 January 
2009, at p.5. 
38 Rheinstein M ‘Comparative Law – Its Functions, Methods and Usages’ (1968-1969) Ark. L. Rev. Vol. 22, No.3, 
415, at p.415. 
39 Sacco R ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II) (1991) 39 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 343, at p.388. 
40 Wilson G Comparative Legal Scholarship in McConville M and Chui W H Research Methods for Law (eds) 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), at p.87. 
41 Green L C ‘Comparative Law as a “Source” of International Law’ (1967-1968) Tul. L. Rev. 52, at p.54, further 
explains that this purpose could be served by allowing him to seek a common rules of the local law and this form a 
basis for the international unification; in term of the universal concept of justice, it avoids lacunae for the court to 
decide upon international disputes; and in term of the development of the legal rules, it provides the general 
principles of laws with the aim of clarifying the existing law or allow the existing law to adjust to new social 
conditions, at p.66. 
42 Koopmans T ‘Comparative Law and the Courts’ (1996) 45 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 545, at p.545. 
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Legrand also highlights the same contention that “it is apt to say that Europe, or at least the 
Europe of the European Union is currently experiencing a comparative moment”.43 It is also 
worth observing Lord Goff’s view on this that “comparative law may have been the hobby of 
yesterday, but it is destined to become the science of tomorrow. We must welcome, rather than 
fear, its influence”.44 In addition to this, the growing interest in comparative study is witnessed 
over the last ten years, a period in which the number of article on comparative law has 
quadrupled.45  
 
The main aim of comparative law is to acquire knowledge of different rules at comparison46 that 
comparative legal research goes beyond the theoretical context.47 The comparative method has 
considerable value and is of practical significance in assisting the court to fill the gaps in the 
legislation and case law or in matters that are not covered by statute or case law.48 Furthermore, 
comparative legal research provides a greater range of solution because of different systems that 
are compared; in comparison to the analysis of a single legal system.49 As far as the international 
dimension is concerned, comparative legal research facilitates in the discovery, elucidation and 
application of the “general principle of law” for the national and international courts to apply.50 
The comparative analysis also acts as a tool for the researcher towards universal theory of law, 
and to achieve international unification and harmonisation of the law.51 This means that the 
investigation of the knowledge from other countries assists the researcher in better understanding 
the functions of the rules and principles of the law.52  
 
                                                          
43 Legrand P ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 Legal Stud. 232, at p.232. 
44 Lord Goff of Chieveley ‘The Future of the Common Law’ (1997) 46 Int’l & Comparative L. Q. 747, at p.748. 
45 Örücü, n.31 at p.2. 
46 Zweigert K and Kötz, n.32, at p.15; see also Sacco, n.39, at pp.4-6. 
47 Legrand, n.43, at p.233. 
48 Gutteridge, n.31, at pp.37-40; De Cruz, 34, p.21; Wilson, n.40, at p.88. In observing gaps of the law, according to 
Dannemann is like a blind spot in the eyes, which is very difficult to detect from within, unless such blind spot is 
compared with other system, n.36, at p.416-417. This is because comparative law is considered as blue prints 
models for legal reasoning and also models of law reform for better understanding of changing concepts, Örücü, 
n.31 at p.14. 
49 Zweigert and Kötz, n.32, at p.15. 
50 De Cruz, 34, at p.25. 
51 These objectives sometimes have been categorised as practical, sociological, political, or pedagogical, Örücü, 
n.31, at p.2, at n.7; see also Sacco, n.39, at pp.2-3.  
52 This aids the courts as a method of construction and interpretation of the disputed subject matters, Örücü, n.31, at 
p.14. 
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One of the most significant discussions among scholars is the right approach for comparative 
method. Zweigert and Kötz advocate a “functionalist” approach53 which suggest that in 
comparing individual legal systems or groups of legal systems “comparatist must strive to grasp 
these legal styles”, and the factors which crucial to legal styles include historical background and 
development; characteristic mode of thought in legal issues; type of legal sources and the way to 
handle them and ideology.54 Husa examines that the functionalist approach for comparative law 
should not be limited to the written law only, but should be prepared to consider a larger cultural, 
social, economic and ideological issues as a whole.55 However, the functionality approach has 
been refuted by Palmer on the basis that one may not necessarily be interested to explore the 
function of the legal rules and principles, but instead it is only to understand, preserve and trace 
the evolution of another law.56  
 
On the other hand, Palmer strongly suggests that comparative law should expand more on a 
practical level and submits that the strategies for comparative methodology should be viewed 
pragmatically, especially on the law in action and not merely the law in the book.57 Palmer 
concludes that the best approach should be concerned, for example the specific purposes of the 
research.58 
 
Similar to doctrinal analysis, comparative analysis has also received many criticisms. Gutteridge, 
points out that it is difficult for the comparative process to take place because comparative law 
employed broad areas and it tended to serve many purposes59  Glendon describes “the problem 
                                                          
53 “the basic methodological principle of all comparative laws is that of functionalist”, n.32, at p.34. 
54 Zweigert and Kötz, n.32, pp.67-68 (emphasis in the original). 
55 Husa, n.37, at pp.8-9. 
56 Palmer, n.31, at p.23, further argues that to claim functionality as a basic method for comparative law is actually 
an artificial restriction on the scope of one type of comparison over the other, at p.24. 
57 Ibid, at pp.33-34; see also Rheinstein states that comparative law is intellectually challenges and “a field of 
practical utility” n.38, at p.424. 
58 “it cannot be a single exclusive method that comparative law research should follow. The tasks of teaching, 
research of law reform, or historical investigation are too varies and contingent to be achieved by a single 
approach. It would be a serious blow if all matters had to be analysed from one angle or perspective, or treated with 
the same detail and depth, or prepared to the same degree or in the same way”, n.31, at p.29. 
59 Gutteridge, n.31, at p.72; see also Legrand notes that “before we talk about method, we need to know what is the 
point of the whole enterprise”, Legrand ‘John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal Studies: A Dialogue’ 
(1999) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 2, at p.50; see also Leyland “important to consider first what we are trying to achieve by 
undertaking comparative work”, Leyland, Oppositions and Fragmentations: In Search of a Formula for 
Comparative Analysis in Harding A and Orucu E (eds) Comparative Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2006), at p.221. 
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of comparative law is one word “context” – to understand legal rule in any system, one must 
have some understanding of its social and economic background and its practical consequences 
in operation”.60 She further emphasises that to compare means that one should go beyond 
comparing the rules as she points out that:  
“no matter how carefully limited the scope of project may be, one runs the risk of missing real 
functional similarities and differences unless one compares not only the rules themselves, but their 
social context and the manner in which they actually operate within their surrounding legal system”.
61  
 
Legrand, queries on the basis the limit of comparison by asking that “where law begins and 
where it ends and to what extent the contextual element ought to be pursued”.62 On the other 
hands, Glendon lists the problems of comparison in determining the subject matter of 
comparison, the validity of comparison, the efficiency of one model legal systems from the other 
legal systems and the policy consideration of the legal systems may not be similar.63 The 
differences of language and uncertainty of the legal terminology are also the obstacles that 
comparatist encounters throughout the process of comparison especially when the foreign law is 
not given a proper definition.64 The lack of rich intellectual range is one of the problems of 
comparative analysis, because comparatist fails to appreciate the comparison beyond a mere 
description of the legal rules.65 Other than these obstacles, “legal transplant”66 may also be 
perceived as one of the problems of comparative law. The relationship of comparative law and 
legal transplants has been recognised and explained by De Cruz: 
“comparative law remains useful and challenging enterprise that provides the methodological basis for 
identifying, interpreting and evaluating legal transplants; it thereby provides a vital step towards a 
                                                          
60 Glendon M A State, Law and Family: Family Law in Transition in the United States and Western Europe 
(Amsterdam-New York-Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977), at pp.17-18. 
61 Ibid, at pp.17-18; This has also been suggested by Legrand to look beyond a mere legal rules where states that 
“the danger of superficial comparison that overlooks the socio-cultural or the socio-historical context have been 
demonstrated by reference to examples that might suggest that deeper comparative inquiry is essential to avoid 
serious misconceptions”, n.43, at p.235; see also Leyland, n.59, at p.221. 
62 Legrand, n.43, at p.234. 
63 Glendon, n.60, at p.18. 
64 Gutteridge, n.31, at p.119; see also Leyland states that “at practical level the translations of terminology can 
present a formidable obstacle”, n.59, at p.215. 
65 Legrand, n.43, at pp.233-234; see also Leyland, n.59, at p.220. 
66 Watson refers “legal transplants” as “the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another, of from 
one people to another. – have been common since the earliest recorded history”, Watson A Legal Transplants 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974) at p.21; “at most times, in most places, borrowing from a different 
jurisdiction has been principally way in which law has developed”, Watson A Society and Legal Change 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1977), at p.98. Other terminology for legal transplants is “legal 
transposition”, Örücü, n.31, at p.13; “borrowing and imitation”, Sacco, n.39, at p.394.  
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deeper and more understanding of the cross fertilisation of ideas across different jurisdictions, legal 
systems and cultures”.67  
 
Nevertheless, the importance of legal transplants has been emphasised as “the most fertile source 
of development”68 and “borrowing and imitation is therefore of central importance to 
understanding the course of legal change”.69 It is also importance to find a quick answer to 
similar legal problems70 or having similar economical development between the countries.71  
 
Comparing the laws means that it is necessary to look at other legal systems, however as warned 
by Lepaulle careful consideration should be observed when there is legal transplantation.72 This 
is because as Shah illustrated the moving of legal rule from one place to the other as advocated 
by Watson seems not to consider the role of the culture of the “sending” or “receiving” society.73 
Fedtke notes certain difficulties that may occur when legal transplantation takes place such as to 
determine the types of law concerned, the extent to which legal transplantation takes place, the 
translation of the foreign language and the technical aspects of applying the new rules to the 
existing rules.74 Legal transplantation may also be perceived as problematic because the lawyers 
failed to tackle the complexities of the law.75  
In utilising a comparative analysis in this thesis, this study does not intend to follow any 
particular comparative approach, but rather analyse more flexibly and adopt contextual or 
practical analysis whenever deemed appropriate. This accords with Husa who emphasises that 
there should not be one method or approach, but comparatists should adopt many methods and 
                                                          
67 De Cruz, n.34 at p.119. See also “importance of “legal transplant” is central theme in current comparative law 
Schlesinger, n. 36, at p.13.  
68 Watson, n.66, at p.21. 
69 Sacco, n.39, at p.394; the same view that it is common situation of transferring one legal system to the other, and 
legal transplant has become the sources for legal change, Wise E M ‘The Transplant of Legal Patterns’ (1990) 38 
Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 1, at p.5. 
70 Atar N ‘The Impossibility of a Grand Transplant Theory’ (2007) Ankara Law Review Vol. 4, No. 2 177, at p.195 
71 Kahn-Freund O ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 M.L.R. 1, at p.23. 
72 Lepaulle ‘The Function of Comparative Law’ (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 838, at 839; see for example criticism of 
legal transplantation in Legrand P ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging' (1996) I.C.L.Q. 52, at p.79. 
73 Shah P ‘Globalisation and the Challenge of Asian Legal Transplants in Europe’ (2005) S.J.L.S. 348 at p.348. 
74 Fedtke J Legal Transplants in Smiths J M (ed) The Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), at pp.435-436. 
75 Comments on case Soo Boon Siong @ Saw Boo Siong v Saw Fatt Seong & Soo Hock Seang [2005] 5 M.L.J. 129 
(High Court); [2008] 1 M.L.J. 27 (Court of Appeal), Salim M R ‘Are Legal Transplants Impossible’ (2009) Journal 
of Comparative Law, downloadable at http://ssrn.com/abstarct=1444684, at p.1, visited on 27 April 2010. 
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approaches that are contingent to the purposes of their research.76 Since comparative legal study 
seeks to explore similarities and differences of the subject matters it will be advantageous for 
Malaysia because it has already shared the legal historical background with the UK.77 From the 
perspective of IP protection in Malaysia, the earlier laws enacted were closely linked to the law 
in the UK. For example, before the introduction of the indigenous Malaysian Patent Act 1983 
(PA 1983)78, there were four pieces of laws governing patent system: the Registration of United 
Kingdom Patents Act 1951 for the Federation of Malaya; the Patents Ordinance for the State of 
Sarawak; the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance 1937 for the State of Sabah and 
the Patents (Rights of Government) Act 1967.  This provides a good basis of comparative 
analysis of IP laws between Malaysian and the UK law. Similarly, before the introduction of the 
Malaysian Industrial Design Act 1996 (IDA 1996),79 industrial designs were protected under 
different statutes:  the United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Act 1949 for West Malaysia; the 
United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Ordinance for the State of Sabah; the Designs (United 
                                                          
76 Husa, n.37, at p.18, further explains that it would be more useful if comparatists define concretely the idea of 
flexible methodology. 
77 The reception of English law to Malaysia has been made through the section 3 and section 5 of the Civil Law Act 
1956. Section 3 reads as follow: 
(1) Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any written law in force in 
Malaysia, the Court shall – 
(a) in Peninsular Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity 
as administered in England on the 7 April 1956; 
(b) in Sabah, apply in common law of England and the rules of equity, together with statutes of general 
application, as administered or in force in England on 1 December 1951; 
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with statutes of general 
application, as administered or in force in England on 12 December 1949, subject however to 
subparagraph 3(ii); 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and statutes of general application shall be applied so far 
only as the circumstances of the States of Malaysia and their respective inhabitants permit and subject to such 
qualifications as local circumstances render necessary 
Section5 reads: 
(1) In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in the States of Peninsular Malaysia other 
than Malacca and Penang with respect to the law of partnerships, corporations, banks and banking, 
principals and agents, carriers by air, land and sea, marine insurance, average, life and fire insurance, and 
with respect to mercantile law generally the law to be administered shall be the same as would be 
administered in England in the like case at the date of the coming into force of this Act, if such question or 
issue had arisen or had to be decided in England, unless in any case other provision is or shall be made by 
any written law; 
In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in the States of Malacca, Penang, Sabah and 
Sarawak with respect to the law concerning any of the matters referred to in subsection (1), the law to be 
administered shall be the same as would be administered in England in the like case at the corresponding period, if 
such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in England, unless in any case other provision is or shall be 
made by any written law. 
78 Act 291, as amended in 1986 and 1993. The similar historical legal connection is also shown in industrial design 
and trade marks laws. 
79 Act 552. 
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Kingdom) Ordinance for the State of Sarawak.80 Another example concerns trade mark law. 
Before the Trade Marks Act 1976 (TMA 1976)81 came into effect, there were also different laws 
governing the trade marks: Trade Marks Ordinance 1938 for Straits Settlements which was 
closely modelled on the UK Trade Mark Act 1938; Trade Mark Ordinance 1950 for the 
Federation of Malaya; Trade Mark Ordinance 1949 for Sabah and Trade Mark Ordinance for 
Sarawak.82 These examples provide a good basis of comparative analysis of IP laws between 
Malaysian and the UK law.  
 
Other than the legal historical development, this study also examines the historical development 
across the technology. One of the methods was conducted by employing the qualitative interview 
between Malaysian and the UK key scientists. This study also investigates similarities and 
differences issues between nanotechnology with the previous technology, such as biotechnology 
and semiconductor chip and how the previous technological issues could be potentially relevant 
to nanotechnology. Both similarities and differences are also useful from the international 
perspectives. Other than comparing between the two legal systems (Malaysia and UK), the 
international treaty which is mostly relevant throughout the thesis is the Agreement of Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (TRIPS). The comparative legal study also 
examines the approaches adopted in other Commonwealth countries for instance, Australia.83 
Thus, both similarities and differences either in terms of the legal or technological development 
between Malaysia and the UK jurisdiction, as according to Dannemann yields the best result 
when the researcher balances between discovering the common features and detecting 
contrasting features.84 Moreover, the newly developing legal areas like Malaysia are inevitably 
concerned to adopt a more matured legal system like UK.85 Whilst technological and economic 
developments in the UK are more advanced, however, both may share similar technological 
cycle although to some extent they may not be identical. Thus, the historical and technological 
                                                          
80 For a general introduction of the historical background of industrial designs law in Malaysia, see for example 
Abdul Jalil J Industrial Designs Law in Malaysia: Cases and Commentary (Petaling Jaya: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 
2004), pp.1- 9.  
81 Act 175, as amended in 1994 and 2000. 
82 For an extensive discussion of the historical background of the trade marks law in Malaysia, see for example 
Kwang T B Trade Mark Law and Practice in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Butterworth Asia, 2001) at Chapter 1. 
83 See Chapter 3 specifically relevant discussion for breach of confidence and nanotechnology on the basis of 
common law approach, judgment and cases from Australia will be treated persuasive. 
84 Dannemann, n.36, at p.401. 
85 Zweigert and Kötz, n.32, at p.41. 
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development as the basis for “transplants” between both systems, suggest that in the future the 
“transplants” could thrive in either way (from UK to Malaysia or Malaysia to UK).  
 
The technique of comparing both similarities and differences is significant as part of an effort to 
improve legal rules which have been recognised as a problem by referring how other systems 
have solved the same problems.86 The technique suggested by Zweigert and Kötz will be 
relevant to this study. In applying the technique in this study, the question is whether IP law 
relevant to nanotechnology creations has been successfully established in the UK; and followed 
by whether, the models law adopted from the UK could potentially work in Malaysia. In 
applying the second questions, all the relevant context of Malaysia should be taken into 
consideration. These two questions are likely to be answered if, as quoted from Dannemann, the  
“unifying legal rules makes sense only if the problems experienced by the legal systems involved 
are at least roughly similar, and unification is more easily justified if the rules in the different 
systems involved produce identical or at least similar results”.
87 
 
Despite these advantages, comparative approach may be criticised, for example the propriety of 
legal transplantation that is, of recommending imposing a law from one country into another. In 
applying and receiving a law from another country, there may occur incidents of less likely to 
consider the differences of culture, social, political and economy context of the receiving 
country.  
 
Despite the difficulties in comparative law, it is nevertheless an importance tool for a better 
development, amendment and modification of the laws. The legal researcher plays a crucial role 
in examining and interpreting the function of the legal rules and principles.88 Furthermore, the 
comparative legal analysis is significant when the law in one country is still new or rather non-
existent, like Malaysia, to adopt the legal rules which has been established in other country, like 
UK particularly in the areas of IP protection for nanotechnology.  
 
1.4 Interview technique 
                                                          
86 Dannemann, n.36, at p.403. 
87 Ibid, at p.402. 
88 According to Palmer all lawyers by nature are comparatists, when they look, differentiate and deduce of the legal 
point, n.31, at p.1. 
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The interviews were combined with other methods of equipping the researcher with important 
technology and upcoming legal issues. A period of literature study and attendance at a 
conference in Leuven89 which reported on the progress of an extensive EU funded programme 
and presented the views of scientific and legal experts for the US and Australia, as well as EU 
member states were undertaken. This combination of approaches enhanced the technical level of 
dialogue during interviews, thus optimising their effectiveness. The combined programme also 
facilitated a critical approach to the content of conferences and interviews (Table 1.1). This 
integrated approach of programme and interviews has worked successfully and interviewees’ 
responses have been valuable to inform legal analysis and recommendations. 
 
Table 1.1: Approach of qualitative methodology 
Schedule 
Activity Date 
Reading the scientific literature, under 
guidance of Prof Emeritus Peter Jones 
Continuing until 2009 
Interview A 3 June 2008 
Interview B 25 September 2008 
Leuven Conference – Nanotechnology 
and the Law: The Legal Nitty-Gritty for 
Nanofoods, Nanocosmetics and 
Nanomedicines 
8 and 9 December 2008 
Interview C 21 April 2009 
Interview D 28 April 2009 
 
1.4.1 Justification for qualitative interviews  
 
From the interviews it was hoped to gain some insight into nanotechnology both under 
Malaysian and UK scientific development and legal jurisdiction as well as to equip the 
                                                          
89 Conference on “Nanotechnology and the Law: The Legal Nitty-Gritty for Nanofoods, Nanocosmetics and 
Nanomedicines”, Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, 8 – 9 December 2008. 
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researcher with the scientific background and identify relevant legal issues of the technology. 
This is particularly important for new subjects because, as Stedward notes interviews may 
provide contemporary data on subjects which have not been thoroughly studied elsewhere or in 
which accessible literatures is still limited.90 It is also a greater informative experience for the 
researcher to be able to observe the attitude of the interviewees to supplying the information 
which could be helpful in order to evaluate the information supplied.91 The interview is flexible 
and encourages the researcher to probe any question or to follow up any questions which are 
relevant to the study or to turn back to the questions which need further clarification. Another 
reason for undertaking interviews was that it may provide the opportunity to motivate the 
interviewee to give accurate and complete information immediately.92 Moreover, the opportunity 
is provided in the interview to guide the interviewee to interpret complex and abstract issues in 
the questions.93  
 
The privilege of the interview however is balanced by certain disadvantages. For example, other 
considerations need to be taken into account, not only the time consumed94 and the higher cost, 
but also the preparation for an interview, obtaining and setting up the interview, writing up the 
transcription and the notes as well as analysis of the content.95 This can also be very difficult 
from one interview to another because of different situations and variables, for example, it all 
depends on the speed of the speech, clarity, pacing, complexity of vocabulary, accents of the 
interviewer or respondents, background knowledge and technical skill.96 In this study, interviews 
were conducted with comparatively few key figures with a view to gaining expert insights into 
the field as well as optimising resources and minimising disadvantages, given the need to 
balance qualitative and doctrinal aspects of the thesis.  
 
1.4.2 The objectives of the interview 
                                                          
90 Stedward G On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing in Burnham P (ed) Surviving the Research Process in 
Politics (London: Printer, 1997) at p.151. At the outset of the research, legal analysis of nanotechnology issues was 
scarce and rather superficial in the published literature. 
91 Gorden R L Interviewing: Strategy, techniques and Tactics 3rd edn (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1980) at p.62. 
92 Ibid, at p.61; in contrast for example to a postal questionnaire. 
93 Ibid, at pp.61-62. 
94 Especially on the transcription of the interview, writing and translation if the interview conducted in a language 
other than English. 
95 Stedward, n.90, at p.152. 
96 Gorden, n.91 at p.223. 
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The use of interviews can be challenging and informative, but acts as a vehicle for bringing the 
research topic to life.97 This type of qualitative research allows for greater expression and 
insights of the information than a self-completion questionnaire98 and other non-face-to-face 
techniques99 because people may talk and present their perspective in their own terms freely. 100 
The same submission espoused by May, that conversations with people on a range of topics 
generate rich insights on issues such as biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, 
attitudes and feelings.101 Thus, the aim of these interviews was to provide some insights for the 
researcher in analysing legal aspects along with confirming and augmenting scientific 
understanding of the technology102. Gorden contends that the purpose of the interview should be 
explained in a manner that the respondent understands because if the explanation is too narrow 
or too vague the respondent may not appreciate or connect the questions with the purpose of the 
interview.103  
 
To make the process of interviewing successful, Harrison emphasises four basic requirements:104 
                                                          
97 Stedward, n.90, at p.151. The interview is referred as a tool of research by way of intentionally learning other’s 
feelings, thoughts and experiences, Rubin H J and Rubin I S Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data 
(London: Sage Publications, 1995) at p.2. 
98 Because no one present to clarify any difficulty to respondents and having no opportunity from respondents to 
elaborate the point asked, see further in Bryman A Social Research Methods 3rd ed (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at pp. 218-
219. Gray D E Doing Research in the Real World (London: SAGE Publications, 2004) states that interview 
approach is favoured where (a) need to acquire high personalized data; (b) having opportunity for probing; (c) a 
highly response rate, at pp.214-215. Bell J Doing Your Research Project: A Guide for First-Time Researchers in 
Education, Health and Social Science 4th edn (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2005) points out that adaptability 
in interview means that “a skilful interviewer can follow up ideas, probe responses and investigate motives and 
feelings, which the questionnaires can never do”, at p.157. 
99 For example survey and observational methods. Jones contrasts qualitative interview and survey interview as less 
structured in their approach and allowing individuals to expand beyond ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses which are more 
common in case of survey interviews, Jones C Qualitative Interviewing in Allan G and Skinner C (ed) Handbook for 
Research Students in the Social Sciences (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2002) at p.203. 
100 Harrison L Political Research: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2001), at pp.74-75. 
101 May T Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001), at p.121. 
Kvale S and Brinkmann S Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing 2nd (London: SAGE, 
2009) regard interview as conversational interest between parties involved whereby the knowledge is created “inter” 
the points of view of both interviewer and interviewee, at p.123. 
102 The researcher spent months in studying the relevant technology, so as to be able to understand the legal issues 
from a technologically informed standpoint and to conduct the interviews with a general understanding of the 
interviewees’ work. 
103 Gorden, n.91, at p.215. The purpose of the interview should be clear and honest, Harrison n.100, at p. 97. 
104 N.100, at pp.96-97. Kvale and Brinkmann argue that there are no fixed criteria for good quality of interview, 
except rests upon the craftsmanship of the interviewer to gain knowledge of the research topic, sensitivity of the 
social relation between the interviewer and interviewee, an epistemological awareness as well as ethical 
consideration in conducting interview, n.101, at pp.174-175. 
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(a) Accessibility – the question on how to gain access to the relevant interviewees; and how 
to control the access through the gatekeepers; 
(b) Objectivity – the ‘closeness’ of the interviewer and interviewee; and the objectivity of the 
language used and phrasing of the question; 
(c) Cognition – the interviewee understands the purpose of the interview and the expected 
information obtained from him/her; and she/he must have access to relevant information; 
(d) Motivation – to value the response from the interviewee and to maintain the interest of 
the interview session; the rules and the language used for the questions asked need to be 
taken into consideration.  
 
Other than the process of the interview itself, similarly the researcher needs to posses certain 
traits to make the interview a successful one. A good example of these traits is set out by Gorden. 
He argues that the interviews need:105 
(a) Flexibility – the interviewer to behave actively when it is called for, and  passively when 
needed to facilitate communication; 
(b) intelligence – allow the interviewer to clearly appreciate the objective of the interview; 
evaluate the information critically and probe the clarity and completeness; and 
(c) emotional security – alleviate the interviewee from anxiety so that one may direct full 
attention to the flow of the response and keep up a good interpersonal relationship.  
 
These criteria favour face-to-face meetings between the researcher and interviewees, on the 
interviewees’ ‘home’ territory, with a set of carefully prepared questions that are comprehensive 
but designed not to ‘lead’ the interviewee to a particular response, with the flexibility to follow 
promising lines of conversation and avoid repetition. 
 
1.4.3 The selection criteria 
 
The sample used in this research partly followed the model of a snowball sample. Bryman states 
that this sample is a “form of convenience sample”.106 The procedure is that the interviewer 
                                                          
105 Kvale and Brinkmann, n.101, at pp.172-173. 
106 Bryman, n.98, at p.184. 
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contacts a small group of people relevant to the research and uses their information to make 
contact with others.107 This study applied the same process by providing the initial interviewee 
with a table-list of scientists and seeking advice as to whether the people in the list were 
appropriate to interview or whether there were others who the initial interviewee thought could 
be a relevant person to interview. This approach led to the second interview. One might perceive 
that there could be a problem using of snowball sample, for example according to Bryman that it 
is very unlikely to be representative of a population.108 However, this may be counteracted in a 
limited way by presenting interviewees with a pre-prepared list selected by reference to area of 
scientific interest.  
 
The first interviewee (A) was identified based on his qualifications and his position in a 
particular nanotechnology department. In this regards, this interviewee was considered as the key 
person to inform the researcher comprehensively because he was able to speak across a full 
range of information. Drawing on the technique of the ‘inverse snowball sample’ advice from the 
first expert interviewed, along with the comprehensive nature of the information received in the 
first interview, informed and enabled the next selection to be made.109 Thus, the second 
interviewee (B) was chosen to represent his position on business and the commercialisation 
dimension of nanotechnology. The first two interviewees were sufficient to meet the objectives 
of the interviews110 and therefore, there was no need to extend the sample further.  
The interviews were also conducted in Malaysia to gain comparative on the scientific 
development and the legal analysis. There were two interviewees chosen in Malaysia. The third 
interviewee (C) was identified based on his own qualification and experience, scientific 
networking as well as likely acquaintance himself with inventions and other forms of IP. His 
institution is a prominent nanotechnology institution and has been identified by the government 
of Malaysia among the established six nanotechnology centres. In parallel, the fourth interviewee 
                                                          
107 Ibid, at p.184. 
108 Ibid, at p.185. 
109 When he has been given a list of the next person, he was not only agreed with the list, but also suggested the 
second interviewee. He also eliminated few names in the list. This is inverse snowball sample. 
110 The reasons for the selection of the first and the second interviewees were because there are departments 
dedicated to nanotechnology and the range of divergent of expertise in the Newcastle University. This is an 
independent valuation of their expertise and standing in a wider community because apart from their being located at 
the University where the researcher is doing her PhD, comparison of their profiles with those of scientists at other 
UK universities suggests that their expertise was the best suited to this research. The easy accessibility to researcher 
also supported the justification for choosing the institution. 
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(D) was also recognised on his distinct position in the institution as well as the training he 
received in nanotechnology related subject matter. Both were associated to contribute on the 
policy consideration for nanotechnology in Malaysia. The four interviewees ultimately chosen 
were considered leading nanotechnology experts and can explain the scientific and legal regime 
for nanotechnology both in Malaysia and UK.  
 
They may be considered as special respondents because according to Gorden, they hold unique 
positions in their organisations which qualify them to give special information which are directly 
relevant to the objective of the study.111 One interviewee, for example, characterised his own 
approach as “top-down” and another interviewee as “bottom-up” approach. This suggests that 
although the very small number of interviewees nonetheless reflects the variety of approach.  
 
1.4.4 The significance role of an expert 
 
Harrison states that “in qualitative research, all interviewees are regarded as ‘experts’, that is, 
they have information in which we as students or researchers are interested”.112 The technique 
of the interview process to be analogous with the role of the scientific expert113 in the courts. 
Prominent scientists are often called as such as those the researcher interviewed. In UK and 
Malaysia, expert witnesses in patent cases help to shape new development in the law by 
informing the courts understanding of new technologies.114 Thus, evidence from technical 
experts is of considerable importance in developing and interpreting IP law. The researcher 
wished to adopt similar standards for the gathering of evidence for the thesis. In this concern, the 
process of the examination-in-chief in the court is perceived relevant in particular the avoidance 
of non-leading questions to the current study. That the court has given great significance to the 
                                                          
111 Gorden, n.91, at, p.136 provides interesting guidelines criteria for selecting respondents - (a) who has the relevant 
information; (b) are they physically and socially accessible to have the information; (c) which persons are the most 
willing to offer the information?; (d) which persons are most able to give an accurate accounting of the 
information?, at pp.146-147.  
112 N.100, at p.98. 
113 An interesting experience in dealing with high technical patent cases and make a concluding remarks that “there 
is no perfect way of going about expert evidence”, Jacob R ‘Court-Appointed Experts v Party Experts: Which is 
Better?’ (2004) C.J.Q. 400, at p.407. 
114 SmithKline Beecham Plc v Apotex Europe Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1568; [2005] F.S.R. 23, at 543. The expert is 
important in patent cases to; (a) explain the technical terms; (b) instruct the court pertaining scientific principles; (c) 
show the scientific knowledge at the time of the grant; (d) explain the nature and characteristics of the invention, 
Malek H M et al. (eds) Phipson on Evidence 16th edn (London: S&M, 2005) at p.1025. 
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role of an expert relates not only to facts, opinions and experiences in the evidence adduced.115 
Their duties and responsibilities have been set out in particular detail in the case law and should 
be widely applicable.116 They should possess relevant qualifications and experience in the 
relevant field of dispute, ability to draw logical opinion from the facts and have the quality to 
view a problem impartially.117 The greater weight should be emphasised in giving their opinion 
independently, unbiased and truthfulness.118 Lord Wilberforce in Whitehouse v Jordan119 upheld 
the role of an independent expert: 
“it is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be, the 
independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content via the exigencies of 
litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only incorrect but self-
defeating”.
120  
 
Equally, experts may provide valuable assistance to the court by giving a series of seminars in 
the relevant aspects of technology and it has been perceived to be adopted in the future if the 
                                                          
115
 As, in court, judges find the demeanour of witnesses gives a guide to the weight to be given to their evidence. 
The skill and training of the experts enable them to form opinions, to deduce conclusion from the observed facts and 
to identify facts which may be obscured from the eyes of lay witnesses, Malek et al., n.114, Ch 33 at p.972. Where 
the expert opinion is properly adduced, the tribunal may take into consideration of an expert’s qualification, how has 
the expert obtained the qualification, the expert’s credibility and the extent to which his evidence is based, Keane A 
The Modern Law of Evidence 7th ed (Oxford: OUP, 2008). The law has treated experts special sorts of witness 
whose power flowed from his own special knowledge, Jones C A G Expert Witnesses: Science, Medicine, and the 
Practice of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Although the courts have increasingly relied on the scientific and 
expert evidence, the problem might be encountered by the courts on qualifications of experts, probative helpfulness 
of expert evidence, how to weight the novel and contested “scientific” findings and the role of experts in testifying 
the ultimate issue, Anderson T et al Analysis of Evidence 2nd edn (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). Dennis queries whether 
English law should have any specific threshold requirements for the reliability of the expert witnesses. The 
development of experts technique for analysing and interpreting evidence suggests to adopt a pragmatic approach in 
order to make expert witnesses are more reliable in the future, at pp.858-860, Dennis I The Law of Evidence 3rd edn 
(London: S&M, 2007). The higher standard of accuracy and objectivity should be required and seem to be provided 
due to the fact that the evidence of experts carries more weight than ordinary witnesses, Tapper C Cross & Tapper 
on Evidence 11th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2007). For an interesting discussion on the effect of ill-served of expert 
witnesses in the adversarial system of trial see McEwan J Evidence and the Adversarial Process – The Modern Law 
2nd edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998); a good discussion of expert opinion in a monograph see Redmayne M 
Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
116 National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 68. 
117 Mildred R H The Expert Witness (London: Long Group Ltd, 1982), at p.7. Their role as educator to assist party, 
lawyers and judges, see Bond C et al. The Expert Witness in Court: A Practical Guide 2nd edn, Burn S ed (Kent: 
Shaw & Sons, 1999) at p.61. 
118 Holborn C J et al. Health Care Professionals as Witnesses to the Court (London: Greenwich Medical Media Ltd, 
2000), at p.30. 
119 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246, at 256-257. 
120 This principle has been adopted in The Ikarian Refer [1993) 2 Lloyd’s Reports 68. 
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technology was “complex and undisputed” and the parties have consented to it.121 If the subject 
matter involved is highly technical, it is important that the expert put forward all relevant 
considerations to the issue to be decided because the court warned of the dangers of an expert 
acting as an advocate or holding back relevant information.122 However, the court should give 
careful consideration not to accept the expert’s personal view, instead of his reasons for that 
view.123 Thus, the reception of such evidence resembles qualitative research techniques. By 
contrast the court tend to be impatient of qualitative or statistical techniques in IP cases for 
example the market survey evidence124 as of little significance because of concerns on the 
technical flaws whilst preparing questions for the interview.125 Put another way, the courts have 
been doubtful as qualitative methodologies and questionnaires. There seems here a clear parallel 
between legal literature of evidence and the research methodology literature.  
 
1.4.5. Semi-structured interview 
 
Bryman has contrasted the interview in qualitative research and quantitative research to the 
effect that qualitative interview is less structured because it emphasises generality in the 
formulation of initial research ideas and interviewees’ perspectives.126 Bryman further asserts 
that the flexible approach of the qualitative interview allows the interviewers not to stick to one 
particular schedule or guide; that they are free to ask new questions or follow up questions; and 
they may also emphasise in the research result important issues in the course of interview 
because what is important at this stage is that researcher expects rich and detailed answers.127 
                                                          
121 Lord Hope of Craighead in Kirin Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2004] UKHL 46, para 135. 
122 Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd [2000] R.P.C. 95, at 127. 
123 SmithKline Beecham Plc v Apotex Europe Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1568, at 543. 
124 Usually confined to trademarks and passing-off case. 
125 Lea G ‘Masters of All They Survey? Some Thoughts upon Official Attitudes to Market Survey Evidence in U.K. 
Trade Mark Practice’ (1999) I.P.Q 191 and suggests that the questions should be phrased in clear, simple language 
and elicit only necessary information to the subject matter concerned and if possible to encourage the interviewee to 
actively participate in survey proceedings, at p.225. 
126 Bryman, n.98, at p.437. The general accepted view that there are structured interview and semi structured 
interview. Some may refer to less structured interview or unstructured interview, however, the terms ‘unstructured-
interview’ is misnomer because it is impossible to have completely unstructured interview as it will always have 
structure and the interviewer is still keep control on the process of the interview, Wilson, n.40, at p.98; Salter and 
Mason, n.7, at p.62. Harrison categorises that unstandardised interview as including informal, focused, unstructured 
and free interview, unstructured-interview, n.100, at p.92. 
127 Bryman, n.98, at p.437. 
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Rubin and Rubin have submitted that qualitative interview is distinguished from data collection 
in social and political research because:128 
(a) qualitative interviews are modifications and extensions of ordinary dialogue, 
(b) qualitative interviews are more concerned with the understanding, knowledge and 
insights of the interviewees, 
(c) the content, the flow of the idea and the choices of the topic may change in order to meet 
the interviewee’s knowledge and feeling. 
 
This research employed semi-structured interviews because, as May has pointed out, the 
interviewer is more flexible and freer to probe beyond the acquired answers and consequently 
enter into a very helpful dialogue with the interviewee.129 This category of interview is non-
standardised where the interviewer has prepared a list of issues or questions to be asked, but did 
not necessarily deal with all of them in each interview.130 This interview approach was 
considered imperative because the researcher was interested to know the ‘whys’, the ‘hows’ and 
the ‘whats’ of the respondent’s clarification and elaboration of the response.131  
 
1.4.6 An introductory statement 
Once the interviewees had indicated their willingness to participate132, they were provided with 
an ‘introductory statement’. This was to inform them briefly of the nature and approach of the 
interview and to ask for an appropriate date for the interview.  The introductory statement was 
sent to the interviewee before the interview briefly to sketch out for the interviewee the nature, 
context, and expected result and the topic which will be covered in brief; outline the justification 
of the chosen topic; the selection criteria of the interviewee; the confidentiality issues of the 
                                                          
128 Rubin and Rubin, n.97, at p.6. 
129 May, n.101, at p.123. 
130 Gray, n.98, pp.215-217 and explained that the flexibility may allow the order of questions to be changed or 
adding an additional questions including issues which were not anticipated at the beginning of the interview. 
131 Harrison, n.100, at p.92. 
132 The researcher is grateful for the assistance of her supervisor, Professor Alison Firth who initially sent selected 
potential interviewees emails approaching them for the interview. The emails were to inform the prospective 
interviewees of the purpose of the interview: to discuss on the scientific aspects of the technology and how the 
information obtained from the interview will allow the researcher to focus on her legal analysis of the IPRs for 
nanotechnology. The supervisor attended Newcastle interviews to effect introductions and she remained in 
attendance. This did not seem to affect the successful dynamic of the interviews. The supervisor was given 
opportunity to ask supplementary questions for her own interest and enlightenment but otherwise did not participate 
actively during the interviews. Subsequently she was able to assist with completing the record at one or two points 
where the tape recordings were not completely clear. 
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interview; the research and development of nanotechnology; the possible IPRs for 
nanotechnology.133  
 
Introductory statement explained the emerging status of the technology draws the attention not 
only for being contentious but also the status of legal discussions especially in the context IP, is 
still at the very basic.  For this reason, introductory statement explained that the interviews were 
very significant because they sought to examine the trend and development of the technology 
based on experiences of both Malaysia and the UK. To inform the interviewees attentively, the 
introductory statement gave an overview of the current trend of the research and development of 
nanotechnology including US, Japan and Europe. Moreover, the importance of IP protection was 
explained along the lines of general justification and problematic challenges posed by the current 
state of the law.  
 
1.4.7 During interview 
 
Normally, when the interview started134 the researcher asked interviewees whether in particular 
they have understood, or would need further clarification on anything which was still unclear for 
them in the IS.135 If the answer was affirmative, then the researcher dealt with any issues that 
arose before proceeding to the next step of giving the assurance on the issue of the 
confidentiality of the information given. The researcher gave assurance that the interviewees’ 
names would be kept anonymous unless and until they gave permission to be cited explicitly. 
The interviewees were also given an assurance that the material they provided in the interview 
will be kept confidential until it was included in the thesis. The researcher then sought the 
interviewees’ permission to be tape-recorded during the interview and asked further whether they 
would like to have a copy of the finding of the research from the interview.  
 
                                                          
133 For some tips on good introductory statement see Bryman, n.98, at p.210. 
134 The first few minutes of an interview are important that the interviewer should show interest, understand and 
respect to the subject matter before the interviewee uncover his information and talk freely, Kvale and Brinkmann, 
n.101, at p.128.  
135 For example, interviewee C asked the relevancy the researcher with a legal background interviewing the scientist 
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In approaching136 the interview, the researcher then outlined briefly the topics which to be 
covered in the interview. During the session, there should be strategies for establishing and 
maintaining good relationships between interviewer and interviewee.137 Only then the 
atmosphere of the session becomes more neutral and free. For example, the session with 
interviewee C was conducted in the staff room in an informal setting. Normally the interview 
was conducted with little prompt138 and the researcher should be aware of what is being said and 
be prepared to explore some issues in greater depth.139 In the interview, the researcher skimmed 
through the sub-theme of the questions because with little prompt sometimes the interviewees 
have already covered the information although initially they have not been asked. At the end of 
the session, the researcher asked the interviewees permission to proceed with the transcription. 
The researcher asked all interviewees if they would like to have a copy of the finding of the 
research at the end of the study.    
 
The interviews were very exciting, enriching and enjoyable experiences for not only an excellent 
cooperation during the interview sessions, but for the most important part is that they served the 
main purpose of doing interview. For example one of the interviewees in the Newcastle 
University was very generous with his time and information and he was volunteering to disclose 
very exceptional information in response to the prompting questions. In discussing the concept of 
nanotechnology too, one of the interviewees showed the researcher his invention on rice husk at 
the range of nanoscale, and another interviewee explained his booklet “the law of scale” quite 
extensively. He also kindly shared his experience and views on the technological development in 
Malaysia as well as gave the researcher copies of other documented reports on his institutional 
research and development.  
 
Interestingly, the researcher also found fascinating with the used of certain techniques during the 
interview, for example as suggested by Bryman on the flash cards or show cards.140 This 
technique seemed to work very well especially when the interviewee has been given a choice to 
                                                          
136 There are considerably wide approaches to produce effective materials such as writing it down, or prompting, 
simple key-issues or an aid-memoire, Jones, n.99, at p.204. 
137 Jones, n.99, at p.208. The interviewee is unwilling to answer the question or may possibly cut the interview short 
if the interviewer has little rapport, Gray, n.98, at p.223. 
138 Jones, n.99, at p.205. 
139 Ibid, at p.204. 
140 Bryman, n.98, at p.207, this reasonably works well when the respondent is given a list of possible answers. 
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opt for the three different definition of nanotechnology quoted from the Royal Society and Royal 
Academy of Engineering, UK; the European Patent Office and the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative, US.  
 
At the end of the interview, in order to make to that everything was covered in the interview, the 
researcher asked the question “is there anything we have not covered in this interview that you 
think relevant to my research”. According to Stedward this augments the rich generation of the 
original information.141 This could be a back-up too if the interview has gone astray to 
deliberately balance the good points which have not been covered as well as to take advantage of 
the interviewee’s knowledge.142  
 
After the substantive interview session ended, the researcher thanked the interviewees for 
sharing their thoughts and interesting views and for bringing some helpful knowledge to the 
study. The researcher felt indebted for the time spent and gain fruitful conversation throughout 
the interview session.  
 
1.4.8 The use of tape recording and the transcription of the tape 
 
The researcher was granted permission to use tape-recorder during all the interview sessions. 
Inevitably, this device is helpful because the chance of getting the whole information is minimal 
unless the person is well-versed with shorthand.143 Hence, the interview data in the interview was 
interpreted by verbatim transcription. As Jones emphasise that “ideally interviews are 
transcribed verbatim”.144 One of the interviewees in Malaysia used Malay in the interview and 
the other one partly used English and partly Malay. Both of these interviews were transcribed 
verbatim, translated into English and paraphrasing the essence of relevant information. In view 
                                                          
141 Stedward, n.90, at p.155. This gives interviewee additional opportunity to deal with issues he has been thinking 
or worrying him during the interview session, Kvale and Brinkmann, n.101, at p.129. 
142 Stedward, n.90, at p.158. 
143 Because the quality of the interview sometimes is undermined for deliberately focusing on note-taking rather than 
actually listening to what has been said which of course affect for verbatim text, Harrison, n.100, at p.93. Kvale and 
Brinkmann note that rather than involve a simple clerical task, transcription is considered as an interpretative 
process where series of practical and principal issues arise in transforming oral speech into the written text, n.101, at 
p.177. It also allows the interviewer to concentrate on listening, interpreting and re-focusing the interview, Gray, 
n.98, at p.227. 
144 Jones, n.99, at p.210. 
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of that, the time required for transcription was greater.145 In this study, the shortest time took for 
the interview was approximately 60 minutes, and the longest time took for about 120 minutes. 
Hence, the average time taken for transcription almost 8 to 10 hours of verbatim text for at least 
13-15 long typed pages. Ideally because of its laborious works, it is advisable to transcribe while 
the mind is still fresh with the interview and by reference to the notes taken during the interview 
session.146 However, using the tape recorder may not always be practicable, especially in a noisy 
environment.147 Furthermore, the technical interruption may occur using tape recorder for run 
malfunction, or miss a crucial sentence or respondent who speak very softly.148  
 
1.4.9 Ethical and confidentiality issues 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that in these interviews the ethics of confidentiality149 was given 
utmost importance. In certain situations the confidentiality issue can be really difficult to 
maintain and the reason why the respondents are reluctant to have information published is 
because to a certain extent his position may in some way be identified.150 If this happens, it has 
been suggested that the researcher needs to further mask identity or seek approval for disclosure 
from the interviewee.151 To that effect, the researcher gave reassurance the interviewees names 
will remain anonymous unless permission was given to reveal the information. In this respect, at 
the end of the interview session, the researcher asked each of the interviewees if they would like 
                                                          
145 Harrison, n.100, at p.102. 
146 Ibid, at p.102. In addition to the tape-recording, note taking and transcribing into the text, Stedward suggests 
effective note taking may be in the form of contextual information, for example with the inclusion of the impression, 
observation and expansions of the interview, n.90, at p.161. Ideally, in the qualitative report, the writing style has to 
be rich, convincing and readable, Rubin and Rubin, n.97, at p.268. See also the reflexion on the feminist research in 
interviewing women MPs by Puwar N ‘Reflections on Interviewing Women MPs – Sociological Research Online 
(1997), available online at http://ideas.repec.org/a/sro/srosro /1996-19-1.html , visited on 18 Feb 2009. 
147 Stedward, n.90, at p.152. 
148 Jones, n.99, at p.207 and suggests to back-up with note taking although arguably it will affect eye-contact during 
the session.  
149 More often present in psychological experiments or sociological or social anthropological field, Rees R Ethical 
Issues in Allan G and Skinner C (ed) Handbook for the Research Students in the Social Sciences (London: 
RoutledgeFalmer, 2002) at p.142. The protection involves “secure storage data; restricting access to raw data; 
obtaining permission for subsequent use of data; publication of research findings in a manner that does not allow 
for ready identification of subjects; destruction of raw data” O’Leary Z The Essential Guide to Doing Research 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2007) at p.54. 
150 Gorden, n.91, at p.219. 
151 O’Leary, n149, at p.54. Kvale and Brinkmann argue that in certain situation, for example journalistic interview, 
interviewees might wish to be credited with their full name for the time spent and information provided, n.101, at 
p.73. 
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to approve the transcription of the interview. One interviewee kindly allowed the researcher to 
proceed with the transcription, stating that he would like to have a copy of the findings at a later 
stage. On another occasion the interviewee expected an explicit permission if the information is 
very likely involved confidential information of the institution.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
The doctrinal analysis plays an important role in the development of the legal system. Doctrinal 
research has become the prominent method for the legal research and continues to be a popular 
method among legal researchers. However, it was also subjected to criticism for being too 
theoretical and of no real world application. Thus, as a complement to the doctrinal analysis, the 
comparative legal study is adopted in this thesis. The comparative approach extends not just to 
law, but also to scientific and practical considerations. In this thesis, the contrasting comparison 
of the technological experiences and views of the Malaysian and UK scientists enable the 
researcher to better appreciate the significant interplay of the law and science in the two 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, this comparison provides a focus for the researcher by which the gaps 
in Malaysian law may be identified and analysed.   
 
Although interviews conducted in this study were treated as anecdotal rather than substantive, 
nonetheless they offer a rich analysis and some insights for this thesis. The interviews acquainted 
the researcher with significant technological and legal issues that are helpful in this thesis.   
 
 
324 
 
APPENDIX 2 
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND 
PROPOSED ACTIONS IN MALAYSIA 
 
Table 2.1: Centre of excellence for nanotechnology in Malaysia  
Institute /University Application Funding (RM 
million) 
Institute of Microengineering and Nanoelectronics 
(IMEN), UKM1 
MEMS 38.2 (MOSTE) 
Ibnu Sina Institute for Fundamental 
Science Studies (IIS), UTM2 
Nanochemistry 20 (IDB)3 
11(MOSTE) 
Combinatorial Technology and Catalysis Research 
Centre (COMBICAT), UM4 
Catalysts 15 (MOSTE) 
Glycolipids Research Centre, UM Nanomaterials/Surfactants 11.2 (MOSTE) 
Advanced Materials Research Centre (AMREC), 
SIRIM Berhad 
Nanocomposites Unknown 
School of Physics, USM5 Electronics (Blue LED) 22.5 (MOSTE) 
School of Medical Sciences, USM Molecular Nanotech 2.2 (MOSTE) 
Institute of Advanced Technology (ITMA), UPM6 Electronics, Nanomedicine Unknown 
Source: The SIRIM Report7 
There is also a new institute established called Institute of Nanoelectronics Engineering, in 
UniMaP.8 This has become one of the focused regional centres in nanoelectronics engineering 
for the Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER)9 in the areas of nanobiochips, photonics, 
non-volatile memory devices, novel devices and smart sensors.10 
 
                                                          
1 National University of Malaysia. 
2 Technology University of Malaysia. 
3 Islamic Development Bank. 
4 University of Malaya. 
5 Science University of Malaysia. 
6 Putra University of Malaysia. 
7 Final Report, Research Survey for Implementing Nedo’s International Cooperative Research Project for 
Development Support Projects in Asian Countries (Malaysia) Environmental and Bioprocess Technology 
Centre, (2006) ETC237/16/586 (R045/06) SIRIM Berhad available 
http://www.tech.nedo.go.jp/PDF/100008942.pdf (SIRIM REPORT). 
8 Perlis University of Malaysia. 
9 It is government initiatives to maximize economic potential at the northern regions of Peninsular Malaysia and to 
bridge the economics gap between regions. 
10 Hashim U et al. ‘Nanotechnology Development Status in Malaysia: Industrialisation, Strategy and Practices’ 
(2009) Int. J. Nanoelectronics and Materials 2, No. 1, at p.7. 
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The tables below show the research undertaken in various research groups on given prioritized 
areas. 
Table 2.2: Advanced materials and sensors 
Application Areas Head/Institute Funds 
Metal Industry  Metal Composites AMREC MOSTI 
Chemical industries 
- acrylic acids 
- oleochemicals 
- surfactants 
Catalysts, 
Catalyst support, 
Adsorbent 
COMBICAT, UM MOSTI 
Catalyst 
Adsorbent 
Institut Ibnu Sina, UTM 
MOSTI 
MOHE11 
Nanoelectronics Chemical sensor UTP12 MOSTI 
Source: The MNNI13 
Table 2.3: Electronics and communications 
Applications Areas Head/Institute Funds 
Automotive 
MEMS and 
Microsensors/ 
Organic Electronics 
IMEN UKM, UPM, 
VLSI 
MOSTI 
GMR Electronics AMREC MOSTI 
Blue Light Emitting Devices Electronics USM MOSTI 
Advanced optical crystal for electro-
optic application 
Electronics UTM, UM, UPM MOSTI 
Source: The MNNI14 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Medicine and Health 
Application Areas Head/Institute Funds 
Biopharmaceutical proteins for 
human therapeutics drugs and 
vaccines 
Nanomedicine UPM MOSTI 
Bone graft substitutes   Nanomaterial 
MINT15, SIRIM, 
USM, UKM, UIA16 
MOSTI 
                                                          
11 Ministry of Higher Education. 
12 Petronas Technology University of Malaysia. 
13 http://www.nano.gov.my.   
14 http://www.nano.gov.my.   
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Diagnostic kits for infectious 
diseases 
Nano-device 
Molecular 
Nanotechnology 
USM MOSTI 
Antioxidants in preventing 
degenerative damage in Down 
syndrome and ageing 
Nanomedicine UKM MOSTI 
Vaccine production against 
infectious diseases 
Nanomedicine USM MOSTI 
Oncology: Liver cancer Nanomedicine UM MOSTI 
Diagnostic kit for diabetic 
vasculopathy 
Nanomedicine UM MOSTI 
Antibiotic resistance Nanomedicine 
UM, USM, VRI17, 
MOH18 
MOSTI 
Drug Synthesis Nanomedicine UiTM19 MOSTI 
Source: The MNNI20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 below shows the key actions for nanotechnology that have been proposed for 
Malaysia in the Short Term, Medium Term and Long Term 
Figure 2.1: Key proposed actions for nanotechnology 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 Malaysian Institute of Nuclear Technology Research. 
16 International Islamic University of Malaysia. 
17 Veterinary Research Institute. 
18 Ministry of Health. 
19 MARA Technology University of Malaysia. 
20 http://www.nano.gov.my.  
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Source: The MNNI21 
 
                                                          
21 http://www.nano.gov.my.   
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APPENDIX 3 
THEORY OF PROPERTY 
 
The court in the UK and Malaysia are reluctant to accept proprietary rights in information. 
Furthermore, the implied and equitable obligation for ex-employee may have the potential of 
difficulty for the court to determine the obligation that arises between the parties. Furthermore, in 
the cross-border movements and exchange of ideas and information the proprietary analysis may 
provide a useful ground of protection.  
 
This Appendix 3 examines theory of property by Honoré and to what extent it applies to 
nanotechnology context; discusses the rights, duties, limitation and other elements which form 
part of the standard incidents of ownership.1 He also suggests that an individual must at least 
hold some of these incidents for the rightful ownership, although does not necessarily mean that 
he should hold all of them. A property framework provided by Honoré may be an effective 
method of exploring issues arising from nanotechnology and confidential issue. This theory 
shows that how nanotechnology information might be controlled and used. Since 
nanotechnology involves collaborative research project, this theory of property may be important 
in determining the ownership of nanotechnology information. 
 
The right to possess  
 
According to Honoré, the right to possess means that the person has an exclusive physical 
control over the thing. He divides the legal control into two; (a) the right to be put in exclusive 
control of a thing; (b) the right to remain control. He maintains that the other should not have the 
right without the permission, or unless the laws provide otherwise. The question that relevant 
here whether the parties able to have physical control over the information? The word “exclusive 
physical control over the thing” seems very unlikely to fit well with nanotechnology information. 
This is because it is very unlikely to prove that the person has physical control over the 
confidential information of nanotechnology. Nonetheless, an important element of the case law is 
the efforts made to keep information secret. For example, when the information has been treated 
                                                          
1 Honoré T Making Law Bind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) original version published in Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, Guest A G (ed) (1961) at pp 161-192. 
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with limited access, or put it under locked or key access, or has been encrypted with secret or 
special code, this situation could satisfy the criteria of “right to possess” because unauthorised 
person would not have the right to control over the information. 
 
The right to use  
 
The right to use includes the “use”, “management” and “entitlement to income” which overlap 
with the right to manage and the right to income. He also refers the right to use encompasses 
owner’s personal use and enjoyment of the thing owned. This is likely relevant to 
nanotechnology information because it gives right to the owner to enjoy and use of the 
information.  
 
The right to manage   
 
This right demonstrates how and by whom the thing owned shall be used. The right to manage 
for the use and exploitation according to Honoré may includes for example the right to licence, 
the right to make contract, the right to use of others’ things. In the nanotechnology information, 
this could mean that the owner of the information has the power to determine the terms regarding 
to licence, make contract or use. The existence of know-how licensing suggests that this could be 
satisfied.2 Know-how is used to describe a license of confidential information with some level of 
accuracy i.e. the licensee should be shown the means on how to use the information into 
practicality.3 This is because simply disclosing the information does not make the licensee to 
make effective use of the information.4 Thus, in nanotechnology, the licensee should be shown 
the practicality of the information for example by exhibiting that the properties behave 
differently at nanoscale.  
 
 
 
The right to income  
                                                          
2 See 3.2. 
3 Hull J ‘Trade Secret Licensing: The Art of the Possible’ (2009) J.I.P.L.P, Vol.4, No.3, 203, at p.206. 
4 Ibid, at p.206. 
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The income is derived from the use of a thing. Honoré refers this right as surrogate of use; where 
allowing other to use the thing in return for a reward. With regards to nanotechnology 
information, this occurs when the owner allows other persons to use the information. In return, 
the owner would receive a kind of reward, for example in term of the money or any commercial 
investment for example as in Douglas v Hello!5 where commercial interest of photographic 
images of a celebrity wedding were recognised by the court.  
 
The right to capital  
 
According to Honoré this right is having an economic aspects consists the most important right - 
the power to alienate; and the liberty to consume, waste and destroy either whole or part of a 
thing. The person can exercise the right during his life or on his death by way of sale, mortgage, 
gift or other mode. In nanotechnology information, the person may choose to publish the 
information, thereby destroying confidentiality, or may choose to keep it secret thereby to accord 
the protection.  
 
The right to security  
 
The right of the owner to remain in the position of his property and entitle for adequate 
compensation for any expropriation made. In other words, without adequate compensation, the 
owner will not be forced to give up his property. This right may not be applicable to 
nanotechnology information, because any expropriation will make the information available and 
lose its confidentiality. However, the question may arise here, whether the owner of the 
information has to be forced for the disclosure, such as for the interest of the public? This means 
that if it is proved that the information has considerably affected the interest of the public; the 
owner of the information will not have the right to secure his information.  
 
 
The rights of transmissibility  
                                                          
5 [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2007] UKHL 21. 
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This right is described as the owner of having interest in transferring his ownership to another 
person by of giving them away, through its sale or at the owner’s death through a will to 
successors. In nanotechnology information, it has been argued that the information may involve 
by more than one person and this would rather difficult to maintain the secrecy once the 
information has been transmitted to another person, by giving it away, or by sale or upon the 
death of the owner. The information can be transmitted, but it is difficult to “alienate” in the 
sense of original holder losing knowledge of it.  
 
The incident of absence of term  
 
The right is given to the owner to enjoy the right for indeterminate of time without appearing 
some contingencies such as bankruptcy, sale in execution or state expropriation. For this, the 
owner has indeterminate duration of ownership to enjoy his right without unjustifiable reasons 
regarding his right over his property. This right may be applicable to nanotechnology 
information if the information has been kept secret for indeterminate of time. But the problem 
may arise in nanotechnology as multidiscipline and a lot of people involved and is very difficult 
to maintain the confidentiality as some people may disclose the information.    
 
The duty to prevent harm  
 
This is the duty of the owner not to use the thing owned that may harm others and duty to 
prevent other from using to harm other members of society. This right may be relevant to 
nanotechnology information on the basis that the owner of the information does not have the 
right to use the information that harms others. For example, the use of nanotechnology 
information should be prevented if it is believed that it can violate or risk the environment.  
 
 
 
 
The liability of execution  
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The right concerns with the liability of the owner’s interest in their debts either can be taken 
away by execution for a judgement debtor or insolvency. Their property may be liable to be 
seized for the payment of the debt. This is unlikely to be relevant to the discussion for 
confidential information generally or in the nanotechnology context. 
 
The incident of residuary character 
 
The ownership of the property may be expired or abandoned, and in certain circumstances the 
other person will have the corresponding right of the property. In relation to nanotechnology 
information, information abandoned in the sense of lost; nobody is capable of possessing the 
right. If confidential information is abandoned, i.e. the information made available to the public, 
third party cannot claim for breach of confidence.  
 
The adaptability of Honoré’s theory shows that the rights, duties and other elements are required 
to give account on ownership are indeed may be applicable to nanotechnology information. This 
theory shows that nanotechnology information may be considered as property  in the sense of 
controlling and using as well as determining the ownership of the information. For example, in 
case of ex-employee who wishes to move to another company, the theory can protect the 
information if the implied or equitable obligation are not able to solve the issues. Furthermore, in 
the cross-border transmission and exchanging of information and ideas, this theory may be 
helpful to protect the flow of the information. Thus, if the court moves to characterise the 
information, although it is not much hope in the UK, the court in Malaysia might be influenced 
by the decision in the Hong Kong’s court,6 to take the proprietary lead will be sound. 
                                                          
6 In Linda Chih Ling Koo, John Ho Huang Chiu v Lam Tai Hing where the Hong Kong’s Court took the view that 
confidential in university researchers’ questionnaires could be protected as proprietary analysis. In this case Bokhari 
J considered that proprietary rights can be used to restrain the use of confidential information, and concluded that “a 
man’s entitlement to keep his confidential information confidential, and to recover compensation of such 
information is misused, is not confined to what can be achieved under contract or through the intervention of equity 
where the information was imparted trusting the recipient to keep the same confidential. There is a proprietary 
interest in confidential information; and there is jurisdiction in the Courts to intervene to preserve such interest or 
award compensation for harm done to it.” (1993) 23 I.P.R. 607, at 632. See comment on this case, Hull J 
‘Proprietary Rights in Questionnaires: An Academic Question in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal’ (1994) E.I.P.R. 
104; see also Loh E ‘Intellectual Property: Breach of Confidence?’ (1995) E.I.P.R. 405. 
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Nevertheless, this may not be possible to achieve in the near future since both jurisdictions, 
Malaysia and UK have reluctance to accept the stance of proprietary analysis of the information. 
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APPENDIX 4 
THE EUROPENA PATENT OFFICE NANOTECHNOLOGY 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
Table 4: 1 The EPO nanotechnology classification  
Code New Code Class/Fields Example 
Y01N2 B82Y5 Nanobiotechnology *Nanocapsules as carrier systems for 
therapy and pharmaceutical 
treatment 
*Biomolecular motors  
*Molecular arrangements for 
biocatalysts 
*Pre-targeting with peptides or 
antibodies 
*Host-guest complexes in targeted 
drugs 
*Ultrasound imaging or radioactive 
pharmaceutical preparations 
Y01N4 B82Y10 Nanotechnology for 
information processing, 
storage and transmission 
*DNA computing 
*Quantum computing 
*Single electron logic 
*Nanotube displays 
*Biomolecules for electronics and 
data storage 
*Read heads with nm precision 
Y01N6 B82Y30 Nanotechnology for materials 
and surface science 
*Nanoparticles, nanocomposites, 
dendrimers, nanotubes and 
fullerenes 
*Supramolecular systems 
*Ultrathin functional films 
*Self assembling monolayers (SAM) 
*Hydrogen storage in nanostructured 
materials 
Y01N8 B82Y15 Nanotechnology for 
interacting, sensing or 
actuating 
*Measurement of physical, 
chemical, biological properties at 
surfaces with nm-resolution 
*Measurement of interfaces with 
lateral resolutions in the nm-range  
*Normalisation routines for 
nanoanalytics 
*Measurements of size distribution 
of nanoparticles 
*Tools for ultraprecision 
engineering like Scanning Probe 
Microscopes 
Use of quantum dot labels for 
analysis biological material 
Y01N10 B82Y20 Nanooptics *Optical quantum well structures 
*Photonic crystals 
*Quantum optics 
*Optical surfaces with nm surface 
precision 
Y01N12 B82Y25 Nanomagnetics *Low dimensional magnetism 
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*XMR technologies such as 
magnetoimpedance, anisotropic 
magnetoresistance, giant 
magnetoresistance, tunnelling 
magnetoresistance 
 B82Y35 Methods or apparatus for 
measurement or analysis for 
nanostructures 
 
 B82Y40 Manufacture or treatment of 
nanostructures 
 
 
Source: Scheu M et al., at p.207; and the EPO1 
 
                                                          
1 Available at http://www.epo.org/topics/issues/nanotechnology.html 
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APPENDIX 5 
INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
 
5.1  How to define nanotechnology? 
For this question, one of the interviewees expressed the view that to define nanotechnology is 
not difficult for scientists because they are the ones who work in this field. Two of the 
interviewees defined nanotechnology as the ability to manipulate things at the scale of 1nm to 
100nm, and at this scale there is sudden change of the properties with different characteristics 
such as strength and chemical reactivity.  
5.2  What is the effect of sudden change of properties from macro-scale to nano-
scale? 
All of the interviewees agreed that the effect of sudden change of the quantum effect would 
bring the properties to behave differently. According to them, many properties can be 
exploited at this scale with new particles, different structure and a lot of opportunity. The 
opportunity would also give advantage to develop novel products, different functionality, 
accessible new areas, manipulating new areas and new process.  
5.3 What are areas of interest in nanotechnology (in general)? 
For this question, all of the interviewees viewed the important areas in nanotechnology being 
medical applications. One of the interviewees gave as an example sensory device in detecting 
molecules in the blood or detecting diseases that quickly bring the result as compared to the 
normal diagnosis system, and drug delivery system. The other two interviewees gave the 
example of developing nanomachine called “nano-bot” that manages to go through the blood 
and detect the cell system, for example cancerous cells. Other examples given by the 
interviewees were analysis of the DNA by developing a lab-on-chip system, as well as the 
application for agricultural, environmental and clean energy.  
Three of the interviewees agreed that other than medical application, nanotechnology is also 
important in consumer products such as nano-cream that helps skin cell preventing from acne 
and scars, or the using of titanium oxide in compact powder. One of the interviewees viewed 
upcoming areas of interest in nanotechnology as the micro-system business areas, in 
particular contract of manufacturing; defences application and electronic systems.  
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5.4 What are their personal areas of interest? 
The personal interests of the interviewees were different. One of them is involved in nano-
electronics, another involved in the business type of contract of manufacturing, one involved 
in chemistry working on the zeolite, and aerogel using rice husk at the range of 1 to 100nm.  
One of the interviewees works in photonics and bio-mimetic (the technology that mimics 
nature). 
5.5  Is nanotechnology new? 
Two of the interviewees pointed out that nanotechnology are not new because it has been 
around us for many years, for example clay involving nano-composites was used during 
Greek period and the Egyptians preserved the dead people using nanotechnology. But one of 
the interviewees agreed that it is new now in the way we understand the technology and this 
technology is expected to mature in the next 100 years. They all agreed that it is only recently 
that nanotechnology has been actively explored.  
5.6 What is the nature of nanotechnology?  
All of the interviewees agreed that nanotechnology is not a single or focused discipline as 
compared to other disciplines. They mentioned that because of the different areas involved in 
nanotechnology it might engage people to work collaboratively and across disciplines 
including persons from medicine, science and engineering. One interviewee mentioned that 
nanotechnology not only involved people from technical and engineering aspects, but should 
also involve persons from legal, religious and social sciences fields. Another interviewee had 
a similar view by stating that nanotechnology is different from other technology because it 
integrated between sciences and its application and people involved are have different 
background and they must work in a team. 
5.7 Are there any safety, environment and health (SEH) issue that nanotechnology 
could pose? 
One interviewee mentioned that the ethical and environmental issues are likely to occur in the 
chemistry field, for example the use of nano-particles in sunscreen and other beauty and 
cosmetic treatment, on the issue whether they have toxicological effect. The same 
interviewee has also queried whether nano-particles would have the similar effects like 
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asbestos. The same interviewee also doubted whether it is ethical to the use the materials until 
the effects are known or whether the precautionary principle should be adopted. However, 
according to this interviewee there is less concern of SEH in medical technology and nano-
electronics. The interviewee doubted whether currently there is any toxicological effect of 
nanotechnology to the environment and mentioned that the UK government are working hard 
on this issue. The interviewee suggested that there should be a serious study on chemical 
engineering to see whether there was any nanotechnology risk in that area. 
 One of the interviewees pointed out that with the effect of quantum mechanics, where there 
are sudden changes of properties; nanotechnology behaves differently with different function, 
effect and properties. He stated that it is unlikely that they would be informed about 
something which is unsettled like nanotechnology on its health and environmental issue. One 
of the interviewee also stated that there is likely more concern with the danger of nanoparticle 
especially when inhaled to the body in terms of its health and safety. For that reason, 
according to him, there are people who study nano-safety. One of the interviewees stated that 
whether nanotechnology is dangerous depends upon how it is handles. Therefore, according 
to this interviewee people are intimidated by nanotechnology and fear the term “nano-bot” 
that could have the dangerous effect. However, he expressed that nano-bot is just DNA 
molecule acting as a robot that can go through the body, for example in detecting some 
disease. 
 
5.8 Are there any activities or steps taken to minimise the potential risk posed by 
nanotechnology? 
In prompting this issue, one of the interviewees stated that in two or three years time the 
environmental toxicological data at nanoscale should be recognised. He added that there is 
activity for the engagement of the public such as works done by the Policy, Ethics and Life 
Science Centre (PEALS). The other activities made, as one of the interviewees mentioned 
was that through conferences, seminars and workshops on nanotechnology. One of the 
interviewees mentioned a company which had written in its Annual Report on the impact of 
nanotechnology particularly in the industrial sectors and predicted the applications of 
nanotechnology on the consumer products. 
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5.9 What are the trends and development of nanotechnology? 
One of the interviewees stated that he was involved in the contract of manufacturing for 
process development, i.e. to do things that incorporated new development process. Therefore, 
as he commented further, there are a lot of collaborations with the industry and joint fund 
with the government agency. One of the interviewees suspected and hoped that there should 
be a nanotechnology policy for Malaysia in the future and currently Malaysia is the member 
of the Asia Pacific Nano Forum (APNF) to form a nanotechnology working committee. One 
of the interviewees regarded nanotechnology as the “technology in the 21st century” and 
stated Malaysia should identify the niche areas that researchers can participate to do research. 
Another interviewee stated that the niche areas that Malaysia needed to identify must be the 
areas that other countries have not explored yet. He opined that this is a good opportunity for 
Malaysia and would bring advantages for Malaysia. 
5.10 What are the intellectual property rights that are relevant to nanotechnology?  
Two of the interviewees viewed patent as the most relevant for protecting nanotechnology, 
one of the interviewees agreed that all forms IP protection are relevant for protecting 
nanotechnology, one interviewee mentioned that the most IP best timing for nanotechnology 
is non-disclosure in the contract of manufacturing. In other words, he involved in maintaining 
of the confidential information by way of non-disclosure agreement between customers. 
Another interviewee agreed where he stated that the post-graduate students will be required 
to sign the non-disclosure agreement to make sure that all information relevant to the research 
conducted are being kept in confidence and not flowing out from the university. He warned 
that whenever someone has good information about something, based on his own personal 
experience, the information should not be disclosed to anyone. This is because the 
information might have some value which is worth IP protection. Two interviewees 
mentioned that trade marks in particular are relevant, for example concerning the shape of 
carbon nanotubes and the used of the word “nano”.  
5.11 Whether the current IP system is sufficient protection for nanotechnology? 
One of the interviewees held the view that some element of nanotechnology related to 
intellectual property can be tackled using the existing framework, and some of the elements 
are challenged by the existing system. He analogised to the semiconductor industry (for 
340 
 
example in Texas Instrument), because at the beginning of technology patent protection was 
not regarded as important until the technology matured. One of the interviewees held the 
view that nanotechnology has to fit to the existing regulation, because new technology has to 
cope with the existing regulation, and that it is undesirable to have specific regulation for 
nanotechnology. 
 
5.12 To what extent is the current IP system sufficient to address the issues related to 
nanotechnology? 
For this question, one of the interviewees mentioned the challenge of the different size of 
nanotechnology could bring. He gave the example of metal alloy at the macro scale with the 
range at centimetre level; he queried whether metal alloy at nano-scale can be patented again? 
He understood that the matter is still not fully settled, and according to him this is the big 
issue and important to consider i.e the length scale from macro to nano scale is relevant, and 
it could be argued also that there is no important different between the two scales. He also 
queried whether it can be patented or not when the only difference is in size? He stated that 
since a lot of investment is needed to develop products at nano level, if the patent is not 
allowed, the useful technology might be inhibited (because the function of patent is 
promoting innovation and creating incentive). Thus, according to this interviewee, many 
companies may close down and the product would never reach the market.  
Another interviewee made the point that it will always be a guess as to whether the current IP 
system is sufficient or not... He expressed the view that whenever new technology emerged, 
there would be a lack of experts at the patent office in accessing the documents. Thus, 
according to this interviewee, this could affect whether or not the patent is broadly granted.  
He further stated that as the new technology progresses to the application, the early patent 
will lose its value. This is because according to him generally a lot of time required to 
develop new invention. He gave the example in software industry on how to write the code 
using microscope and in genetic patent on the issue whether the discovery in genetics could 
patented? He however expressed doubts as to whether these issues are fundamental to 
nanotechnology.  
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When prompted with this issue, one of the interviewees pointed out that the patent examiners 
need to have the expertise so that whenever application is made they have the ability to 
distinguish whether the product is novel or not, and not simply to reject any application that 
looks similar between macro-scale products and nano-scale products, for example his product 
on nano-membrane was rejected because it was stated that it was not new. He also mentioned 
that in term of nanotechnology standardization, he expected that Malaysia will adopt the 
standard for nanotechnology under ISO TTC/299.1 This matter of adoption of standardisation 
is still under discussion in Malaysia. According to this interviewee standardization is very 
important for nanotechnology especially in term of the size, particle and safety.  
As to the word “nano” one of the interviewees held the viewed that nowadays the word 
“nano” is very popular and everyone is rushing to put the word “nano” in their products. He 
suggested that if the word “nano” is to be used, it has to make sure that the “nano” 
enhancement has been put in the products. This is because, people are simply put nano word, 
for example in cosmetic for example “Nano Silver”. The interviewee gave the example of  
Taiwan which has already introduced the “Nano Mark” to control the use of “nano” word, 
that if the word “nano” is to be used, the product needs to go a testing in order to make sure 
that it actually contains nanotechnology. He suggested that this could be adopted by the 
Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM)2 for nanomaterials testing 
and measurement. The popular use of the word “nano” was also an issue raised by another 
interviewee. The other interesting issue relevant to trade marks mentioned by one of the 
interviewees was  the shape of carbon nanotubes either in single-walled, double-walled and 
multi-walled, and current law was sufficient to address the issue. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This is standard for classification, terminology and nomenclature; metrology and instrumentation; science-
based health; safety and environmental practices; and nanotechnology products and processes,  see more at 
Hatto P ISO/TC 229 – Nanotechnologies, ISO Committee Chairs Conference, Geneva, 5 June 2008, available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/search.htm?qt=ISO%2FTC+229&searchSubmit=Search&sort=rele&type=simple&publis
hed=on; see also at http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=381983; 
http://www.who.int/ifcs/documents/forums/forum6/ppt_nano_hatto.pdf accessed on 22 February 2010. 
2 Especially relevant for nanotechnology may be providing technical standard and quality, and certification, 
inspection and testing for nanotechnology, see generally at http://www.sirim.my/web/core.  
342 
 
5.13 How did they compare nanotechnology with previous technology? 
One of the interviewees analogised nanotechnology with the semiconductor chip industry. 
According to him, at the early time, as happened to Texas Instruments, patents were not very 
popular until the technology matured. During this time, companies were not worried to patent 
their products, and they would wait until the technology matured. One of the interviewees 
stated that naturally biotechnology is nanotechnology because of the working on DNA. 
According to him, it has been predicted that after biotechnology there would be 
nanotechnology and there is strong relationship between nanotechnology and biotechnology 
for example as in biosensors, genomic and proteomic. Another interviewee agreed that 
biotechnology is part of nanotechnology. 
 
5.14 Does nanotechnology enjoy strong commercialisation? 
Two of the interviewees viewed that in Malaysia nanotechnology does not enjoy strong 
commercialisation because commercialisation is still low in Malaysia. The area which has 
enjoyed some commercialisation is in nanoparticle, but this does not yet apply in the high 
technology. One of the interviewees pointed out that his department has enjoyed a lot of 
commercialisation in nanotechnology; has developed and considered his department as 
commercialisation organised system.  
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APPENDIX 6 
QUESTION FOR INTERVIEW 
 
QUESTION 1: Interview subject information  
This section is to learn about the expert (warm-up questions). This section represents the general 
question including interviewee’s background, their qualification (training or experiences), their 
divergent of disciplines, the role play and their responsibilities.  
1a.  What is your title? 
1b.  How long have you been in this current position?  
1c.  Would you like to tell me something about your work and your responsibilities? (Please 
comment on how far your responsibilities extended throughout the organisation) 
1d.   How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experiences?  
1e. What is your areas of interest? (omit if already answer under 1c) 
 
QUESTION 2: Organisation’s information 
This section is to learn more of the organisation in investigating the different disciplines involve 
in the organisation. The goal is to identify research conducted in various areas of nanotechnology 
with specific expertise. This will determine/indicate the specific and forthcoming areas of 
interest in nanotechnology at the organisation.   
2a. Would you like to tell me something about your organisation’s works?  
2b. What different types of nanotechnology does your organisation works with? 
2c. Which areas would you say are the most important areas of nanotechnology in your 
organisation? 
2d. What would be the forthcoming areas of interest of nanotechnology in your organisation 
or other spheres that you know? (for example Malaysia)? 
2e. Why do you think the trends of discipline have evolved in such a way? (the underlying 
factors)? 
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QUESTION 3: Defining nanotechnology  
This section examines the effect between classical and quantum physics at the nanoscale. This is 
to understand how nanoscale structures behave differently as compared to the macro-scale.  
 
3a. How do you explain the effect of sudden changes that have novel properties and 
functions at nanoscale is different at macro scale level? (the large surface area to volume 
ratio at the nanoscale leads to chemical reaction, where the law of physics change to 
quantum effects) 
 
QUESTION 4: Own perception of the technology 
This section is to get interviewee own perception on the impact of nanotechnology. This is to 
identify the key benefits of nanotechnology and potential problems of nanotechnology could 
pose. 
4a. What is the impact of nanotechnology in general? 
4b. What do you think the beneficial impact of your own area of technology? 
4c. Is there any potential problem of your own area of technology? 
 
QUESTION 5: Risks to Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) 
The section is to identify the potential risks that nanotechnology could pose to HSE. This uses as 
an indication of what is happening in the field and which might be useful of patent refusal on the 
ground of public order.  
5a. Do you think that nanotechnology could pose any risk to human health, safety and 
environment? (this question is conditional upon Question 4.c) 
 Follow up: Whether the risk poses to your own areas or as a whole? 
 Follow up: If the answer in 5a is NO, then ask any dangers that nanoparticles/artefacts 
could cause diseases like mesothelioma as in asbestos case. 
5b. Are there any programs or activities initiated to anticipate the matters so far? 
 Follow up: Would you suggest any programs or activities relevant to that? 
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QUESTION 6: Trends and development of nanotechnology 
This section is to get the view of the trends and development of nanotechnology. The 
interviewees may provide with any statistical data, funding sources, projects under 
development/already developed, publications and research and development (R&D)  
 
6a. What are the trends and development of nanotechnology at your organisation? 
6b. What relevant scientific research at your organisation most significant to date? 
6c. What types of research needs might be relevant to your organisation? (this may include 
the equipment and tools necessary to conduct the research in the technology) 
6d.  Does your organisation receives any funding from national and international 
organisation? (this includes the funding from the government and the industrial sectors) 
6e. Does your organisation have strong collaboration with government and industry? 
 
QUESTION 7: Legal regime for nanotechnology 
This section examines whether the interviewees have any experience in IP system. This section 
asks whether to have specific legal regime for nanotechnology or otherwise.  
7a. Do you have any personal experience in dealing with IP system? (for example as patent 
examiner or as an expert to give evidence in litigation) 
7b. (if the answer is YES in 7a)... Do you think that current IP system is sufficient to govern 
the issues relating to this technology? (then go to Question 7d) 
 Follow up: Do you think that the research exemption enforcement is adequate? 
7c. (If the answer is NO in 7a)... Then ask whether regulation related to environment and IP 
are relevant to nanotechnology? (then go to Question 7e) 
7d. What are other types of regulation which could possibly be applicable to 
nanotechnology? 
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7e. How do you compare nanotechnology and other technology that preceded it for 
example... 
(a) Biotechnology 
 
(b) Semiconductor chips 
 
QUESTION 8: Commercialisation of nanotechnology 
This section is to know the practices of commercialisation aspect (strong or otherwise) at 
interviewee’s organisation. 
 
9a. Do you think that your organisation enjoys strong commercialisation of nanotechnology? 
9b. What problems does commercialisation of nanotechnology raise? (note whether 
interviewee aware of the copyright research exception) 
 
QUESTION 9: The closing questions 
10a. Is there anything we have not covered in this interview that you think that relevant to my 
research/survey? 
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APPENDIX 7 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT OF THE INTERVIEW 
 
My name is Norain Ismail, having law background, and currently a PhD student at the 
Newcastle law school. My research concerns with the intellectual property rights over 
nanotechnology. The topic draws my attention because being an emerging status of 
technology it involves contentious issues and yet the discussion is still on the basic legal 
aspects of the law. The aim of my research is to assess the scope and development of 
nanotechnology in different selected legal jurisdiction and how it can be applicable to 
Malaysian context. In other words, the central idea of my research is to propose a legal 
framework to nanotechnology in Malaysia based on the approaches and experiences from 
other legal jurisdiction.  
I am working at the university which encourage the staff to acquire knowledge relevant to the 
niche area of the university. This is in line with the university aspiration to become the world 
leading innovative and creative technical university. This conforms to the national aspiration 
to produce highly competent professionals. I believe undertaking of this research will 
enhance further contribution especially in the legal aspects of engineering and technology. 
Nanotechnology is believed to have diverse effect and wide range application to human life. 
Worldwide research and development (R&D) has allocated a large sum to the technology 
investment. For example, a number of patent applications have increased, where United 
States takes a leading role, followed by Japan and Europe. Consulting literatures through 
European Patent Office website, suggests that by 2004, about EUR8 billion was devoted in 
nanotechnology Research and development (R&D) worldwide. Accordingly, by the year 
2015, nanotechnology is expected to reach market amounted EUR1 trillion. Realising of the 
future importance of this technology, European Commission finances nanotechnology 
projects with approximately EUR500 million a year, which is likely to double over the next 
decade or two.1 
Many view that intellectual property plays a vital role in protecting the new emerging 
technology like nanotechnology. The current state of intellectual property law will be tested 
for example involving the invention at the atomic and molecular scale. The inherent unique 
                                                          
 
1 Available at http://www.epo.org/topics/issues/nanotechnology.html 
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characteristics will eventually create a challenge in determining the right and possible legal 
avenue for nanotechnology. There are discussion concerning the comparative study relating 
to nanotechnology among Trilateral Offices members of the United States Patent and 
Trademarks Office (USPTO), EPO and Japanese Patent Office (JPO), at the 24th Trilateral 
Conference, Tokyo, 17 November 2006, which attested a comparative study concerning 
examination practices and exchange for information about the definition and classification in 
the field of nanotechnology.2  
This interview will be conducted among the selected expert scientist. The experts are 
important because they represent a different scientific background across the range of 
disciplines (the expert is in line with the admissibility of expert opinion in the court). The 
experts are hoped to assist in identifying sources of information, and they are expected to 
give relevant weight of question of fact, opinion, experience and perception on the 
technology. In so doing, this interview hopes to learn the divergent discipline, the role play 
and the responsibilities of an expert; the interest and forthcoming interest of the technology as 
well as the trends of nanotechnology; the potential impact of nanotechnology and possible 
legal regime to nanotechnology. The selection criteria of those scientists are based on 
multidisciplinary in nature, patent listed, no overlapping publication, science and 
international networking.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Available at http://www.trilateral.net/conf_sum/2006.pdf 
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APPENDIX 1 
DOCTRINAL AND COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
1.1 Introduction of legal research 
 
In this study, the methodological approach employs doctrinal and comparative legal analysis. 
This section examines the doctrinal and comparative analysis and justifies their usefulness and 
appropriateness for the current study.  
 
Legal research relates to the various principles and relationship of “how the law works”.1 This is 
to understand the operation of the law and legal system in matters concerning the sources of law, 
operation of judicial precedent, equitable principles, statutory interpretation, the judicial decision 
making process and the relationship between domestic and international law.2  
Kissam identifies the purpose of legal research broadly as to:3 
(a) classify and categorise cases, statutes and other legal materials into separate legal 
elements; 
(b) synthesis various elements of cases and statutes together into a consistent and useful legal 
standard or legal rules; 
(c) clarify and resolve the doctrinal issue; 
(d) produce teaching materials and all kinds of educational guides; 
(e) understand legal doctrine or legal process by explanation of causes, analysing of 
consequence and interpretation of meaning; and 
(f) critique legal doctrine or legal process as to whether appropriate methods are being used 
or whether the values are achieved. 
 
Kissam’s approach is significant in classifying, categorising and synthesising IP laws especially 
from Malaysia and the UK in order to identify the common rule which may be suitable for 
nanotechnology. In clarifying and resolving the doctrinal issues, this study examines how 
nanotechnology is protected under the current IPRs. However, according to (d), this is not the 
                                                          
1 Stott D Legal Research (2nd edn) (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999), at p.1. 
2 Ibid, at pp.1-2. 
3 Kissam P C ‘The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship’ (1988) 63 Wash. L. Rev. 223, at pp.230-239, however admits 
that these purposes are complex and overlapping. 
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main purpose of this study to produce of teaching materials and all of educations guides, but it is 
hoped to have some values and practices in the future. In order to understand legal doctrine or 
legal process this study explains, for example the justification of the most appropriate form IPRs 
over the others. In analysing the consequence and interpreting the meaning, this study 
investigates for example what constitutes confidentiality in nanotechnology. This study also aims 
to critique whether the legal doctrine or legal process is appropriate for nanotechnology. Thus, 
the list provided by Kissam is relevant to this study and manages to validate the approach 
employed throughout this thesis.  
 
This study adopts doctrinal legal research in analysing legal rules of IPRs and nanotechnology, 
both under Malaysian and UK law. This study also engages a comparative analysis of the law in 
Malaysia and UK as well as, where relevant, European laws and other international instruments. 
However, this wider and limited jurisdictional material may be treated as persuasive rather than 
authoritative. Therefore, in this study, doctrinal and comparative law are not treated mutually 
exclusive, but rather complement each other.4 It is hoped that the approaches employed are able 
to reflect the aim of the study that is to assess the scope and development in selected legal 
jurisdictions in relation to IPRs over nanotechnology and to propose a legal framework for 
Malaysia.  
 
1.2 Doctrinal analysis 
 
Doctrinal analysis5 tries to ask “what the law is in a particular area”.6 It is a type of “black-
letter”7 rules in analysing, interpreting and clarifying of the legal rules and principles of the law. 
                                                          
4 The legal doctrinal itself plays a vital part to achieve the objective of comparative analysis, Warrington M and Van 
Hoecke M ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards New Model for Comparative Law’ 
(1998) I. C. L. Q. 495, at p.522. 
5 Also known as "traditional legal scholarship”, Jones G ‘Traditional’ Legal Scholarship: A Personal View in Birks 
P B H (ed) Pressing Problems in the Law: What Are Law Schools For?  Vol. 2 (Oxford: OUP, 1996), at p.9; 
Dobinson and Johns in McConville M and Chui W H Research Methods for Law (eds) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007) refer as “theoretical legal research”, at p.18; also called “the definitive form of legal 
scholarship”, Murphy W T and Roberts S ‘Introduction’ (1987) 50 M.L.R. 677, at p.677. 
6 Dobinson and Johns, n.5, at pp.18-19. This contrasts with the natural sciences research which tries to explain 
natural phenomena through causal relationship between variable, Chynoweth P Legal Research in Knight A and 
Ruddock L (eds) Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) at 
p.30. 
297 
 
The formulation of legal ‘doctrine’ through the analysis of legal rules can be found in the 
primary legal materials such as statutes and cases.8 The collection and analysis of the case law 
and relevant legislation are primarily important to demonstrate how the law has been developed 
in relation to the judicial reasoning and legislative enactment.9 Traditionally, doctrinal analysis 
has been successfully applied in relation to legal analysis, legal synthesis and policy 
argumentation.10 This is the prime task of legal scholars for the law to be in the future, as Lord 
Goff states that: 
“the prime task of the jurist is to take the cases and statutes which provide the raw material of the law 
on any particular topic; and, by a critical re-appraisal of that raw material, to build up a systematic 
statement of the law on the relevant topic in a coherent form, often combined with proposals of how 
the law can beneficially be developed in the future. There has thus been provided for all lawyers, 
practitioners and students, an established framework for the consideration of each problem as it 
arises”.11  
On the basis of authoritative texts of primary and secondary sources, the aim of doctrinal 
research is to systematise, rectify and clarify the legal rules.12  
 
Doctrinal analysis plays an important role in developing legal system and has considerably been 
emphasised, Birks who advocates that “traditional legal research and scholarship which 
criticises, explains, corrects and directs legal doctrine is still and must remain in the heart of the 
law school’s research”.13 Similarly, Jones argues that:  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “black-letter” as “one or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well 
settled. The term refers to the law printed in book set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black” ; Black’s Law 
Dictionary (9th edn) (United States: A Thomson Reuters); it is “the black or Gothic type that was traditionally used 
in formal statements of legal principles or rules at the start of a section, which was typically followed by a 
descriptive exposition or commentary” Salter M and Mason J Writing Law Dissertation: An Introduction and Guide 
to the Conduct of Legal Research (New York: Pearson, 2007) at p. 48, and at p.44, n.1; In emphasising the role of 
comparative law and black-letter rule, Örücü points out that “traditional black-letter law-oriented (rule-based) 
comparative law research is normative, structural, institutional and positivistic, and would not use any approach 
other than  the reading of statutes, cases, parliamentary debates and doctrinal works, and would regard description 
and identification to be the final stages of the inquiry”, Örücü E Methodology of Comparative Law in Smits J M 
(ed) The Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006) at p.449. 
8 Chynoweth, n.6, at p.29; the doctrinal analysis is characterised by unique method of reasoning and analysis, Vick 
D W ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) J. Law & Soc. Vol. 31, No.2 163, at p.178. 
9 Dobinson and Johns, n.5, at p.19. 
10 Kissam, n.3, at p.234. 
11 Lord Goff ‘Judge, Jurist and Legislature’ (1987) 2 Denning L.J. 79, at p.92. 
12 McConville M and Chui W H Research Methods for Law (eds) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) at 
p.4. 
13 Birks P B H (ed) Pressing Problems in the Law: What Are Law Schools For?  Vol. 2 (Oxford: OUP, 1996), at 
p.ix. 
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“to dismiss doctrinal writing as expository is to dismiss the skills of synthesis, evaluation and criticism 
which have always been the hall-marks of leading texts and articles. It also ignores the fact that the 
doctrine is still the heart of English law”.14  
Therefore, according to Rhode doctrinal analysis remains the method of choice among the 
majority of legal scholars, because it requires no special expertise beyond what has been taught 
through the training of the traditional law school and this analysis has the capacity to influence 
and assist practitioners, judges and policy makers in drafting and implementing legislation.15 
However, Levmore claims that the doctrinal analysis requires intellectually demanding tasks by 
stating that: 
“ the messy work product of the judges and legislators requires a good deal of tidying up, of synthesis, 
analysis, restatement, and critique. These are intellectually demanding tasks, requiring vast knowledge 
and the ability (not only brains and knowledge and judgment, but also Sitzfleisch) to organize 
dispersed, fragmentary, prolix, and rebarbative materials. These are tasks that lack the theoretical 
breadth or ambition of scholarship in more typically academic fields. Yet they are of inestimable 
importance to the legal system and of greater social value than much esoteric interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship”.
16  
Thus, doctrinal research is not simply finding the correct legal rules per se, but the researcher 
also has to engage with the process of selecting and weighing materials based on the 
authoritative, hierarchical and social context of the interpretation of the legal rules.17  
 
The function of doctrinal analysis is interpreting, analysing and evaluating legal rules and the 
legal system. Doctrinal analysis also plays a role as a basic building block of other studies such 
                                                          
14 Jones, n.5, at p.11; Doctrinal analysis is still dominant mode of legal scholarship, see Posner P A ‘The Legal 
Situation in Legal Scholarship’ (1980-1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1113, at p.1113; historically, theoretical and text-based 
doctrinal research have been dominated the law schools in the UK, see Genn D H et al. Law in the Real World: 
Improving Our Understanding of How Law Works’ Report Summary, The Nuffield Inquiry of Empirical Legal 
Research, Nov 2006, at p.4. 
15 Rhode D L ‘Legal Scholarship’ (2001-2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, at p.1339; the predominant effect of 
doctrinal has become synonymous to the legal study, Vick, n.8, at p.177.  
16 Levmore S ‘In Memoriam: Bernard D Meltzer (1914-2007)’  U. Chi. L. Rev. 409, Vol 74, No. 2, at p.437; Siems 
views that the overriding principles which have been developed by the legal scholar require them to construct the 
area of law in a consistent manner, Siems M M ‘Legal Originality’ (2008) 28 O.J.L.S. 147, at p.153; this 
formulation requires rigorous analytical skill, see also Jones, n.5, at p.14; the close reasoning and greater attention to 
textual context are themselves involved intellectual skills, Bradney A ‘Law as a Parasitic Discipline’ (1998) J. Law 
& Soc. Vol. 25, No.1, 71, at p.76; the doctrinal legal research was always evaluative and critical, see Tiller E H and 
Cross F B ‘What is Legal Doctrine?’ (2006) Nw. U.L.Rev. Vol. 100, No.1 517, at p.518. 
17 Dobinson and Johns, n.5, at pp.21-22. 
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as historical of comparative studies of law.18 The other functions of doctrinal analysis are to 
describe and interpret the law beyond than just merely reporting the legal rules and to 
systematise the law by way of reinterpreting differing concepts, rules and principles.19 
 
Apart from being emphasised as important, doctrinal analysis has also received criticism for 
being too theoretical without a real world application, as Rhode observes that: 
 “much conventional legal analysis is not done well. It exhaustively exhumes unimportant topics or 
replicate familiar argument on important ones. Too little effort is made to connect law to life by 
assessing the real world consequences of analytic frameworks. Of course to do so in systematic 
fashion would require significant time, money, and expertise, which is precisely what most authors 
of doctrinal works are happy to avoid. The result is that on many key legal issues, we are glutted 
with theory and starved for facts”.20  
 
Not only that, some criticised doctrinal analysis as being “merely descriptive or expository, or 
about the dry, mechanical application of rules”.21 Collier has criticised doctrinal analysis as 
“impoverishes the questioning spirit of both law student and teacher”22 and as “an intellectual 
strait-jacket on understanding of law and society”.23 It also has been observed by Bradney that 
doctrinal research which used to dominate the law schools through the internal evidence of the 
court judgements and statutes has now entered its final death throes.24 The criticism of doctrinal 
analysis according to Bradney appeared in two different situations i.e. it ignores the questions 
outside the legal range and treats them as something less important; and it concepts are 
complexed and complicated without able to bridge the gap to other disciplines. 25 
 
Although the accepted paradigm for legal research is legal doctrinal analysis due to new sources 
and the types of modern research, the emphasis has shifted requiring the researcher to engage in 
                                                          
18 Vick, n.8, at n.86, pp.177-178; see also Warrington and Van Hoecke state that doctrinal forms an essential part of 
any legal system, n.4, at p.522. 
19 Warrington M and Van Hoecke, n.4, at pp.523-528. 
20 Rhode, n.15, at p.1340. 
21 Vick, n.8, at p.179. 
22 Collier R ‘The Changing University and the (Legal) academic Career – Rethinking the Relationship between 
Women, Men and the ‘Private Life’ of the Law School’ (2002) 22 Legal Stud. 1, at p.19. 
23 Ibid, at p.27. 
24 Bradney, n.16, at p.71, however claims that this statement does not mean that doctrinal analysis is no longer done. 
25 Ibid, at pp.76-78. 
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a wider context rather than a restrictive doctrinal research methodology.26 The trend of legal 
study has now changed, not only on purely “black-letter” law, but also other important 
approaches such as interdisciplinary, social-legal study, empirical study, comparative study etc.27 
It has been claimed also that the doctrinal research is too narrow in its scope and application 
because of reference primarily on the legal text, and the non-doctrinal approaches represent the 
broader approach taken into consideration of methods from other disciplines such as social 
sciences and humanities.28  
 
The doctrinal analysis of legal rules is crucial for legal research and it continues to pervade legal 
research. This study is no exception and adopts the doctrinal analysis and approach. In relation to 
the IP protection for nanotechnology, the critical analysis has been engaged in analysing the 
appropriate and adequate legal rules protecting nanotechnology. However, the doctrinal analysis 
may not be able to satisfy all the questions relevant to IP protection for nanotechnology, as 
reflected from the criticisms of doctrinal analysis noted above and as  Hutchinson’s view that the 
researcher should be able to understand, appreciate and critique different available 
methodologies to build a more academic and critical view of law.29 For this reason, this study 
does not attempt to treat doctrinal analysis in isolation or as the only important method for legal 
research but comparative analysis between Malaysian and the UK law will also be given 
consideration. This is because as Warrington and Van Hoecke argue doctrinal analysis provides 
groundwork and insights for the comparatists to reconstruct the legal landscape.30 On the basis of 
                                                          
26 In addition to the doctrinal methodology, the legal researcher may engage in social science research such as 
qualitative and quantitative, comparative research, case studies, benchmarking and content analysis, Hutchinson T 
‘Developing Legal Research Skills: Expanding the Paradigm’ (2008) 32 Melb. U. L. Rev. 1065, at pp.1082-1084; 
and, at p.1094. 
27 For an extended discussion of different types research in law, of not promoting or discrediting one after another 
see Siems, n.16 above; see also the discussion of legal research relationship at the core of humanities such as classic, 
history, philosophy and political theory in McCrudden C ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) L. Q. R. 
632; For an interesting exposition benefits of interdisciplinary approaches see Vick, n.8 above; for a good 
consideration of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, and why it develops rapidly and what future it may hold, see 
Posner R A ‘Legal Scholarship Today’ (2001-2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1313; For a useful observation of the 
empirical legal research which is increasingly important for the policy makers, the judiciary, academics, 
practitioners and law reformers, see Genn, n.14 above.  
28 McConville and Chui, n.12, at p.5; See also Hutchinson T C and Burns K ‘The Impact of “Empirical Facts” on 
Legal Scholarship and Legal Research Training’ (2009) The Law Teacher, 43(2) 153, state that doctrinal legal 
research has never been taught explicitly to the legal researcher within the traditional legal territory, at p.161. 
29 Hutchinson, n.26, at pp.1086-1087. 
30 Warrington and Van Hoecke, n.4, at p.522. 
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historical and technological perspective, this study is trying to look at the scientific and legal 
principles underpinning nanotechnology in response to earlier technologies.  
 
1.3 Comparative legal analysis 
 
There is no decisive meaning of what might be considered as comparative law and comparative 
method.31 Several attempts have been made to define the term comparative law and its method.  
Some scholars refer as the process of comparing legal system – Zweigert and Kötz, for example 
advocate that comparative law involves “an intellectual activity with law as its object and 
comparison as its process”.32 Similarly, Gordley refers it as a process of comparing the law of 
different legal systems;33 and De Cruz defines comparative law as a systematic study of the legal 
rules which seeks to compare two or more legal systems, legal traditions, or institutions as a 
method of comparing legal systems which produces results on the legal systems being 
analysed.34 Some other scholars place emphasis on similarities and differences, for example 
Jansen claims that comparative law is a special legal subject which explores the similarities and 
differences of different cultural and social phenomenon.35 Dannemann also demonstrates that 
“comparing legal systems involves at least to some degree exploring both similarities and 
differences”.36 Husa notes that comparative study “concern those who seek similarities, those 
                                                          
31 Örücü E Unde Venit, Quo Tendit Comparative Law? in Harding A and Örücü E (eds) Comparative Law in the 21st 
Century (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) at p.1 and admits that comparative law is a distinct subject 
on its own right, at p.4; see also comparative law has been perceived as a discipline and an independent subject in its 
own internal structure, see Samuel G ‘Comparative Law and Jurisprudence’ (1998) 47 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 817, at 
p.817; but see different view by Gutteridge which emphasises that comparative law is a study and research in law, 
and not a distinct branch of law, Gutteridge H C Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of 
Legal Study and Research (Cambridge: CUP, 1946) at p.1. Gordley J ‘Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline?’ 
(1998) 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 states that comparative law is not a distinct disciplines, at p.607; Palmer V V ‘From 
Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2004) Global Jurist Frontiers, Vol. 4, Issue 
2, 1 emphasises that comparative law is only a method and not a substantive body of knowledge, at p.2. 
32 Zweigert K and Kötz H Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd edn) (trans. Weir T) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), at p.2 add that should put extra dimension of internationalism, that is comparative of different legal system of 
the worlds rather than comparison of different rules in a single legal system; Örücü, n.31, disagree with this 
definition, states rather “circular and vague”, at p.1. 
33 Gordley, n.31, at p.607. 
34 De Cruz P Comparative Law in a Changing World (London: Routledge and Cavendish, 2007) at p.232 and at p.4; 
see also Palmer, n.31, at p.2. 
35 Jansen N Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge in Reimann M and Zimmermann R (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at p.306. 
36 Dannemann G Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences? In Reimann M and Zimmermann R (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at p.384; see also Schlesinger R B ‘The Past and 
302 
 
who stress differences; those interested in western law, those interested to non-western law; 
those who are generalists and those who are country-specialists”.37 Some include international 
dimension, for example Rheinstein discusses that “comparative law has something to do with 
world outside of our own country, ... that it is concerned with law as a supra-national 
phenomenon”.38 Similarly, Sacco explains that “comparative law examines the way in which 
legal institutions are connected, diversified and transplanted from one country to another”.39 
Likewise, Wilson argues that comparative law provides advantageous for future development of 
the national legal systems.40 Furthermore, as pointed out by Green comparative law provides 
special significance for the international lawyer.41  
 
The growing interest for comparative legal research has become increasingly important. There is 
a large volume of studies describing the significance of comparative legal research. For example, 
Koopmans claims that the twenty-first century may be considered as the era of comparative 
methods and explains that: 
“Over the least ten or fifteen years the legal climate seems to be changing. There is more awareness 
that comparative methods may lead the lawyer somewhere, and that comparative materials may be a 
source of inspiration for legal decisions – whether by legislative bodies or by the courts. This evolution 
may be influenced by the process of European integration; it may also just result from the fact that we 
are living closer together (the “global village” situation); it may, finally, be an autonomous process, 
occasioned by the lawyer’s search for fresh perspectives, in particular when completely new legal 
problems are to be solved”.42  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Future of Comparative Law’ (1995) 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 477 who states that “to compare means to observe and to 
explain similarities as well as differences”, at p.477. 
37 Husa J ‘About Methodology of Comparative Law – Some Comments Concerning the Wonderland…’ Maastricht 
Faculty of Law Working Paper 2007/5 downloadable via http://ssrn.com/abstract=1085970, visited on 12 January 
2009, at p.5. 
38 Rheinstein M ‘Comparative Law – Its Functions, Methods and Usages’ (1968-1969) Ark. L. Rev. Vol. 22, No.3, 
415, at p.415. 
39 Sacco R ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II) (1991) 39 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 343, at p.388. 
40 Wilson G Comparative Legal Scholarship in McConville M and Chui W H Research Methods for Law (eds) 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), at p.87. 
41 Green L C ‘Comparative Law as a “Source” of International Law’ (1967-1968) Tul. L. Rev. 52, at p.54, further 
explains that this purpose could be served by allowing him to seek a common rules of the local law and this form a 
basis for the international unification; in term of the universal concept of justice, it avoids lacunae for the court to 
decide upon international disputes; and in term of the development of the legal rules, it provides the general 
principles of laws with the aim of clarifying the existing law or allow the existing law to adjust to new social 
conditions, at p.66. 
42 Koopmans T ‘Comparative Law and the Courts’ (1996) 45 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 545, at p.545. 
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Legrand also highlights the same contention that “it is apt to say that Europe, or at least the 
Europe of the European Union is currently experiencing a comparative moment”.43 It is also 
worth observing Lord Goff’s view on this that “comparative law may have been the hobby of 
yesterday, but it is destined to become the science of tomorrow. We must welcome, rather than 
fear, its influence”.44 In addition to this, the growing interest in comparative study is witnessed 
over the last ten years, a period in which the number of article on comparative law has 
quadrupled.45  
 
The main aim of comparative law is to acquire knowledge of different rules at comparison46 that 
comparative legal research goes beyond the theoretical context.47 The comparative method has 
considerable value and is of practical significance in assisting the court to fill the gaps in the 
legislation and case law or in matters that are not covered by statute or case law.48 Furthermore, 
comparative legal research provides a greater range of solution because of different systems that 
are compared; in comparison to the analysis of a single legal system.49 As far as the international 
dimension is concerned, comparative legal research facilitates in the discovery, elucidation and 
application of the “general principle of law” for the national and international courts to apply.50 
The comparative analysis also acts as a tool for the researcher towards universal theory of law, 
and to achieve international unification and harmonisation of the law.51 This means that the 
investigation of the knowledge from other countries assists the researcher in better understanding 
the functions of the rules and principles of the law.52  
 
                                                          
43 Legrand P ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 Legal Stud. 232, at p.232. 
44 Lord Goff of Chieveley ‘The Future of the Common Law’ (1997) 46 Int’l & Comparative L. Q. 747, at p.748. 
45 Örücü, n.31 at p.2. 
46 Zweigert K and Kötz, n.32, at p.15; see also Sacco, n.39, at pp.4-6. 
47 Legrand, n.43, at p.233. 
48 Gutteridge, n.31, at pp.37-40; De Cruz, 34, p.21; Wilson, n.40, at p.88. In observing gaps of the law, according to 
Dannemann is like a blind spot in the eyes, which is very difficult to detect from within, unless such blind spot is 
compared with other system, n.36, at p.416-417. This is because comparative law is considered as blue prints 
models for legal reasoning and also models of law reform for better understanding of changing concepts, Örücü, 
n.31 at p.14. 
49 Zweigert and Kötz, n.32, at p.15. 
50 De Cruz, 34, at p.25. 
51 These objectives sometimes have been categorised as practical, sociological, political, or pedagogical, Örücü, 
n.31, at p.2, at n.7; see also Sacco, n.39, at pp.2-3.  
52 This aids the courts as a method of construction and interpretation of the disputed subject matters, Örücü, n.31, at 
p.14. 
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One of the most significant discussions among scholars is the right approach for comparative 
method. Zweigert and Kötz advocate a “functionalist” approach53 which suggest that in 
comparing individual legal systems or groups of legal systems “comparatist must strive to grasp 
these legal styles”, and the factors which crucial to legal styles include historical background and 
development; characteristic mode of thought in legal issues; type of legal sources and the way to 
handle them and ideology.54 Husa examines that the functionalist approach for comparative law 
should not be limited to the written law only, but should be prepared to consider a larger cultural, 
social, economic and ideological issues as a whole.55 However, the functionality approach has 
been refuted by Palmer on the basis that one may not necessarily be interested to explore the 
function of the legal rules and principles, but instead it is only to understand, preserve and trace 
the evolution of another law.56  
 
On the other hand, Palmer strongly suggests that comparative law should expand more on a 
practical level and submits that the strategies for comparative methodology should be viewed 
pragmatically, especially on the law in action and not merely the law in the book.57 Palmer 
concludes that the best approach should be concerned, for example the specific purposes of the 
research.58 
 
Similar to doctrinal analysis, comparative analysis has also received many criticisms. Gutteridge, 
points out that it is difficult for the comparative process to take place because comparative law 
employed broad areas and it tended to serve many purposes59  Glendon describes “the problem 
                                                          
53 “the basic methodological principle of all comparative laws is that of functionalist”, n.32, at p.34. 
54 Zweigert and Kötz, n.32, pp.67-68 (emphasis in the original). 
55 Husa, n.37, at pp.8-9. 
56 Palmer, n.31, at p.23, further argues that to claim functionality as a basic method for comparative law is actually 
an artificial restriction on the scope of one type of comparison over the other, at p.24. 
57 Ibid, at pp.33-34; see also Rheinstein states that comparative law is intellectually challenges and “a field of 
practical utility” n.38, at p.424. 
58 “it cannot be a single exclusive method that comparative law research should follow. The tasks of teaching, 
research of law reform, or historical investigation are too varies and contingent to be achieved by a single 
approach. It would be a serious blow if all matters had to be analysed from one angle or perspective, or treated with 
the same detail and depth, or prepared to the same degree or in the same way”, n.31, at p.29. 
59 Gutteridge, n.31, at p.72; see also Legrand notes that “before we talk about method, we need to know what is the 
point of the whole enterprise”, Legrand ‘John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal Studies: A Dialogue’ 
(1999) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 2, at p.50; see also Leyland “important to consider first what we are trying to achieve by 
undertaking comparative work”, Leyland, Oppositions and Fragmentations: In Search of a Formula for 
Comparative Analysis in Harding A and Orucu E (eds) Comparative Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2006), at p.221. 
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of comparative law is one word “context” – to understand legal rule in any system, one must 
have some understanding of its social and economic background and its practical consequences 
in operation”.60 She further emphasises that to compare means that one should go beyond 
comparing the rules as she points out that:  
“no matter how carefully limited the scope of project may be, one runs the risk of missing real 
functional similarities and differences unless one compares not only the rules themselves, but their 
social context and the manner in which they actually operate within their surrounding legal system”.
61  
 
Legrand, queries on the basis the limit of comparison by asking that “where law begins and 
where it ends and to what extent the contextual element ought to be pursued”.62 On the other 
hands, Glendon lists the problems of comparison in determining the subject matter of 
comparison, the validity of comparison, the efficiency of one model legal systems from the other 
legal systems and the policy consideration of the legal systems may not be similar.63 The 
differences of language and uncertainty of the legal terminology are also the obstacles that 
comparatist encounters throughout the process of comparison especially when the foreign law is 
not given a proper definition.64 The lack of rich intellectual range is one of the problems of 
comparative analysis, because comparatist fails to appreciate the comparison beyond a mere 
description of the legal rules.65 Other than these obstacles, “legal transplant”66 may also be 
perceived as one of the problems of comparative law. The relationship of comparative law and 
legal transplants has been recognised and explained by De Cruz: 
“comparative law remains useful and challenging enterprise that provides the methodological basis for 
identifying, interpreting and evaluating legal transplants; it thereby provides a vital step towards a 
                                                          
60 Glendon M A State, Law and Family: Family Law in Transition in the United States and Western Europe 
(Amsterdam-New York-Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977), at pp.17-18. 
61 Ibid, at pp.17-18; This has also been suggested by Legrand to look beyond a mere legal rules where states that 
“the danger of superficial comparison that overlooks the socio-cultural or the socio-historical context have been 
demonstrated by reference to examples that might suggest that deeper comparative inquiry is essential to avoid 
serious misconceptions”, n.43, at p.235; see also Leyland, n.59, at p.221. 
62 Legrand, n.43, at p.234. 
63 Glendon, n.60, at p.18. 
64 Gutteridge, n.31, at p.119; see also Leyland states that “at practical level the translations of terminology can 
present a formidable obstacle”, n.59, at p.215. 
65 Legrand, n.43, at pp.233-234; see also Leyland, n.59, at p.220. 
66 Watson refers “legal transplants” as “the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another, of from 
one people to another. – have been common since the earliest recorded history”, Watson A Legal Transplants 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974) at p.21; “at most times, in most places, borrowing from a different 
jurisdiction has been principally way in which law has developed”, Watson A Society and Legal Change 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1977), at p.98. Other terminology for legal transplants is “legal 
transposition”, Örücü, n.31, at p.13; “borrowing and imitation”, Sacco, n.39, at p.394.  
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deeper and more understanding of the cross fertilisation of ideas across different jurisdictions, legal 
systems and cultures”.67  
 
Nevertheless, the importance of legal transplants has been emphasised as “the most fertile source 
of development”68 and “borrowing and imitation is therefore of central importance to 
understanding the course of legal change”.69 It is also importance to find a quick answer to 
similar legal problems70 or having similar economical development between the countries.71  
 
Comparing the laws means that it is necessary to look at other legal systems, however as warned 
by Lepaulle careful consideration should be observed when there is legal transplantation.72 This 
is because as Shah illustrated the moving of legal rule from one place to the other as advocated 
by Watson seems not to consider the role of the culture of the “sending” or “receiving” society.73 
Fedtke notes certain difficulties that may occur when legal transplantation takes place such as to 
determine the types of law concerned, the extent to which legal transplantation takes place, the 
translation of the foreign language and the technical aspects of applying the new rules to the 
existing rules.74 Legal transplantation may also be perceived as problematic because the lawyers 
failed to tackle the complexities of the law.75  
In utilising a comparative analysis in this thesis, this study does not intend to follow any 
particular comparative approach, but rather analyse more flexibly and adopt contextual or 
practical analysis whenever deemed appropriate. This accords with Husa who emphasises that 
there should not be one method or approach, but comparatists should adopt many methods and 
                                                          
67 De Cruz, n.34 at p.119. See also “importance of “legal transplant” is central theme in current comparative law 
Schlesinger, n. 36, at p.13.  
68 Watson, n.66, at p.21. 
69 Sacco, n.39, at p.394; the same view that it is common situation of transferring one legal system to the other, and 
legal transplant has become the sources for legal change, Wise E M ‘The Transplant of Legal Patterns’ (1990) 38 
Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 1, at p.5. 
70 Atar N ‘The Impossibility of a Grand Transplant Theory’ (2007) Ankara Law Review Vol. 4, No. 2 177, at p.195 
71 Kahn-Freund O ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 M.L.R. 1, at p.23. 
72 Lepaulle ‘The Function of Comparative Law’ (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 838, at 839; see for example criticism of 
legal transplantation in Legrand P ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging' (1996) I.C.L.Q. 52, at p.79. 
73 Shah P ‘Globalisation and the Challenge of Asian Legal Transplants in Europe’ (2005) S.J.L.S. 348 at p.348. 
74 Fedtke J Legal Transplants in Smiths J M (ed) The Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), at pp.435-436. 
75 Comments on case Soo Boon Siong @ Saw Boo Siong v Saw Fatt Seong & Soo Hock Seang [2005] 5 M.L.J. 129 
(High Court); [2008] 1 M.L.J. 27 (Court of Appeal), Salim M R ‘Are Legal Transplants Impossible’ (2009) Journal 
of Comparative Law, downloadable at http://ssrn.com/abstarct=1444684, at p.1, visited on 27 April 2010. 
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approaches that are contingent to the purposes of their research.76 Since comparative legal study 
seeks to explore similarities and differences of the subject matters it will be advantageous for 
Malaysia because it has already shared the legal historical background with the UK.77 From the 
perspective of IP protection in Malaysia, the earlier laws enacted were closely linked to the law 
in the UK. For example, before the introduction of the indigenous Malaysian Patent Act 1983 
(PA 1983)78, there were four pieces of laws governing patent system: the Registration of United 
Kingdom Patents Act 1951 for the Federation of Malaya; the Patents Ordinance for the State of 
Sarawak; the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance 1937 for the State of Sabah and 
the Patents (Rights of Government) Act 1967.  This provides a good basis of comparative 
analysis of IP laws between Malaysian and the UK law. Similarly, before the introduction of the 
Malaysian Industrial Design Act 1996 (IDA 1996),79 industrial designs were protected under 
different statutes:  the United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Act 1949 for West Malaysia; the 
United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Ordinance for the State of Sabah; the Designs (United 
                                                          
76 Husa, n.37, at p.18, further explains that it would be more useful if comparatists define concretely the idea of 
flexible methodology. 
77 The reception of English law to Malaysia has been made through the section 3 and section 5 of the Civil Law Act 
1956. Section 3 reads as follow: 
(1) Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any written law in force in 
Malaysia, the Court shall – 
(a) in Peninsular Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity 
as administered in England on the 7 April 1956; 
(b) in Sabah, apply in common law of England and the rules of equity, together with statutes of general 
application, as administered or in force in England on 1 December 1951; 
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with statutes of general 
application, as administered or in force in England on 12 December 1949, subject however to 
subparagraph 3(ii); 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and statutes of general application shall be applied so far 
only as the circumstances of the States of Malaysia and their respective inhabitants permit and subject to such 
qualifications as local circumstances render necessary 
Section5 reads: 
(1) In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in the States of Peninsular Malaysia other 
than Malacca and Penang with respect to the law of partnerships, corporations, banks and banking, 
principals and agents, carriers by air, land and sea, marine insurance, average, life and fire insurance, and 
with respect to mercantile law generally the law to be administered shall be the same as would be 
administered in England in the like case at the date of the coming into force of this Act, if such question or 
issue had arisen or had to be decided in England, unless in any case other provision is or shall be made by 
any written law; 
In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in the States of Malacca, Penang, Sabah and 
Sarawak with respect to the law concerning any of the matters referred to in subsection (1), the law to be 
administered shall be the same as would be administered in England in the like case at the corresponding period, if 
such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in England, unless in any case other provision is or shall be 
made by any written law. 
78 Act 291, as amended in 1986 and 1993. The similar historical legal connection is also shown in industrial design 
and trade marks laws. 
79 Act 552. 
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Kingdom) Ordinance for the State of Sarawak.80 Another example concerns trade mark law. 
Before the Trade Marks Act 1976 (TMA 1976)81 came into effect, there were also different laws 
governing the trade marks: Trade Marks Ordinance 1938 for Straits Settlements which was 
closely modelled on the UK Trade Mark Act 1938; Trade Mark Ordinance 1950 for the 
Federation of Malaya; Trade Mark Ordinance 1949 for Sabah and Trade Mark Ordinance for 
Sarawak.82 These examples provide a good basis of comparative analysis of IP laws between 
Malaysian and the UK law.  
 
Other than the legal historical development, this study also examines the historical development 
across the technology. One of the methods was conducted by employing the qualitative interview 
between Malaysian and the UK key scientists. This study also investigates similarities and 
differences issues between nanotechnology with the previous technology, such as biotechnology 
and semiconductor chip and how the previous technological issues could be potentially relevant 
to nanotechnology. Both similarities and differences are also useful from the international 
perspectives. Other than comparing between the two legal systems (Malaysia and UK), the 
international treaty which is mostly relevant throughout the thesis is the Agreement of Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (TRIPS). The comparative legal study also 
examines the approaches adopted in other Commonwealth countries for instance, Australia.83 
Thus, both similarities and differences either in terms of the legal or technological development 
between Malaysia and the UK jurisdiction, as according to Dannemann yields the best result 
when the researcher balances between discovering the common features and detecting 
contrasting features.84 Moreover, the newly developing legal areas like Malaysia are inevitably 
concerned to adopt a more matured legal system like UK.85 Whilst technological and economic 
developments in the UK are more advanced, however, both may share similar technological 
cycle although to some extent they may not be identical. Thus, the historical and technological 
                                                          
80 For a general introduction of the historical background of industrial designs law in Malaysia, see for example 
Abdul Jalil J Industrial Designs Law in Malaysia: Cases and Commentary (Petaling Jaya: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 
2004), pp.1- 9.  
81 Act 175, as amended in 1994 and 2000. 
82 For an extensive discussion of the historical background of the trade marks law in Malaysia, see for example 
Kwang T B Trade Mark Law and Practice in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Butterworth Asia, 2001) at Chapter 1. 
83 See Chapter 3 specifically relevant discussion for breach of confidence and nanotechnology on the basis of 
common law approach, judgment and cases from Australia will be treated persuasive. 
84 Dannemann, n.36, at p.401. 
85 Zweigert and Kötz, n.32, at p.41. 
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development as the basis for “transplants” between both systems, suggest that in the future the 
“transplants” could thrive in either way (from UK to Malaysia or Malaysia to UK).  
 
The technique of comparing both similarities and differences is significant as part of an effort to 
improve legal rules which have been recognised as a problem by referring how other systems 
have solved the same problems.86 The technique suggested by Zweigert and Kötz will be 
relevant to this study. In applying the technique in this study, the question is whether IP law 
relevant to nanotechnology creations has been successfully established in the UK; and followed 
by whether, the models law adopted from the UK could potentially work in Malaysia. In 
applying the second questions, all the relevant context of Malaysia should be taken into 
consideration. These two questions are likely to be answered if, as quoted from Dannemann, the  
“unifying legal rules makes sense only if the problems experienced by the legal systems involved 
are at least roughly similar, and unification is more easily justified if the rules in the different 
systems involved produce identical or at least similar results”.
87 
 
Despite these advantages, comparative approach may be criticised, for example the propriety of 
legal transplantation that is, of recommending imposing a law from one country into another. In 
applying and receiving a law from another country, there may occur incidents of less likely to 
consider the differences of culture, social, political and economy context of the receiving 
country.  
 
Despite the difficulties in comparative law, it is nevertheless an importance tool for a better 
development, amendment and modification of the laws. The legal researcher plays a crucial role 
in examining and interpreting the function of the legal rules and principles.88 Furthermore, the 
comparative legal analysis is significant when the law in one country is still new or rather non-
existent, like Malaysia, to adopt the legal rules which has been established in other country, like 
UK particularly in the areas of IP protection for nanotechnology.  
 
1.4 Interview technique 
                                                          
86 Dannemann, n.36, at p.403. 
87 Ibid, at p.402. 
88 According to Palmer all lawyers by nature are comparatists, when they look, differentiate and deduce of the legal 
point, n.31, at p.1. 
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The interviews were combined with other methods of equipping the researcher with important 
technology and upcoming legal issues. A period of literature study and attendance at a 
conference in Leuven89 which reported on the progress of an extensive EU funded programme 
and presented the views of scientific and legal experts for the US and Australia, as well as EU 
member states were undertaken. This combination of approaches enhanced the technical level of 
dialogue during interviews, thus optimising their effectiveness. The combined programme also 
facilitated a critical approach to the content of conferences and interviews (Table 1.1). This 
integrated approach of programme and interviews has worked successfully and interviewees’ 
responses have been valuable to inform legal analysis and recommendations. 
 
Table 1.1: Approach of qualitative methodology 
Schedule 
Activity Date 
Reading the scientific literature, under 
guidance of Prof Emeritus Peter Jones 
Continuing until 2009 
Interview A 3 June 2008 
Interview B 25 September 2008 
Leuven Conference – Nanotechnology 
and the Law: The Legal Nitty-Gritty for 
Nanofoods, Nanocosmetics and 
Nanomedicines 
8 and 9 December 2008 
Interview C 21 April 2009 
Interview D 28 April 2009 
 
1.4.1 Justification for qualitative interviews  
 
From the interviews it was hoped to gain some insight into nanotechnology both under 
Malaysian and UK scientific development and legal jurisdiction as well as to equip the 
                                                          
89 Conference on “Nanotechnology and the Law: The Legal Nitty-Gritty for Nanofoods, Nanocosmetics and 
Nanomedicines”, Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, 8 – 9 December 2008. 
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researcher with the scientific background and identify relevant legal issues of the technology. 
This is particularly important for new subjects because, as Stedward notes interviews may 
provide contemporary data on subjects which have not been thoroughly studied elsewhere or in 
which accessible literatures is still limited.90 It is also a greater informative experience for the 
researcher to be able to observe the attitude of the interviewees to supplying the information 
which could be helpful in order to evaluate the information supplied.91 The interview is flexible 
and encourages the researcher to probe any question or to follow up any questions which are 
relevant to the study or to turn back to the questions which need further clarification. Another 
reason for undertaking interviews was that it may provide the opportunity to motivate the 
interviewee to give accurate and complete information immediately.92 Moreover, the opportunity 
is provided in the interview to guide the interviewee to interpret complex and abstract issues in 
the questions.93  
 
The privilege of the interview however is balanced by certain disadvantages. For example, other 
considerations need to be taken into account, not only the time consumed94 and the higher cost, 
but also the preparation for an interview, obtaining and setting up the interview, writing up the 
transcription and the notes as well as analysis of the content.95 This can also be very difficult 
from one interview to another because of different situations and variables, for example, it all 
depends on the speed of the speech, clarity, pacing, complexity of vocabulary, accents of the 
interviewer or respondents, background knowledge and technical skill.96 In this study, interviews 
were conducted with comparatively few key figures with a view to gaining expert insights into 
the field as well as optimising resources and minimising disadvantages, given the need to 
balance qualitative and doctrinal aspects of the thesis.  
 
1.4.2 The objectives of the interview 
                                                          
90 Stedward G On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing in Burnham P (ed) Surviving the Research Process in 
Politics (London: Printer, 1997) at p.151. At the outset of the research, legal analysis of nanotechnology issues was 
scarce and rather superficial in the published literature. 
91 Gorden R L Interviewing: Strategy, techniques and Tactics 3rd edn (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1980) at p.62. 
92 Ibid, at p.61; in contrast for example to a postal questionnaire. 
93 Ibid, at pp.61-62. 
94 Especially on the transcription of the interview, writing and translation if the interview conducted in a language 
other than English. 
95 Stedward, n.90, at p.152. 
96 Gorden, n.91 at p.223. 
312 
 
 
The use of interviews can be challenging and informative, but acts as a vehicle for bringing the 
research topic to life.97 This type of qualitative research allows for greater expression and 
insights of the information than a self-completion questionnaire98 and other non-face-to-face 
techniques99 because people may talk and present their perspective in their own terms freely. 100 
The same submission espoused by May, that conversations with people on a range of topics 
generate rich insights on issues such as biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, 
attitudes and feelings.101 Thus, the aim of these interviews was to provide some insights for the 
researcher in analysing legal aspects along with confirming and augmenting scientific 
understanding of the technology102. Gorden contends that the purpose of the interview should be 
explained in a manner that the respondent understands because if the explanation is too narrow 
or too vague the respondent may not appreciate or connect the questions with the purpose of the 
interview.103  
 
To make the process of interviewing successful, Harrison emphasises four basic requirements:104 
                                                          
97 Stedward, n.90, at p.151. The interview is referred as a tool of research by way of intentionally learning other’s 
feelings, thoughts and experiences, Rubin H J and Rubin I S Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data 
(London: Sage Publications, 1995) at p.2. 
98 Because no one present to clarify any difficulty to respondents and having no opportunity from respondents to 
elaborate the point asked, see further in Bryman A Social Research Methods 3rd ed (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at pp. 218-
219. Gray D E Doing Research in the Real World (London: SAGE Publications, 2004) states that interview 
approach is favoured where (a) need to acquire high personalized data; (b) having opportunity for probing; (c) a 
highly response rate, at pp.214-215. Bell J Doing Your Research Project: A Guide for First-Time Researchers in 
Education, Health and Social Science 4th edn (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2005) points out that adaptability 
in interview means that “a skilful interviewer can follow up ideas, probe responses and investigate motives and 
feelings, which the questionnaires can never do”, at p.157. 
99 For example survey and observational methods. Jones contrasts qualitative interview and survey interview as less 
structured in their approach and allowing individuals to expand beyond ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses which are more 
common in case of survey interviews, Jones C Qualitative Interviewing in Allan G and Skinner C (ed) Handbook for 
Research Students in the Social Sciences (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2002) at p.203. 
100 Harrison L Political Research: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2001), at pp.74-75. 
101 May T Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001), at p.121. 
Kvale S and Brinkmann S Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing 2nd (London: SAGE, 
2009) regard interview as conversational interest between parties involved whereby the knowledge is created “inter” 
the points of view of both interviewer and interviewee, at p.123. 
102 The researcher spent months in studying the relevant technology, so as to be able to understand the legal issues 
from a technologically informed standpoint and to conduct the interviews with a general understanding of the 
interviewees’ work. 
103 Gorden, n.91, at p.215. The purpose of the interview should be clear and honest, Harrison n.100, at p. 97. 
104 N.100, at pp.96-97. Kvale and Brinkmann argue that there are no fixed criteria for good quality of interview, 
except rests upon the craftsmanship of the interviewer to gain knowledge of the research topic, sensitivity of the 
social relation between the interviewer and interviewee, an epistemological awareness as well as ethical 
consideration in conducting interview, n.101, at pp.174-175. 
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(a) Accessibility – the question on how to gain access to the relevant interviewees; and how 
to control the access through the gatekeepers; 
(b) Objectivity – the ‘closeness’ of the interviewer and interviewee; and the objectivity of the 
language used and phrasing of the question; 
(c) Cognition – the interviewee understands the purpose of the interview and the expected 
information obtained from him/her; and she/he must have access to relevant information; 
(d) Motivation – to value the response from the interviewee and to maintain the interest of 
the interview session; the rules and the language used for the questions asked need to be 
taken into consideration.  
 
Other than the process of the interview itself, similarly the researcher needs to posses certain 
traits to make the interview a successful one. A good example of these traits is set out by Gorden. 
He argues that the interviews need:105 
(a) Flexibility – the interviewer to behave actively when it is called for, and  passively when 
needed to facilitate communication; 
(b) intelligence – allow the interviewer to clearly appreciate the objective of the interview; 
evaluate the information critically and probe the clarity and completeness; and 
(c) emotional security – alleviate the interviewee from anxiety so that one may direct full 
attention to the flow of the response and keep up a good interpersonal relationship.  
 
These criteria favour face-to-face meetings between the researcher and interviewees, on the 
interviewees’ ‘home’ territory, with a set of carefully prepared questions that are comprehensive 
but designed not to ‘lead’ the interviewee to a particular response, with the flexibility to follow 
promising lines of conversation and avoid repetition. 
 
1.4.3 The selection criteria 
 
The sample used in this research partly followed the model of a snowball sample. Bryman states 
that this sample is a “form of convenience sample”.106 The procedure is that the interviewer 
                                                          
105 Kvale and Brinkmann, n.101, at pp.172-173. 
106 Bryman, n.98, at p.184. 
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contacts a small group of people relevant to the research and uses their information to make 
contact with others.107 This study applied the same process by providing the initial interviewee 
with a table-list of scientists and seeking advice as to whether the people in the list were 
appropriate to interview or whether there were others who the initial interviewee thought could 
be a relevant person to interview. This approach led to the second interview. One might perceive 
that there could be a problem using of snowball sample, for example according to Bryman that it 
is very unlikely to be representative of a population.108 However, this may be counteracted in a 
limited way by presenting interviewees with a pre-prepared list selected by reference to area of 
scientific interest.  
 
The first interviewee (A) was identified based on his qualifications and his position in a 
particular nanotechnology department. In this regards, this interviewee was considered as the key 
person to inform the researcher comprehensively because he was able to speak across a full 
range of information. Drawing on the technique of the ‘inverse snowball sample’ advice from the 
first expert interviewed, along with the comprehensive nature of the information received in the 
first interview, informed and enabled the next selection to be made.109 Thus, the second 
interviewee (B) was chosen to represent his position on business and the commercialisation 
dimension of nanotechnology. The first two interviewees were sufficient to meet the objectives 
of the interviews110 and therefore, there was no need to extend the sample further.  
The interviews were also conducted in Malaysia to gain comparative on the scientific 
development and the legal analysis. There were two interviewees chosen in Malaysia. The third 
interviewee (C) was identified based on his own qualification and experience, scientific 
networking as well as likely acquaintance himself with inventions and other forms of IP. His 
institution is a prominent nanotechnology institution and has been identified by the government 
of Malaysia among the established six nanotechnology centres. In parallel, the fourth interviewee 
                                                          
107 Ibid, at p.184. 
108 Ibid, at p.185. 
109 When he has been given a list of the next person, he was not only agreed with the list, but also suggested the 
second interviewee. He also eliminated few names in the list. This is inverse snowball sample. 
110 The reasons for the selection of the first and the second interviewees were because there are departments 
dedicated to nanotechnology and the range of divergent of expertise in the Newcastle University. This is an 
independent valuation of their expertise and standing in a wider community because apart from their being located at 
the University where the researcher is doing her PhD, comparison of their profiles with those of scientists at other 
UK universities suggests that their expertise was the best suited to this research. The easy accessibility to researcher 
also supported the justification for choosing the institution. 
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(D) was also recognised on his distinct position in the institution as well as the training he 
received in nanotechnology related subject matter. Both were associated to contribute on the 
policy consideration for nanotechnology in Malaysia. The four interviewees ultimately chosen 
were considered leading nanotechnology experts and can explain the scientific and legal regime 
for nanotechnology both in Malaysia and UK.  
 
They may be considered as special respondents because according to Gorden, they hold unique 
positions in their organisations which qualify them to give special information which are directly 
relevant to the objective of the study.111 One interviewee, for example, characterised his own 
approach as “top-down” and another interviewee as “bottom-up” approach. This suggests that 
although the very small number of interviewees nonetheless reflects the variety of approach.  
 
1.4.4 The significance role of an expert 
 
Harrison states that “in qualitative research, all interviewees are regarded as ‘experts’, that is, 
they have information in which we as students or researchers are interested”.112 The technique 
of the interview process to be analogous with the role of the scientific expert113 in the courts. 
Prominent scientists are often called as such as those the researcher interviewed. In UK and 
Malaysia, expert witnesses in patent cases help to shape new development in the law by 
informing the courts understanding of new technologies.114 Thus, evidence from technical 
experts is of considerable importance in developing and interpreting IP law. The researcher 
wished to adopt similar standards for the gathering of evidence for the thesis. In this concern, the 
process of the examination-in-chief in the court is perceived relevant in particular the avoidance 
of non-leading questions to the current study. That the court has given great significance to the 
                                                          
111 Gorden, n.91, at, p.136 provides interesting guidelines criteria for selecting respondents - (a) who has the relevant 
information; (b) are they physically and socially accessible to have the information; (c) which persons are the most 
willing to offer the information?; (d) which persons are most able to give an accurate accounting of the 
information?, at pp.146-147.  
112 N.100, at p.98. 
113 An interesting experience in dealing with high technical patent cases and make a concluding remarks that “there 
is no perfect way of going about expert evidence”, Jacob R ‘Court-Appointed Experts v Party Experts: Which is 
Better?’ (2004) C.J.Q. 400, at p.407. 
114 SmithKline Beecham Plc v Apotex Europe Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1568; [2005] F.S.R. 23, at 543. The expert is 
important in patent cases to; (a) explain the technical terms; (b) instruct the court pertaining scientific principles; (c) 
show the scientific knowledge at the time of the grant; (d) explain the nature and characteristics of the invention, 
Malek H M et al. (eds) Phipson on Evidence 16th edn (London: S&M, 2005) at p.1025. 
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role of an expert relates not only to facts, opinions and experiences in the evidence adduced.115 
Their duties and responsibilities have been set out in particular detail in the case law and should 
be widely applicable.116 They should possess relevant qualifications and experience in the 
relevant field of dispute, ability to draw logical opinion from the facts and have the quality to 
view a problem impartially.117 The greater weight should be emphasised in giving their opinion 
independently, unbiased and truthfulness.118 Lord Wilberforce in Whitehouse v Jordan119 upheld 
the role of an independent expert: 
“it is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to be, the 
independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content via the exigencies of 
litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only incorrect but self-
defeating”.
120  
 
Equally, experts may provide valuable assistance to the court by giving a series of seminars in 
the relevant aspects of technology and it has been perceived to be adopted in the future if the 
                                                          
115
 As, in court, judges find the demeanour of witnesses gives a guide to the weight to be given to their evidence. 
The skill and training of the experts enable them to form opinions, to deduce conclusion from the observed facts and 
to identify facts which may be obscured from the eyes of lay witnesses, Malek et al., n.114, Ch 33 at p.972. Where 
the expert opinion is properly adduced, the tribunal may take into consideration of an expert’s qualification, how has 
the expert obtained the qualification, the expert’s credibility and the extent to which his evidence is based, Keane A 
The Modern Law of Evidence 7th ed (Oxford: OUP, 2008). The law has treated experts special sorts of witness 
whose power flowed from his own special knowledge, Jones C A G Expert Witnesses: Science, Medicine, and the 
Practice of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Although the courts have increasingly relied on the scientific and 
expert evidence, the problem might be encountered by the courts on qualifications of experts, probative helpfulness 
of expert evidence, how to weight the novel and contested “scientific” findings and the role of experts in testifying 
the ultimate issue, Anderson T et al Analysis of Evidence 2nd edn (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). Dennis queries whether 
English law should have any specific threshold requirements for the reliability of the expert witnesses. The 
development of experts technique for analysing and interpreting evidence suggests to adopt a pragmatic approach in 
order to make expert witnesses are more reliable in the future, at pp.858-860, Dennis I The Law of Evidence 3rd edn 
(London: S&M, 2007). The higher standard of accuracy and objectivity should be required and seem to be provided 
due to the fact that the evidence of experts carries more weight than ordinary witnesses, Tapper C Cross & Tapper 
on Evidence 11th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2007). For an interesting discussion on the effect of ill-served of expert 
witnesses in the adversarial system of trial see McEwan J Evidence and the Adversarial Process – The Modern Law 
2nd edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998); a good discussion of expert opinion in a monograph see Redmayne M 
Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
116 National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 68. 
117 Mildred R H The Expert Witness (London: Long Group Ltd, 1982), at p.7. Their role as educator to assist party, 
lawyers and judges, see Bond C et al. The Expert Witness in Court: A Practical Guide 2nd edn, Burn S ed (Kent: 
Shaw & Sons, 1999) at p.61. 
118 Holborn C J et al. Health Care Professionals as Witnesses to the Court (London: Greenwich Medical Media Ltd, 
2000), at p.30. 
119 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 246, at 256-257. 
120 This principle has been adopted in The Ikarian Refer [1993) 2 Lloyd’s Reports 68. 
317 
 
technology was “complex and undisputed” and the parties have consented to it.121 If the subject 
matter involved is highly technical, it is important that the expert put forward all relevant 
considerations to the issue to be decided because the court warned of the dangers of an expert 
acting as an advocate or holding back relevant information.122 However, the court should give 
careful consideration not to accept the expert’s personal view, instead of his reasons for that 
view.123 Thus, the reception of such evidence resembles qualitative research techniques. By 
contrast the court tend to be impatient of qualitative or statistical techniques in IP cases for 
example the market survey evidence124 as of little significance because of concerns on the 
technical flaws whilst preparing questions for the interview.125 Put another way, the courts have 
been doubtful as qualitative methodologies and questionnaires. There seems here a clear parallel 
between legal literature of evidence and the research methodology literature.  
 
1.4.5. Semi-structured interview 
 
Bryman has contrasted the interview in qualitative research and quantitative research to the 
effect that qualitative interview is less structured because it emphasises generality in the 
formulation of initial research ideas and interviewees’ perspectives.
126 Bryman further asserts 
that the flexible approach of the qualitative interview allows the interviewers not to stick to one 
particular schedule or guide; that they are free to ask new questions or follow up questions; and 
they may also emphasise in the research result important issues in the course of interview 
because what is important at this stage is that researcher expects rich and detailed answers.127 
                                                          
121 Lord Hope of Craighead in Kirin Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2004] UKHL 46, para 135. 
122 Cantor Fitzgerald International v Tradition (UK) Ltd [2000] R.P.C. 95, at 127. 
123 SmithKline Beecham Plc v Apotex Europe Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1568, at 543. 
124 Usually confined to trademarks and passing-off case. 
125 Lea G ‘Masters of All They Survey? Some Thoughts upon Official Attitudes to Market Survey Evidence in U.K. 
Trade Mark Practice’ (1999) I.P.Q 191 and suggests that the questions should be phrased in clear, simple language 
and elicit only necessary information to the subject matter concerned and if possible to encourage the interviewee to 
actively participate in survey proceedings, at p.225. 
126 Bryman, n.98, at p.437. The general accepted view that there are structured interview and semi structured 
interview. Some may refer to less structured interview or unstructured interview, however, the terms ‘unstructured-
interview’ is misnomer because it is impossible to have completely unstructured interview as it will always have 
structure and the interviewer is still keep control on the process of the interview, Wilson, n.40, at p.98; Salter and 
Mason, n.7, at p.62. Harrison categorises that unstandardised interview as including informal, focused, unstructured 
and free interview, unstructured-interview, n.100, at p.92. 
127 Bryman, n.98, at p.437. 
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Rubin and Rubin have submitted that qualitative interview is distinguished from data collection 
in social and political research because:128 
(a) qualitative interviews are modifications and extensions of ordinary dialogue, 
(b) qualitative interviews are more concerned with the understanding, knowledge and 
insights of the interviewees, 
(c) the content, the flow of the idea and the choices of the topic may change in order to meet 
the interviewee’s knowledge and feeling. 
 
This research employed semi-structured interviews because, as May has pointed out, the 
interviewer is more flexible and freer to probe beyond the acquired answers and consequently 
enter into a very helpful dialogue with the interviewee.129 This category of interview is non-
standardised where the interviewer has prepared a list of issues or questions to be asked, but did 
not necessarily deal with all of them in each interview.130 This interview approach was 
considered imperative because the researcher was interested to know the ‘whys’, the ‘hows’ and 
the ‘whats’ of the respondent’s clarification and elaboration of the response.131  
 
1.4.6 An introductory statement 
Once the interviewees had indicated their willingness to participate132, they were provided with 
an ‘introductory statement’. This was to inform them briefly of the nature and approach of the 
interview and to ask for an appropriate date for the interview.  The introductory statement was 
sent to the interviewee before the interview briefly to sketch out for the interviewee the nature, 
context, and expected result and the topic which will be covered in brief; outline the justification 
of the chosen topic; the selection criteria of the interviewee; the confidentiality issues of the 
                                                          
128 Rubin and Rubin, n.97, at p.6. 
129 May, n.101, at p.123. 
130 Gray, n.98, pp.215-217 and explained that the flexibility may allow the order of questions to be changed or 
adding an additional questions including issues which were not anticipated at the beginning of the interview. 
131 Harrison, n.100, at p.92. 
132 The researcher is grateful for the assistance of her supervisor, Professor Alison Firth who initially sent selected 
potential interviewees emails approaching them for the interview. The emails were to inform the prospective 
interviewees of the purpose of the interview: to discuss on the scientific aspects of the technology and how the 
information obtained from the interview will allow the researcher to focus on her legal analysis of the IPRs for 
nanotechnology. The supervisor attended Newcastle interviews to effect introductions and she remained in 
attendance. This did not seem to affect the successful dynamic of the interviews. The supervisor was given 
opportunity to ask supplementary questions for her own interest and enlightenment but otherwise did not participate 
actively during the interviews. Subsequently she was able to assist with completing the record at one or two points 
where the tape recordings were not completely clear. 
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interview; the research and development of nanotechnology; the possible IPRs for 
nanotechnology.133  
 
Introductory statement explained the emerging status of the technology draws the attention not 
only for being contentious but also the status of legal discussions especially in the context IP, is 
still at the very basic.  For this reason, introductory statement explained that the interviews were 
very significant because they sought to examine the trend and development of the technology 
based on experiences of both Malaysia and the UK. To inform the interviewees attentively, the 
introductory statement gave an overview of the current trend of the research and development of 
nanotechnology including US, Japan and Europe. Moreover, the importance of IP protection was 
explained along the lines of general justification and problematic challenges posed by the current 
state of the law.  
 
1.4.7 During interview 
 
Normally, when the interview started134 the researcher asked interviewees whether in particular 
they have understood, or would need further clarification on anything which was still unclear for 
them in the IS.135 If the answer was affirmative, then the researcher dealt with any issues that 
arose before proceeding to the next step of giving the assurance on the issue of the 
confidentiality of the information given. The researcher gave assurance that the interviewees’ 
names would be kept anonymous unless and until they gave permission to be cited explicitly. 
The interviewees were also given an assurance that the material they provided in the interview 
will be kept confidential until it was included in the thesis. The researcher then sought the 
interviewees’ permission to be tape-recorded during the interview and asked further whether they 
would like to have a copy of the finding of the research from the interview.  
 
                                                          
133 For some tips on good introductory statement see Bryman, n.98, at p.210. 
134 The first few minutes of an interview are important that the interviewer should show interest, understand and 
respect to the subject matter before the interviewee uncover his information and talk freely, Kvale and Brinkmann, 
n.101, at p.128.  
135 For example, interviewee C asked the relevancy the researcher with a legal background interviewing the scientist 
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In approaching136 the interview, the researcher then outlined briefly the topics which to be 
covered in the interview. During the session, there should be strategies for establishing and 
maintaining good relationships between interviewer and interviewee.137 Only then the 
atmosphere of the session becomes more neutral and free. For example, the session with 
interviewee C was conducted in the staff room in an informal setting. Normally the interview 
was conducted with little prompt138 and the researcher should be aware of what is being said and 
be prepared to explore some issues in greater depth.139 In the interview, the researcher skimmed 
through the sub-theme of the questions because with little prompt sometimes the interviewees 
have already covered the information although initially they have not been asked. At the end of 
the session, the researcher asked the interviewees permission to proceed with the transcription. 
The researcher asked all interviewees if they would like to have a copy of the finding of the 
research at the end of the study.    
 
The interviews were very exciting, enriching and enjoyable experiences for not only an excellent 
cooperation during the interview sessions, but for the most important part is that they served the 
main purpose of doing interview. For example one of the interviewees in the Newcastle 
University was very generous with his time and information and he was volunteering to disclose 
very exceptional information in response to the prompting questions. In discussing the concept of 
nanotechnology too, one of the interviewees showed the researcher his invention on rice husk at 
the range of nanoscale, and another interviewee explained his booklet “the law of scale” quite 
extensively. He also kindly shared his experience and views on the technological development in 
Malaysia as well as gave the researcher copies of other documented reports on his institutional 
research and development.  
 
Interestingly, the researcher also found fascinating with the used of certain techniques during the 
interview, for example as suggested by Bryman on the flash cards or show cards.140 This 
technique seemed to work very well especially when the interviewee has been given a choice to 
                                                          
136 There are considerably wide approaches to produce effective materials such as writing it down, or prompting, 
simple key-issues or an aid-memoire, Jones, n.99, at p.204. 
137 Jones, n.99, at p.208. The interviewee is unwilling to answer the question or may possibly cut the interview short 
if the interviewer has little rapport, Gray, n.98, at p.223. 
138 Jones, n.99, at p.205. 
139 Ibid, at p.204. 
140 Bryman, n.98, at p.207, this reasonably works well when the respondent is given a list of possible answers. 
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opt for the three different definition of nanotechnology quoted from the Royal Society and Royal 
Academy of Engineering, UK; the European Patent Office and the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative, US.  
 
At the end of the interview, in order to make to that everything was covered in the interview, the 
researcher asked the question “is there anything we have not covered in this interview that you 
think relevant to my research”. According to Stedward this augments the rich generation of the 
original information.141 This could be a back-up too if the interview has gone astray to 
deliberately balance the good points which have not been covered as well as to take advantage of 
the interviewee’s knowledge.142  
 
After the substantive interview session ended, the researcher thanked the interviewees for 
sharing their thoughts and interesting views and for bringing some helpful knowledge to the 
study. The researcher felt indebted for the time spent and gain fruitful conversation throughout 
the interview session.  
 
1.4.8 The use of tape recording and the transcription of the tape 
 
The researcher was granted permission to use tape-recorder during all the interview sessions. 
Inevitably, this device is helpful because the chance of getting the whole information is minimal 
unless the person is well-versed with shorthand.143 Hence, the interview data in the interview was 
interpreted by verbatim transcription. As Jones emphasise that “ideally interviews are 
transcribed verbatim”.144 One of the interviewees in Malaysia used Malay in the interview and 
the other one partly used English and partly Malay. Both of these interviews were transcribed 
verbatim, translated into English and paraphrasing the essence of relevant information. In view 
                                                          
141 Stedward, n.90, at p.155. This gives interviewee additional opportunity to deal with issues he has been thinking 
or worrying him during the interview session, Kvale and Brinkmann, n.101, at p.129. 
142 Stedward, n.90, at p.158. 
143 Because the quality of the interview sometimes is undermined for deliberately focusing on note-taking rather than 
actually listening to what has been said which of course affect for verbatim text, Harrison, n.100, at p.93. Kvale and 
Brinkmann note that rather than involve a simple clerical task, transcription is considered as an interpretative 
process where series of practical and principal issues arise in transforming oral speech into the written text, n.101, at 
p.177. It also allows the interviewer to concentrate on listening, interpreting and re-focusing the interview, Gray, 
n.98, at p.227. 
144 Jones, n.99, at p.210. 
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of that, the time required for transcription was greater.145 In this study, the shortest time took for 
the interview was approximately 60 minutes, and the longest time took for about 120 minutes. 
Hence, the average time taken for transcription almost 8 to 10 hours of verbatim text for at least 
13-15 long typed pages. Ideally because of its laborious works, it is advisable to transcribe while 
the mind is still fresh with the interview and by reference to the notes taken during the interview 
session.146 However, using the tape recorder may not always be practicable, especially in a noisy 
environment.147 Furthermore, the technical interruption may occur using tape recorder for run 
malfunction, or miss a crucial sentence or respondent who speak very softly.148  
 
1.4.9 Ethical and confidentiality issues 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that in these interviews the ethics of confidentiality149 was given 
utmost importance. In certain situations the confidentiality issue can be really difficult to 
maintain and the reason why the respondents are reluctant to have information published is 
because to a certain extent his position may in some way be identified.150 If this happens, it has 
been suggested that the researcher needs to further mask identity or seek approval for disclosure 
from the interviewee.151 To that effect, the researcher gave reassurance the interviewees names 
will remain anonymous unless permission was given to reveal the information. In this respect, at 
the end of the interview session, the researcher asked each of the interviewees if they would like 
                                                          
145 Harrison, n.100, at p.102. 
146 Ibid, at p.102. In addition to the tape-recording, note taking and transcribing into the text, Stedward suggests 
effective note taking may be in the form of contextual information, for example with the inclusion of the impression, 
observation and expansions of the interview, n.90, at p.161. Ideally, in the qualitative report, the writing style has to 
be rich, convincing and readable, Rubin and Rubin, n.97, at p.268. See also the reflexion on the feminist research in 
interviewing women MPs by Puwar N ‘Reflections on Interviewing Women MPs – Sociological Research Online 
(1997), available online at http://ideas.repec.org/a/sro/srosro /1996-19-1.html , visited on 18 Feb 2009. 
147 Stedward, n.90, at p.152. 
148 Jones, n.99, at p.207 and suggests to back-up with note taking although arguably it will affect eye-contact during 
the session.  
149 More often present in psychological experiments or sociological or social anthropological field, Rees R Ethical 
Issues in Allan G and Skinner C (ed) Handbook for the Research Students in the Social Sciences (London: 
RoutledgeFalmer, 2002) at p.142. The protection involves “secure storage data; restricting access to raw data; 
obtaining permission for subsequent use of data; publication of research findings in a manner that does not allow 
for ready identification of subjects; destruction of raw data” O’Leary Z The Essential Guide to Doing Research 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2007) at p.54. 
150 Gorden, n.91, at p.219. 
151 O’Leary, n149, at p.54. Kvale and Brinkmann argue that in certain situation, for example journalistic interview, 
interviewees might wish to be credited with their full name for the time spent and information provided, n.101, at 
p.73. 
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to approve the transcription of the interview. One interviewee kindly allowed the researcher to 
proceed with the transcription, stating that he would like to have a copy of the findings at a later 
stage. On another occasion the interviewee expected an explicit permission if the information is 
very likely involved confidential information of the institution.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
The doctrinal analysis plays an important role in the development of the legal system. Doctrinal 
research has become the prominent method for the legal research and continues to be a popular 
method among legal researchers. However, it was also subjected to criticism for being too 
theoretical and of no real world application. Thus, as a complement to the doctrinal analysis, the 
comparative legal study is adopted in this thesis. The comparative approach extends not just to 
law, but also to scientific and practical considerations. In this thesis, the contrasting comparison 
of the technological experiences and views of the Malaysian and UK scientists enable the 
researcher to better appreciate the significant interplay of the law and science in the two 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, this comparison provides a focus for the researcher by which the gaps 
in Malaysian law may be identified and analysed.   
 
Although interviews conducted in this study were treated as anecdotal rather than substantive, 
nonetheless they offer a rich analysis and some insights for this thesis. The interviews acquainted 
the researcher with significant technological and legal issues that are helpful in this thesis.   
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APPENDIX 2 
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY AND 
PROPOSED ACTIONS IN MALAYSIA 
 
Table 2.1: Centre of excellence for nanotechnology in Malaysia  
Institute /University Application Funding (RM 
million) 
Institute of Microengineering and Nanoelectronics 
(IMEN), UKM1 
MEMS 38.2 (MOSTE) 
Ibnu Sina Institute for Fundamental 
Science Studies (IIS), UTM2 
Nanochemistry 20 (IDB)3 
11(MOSTE) 
Combinatorial Technology and Catalysis Research 
Centre (COMBICAT), UM4 
Catalysts 15 (MOSTE) 
Glycolipids Research Centre, UM Nanomaterials/Surfactants 11.2 (MOSTE) 
Advanced Materials Research Centre (AMREC), 
SIRIM Berhad 
Nanocomposites Unknown 
School of Physics, USM5 Electronics (Blue LED) 22.5 (MOSTE) 
School of Medical Sciences, USM Molecular Nanotech 2.2 (MOSTE) 
Institute of Advanced Technology (ITMA), UPM6 Electronics, Nanomedicine Unknown 
Source: The SIRIM Report7 
There is also a new institute established called Institute of Nanoelectronics Engineering, in 
UniMaP.8 This has become one of the focused regional centres in nanoelectronics engineering 
for the Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER)9 in the areas of nanobiochips, photonics, 
non-volatile memory devices, novel devices and smart sensors.10 
 
                                                          
1 National University of Malaysia. 
2 Technology University of Malaysia. 
3 Islamic Development Bank. 
4 University of Malaya. 
5 Science University of Malaysia. 
6 Putra University of Malaysia. 
7 Final Report, Research Survey for Implementing Nedo’s International Cooperative Research Project for 
Development Support Projects in Asian Countries (Malaysia) Environmental and Bioprocess Technology 
Centre, (2006) ETC237/16/586 (R045/06) SIRIM Berhad available 
http://www.tech.nedo.go.jp/PDF/100008942.pdf (SIRIM REPORT). 
8 Perlis University of Malaysia. 
9 It is government initiatives to maximize economic potential at the northern regions of Peninsular Malaysia and to 
bridge the economics gap between regions. 
10 Hashim U et al. ‘Nanotechnology Development Status in Malaysia: Industrialisation, Strategy and Practices’ 
(2009) Int. J. Nanoelectronics and Materials 2, No. 1, at p.7. 
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The tables below show the research undertaken in various research groups on given prioritized 
areas. 
Table 2.2: Advanced materials and sensors 
Application Areas Head/Institute Funds 
Metal Industry  Metal Composites AMREC MOSTI 
Chemical industries 
- acrylic acids 
- oleochemicals 
- surfactants 
Catalysts, 
Catalyst support, 
Adsorbent 
COMBICAT, UM MOSTI 
Catalyst 
Adsorbent 
Institut Ibnu Sina, UTM 
MOSTI 
MOHE11 
Nanoelectronics Chemical sensor UTP12 MOSTI 
Source: The MNNI13 
Table 2.3: Electronics and communications 
Applications Areas Head/Institute Funds 
Automotive 
MEMS and 
Microsensors/ 
Organic Electronics 
IMEN UKM, UPM, 
VLSI 
MOSTI 
GMR Electronics AMREC MOSTI 
Blue Light Emitting Devices Electronics USM MOSTI 
Advanced optical crystal for electro-
optic application 
Electronics UTM, UM, UPM MOSTI 
Source: The MNNI14 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Medicine and Health 
Application Areas Head/Institute Funds 
Biopharmaceutical proteins for 
human therapeutics drugs and 
vaccines 
Nanomedicine UPM MOSTI 
Bone graft substitutes   Nanomaterial 
MINT15, SIRIM, 
USM, UKM, UIA16 
MOSTI 
                                                          
11 Ministry of Higher Education. 
12 Petronas Technology University of Malaysia. 
13 http://www.nano.gov.my.   
14 http://www.nano.gov.my.   
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Diagnostic kits for infectious 
diseases 
Nano-device 
Molecular 
Nanotechnology 
USM MOSTI 
Antioxidants in preventing 
degenerative damage in Down 
syndrome and ageing 
Nanomedicine UKM MOSTI 
Vaccine production against 
infectious diseases 
Nanomedicine USM MOSTI 
Oncology: Liver cancer Nanomedicine UM MOSTI 
Diagnostic kit for diabetic 
vasculopathy 
Nanomedicine UM MOSTI 
Antibiotic resistance Nanomedicine 
UM, USM, VRI17, 
MOH18 
MOSTI 
Drug Synthesis Nanomedicine UiTM19 MOSTI 
Source: The MNNI20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 below shows the key actions for nanotechnology that have been proposed for 
Malaysia in the Short Term, Medium Term and Long Term 
Figure 2.1: Key proposed actions for nanotechnology 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 Malaysian Institute of Nuclear Technology Research. 
16 International Islamic University of Malaysia. 
17 Veterinary Research Institute. 
18 Ministry of Health. 
19 MARA Technology University of Malaysia. 
20 http://www.nano.gov.my.  
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Source: The MNNI21 
 
                                                          
21 http://www.nano.gov.my.   
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APPENDIX 3 
THEORY OF PROPERTY 
 
The court in the UK and Malaysia are reluctant to accept proprietary rights in information. 
Furthermore, the implied and equitable obligation for ex-employee may have the potential of 
difficulty for the court to determine the obligation that arises between the parties. Furthermore, in 
the cross-border movements and exchange of ideas and information the proprietary analysis may 
provide a useful ground of protection.  
 
This Appendix 3 examines theory of property by Honoré and to what extent it applies to 
nanotechnology context; discusses the rights, duties, limitation and other elements which form 
part of the standard incidents of ownership.1 He also suggests that an individual must at least 
hold some of these incidents for the rightful ownership, although does not necessarily mean that 
he should hold all of them. A property framework provided by Honoré may be an effective 
method of exploring issues arising from nanotechnology and confidential issue. This theory 
shows that how nanotechnology information might be controlled and used. Since 
nanotechnology involves collaborative research project, this theory of property may be important 
in determining the ownership of nanotechnology information. 
 
The right to possess  
 
According to Honoré, the right to possess means that the person has an exclusive physical 
control over the thing. He divides the legal control into two; (a) the right to be put in exclusive 
control of a thing; (b) the right to remain control. He maintains that the other should not have the 
right without the permission, or unless the laws provide otherwise. The question that relevant 
here whether the parties able to have physical control over the information? The word “exclusive 
physical control over the thing” seems very unlikely to fit well with nanotechnology information. 
This is because it is very unlikely to prove that the person has physical control over the 
confidential information of nanotechnology. Nonetheless, an important element of the case law is 
the efforts made to keep information secret. For example, when the information has been treated 
                                                          
1 Honoré T Making Law Bind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) original version published in Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, Guest A G (ed) (1961) at pp 161-192. 
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with limited access, or put it under locked or key access, or has been encrypted with secret or 
special code, this situation could satisfy the criteria of “right to possess” because unauthorised 
person would not have the right to control over the information. 
 
The right to use  
 
The right to use includes the “use”, “management” and “entitlement to income” which overlap 
with the right to manage and the right to income. He also refers the right to use encompasses 
owner’s personal use and enjoyment of the thing owned. This is likely relevant to 
nanotechnology information because it gives right to the owner to enjoy and use of the 
information.  
 
The right to manage   
 
This right demonstrates how and by whom the thing owned shall be used. The right to manage 
for the use and exploitation according to Honoré may includes for example the right to licence, 
the right to make contract, the right to use of others’ things. In the nanotechnology information, 
this could mean that the owner of the information has the power to determine the terms regarding 
to licence, make contract or use. The existence of know-how licensing suggests that this could be 
satisfied.2 Know-how is used to describe a license of confidential information with some level of 
accuracy i.e. the licensee should be shown the means on how to use the information into 
practicality.3 This is because simply disclosing the information does not make the licensee to 
make effective use of the information.4 Thus, in nanotechnology, the licensee should be shown 
the practicality of the information for example by exhibiting that the properties behave 
differently at nanoscale.  
 
 
 
The right to income  
                                                          
2 See 3.2. 
3 Hull J ‘Trade Secret Licensing: The Art of the Possible’ (2009) J.I.P.L.P, Vol.4, No.3, 203, at p.206. 
4 Ibid, at p.206. 
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The income is derived from the use of a thing. Honoré refers this right as surrogate of use; where 
allowing other to use the thing in return for a reward. With regards to nanotechnology 
information, this occurs when the owner allows other persons to use the information. In return, 
the owner would receive a kind of reward, for example in term of the money or any commercial 
investment for example as in Douglas v Hello!5 where commercial interest of photographic 
images of a celebrity wedding were recognised by the court.  
 
The right to capital  
 
According to Honoré this right is having an economic aspects consists the most important right - 
the power to alienate; and the liberty to consume, waste and destroy either whole or part of a 
thing. The person can exercise the right during his life or on his death by way of sale, mortgage, 
gift or other mode. In nanotechnology information, the person may choose to publish the 
information, thereby destroying confidentiality, or may choose to keep it secret thereby to accord 
the protection.  
 
The right to security  
 
The right of the owner to remain in the position of his property and entitle for adequate 
compensation for any expropriation made. In other words, without adequate compensation, the 
owner will not be forced to give up his property. This right may not be applicable to 
nanotechnology information, because any expropriation will make the information available and 
lose its confidentiality. However, the question may arise here, whether the owner of the 
information has to be forced for the disclosure, such as for the interest of the public? This means 
that if it is proved that the information has considerably affected the interest of the public; the 
owner of the information will not have the right to secure his information.  
 
 
The rights of transmissibility  
                                                          
5 [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2007] UKHL 21. 
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This right is described as the owner of having interest in transferring his ownership to another 
person by of giving them away, through its sale or at the owner’s death through a will to 
successors. In nanotechnology information, it has been argued that the information may involve 
by more than one person and this would rather difficult to maintain the secrecy once the 
information has been transmitted to another person, by giving it away, or by sale or upon the 
death of the owner. The information can be transmitted, but it is difficult to “alienate” in the 
sense of original holder losing knowledge of it.  
 
The incident of absence of term  
 
The right is given to the owner to enjoy the right for indeterminate of time without appearing 
some contingencies such as bankruptcy, sale in execution or state expropriation. For this, the 
owner has indeterminate duration of ownership to enjoy his right without unjustifiable reasons 
regarding his right over his property. This right may be applicable to nanotechnology 
information if the information has been kept secret for indeterminate of time. But the problem 
may arise in nanotechnology as multidiscipline and a lot of people involved and is very difficult 
to maintain the confidentiality as some people may disclose the information.    
 
The duty to prevent harm  
 
This is the duty of the owner not to use the thing owned that may harm others and duty to 
prevent other from using to harm other members of society. This right may be relevant to 
nanotechnology information on the basis that the owner of the information does not have the 
right to use the information that harms others. For example, the use of nanotechnology 
information should be prevented if it is believed that it can violate or risk the environment.  
 
 
 
 
The liability of execution  
332 
 
 
The right concerns with the liability of the owner’s interest in their debts either can be taken 
away by execution for a judgement debtor or insolvency. Their property may be liable to be 
seized for the payment of the debt. This is unlikely to be relevant to the discussion for 
confidential information generally or in the nanotechnology context. 
 
The incident of residuary character 
 
The ownership of the property may be expired or abandoned, and in certain circumstances the 
other person will have the corresponding right of the property. In relation to nanotechnology 
information, information abandoned in the sense of lost; nobody is capable of possessing the 
right. If confidential information is abandoned, i.e. the information made available to the public, 
third party cannot claim for breach of confidence.  
 
The adaptability of Honoré’s theory shows that the rights, duties and other elements are required 
to give account on ownership are indeed may be applicable to nanotechnology information. This 
theory shows that nanotechnology information may be considered as property  in the sense of 
controlling and using as well as determining the ownership of the information. For example, in 
case of ex-employee who wishes to move to another company, the theory can protect the 
information if the implied or equitable obligation are not able to solve the issues. Furthermore, in 
the cross-border transmission and exchanging of information and ideas, this theory may be 
helpful to protect the flow of the information. Thus, if the court moves to characterise the 
information, although it is not much hope in the UK, the court in Malaysia might be influenced 
by the decision in the Hong Kong’s court,6 to take the proprietary lead will be sound. 
                                                          
6 In Linda Chih Ling Koo, John Ho Huang Chiu v Lam Tai Hing where the Hong Kong’s Court took the view that 
confidential in university researchers’ questionnaires could be protected as proprietary analysis. In this case Bokhari 
J considered that proprietary rights can be used to restrain the use of confidential information, and concluded that “a 
man’s entitlement to keep his confidential information confidential, and to recover compensation of such 
information is misused, is not confined to what can be achieved under contract or through the intervention of equity 
where the information was imparted trusting the recipient to keep the same confidential. There is a proprietary 
interest in confidential information; and there is jurisdiction in the Courts to intervene to preserve such interest or 
award compensation for harm done to it.” (1993) 23 I.P.R. 607, at 632. See comment on this case, Hull J 
‘Proprietary Rights in Questionnaires: An Academic Question in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal’ (1994) E.I.P.R. 
104; see also Loh E ‘Intellectual Property: Breach of Confidence?’ (1995) E.I.P.R. 405. 
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Nevertheless, this may not be possible to achieve in the near future since both jurisdictions, 
Malaysia and UK have reluctance to accept the stance of proprietary analysis of the information. 
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APPENDIX 4 
THE EUROPENA PATENT OFFICE NANOTECHNOLOGY 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
Table 4: 1 The EPO nanotechnology classification  
Code New Code Class/Fields Example 
Y01N2 B82Y5 Nanobiotechnology *Nanocapsules as carrier systems for 
therapy and pharmaceutical 
treatment 
*Biomolecular motors  
*Molecular arrangements for 
biocatalysts 
*Pre-targeting with peptides or 
antibodies 
*Host-guest complexes in targeted 
drugs 
*Ultrasound imaging or radioactive 
pharmaceutical preparations 
Y01N4 B82Y10 Nanotechnology for 
information processing, 
storage and transmission 
*DNA computing 
*Quantum computing 
*Single electron logic 
*Nanotube displays 
*Biomolecules for electronics and 
data storage 
*Read heads with nm precision 
Y01N6 B82Y30 Nanotechnology for materials 
and surface science 
*Nanoparticles, nanocomposites, 
dendrimers, nanotubes and 
fullerenes 
*Supramolecular systems 
*Ultrathin functional films 
*Self assembling monolayers (SAM) 
*Hydrogen storage in nanostructured 
materials 
Y01N8 B82Y15 Nanotechnology for 
interacting, sensing or 
actuating 
*Measurement of physical, 
chemical, biological properties at 
surfaces with nm-resolution 
*Measurement of interfaces with 
lateral resolutions in the nm-range  
*Normalisation routines for 
nanoanalytics 
*Measurements of size distribution 
of nanoparticles 
*Tools for ultraprecision 
engineering like Scanning Probe 
Microscopes 
Use of quantum dot labels for 
analysis biological material 
Y01N10 B82Y20 Nanooptics *Optical quantum well structures 
*Photonic crystals 
*Quantum optics 
*Optical surfaces with nm surface 
precision 
Y01N12 B82Y25 Nanomagnetics *Low dimensional magnetism 
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*XMR technologies such as 
magnetoimpedance, anisotropic 
magnetoresistance, giant 
magnetoresistance, tunnelling 
magnetoresistance 
 B82Y35 Methods or apparatus for 
measurement or analysis for 
nanostructures 
 
 B82Y40 Manufacture or treatment of 
nanostructures 
 
 
Source: Scheu M et al., at p.207; and the EPO1 
 
                                                          
1 Available at http://www.epo.org/topics/issues/nanotechnology.html 
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APPENDIX 5 
INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
 
5.1  How to define nanotechnology? 
For this question, one of the interviewees expressed the view that to define nanotechnology is 
not difficult for scientists because they are the ones who work in this field. Two of the 
interviewees defined nanotechnology as the ability to manipulate things at the scale of 1nm to 
100nm, and at this scale there is sudden change of the properties with different characteristics 
such as strength and chemical reactivity.  
5.2  What is the effect of sudden change of properties from macro-scale to nano-
scale? 
All of the interviewees agreed that the effect of sudden change of the quantum effect would 
bring the properties to behave differently. According to them, many properties can be 
exploited at this scale with new particles, different structure and a lot of opportunity. The 
opportunity would also give advantage to develop novel products, different functionality, 
accessible new areas, manipulating new areas and new process.  
5.3 What are areas of interest in nanotechnology (in general)? 
For this question, all of the interviewees viewed the important areas in nanotechnology being 
medical applications. One of the interviewees gave as an example sensory device in detecting 
molecules in the blood or detecting diseases that quickly bring the result as compared to the 
normal diagnosis system, and drug delivery system. The other two interviewees gave the 
example of developing nanomachine called “nano-bot” that manages to go through the blood 
and detect the cell system, for example cancerous cells. Other examples given by the 
interviewees were analysis of the DNA by developing a lab-on-chip system, as well as the 
application for agricultural, environmental and clean energy.  
Three of the interviewees agreed that other than medical application, nanotechnology is also 
important in consumer products such as nano-cream that helps skin cell preventing from acne 
and scars, or the using of titanium oxide in compact powder. One of the interviewees viewed 
upcoming areas of interest in nanotechnology as the micro-system business areas, in 
particular contract of manufacturing; defences application and electronic systems.  
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5.4 What are their personal areas of interest? 
The personal interests of the interviewees were different. One of them is involved in nano-
electronics, another involved in the business type of contract of manufacturing, one involved 
in chemistry working on the zeolite, and aerogel using rice husk at the range of 1 to 100nm.  
One of the interviewees works in photonics and bio-mimetic (the technology that mimics 
nature). 
5.5  Is nanotechnology new? 
Two of the interviewees pointed out that nanotechnology are not new because it has been 
around us for many years, for example clay involving nano-composites was used during 
Greek period and the Egyptians preserved the dead people using nanotechnology. But one of 
the interviewees agreed that it is new now in the way we understand the technology and this 
technology is expected to mature in the next 100 years. They all agreed that it is only recently 
that nanotechnology has been actively explored.  
5.6 What is the nature of nanotechnology?  
All of the interviewees agreed that nanotechnology is not a single or focused discipline as 
compared to other disciplines. They mentioned that because of the different areas involved in 
nanotechnology it might engage people to work collaboratively and across disciplines 
including persons from medicine, science and engineering. One interviewee mentioned that 
nanotechnology not only involved people from technical and engineering aspects, but should 
also involve persons from legal, religious and social sciences fields. Another interviewee had 
a similar view by stating that nanotechnology is different from other technology because it 
integrated between sciences and its application and people involved are have different 
background and they must work in a team. 
5.7 Are there any safety, environment and health (SEH) issue that nanotechnology 
could pose? 
One interviewee mentioned that the ethical and environmental issues are likely to occur in the 
chemistry field, for example the use of nano-particles in sunscreen and other beauty and 
cosmetic treatment, on the issue whether they have toxicological effect. The same 
interviewee has also queried whether nano-particles would have the similar effects like 
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asbestos. The same interviewee also doubted whether it is ethical to the use the materials until 
the effects are known or whether the precautionary principle should be adopted. However, 
according to this interviewee there is less concern of SEH in medical technology and nano-
electronics. The interviewee doubted whether currently there is any toxicological effect of 
nanotechnology to the environment and mentioned that the UK government are working hard 
on this issue. The interviewee suggested that there should be a serious study on chemical 
engineering to see whether there was any nanotechnology risk in that area. 
 One of the interviewees pointed out that with the effect of quantum mechanics, where there 
are sudden changes of properties; nanotechnology behaves differently with different function, 
effect and properties. He stated that it is unlikely that they would be informed about 
something which is unsettled like nanotechnology on its health and environmental issue. One 
of the interviewee also stated that there is likely more concern with the danger of nanoparticle 
especially when inhaled to the body in terms of its health and safety. For that reason, 
according to him, there are people who study nano-safety. One of the interviewees stated that 
whether nanotechnology is dangerous depends upon how it is handles. Therefore, according 
to this interviewee people are intimidated by nanotechnology and fear the term “nano-bot” 
that could have the dangerous effect. However, he expressed that nano-bot is just DNA 
molecule acting as a robot that can go through the body, for example in detecting some 
disease. 
 
5.8 Are there any activities or steps taken to minimise the potential risk posed by 
nanotechnology? 
In prompting this issue, one of the interviewees stated that in two or three years time the 
environmental toxicological data at nanoscale should be recognised. He added that there is 
activity for the engagement of the public such as works done by the Policy, Ethics and Life 
Science Centre (PEALS). The other activities made, as one of the interviewees mentioned 
was that through conferences, seminars and workshops on nanotechnology. One of the 
interviewees mentioned a company which had written in its Annual Report on the impact of 
nanotechnology particularly in the industrial sectors and predicted the applications of 
nanotechnology on the consumer products. 
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5.9 What are the trends and development of nanotechnology? 
One of the interviewees stated that he was involved in the contract of manufacturing for 
process development, i.e. to do things that incorporated new development process. Therefore, 
as he commented further, there are a lot of collaborations with the industry and joint fund 
with the government agency. One of the interviewees suspected and hoped that there should 
be a nanotechnology policy for Malaysia in the future and currently Malaysia is the member 
of the Asia Pacific Nano Forum (APNF) to form a nanotechnology working committee. One 
of the interviewees regarded nanotechnology as the “technology in the 21st century” and 
stated Malaysia should identify the niche areas that researchers can participate to do research. 
Another interviewee stated that the niche areas that Malaysia needed to identify must be the 
areas that other countries have not explored yet. He opined that this is a good opportunity for 
Malaysia and would bring advantages for Malaysia. 
5.10 What are the intellectual property rights that are relevant to nanotechnology?  
Two of the interviewees viewed patent as the most relevant for protecting nanotechnology, 
one of the interviewees agreed that all forms IP protection are relevant for protecting 
nanotechnology, one interviewee mentioned that the most IP best timing for nanotechnology 
is non-disclosure in the contract of manufacturing. In other words, he involved in maintaining 
of the confidential information by way of non-disclosure agreement between customers. 
Another interviewee agreed where he stated that the post-graduate students will be required 
to sign the non-disclosure agreement to make sure that all information relevant to the research 
conducted are being kept in confidence and not flowing out from the university. He warned 
that whenever someone has good information about something, based on his own personal 
experience, the information should not be disclosed to anyone. This is because the 
information might have some value which is worth IP protection. Two interviewees 
mentioned that trade marks in particular are relevant, for example concerning the shape of 
carbon nanotubes and the used of the word “nano”.  
5.11 Whether the current IP system is sufficient protection for nanotechnology? 
One of the interviewees held the view that some element of nanotechnology related to 
intellectual property can be tackled using the existing framework, and some of the elements 
are challenged by the existing system. He analogised to the semiconductor industry (for 
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example in Texas Instrument), because at the beginning of technology patent protection was 
not regarded as important until the technology matured. One of the interviewees held the 
view that nanotechnology has to fit to the existing regulation, because new technology has to 
cope with the existing regulation, and that it is undesirable to have specific regulation for 
nanotechnology. 
 
5.12 To what extent is the current IP system sufficient to address the issues related to 
nanotechnology? 
For this question, one of the interviewees mentioned the challenge of the different size of 
nanotechnology could bring. He gave the example of metal alloy at the macro scale with the 
range at centimetre level; he queried whether metal alloy at nano-scale can be patented again? 
He understood that the matter is still not fully settled, and according to him this is the big 
issue and important to consider i.e the length scale from macro to nano scale is relevant, and 
it could be argued also that there is no important different between the two scales. He also 
queried whether it can be patented or not when the only difference is in size? He stated that 
since a lot of investment is needed to develop products at nano level, if the patent is not 
allowed, the useful technology might be inhibited (because the function of patent is 
promoting innovation and creating incentive). Thus, according to this interviewee, many 
companies may close down and the product would never reach the market.  
Another interviewee made the point that it will always be a guess as to whether the current IP 
system is sufficient or not... He expressed the view that whenever new technology emerged, 
there would be a lack of experts at the patent office in accessing the documents. Thus, 
according to this interviewee, this could affect whether or not the patent is broadly granted.  
He further stated that as the new technology progresses to the application, the early patent 
will lose its value. This is because according to him generally a lot of time required to 
develop new invention. He gave the example in software industry on how to write the code 
using microscope and in genetic patent on the issue whether the discovery in genetics could 
patented? He however expressed doubts as to whether these issues are fundamental to 
nanotechnology.  
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When prompted with this issue, one of the interviewees pointed out that the patent examiners 
need to have the expertise so that whenever application is made they have the ability to 
distinguish whether the product is novel or not, and not simply to reject any application that 
looks similar between macro-scale products and nano-scale products, for example his product 
on nano-membrane was rejected because it was stated that it was not new. He also mentioned 
that in term of nanotechnology standardization, he expected that Malaysia will adopt the 
standard for nanotechnology under ISO TTC/299.1 This matter of adoption of standardisation 
is still under discussion in Malaysia. According to this interviewee standardization is very 
important for nanotechnology especially in term of the size, particle and safety.  
As to the word “nano” one of the interviewees held the viewed that nowadays the word 
“nano” is very popular and everyone is rushing to put the word “nano” in their products. He 
suggested that if the word “nano” is to be used, it has to make sure that the “nano” 
enhancement has been put in the products. This is because, people are simply put nano word, 
for example in cosmetic for example “Nano Silver”. The interviewee gave the example of  
Taiwan which has already introduced the “Nano Mark” to control the use of “nano” word, 
that if the word “nano” is to be used, the product needs to go a testing in order to make sure 
that it actually contains nanotechnology. He suggested that this could be adopted by the 
Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM)2 for nanomaterials testing 
and measurement. The popular use of the word “nano” was also an issue raised by another 
interviewee. The other interesting issue relevant to trade marks mentioned by one of the 
interviewees was  the shape of carbon nanotubes either in single-walled, double-walled and 
multi-walled, and current law was sufficient to address the issue. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This is standard for classification, terminology and nomenclature; metrology and instrumentation; science-
based health; safety and environmental practices; and nanotechnology products and processes,  see more at 
Hatto P ISO/TC 229 – Nanotechnologies, ISO Committee Chairs Conference, Geneva, 5 June 2008, available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/search.htm?qt=ISO%2FTC+229&searchSubmit=Search&sort=rele&type=simple&publis
hed=on; see also at http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=381983; 
http://www.who.int/ifcs/documents/forums/forum6/ppt_nano_hatto.pdf accessed on 22 February 2010. 
2 Especially relevant for nanotechnology may be providing technical standard and quality, and certification, 
inspection and testing for nanotechnology, see generally at http://www.sirim.my/web/core.  
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5.13 How did they compare nanotechnology with previous technology? 
One of the interviewees analogised nanotechnology with the semiconductor chip industry. 
According to him, at the early time, as happened to Texas Instruments, patents were not very 
popular until the technology matured. During this time, companies were not worried to patent 
their products, and they would wait until the technology matured. One of the interviewees 
stated that naturally biotechnology is nanotechnology because of the working on DNA. 
According to him, it has been predicted that after biotechnology there would be 
nanotechnology and there is strong relationship between nanotechnology and biotechnology 
for example as in biosensors, genomic and proteomic. Another interviewee agreed that 
biotechnology is part of nanotechnology. 
 
5.14 Does nanotechnology enjoy strong commercialisation? 
Two of the interviewees viewed that in Malaysia nanotechnology does not enjoy strong 
commercialisation because commercialisation is still low in Malaysia. The area which has 
enjoyed some commercialisation is in nanoparticle, but this does not yet apply in the high 
technology. One of the interviewees pointed out that his department has enjoyed a lot of 
commercialisation in nanotechnology; has developed and considered his department as 
commercialisation organised system.  
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APPENDIX 6 
QUESTION FOR INTERVIEW 
 
QUESTION 1: Interview subject information  
This section is to learn about the expert (warm-up questions). This section represents the general 
question including interviewee’s background, their qualification (training or experiences), their 
divergent of disciplines, the role play and their responsibilities.  
1a.  What is your title? 
1b.  How long have you been in this current position?  
1c.  Would you like to tell me something about your work and your responsibilities? (Please 
comment on how far your responsibilities extended throughout the organisation) 
1d.   How did you qualify? Did you qualify by training or by experiences?  
1e. What is your areas of interest? (omit if already answer under 1c) 
 
QUESTION 2: Organisation’s information 
This section is to learn more of the organisation in investigating the different disciplines involve 
in the organisation. The goal is to identify research conducted in various areas of nanotechnology 
with specific expertise. This will determine/indicate the specific and forthcoming areas of 
interest in nanotechnology at the organisation.   
2a. Would you like to tell me something about your organisation’s works?  
2b. What different types of nanotechnology does your organisation works with? 
2c. Which areas would you say are the most important areas of nanotechnology in your 
organisation? 
2d. What would be the forthcoming areas of interest of nanotechnology in your organisation 
or other spheres that you know? (for example Malaysia)? 
2e. Why do you think the trends of discipline have evolved in such a way? (the underlying 
factors)? 
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QUESTION 3: Defining nanotechnology  
This section examines the effect between classical and quantum physics at the nanoscale. This is 
to understand how nanoscale structures behave differently as compared to the macro-scale.  
 
3a. How do you explain the effect of sudden changes that have novel properties and 
functions at nanoscale is different at macro scale level? (the large surface area to volume 
ratio at the nanoscale leads to chemical reaction, where the law of physics change to 
quantum effects) 
 
QUESTION 4: Own perception of the technology 
This section is to get interviewee own perception on the impact of nanotechnology. This is to 
identify the key benefits of nanotechnology and potential problems of nanotechnology could 
pose. 
4a. What is the impact of nanotechnology in general? 
4b. What do you think the beneficial impact of your own area of technology? 
4c. Is there any potential problem of your own area of technology? 
 
QUESTION 5: Risks to Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) 
The section is to identify the potential risks that nanotechnology could pose to HSE. This uses as 
an indication of what is happening in the field and which might be useful of patent refusal on the 
ground of public order.  
5a. Do you think that nanotechnology could pose any risk to human health, safety and 
environment? (this question is conditional upon Question 4.c) 
 Follow up: Whether the risk poses to your own areas or as a whole? 
 Follow up: If the answer in 5a is NO, then ask any dangers that nanoparticles/artefacts 
could cause diseases like mesothelioma as in asbestos case. 
5b. Are there any programs or activities initiated to anticipate the matters so far? 
 Follow up: Would you suggest any programs or activities relevant to that? 
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QUESTION 6: Trends and development of nanotechnology 
This section is to get the view of the trends and development of nanotechnology. The 
interviewees may provide with any statistical data, funding sources, projects under 
development/already developed, publications and research and development (R&D)  
 
6a. What are the trends and development of nanotechnology at your organisation? 
6b. What relevant scientific research at your organisation most significant to date? 
6c. What types of research needs might be relevant to your organisation? (this may include 
the equipment and tools necessary to conduct the research in the technology) 
6d.  Does your organisation receives any funding from national and international 
organisation? (this includes the funding from the government and the industrial sectors) 
6e. Does your organisation have strong collaboration with government and industry? 
 
QUESTION 7: Legal regime for nanotechnology 
This section examines whether the interviewees have any experience in IP system. This section 
asks whether to have specific legal regime for nanotechnology or otherwise.  
7a. Do you have any personal experience in dealing with IP system? (for example as patent 
examiner or as an expert to give evidence in litigation) 
7b. (if the answer is YES in 7a)... Do you think that current IP system is sufficient to govern 
the issues relating to this technology? (then go to Question 7d) 
 Follow up: Do you think that the research exemption enforcement is adequate? 
7c. (If the answer is NO in 7a)... Then ask whether regulation related to environment and IP 
are relevant to nanotechnology? (then go to Question 7e) 
7d. What are other types of regulation which could possibly be applicable to 
nanotechnology? 
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7e. How do you compare nanotechnology and other technology that preceded it for 
example... 
(a) Biotechnology 
 
(b) Semiconductor chips 
 
QUESTION 8: Commercialisation of nanotechnology 
This section is to know the practices of commercialisation aspect (strong or otherwise) at 
interviewee’s organisation. 
 
9a. Do you think that your organisation enjoys strong commercialisation of nanotechnology? 
9b. What problems does commercialisation of nanotechnology raise? (note whether 
interviewee aware of the copyright research exception) 
 
QUESTION 9: The closing questions 
10a. Is there anything we have not covered in this interview that you think that relevant to my 
research/survey? 
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APPENDIX 7 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT OF THE INTERVIEW 
 
My name is Norain Ismail, having law background, and currently a PhD student at the 
Newcastle law school. My research concerns with the intellectual property rights over 
nanotechnology. The topic draws my attention because being an emerging status of 
technology it involves contentious issues and yet the discussion is still on the basic legal 
aspects of the law. The aim of my research is to assess the scope and development of 
nanotechnology in different selected legal jurisdiction and how it can be applicable to 
Malaysian context. In other words, the central idea of my research is to propose a legal 
framework to nanotechnology in Malaysia based on the approaches and experiences from 
other legal jurisdiction.  
I am working at the university which encourage the staff to acquire knowledge relevant to the 
niche area of the university. This is in line with the university aspiration to become the world 
leading innovative and creative technical university. This conforms to the national aspiration 
to produce highly competent professionals. I believe undertaking of this research will 
enhance further contribution especially in the legal aspects of engineering and technology. 
Nanotechnology is believed to have diverse effect and wide range application to human life. 
Worldwide research and development (R&D) has allocated a large sum to the technology 
investment. For example, a number of patent applications have increased, where United 
States takes a leading role, followed by Japan and Europe. Consulting literatures through 
European Patent Office website, suggests that by 2004, about EUR8 billion was devoted in 
nanotechnology Research and development (R&D) worldwide. Accordingly, by the year 
2015, nanotechnology is expected to reach market amounted EUR1 trillion. Realising of the 
future importance of this technology, European Commission finances nanotechnology 
projects with approximately EUR500 million a year, which is likely to double over the next 
decade or two.1 
Many view that intellectual property plays a vital role in protecting the new emerging 
technology like nanotechnology. The current state of intellectual property law will be tested 
for example involving the invention at the atomic and molecular scale. The inherent unique 
                                                          
 
1 Available at http://www.epo.org/topics/issues/nanotechnology.html 
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characteristics will eventually create a challenge in determining the right and possible legal 
avenue for nanotechnology. There are discussion concerning the comparative study relating 
to nanotechnology among Trilateral Offices members of the United States Patent and 
Trademarks Office (USPTO), EPO and Japanese Patent Office (JPO), at the 24th Trilateral 
Conference, Tokyo, 17 November 2006, which attested a comparative study concerning 
examination practices and exchange for information about the definition and classification in 
the field of nanotechnology.2  
This interview will be conducted among the selected expert scientist. The experts are 
important because they represent a different scientific background across the range of 
disciplines (the expert is in line with the admissibility of expert opinion in the court). The 
experts are hoped to assist in identifying sources of information, and they are expected to 
give relevant weight of question of fact, opinion, experience and perception on the 
technology. In so doing, this interview hopes to learn the divergent discipline, the role play 
and the responsibilities of an expert; the interest and forthcoming interest of the technology as 
well as the trends of nanotechnology; the potential impact of nanotechnology and possible 
legal regime to nanotechnology. The selection criteria of those scientists are based on 
multidisciplinary in nature, patent listed, no overlapping publication, science and 
international networking.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Available at http://www.trilateral.net/conf_sum/2006.pdf 
 
